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Abstract
China’s dramatically increasing economic development has established a major presence in
the global market since the commencement of its ‘Open Door’ policy in December 1978.
An important result of this policy’s implementation was the involvement of foreign direct
investment in China’s economic reform. Undoubtedly, foreign investors have begun to play
a significant role in the course of China’s economic development. However, foreign
investors in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) must deal with a different legal
environment to that of their home country and find that the law is different both in
appearance and in practice. In this research social and legal issues relating to foreign
investors operating in China are used as a starting point to identify the nature and
development of the PRC legal system. From a historical and cultural point of view, the
reasons for those issues are explored. The study reveals that a feudal political system and
the dominance of Confucian culture in China have had a significant effect on the Chinese
legal system. The different implications for the concepts of law, and its standing in society
are the effects of these factors on the application of law. To comprehend the PRC legal
system for foreign investors doing business in China, it will be suggested that it is
important to understand Chinese history and culture originating in the particular region.
The social standing of law and the nature of its enforcement in practice reflect the PRC
legal culture.
This thesis begins with issues affecting foreign investors operating in China,
accompanied by an analysis of the influence of historical and cultural factors, such as
political power and Confucian concepts of law in society. It reveals an important interaction
between law and culture affecting the Chinese legal system today. The research includes a

survey illustrating how foreign-investment enterprises in the PRC are dealing with the
shock of a different legal system and caused by cross-cultural phenomena. Even though
legal reform has been undertaken in developing a legal system in China, clearly it is the
attitude towards law that has been a primary tool for facilitation of a utilitarian reception of
foreign legal institutions. A survey referring to these issues for existing foreign investors
has been conducted and the results analysed to explore the relations between cultural and
social factors and the development of the legal system in China. It illustrates the interaction
between law and culture in the evolution of China’s history. It reveals that is important to
have a rational and practical attitude to law in China involving an understanding of the
effects of Confucian culture and legalism on the legal system in the course of its evolution.
This is a vital ingredient not only for an entry strategy for foreign investment but also for
continued operations in China.
These issues have illustrated the fact that the function and standing of law are uncertain
as a result of different needs of development. This can be traced to Chinese history and the
acknowledgement of the place of law in society.
The Chinese legal tradition developed from both Confucianism (with its emphasis
upon morality) and Legalism (which emphasised the rule of law), and the legal system is
characterised by the influence of these two influential and adversarial schools of thought.
The Confucian ideology provided the fundamentals for the substance of traditional law and
the Legalist school constructed the important framework of the traditional legal system.
Although the legalist school and Confucianism were adversarial philosophies in terms of
their political ideologies of how Chinese society should be ruled, they certainly shared
some important ideas, such as the emperor’s power over all facets of life, including law.
However, Chinese imperial law bears a strong Confucian moral character. Confucian
-ii-

morality and imperial law were two parallel behavioural codes that combined to order
social conduct in Chinese society.
The features of law in a society and at a particular historical stage are shaped not only
by the prevailing environment but also by the cultural heritage of that society, even though
the role of culture and tradition in shaping the law may be muted, implicit and even
unconscious. The emphasis on the emperor’s superior power under the teaching of
Confucius is a major tradition in political power in China. A good government is based on
virtue and morality but not by law. Certain fundamental features of the traditional legal
culture clearly persist in the contemporary legal system and social attitudes towards law.
Thus, a legal system must be assessed within its historical and cultural context.
This research examines how law in China is created in the light of cultural and
historical dimensions. The patriarchal relationship and behavioural norms within the
extended family or clan were not only reflected in the power structure of officialdom but
also formed the basic foundation and standards for social conformity. Foreign investor
operations in China must meet the challenge posed by differences in legal culture and
tradition because they will continue to significantly influence the future shaping of the PRC
legal system.
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
1.1

Introduction

Law as a discipline is concerned with elaboration of the practical art of government
through rules.1 Also, law embodies important cultural assumptions which constitute a
central aspect of its influence in society.2 Law’s relationship with social conditions is a
significant element in any study of perceived problems in the application of laws.

In the case of China, its social and economic conditions have been rapidly
changing in the last 30 years as a result of the commencement of economic reforms.3
Since 1978, China has consistently pursued what has been termed an ‘Open Door’ 4
policy to international trade and investment. This chapter introduces the environment
existing in China in the late 1970s and the decision-making that set China on a new path
that would see it grow into one of the largest of the world’s economies.

In this chapter, section 1.1 introduces the subject area of the research. It includes
an outline of the remaining 9 chapters of the study and discusses the policy changes that
began China’s massive drive towards becoming a sophisticated world economic power.
Section 1.2 indicates the aims, objectives and intended contribution of this research
1

Roger Cotterell, The Sociology of Law: An Introduction (Butterworths, 1984) 5.
Ibid 26.
3
At the Third Full Meeting of the Central Committee of the Eleventh Term of the China Communist
Party in December 1978, the Four Modernisations (agriculture, industry, defence, and science and
technology) were added to the Revised Rules and New Constitution of the Communist Party. To achieve
these modernisations, China engaged in economic reform centred on the introduction of an open market
economy.
4
The report on the Third Full Meeting states that its purpose, which is founded on a philosophy of selfreliance, is to actively seek to develop mutually beneficial economic cooperation with other world
countries, to work for the introduction of advanced technology and facilities from foreign countries and to
put effort into science and education projects necessary for the realisation of modernisation.
2

Ch 1: General Introduction

paper and its conceptual basis. Section 1.3 provides a background to the economic
growth of China and the legal reform that accompanied that growth and includes an
outline of the scale of foreign enterprises operating in China and some substantial issues
for those investors. Section 1.4 commences analysis of the legal regime for foreign
investors in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) while section 1.5 discusses the
proposition that ‘interaction’ and ‘networks’ are matters of vital importance to foreign
investors. Section 1.6 introduces the link between economic development and legal
reforms in the PRC and section 1.7 commences the analysis of the existing legal
environment for foreign investors.

Section 1.8 examines historical and social

influences in the areas of morality and social order and suggests that these have a
central place in the modern legal environment in China. Section 1.9 discusses the
intersection of philosophy and political power in the PRC. Section 1.10 summarises and
concludes the chapter.

1.1.1 A Brief Outline of the Following Chapters of the Research
In Chapter 2, features of the current legal system of China are explained. These include
the law-making bodies, the executive branch, sources of law, the judiciary and the
interpretation of law.
Chapter 3 includes an examination of the traditional roots of Chinese law and
the intersection of philosophy and political power. Chinese world views in their social
and legal context are analysed and explained by reference to Confucian and legalist
theories.
Chapter 4 further analyses the evolution and development of the current legal
system in China and the roles of Government and the Communist Party of China (CPC).

2
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The chapter reflects upon historical and social influences upon the existing legal
environment for foreign investors.
Chapter 5 gives an introduction on foreign investment and the development of
foreign investment laws in China including the background to the ‘Open Door’ policy
regarding foreign investment, the establishment and development of foreign investment
laws and the legal sources of Chinese foreign investment law.
Chapter 6 includes an analysis of some substantive practical issues for foreign
investors. These include issues concerning the implementation of law and its
administration, such as: the dilemma of national laws versus local regulations, the
discretionary power of the administration, and the enforcement of contract. Some
feedback from a survey in Australia is elaborated.
Chapter 7 includes detail of the development of contract law in the foreign
investment field and examines features of administrative operation in the current legal
system.
Chapter 8 further analyses the outcomes of a survey of Australian enterprises
conducting business in China, and discusses the importance of relationships between
foreign investors, such as those surveyed and/or interviewed and their Chinese business
partners.
Chapter 9 contains some insights into major issues for foreign investors, such as:
social and legal aspects, business and culture, ‘Guanxi’, and a comparative examination
of the experiences of two major joint venture investors (the German Volkswagen Group
and the American Motor Corporation). The chapter also deals with legal uncertainty,
property rights, contract law, and conflict of laws.
Chapter 10 concludes the study and draws together important practical outcomes
of the ramifications of law in China evolving from Chinese culture.

3
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1.1.2 The Genesis of an Economic Revolution
Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) is rightfully called the main inspirer and initiator of market
reforms in China.5 Deng was one of the principal leaders of the PRC’s socialist reform,
opening its economy to the international market and modernisation. 6 He was the
founder and chief architect of Deng Xiaoping Theory.7 When the ‘Cultural Revolution’
began in China in 1966, Deng lost all his leadership positions. 8 In October 1976 the
‘Gang of four’ was smashed and the Cultural Revolution ended. 9 In July 1977, the Third
Plenary Session of the 10th National Congress of the CPC reinstated Deng Xiaoping to
his former duties as military and political leader. 10 In August 1977, convening the 11th

5

<<中国共产党十三届五中全会关于同意邓小平同志辞去中共中央军事委员会主席职务的决定>>
[Decision Concerning Deng Xiaoping’s Resignation of Chairmanship of the Central Military Commission
of the Communist Party of China at the Fifth Plenary Session Meeting of the Thirteenth Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China] Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 9
November 1989. The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China
<http://www.gov.cn/test/2008-07/02/content_1033721.htm>. Deng Xiaoping’s contribution to China’s
economic reform was recognised in this official document and for the first time Deng was officially
regarded as the chief architect of China’s economic reform.
6
Ibid.
7
杨德山 [Yang Deshan]，’邓小平理论’ [Deng Xiaoping Theory]，中国共产党新闻网 [News of the
Communist Party of China] <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64171/4527683.html>. Deng Xiaoping
Theory may be briefly summarised as ‘building socialism with Chinese characteristics’ and primarily
includes: an admission that China is still in the early stages of socialism; that China should have an
attitude of seeking the truth from the facts rather than blindly transplanting any foreign model of a
socialist system; and that China’s socialist model must be based upon China’s national conditions. The
theory includes the need for China to shift its focus from a political movement to emphasis upon
economic construction including opening China’s door to the outside world and accomplishing the ‘Four
Modernisations’ including:- industrial modernisation, agricultural modernisation, military modernisation,
and technology modernisation. Additionally the theory emphasises the upholding of four cardinal
principles, namely: the basic spirit of Communism; the Peoples democratic centralised political system;
leadership by the Communist Party; and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.
8
‘Deng Xiaoping’, News of the Communist Party of China, 23 August 2004
<http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66485/66495/66496/4533662.html>. In 1966 Deng Xiaoping was
criticised by, and lost all his posts within, the Communist Party of China thus experiencing the most
arduous period during his revolutionary career.
9
‘1976 年 10 月 6 日 粉碎四人帮’ [Smashing the Gang of Four on 6 October 1976], 新华新闻 [Xinhua
News], 6 October 2008 <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-10/06/content_9728750.htm>.
10
‘1977 年 7 月 16 日党的十届三中全会在北京召开’ [The Third Plenary Session of the Tenth Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China Held in Beijing on 16 July 1977], 中国共产党新闻 [News
of the Communist Party of China], 16 July 1977
<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/4162/64165/67447/67995/4590629.html>.
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National Congress of the CPC, Deng was elected vice-chairman of the CPC Central
Committee.11
In March 1978 Deng was elected to the Fifth (CPC) National Committee. Deng
began by promoting an ideological line to set things right against the earlier policy
mistakes.12 He undertook leadership and support in the discussion of the criterion that
the truth put forward must be based upon a complete and accurate understanding of Mao
Zedong thought.13 He also proposed to shift the focus of the party’s work as soon as
possible to economic construction. 14 When the Third Plenary Session of the 11th
National Congress of the CPC was held in December 1978, China commenced reform
and to open its market to the outside world and focus efforts on a new socialist
modernisation.15

11

陈雪薇 [Chen Xuewei] <<邓小平再创辉煌的二十年>> [Deng Xiaoping’s Creation of a Splendid
Twenty Years] (19 July 2011) 北 京 市 委 机 关 刊 [Beijing Municipal Government], para 2
<http://www.bjqx.org.cn/qxweb/n29710c5.aspx>; David L Shambaugh, ‘Deng Xiaoping: The Politician’
in David L Shambaugh (ed), Deng Xiaoping: Portrait of a Chinese Statesman (Oxford University Press,
1995)49, 75.
12
陈东林，李建斌 [Chen Donglin and Li Jianbin]，‘邓小平与《关于建国 以来党的若干历史问题
的决议》研究述评’[A Review: Deng Xiaoping and <<Resolution Concerning A Number of Historical
Issues within the Party since Establishment of the PRC>>] in 邓小平研究述评 [Studies Review of Deng
Xiaoping], 中 国 共 产 党 党 史 人 物 纪 念 馆 [Memorial Hall: Historical Figures in History of the
Communist Party of China], <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/69112/69113/69117/4714263.html>.
13
<<关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议>> [Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of
Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) Central
Committee of Communist Party of China, 27 June 1981, [27]; ‘Comments and Historical Solution’ in Mao’s
110th Anniversary News
of the Communist Party of China, 14 June 2006
<http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66095/4471924.html>. The Chinese Communists, with Mao Zedong as
their chief representative, conducted a theoretical synthesis of China’s unique experience in its protracted
revolution in accordance with the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. This synthesis contributed a
scientific system of guidelines befitting China’s conditions, and it is this synthesis which is Mao Zedong
Thought, the product of the integration of the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete
practice of the Chinese revolution.
14
Ibid [32].
15
邓小平 [Deng Xiaoping], ‘关于经济工作的几点意见’ [Some Comments on the Economic Work] in
<<邓小平文选第二集>> [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2] (人民出版社 [People’s Publishing
House], 4 October 1979) [2].
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Deng Xiaoping was at this meeting on the history of the policy changes in the CPC and
played a decisive role.16 After the Third Plenary Session of the 11th National Congress
of the CPC, he insisted upon emancipating the mind and seeking truth from facts and
the creation of a theory of ‘building socialism with Chinese characteristics’. 17 This
theory scientifically clarified the nature of socialism, and provided the first relatively
systematic answers to the question of how to address China’s position as an
economically and culturally backward country while continuing to build on socialism
and explore how best to consolidate and develop utilising a series of basic questions of
socialism.18
According to his ideas, it was imperative for the 13th National Congress of the
CPC (having achieved the most developed primary stage of socialism), to adopt
economic construction as its central element. He pointed out that the fundamental task
of socialism is to develop productive forces and that the Party must wholeheartedly
engage in modernisation and achieve it.19 He believed that modernisation of science and
technology was the key; that science and technology were primary productive forces;
and that education is the most fundamental goal for a nation. 20 The CPC decided to

16

徐永军 [Xu Yongjun], ‘邓小平与十一届三中全会研究述评’ [Deng Xiaoping and the Third Plenary
Session of the Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China], 中国共产党新闻 [News of
the Communist Party of China] < http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/69112/69113/69117/4714261.html>.
17
Ibid. Deng Xiaoping, at the Third Plenary Session, made a significant contribution to re-establish the
ideological line of Marxism and to shift the focus to socialist modernisation and opening up to economic
reform. China embarked on building a new road of socialism with Chinese characteristics.
18
邓 小平 [Deng Xiaoping], ‘ 社 会主 义 也可 以 搞 市场 经济 ’ [Socialism can also Practise Market
Economy] in << 邓 小 平 文 选 第 二 集 >> [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2] ( 人 民 出 版 社
[People’s Publishing House], 26 November 1979).
19
中国共产党党史资料 [Reference of History of Communist Party of China], ‘十一届三中全会 1978
年 12 月 18-22 日’ [the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CPC (18-22 December 1978)] (10 June 2011)
Communist Party of China <http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/165617/166496/168121/10011532.html>.
20
邓小平 [Deng Xiaoping], ‘邓小平在科学和教育工作座谈会’ [Deng Xiaoping’s Speech at the
Science and Education Forum] (Speech delivered at the Science and Education Forum, Beijing, 8 August
1977) <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64165/68640/68644/index.html>. At the Forum, Deng
Xiaoping proposed that China needed to catch up with the world’s most advanced levels and that this
should start with an emphasis on science and education.
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establish a socialist market economy system with reform goals as a theoretical basis. 21
Deng’s initiative — to set up special economic zones, open 14 coastal cities as well as
opening up Shanghai’s Pudong New Area development — was the proper pattern to
adopt in promoting China’s full economic awakening. 22 He actively pushed forward the
political system, emphasising the development of a socialist democracy and improving
the socialist legal system in the building process. 23 In November 1989 at the Fifth
Plenary Session of the 13th National Congress of the CPC, Deng resigned from his last
job as Chairman of the Central Military Commission.24
After retiring, he remained concerned about the Party and state enterprises.25 He
conducted inspections in 1992 in Southern China’s Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai,
Shanghai and other places and delivered an important speech, summing up the basic
experience of reform and economic ‘opening up’ from a theoretical perspective in order
to present solutions to a number of major problems.26 The 15th National Congress of the
CPC held in 1997 discussed the theory of building socialism with Chinese
21

<<中共中央关于建立社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定>> [Decision Concerning a Number
of Issues of Establishment of Socialist Market Economic System at the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China] (People’s Republic of China) Third Plenary Meeting of the Fourteenth
Central Committee, 14 November 1993.
22
<<中华人民共和国广东省经济特区条例>> [Ordinance of the People’s Republic of China on
Guangdong Special Economic Zones] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing
Committee, 26 August 1980; <<沿海部分城市座谈会纪要>> [Memorandum of Conference within
Several Coastal Cities] (People’s Republic of China) Central Committee of the Communist Party and
State Council, 4 May 1984.
23
邓小平 [Deng Xiaoping], ‘邓小平论社会主义法制和政治体制改革’ [Deng Xiaoping’s Speech of
Socialist Legal and Political System Reform] 中央政治局常委会 (Speech delivered at the Central
Political Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China, Beijing, 28 June 1986) <http://xn-gmq282eogn.cn/GB/shizheng/252/4971/5579/20010628/498819.html>.
24
<<中国共产党十三届五中全会关于同意邓小平同志辞去中共中央军事委员会主席职务的决定>>
[Decision Concerning Deng Xiaoping’s Resignation of Chairmanship of the Central Military Commission
of the Communist Party of China at the Fifth Plenary Session Meeting of the Thirteenth Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China] (9 November 1989) The Central People’s Government of
the People’s Republic of China <http://www.gov.cn/test/2008-07/02/content_1033721.htm>.
25
武力 [Wu Li], ‘邓小平南方讲话和十四大的决策’ [Deng Xiaoping’s Talks on the Southern Visit and
Decision of Fourteenth National Congress] (26 January 2010) 中华人民共和国国史网 [The History of
the People’s Republic of China] <http://www.hprc.org.cn/wxzl/wxxgwd/201001/t20100126_42783.html>
26
邓小平 [Deng Xiaoping], ‘在武昌，深圳，珠海和上海等地的谈话要点’[In Wuchang, Shenzhen,
Zhuhai and Shanghai, Talking Points] in <<邓小平文选第三集>> [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping
vol. 3] (人民出版社 [People’s Publishing House], 18 January 1992).
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characteristics and described it as Deng Xiaoping Theory. 27 It was pointed out that this
theory is the Marxism of contemporary China, that is, China’s development of Marxism
to a new stage. The Constitution clearly stipulated that the CPC takes MarxismLeninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory as its guide to action.28
Implementation of the late Deng Xiaoping’s discrete programme of economic reform
has clearly brought about significant changes in China’s economy, politics and
culture.29

The PRC, a country with a rich five thousand year history of civilisation, has
been moving towards becoming a capitalist and market economy. The economic system
is moving away from the heavy hand of centralised state planning toward a system
marked by greater openness, competitiveness, and flexibility. 30 The Anti-Monopoly Law
of the People’s Republic of China 200731 (Anti-Monopoly Law) came into force on 1
August 2008. The new law sets out a broader definition of monopolistic conduct and
creates a commission to oversee this area. The passing of a unified, anti-monopoly law
applying to both domestic and foreign businesses represents a significant milestone for
the PRC. The new legislation adopts and expands on a number of competition law

27

江泽民 [Jiang Zemin], ‘高举邓小平理论伟大旗帜，把建设有中国特色社会主义事业全面推向二
十一世纪，江泽民在中国共产党第十五次全国代表大会上的报告’[Holding High the Great Banner
of Deng Xiaoping Theory, Building of the Socialist Society with Chinese Characteristics in the TwentyFirst Century, Jiang Zemin’s Report on the Fiftheen National Congress of the Communist Party of China]
(12 September 1997) 中国共产党历次全国代表大会数据库 [Statistics of Successive Meetings of the
National Congress of the Communist Party of China]
<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64568/65445/4526285.html>.
28
<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, Preamble.
29
Yuan Wang et al, Business Culture in China (Butterworth-Heinemann Asia, 1998) 8.
30
Charles Wolf Jr, ‘Capitalism, Chinese Style’ (2002) 16 The International Economy 48, 48.
31
<<中华人民共和国反垄断法>> [Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s
Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 68, 30 August 2007.
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concepts that are used in Western jurisdictions, and sets tougher penalties for those that
engage in monopolistic conduct.32

Anti-Monopoly Law has provided restraints upon the predominance of the monopolistic
state owned enterprises. In the context of China’s political, economic and legal
development the Anti-Monopoly Law is nevertheless a very significant achievement.33

Law, in particular, has become highly significant in terms of its functions and
application to economic development in China. Since the mid-1990s a series of steps
have been taken for legal reform, including: changes in the legislative process; the
implementation of legislation via the interpretive practices of courts and administrative
agencies as well as through the enforcement of civil judgments; the addition of legal
advisers to personnel within the system; developments in criminal law and human
rights; key changes in laws relating to foreign trade and investment law; and, finally
alterations to China’s place and role in the international legal order. 34

1.2

Aims, Objectives and Contribution of the Research

China’s dramatic economic development has established a major presence in the global
market in the last 30 years. An important result of its implementation of economic
development has been the inevitable involvement of foreign companies in China’s trade
and development. Foreign investors have begun to play a significant role in the course
of China’s economic development. A core question of this research is how foreign
investors in the PRC can be assisted to deal with a system of law that is different both in

32

Ibid arts 46–54.
Andrew Terry and Zhiqiong June Wang, ‘Competition Law and Policy in China: The 2007 AntiMonopoly Law’ in Patricia Blazey and Kay-Wah Chan (eds), Commercial Law of the People’s Republic
of China (Lawbook Co., 2012) 335.
34
Donald C Clark, ‘Introduction: The Chinese Legal System since 1995: Steady Development and
Striking Continuities’ in Donald C Clark (ed), China’s Legal System: New Developments, New
Challenges (Cambridge, 2008) 1, 1.
33
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appearance and in practice to that of their home country, and to better equip them to
work

effectively

with

outcomes

that

may

be

confusing

and

sometimes

incomprehensible.

1.2.1 Aims of the Research
The aims of this research are twofold. On the one hand it aims to provide an enhanced
understanding of the socio-legal environment in China for those who wish to become
involved in business activity in that country and to better prepare such investors to
avoid the pitfalls experienced by others who have preceded them.
Secondly, the research will map the development of laws in the PRC for the
period during which the country has become a significant player in the global market
economy and, in particular, examine the social, historical and cultural factors that, in the
view of this researcher, underpin the nature of those laws. The research will also analyse
the nature of the implementation of relevant laws including reference to some inherent
flexibility in their interpretation — and thus their implementation — with the purpose of
assisting foreign investors to gain an understanding of the practical effects of laws
applying to them as foreign investors.

1.2.2 Objectives of the Research
The development of laws related to matters of market economics is central to this study.
An objective of the research is to raise the level of understanding of the historical and
cultural background of Chinese society and the extent to which these have had and
continue to have an influence upon the nature of modern laws in China. A further
objective is to provide the reader with knowledge that can shed light upon the ways in

10

Ch 1: General Introduction

which these laws are effective in practical terms and provide an explanation as to why
the implementation of some laws can, on occasion, be confusing to newcomers.

1.2.3 Significance of the Study
In this research legal issues relating to foreign investors operating in China are used as a
means to identify the nature and development of the PRC legal system, particularly in
its appearance and practice. Those issues are explored from historical and cultural
perspectives. The exploration reveals that a feudal political system and the dominance
of Confucian culture in China have had a significant effect on the Chinese legal system.
The different implications of concepts of law and its standing in society are the effects
of these factors on the application of law. To comprehend the PRC legal system for
foreign investors doing business in China, it will be suggested that it is important to
understand Chinese history and culture relevant to the particular region.

1.2.4 Contribution of the Study
This research will assert that there are issues arising for the operations of foreign
investors that illustrate the effects of social and cultural factors on the legal environment
in China in which the investors must operate. A sample group of foreign investors was
surveyed, referring to these issues for existing foreign investors, and an analysis of the
outcomes shed light upon the relationships between cultural and social factors and
development of the legal system in China. The analysis illustrated the relevance of the
interaction between law and culture in the evolution of China’s history.
This research examines three specific aspects related to the legal environment in
China that foreign investors will encounter in the course of their business operations.
These aspects are: legal requirements (laws, regulations and policies) for foreign
11
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investors; communication with the Chinese government (commencing with assessment
and approval procedures for foreign investment projects); and relationships with
Chinese partners. These aspects are generally associated with foreign investors’
commercial interests as well as being a reflection of features of the legal system of the
PRC in reality. The role of law is to serve policies of economic change.35
For the Chinese, in the process of resolving disputes, litigation is to be avoided
and mediation is preferred. 36 Networks between foreign investors and their Chinese
partners and government officials are commonly built up in social activities.
Exploration of Confucian and feudal history in China reveals that there was a nonlitigious tradition in both Confucian teaching and centralised political power in feudal
society. 37 Confucius (551–479BC) promoted the use of ‘Li’(virtue) to control the
country and the people. 38 According to the ‘Confucian Analect’, ‘Good and just
government depends upon the moral and cultural qualities of the ruler and its officials.’
Emperors were exhorted to control common people mainly by using moral rules rather
than laws as most laws were a means of punishment for criminal activity. Moral rules
should be primary and punishment should be secondary. To achieve social harmony the
human race has to find and practice the principles of ‘Li’.39 The teaching of Confucius
became the official creed of the governing elite in China until the late 19th century.
Confucius did not draw a sharp distinction between ethics, morality, propriety and law.
His teaching sought to identify a moral method rather than a moral code. 40

35

欧阳涛 [OuYang Tao], ‘法律工作要准确地为经济建设服务’ [Legal Works Should Serve Economic
Construction Accurately] (1993) 77 法学杂志 [Journal of Legal Study] 2, 2.
36
Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial Law (Oxford University Press, 2000) 307.
37
刘晴辉 [Liu Qinghui], ‘中国诉讼机制的近现代变迁及思考’ [Evolution of China’s Modern Judicial
System and Some Consideration] (2005) 4 社会科学研究 [Social Science Research] 1, 1.
38
崔永东 [Cui Yongdong], <<中国法律思想史>> [History of Chinese Legal Thoughts] (北京大学出版
社 [Beijing University Press], 2004) 13–4.
39
Ibid 15–7.
40
Fung Yu-lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (MacMillan, 1950) 46.
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Feudal society in China from the dynasties of Zhou (1134BC) to that of Qing
(1911) lasted about 3000 years. It strengthened state administration following a rigid
hierarchical system with law mainly being used to preserve social stability. Centralised
political power was supreme.41 Therefore, the role of law and the Chinese approach to
law today can be shown to have their roots in Confucian and feudal history.
This study seeks to create an enhanced understanding of the significance of these
deeply entrenched aspects and to emphasise that the value of social connection involved
in every aspect of legal activities can, and does play a pivotal role in the relationships
between foreign investors in the PRC and their local partners and local agencies.

Rapid economic development and increasing involvement with economic
globalisation have demanded and facilitated legal reform in China. 42 In reality the
questions of the role of law in China and how law is applied within the process of
economic reform have become the subjects of significant debate. There have been many
studies of Chinese law and China’s economic developments.43 This thesis examines the
economic transformation that has led China into a market economy from the perspective
of whether the traditional social and historical conditions have continued to have
relevance to any significant role in the development of the legal system and social
environment in the course of this rapid economic reform. As Fishman suggests:
41

马志冰 [Ma Zhibing], <<中国法制史>> [History of the Chinese Legal System] (北京大学出版社
[Beijing University Press], 2004) 3–5.
42
After some 15 years of reform, a long-term plan – to establish a ‘social market economy’ – was
officially adopted by the party in 1992. The adoption of this policy then also changed the practice in legal
construction. See Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and
Development (Kluwer Law International, 1999) 43.
43
Werner F Menski, ‘Chinese Law: Code and Conduct’ in Werner F Menski, Comparative Law in a
Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 439, 439. Dr
Menski examines Chinese world views in their social and legal context, the classical Chinese legal
system, the practical application of the law, post-imperial Chinese legal systems, and law in the People’s
Republic of China. Amongst legal studies conducted in relation to the development of legal reform and
economic transition in China are: Professor Jianfu Chen’s Chinese Law: Towards an Understanding of
Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development and H Patrick Glenn’s Legal Traditions of the World Sustainable Diversity in Law. The latter examines Asian ways in the perspective of legal tradition. In
John K M Ohnesorge’s Understanding Chinese Legal and Business Norms: A Comment, Janet Tai
Landa’s chapter analyses the nature of business practice and legal application.
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At any given time since China started on the capitalist road, opinions about its prospects
have figuratively, and literally, been all over the map. The present mood is a
combustible mix of euphoria, fear, admiration, and cynicism.44

This research examines foreign direct investment (FDI) in a Chinese legal
cultural context from an interdisciplinary45 point of view. In this research legal issues
relating to foreign investors operating in China provide a window to view and identify
the nature and development of the PRC legal system, particularly in regard to its
appearance and practice. Those issues are explored from an historical and cultural point
of view. The study will analyse whether a previously feudal political system and the
dominance of Confucian culture in China have had significant effects upon the Chinese
legal system. It will examine the unique nature of a communist regime entering into a
capitalist market economy and how the different local concepts of law and its standing
in society affect the application of law in China today.

The research will focus upon how law in China impacts upon foreign investors
in the PRC and the ways that foreign investors comprehend the PRC legal system whilst
doing business in China. It will also address the question of whether an understanding
of Chinese history and culture originating in the particular region is relevant to the
newly arrived or existing foreign investor. This study will explore how law and its
practice are contained in China’s institutions, in the system of departmental assessment
of proposed enterprises, and implementation procedures concerning foreign investment
practice in China today. This researcher commences the study with a conceptual

44

Ted C Fishman, China, Inc. How the Rise of the Next Superpower Challenges America and the World
(Scribner, 2005) 16.
45
This research studies roles and functions of law in practice. Foreign direct investment is chosen as a
window through which both legal and social aspects can be examined in order to explain legal practice in
reality in China today.
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framework that accords with Chen’s view, that an understanding of the nature of laws
requires an understanding of the social environment in which those laws exist. 46

Australian enterprises operating in China were surveyed for this research and
their views and accounts of actual experiences provided some practical insights into the
issues facing multi-national foreign investment in the business environment of China.

1.2.5 A Survey Conducted for This Study
A survey was conducted in the course of this research. It was conducted between June
2004 and March 2005, and was based on written questionnaires sent to 200 Australian
enterprises operating in China and 7 follow-up interviews. A sample group of 200
Australian enterprises with business operations in China was selected in New South
Wales, Australia.

Participants in the survey were asked to respond to questions concerning general
company information; market entry issues; operating issues in China including the legal
environment and administrative environment; and cultural issues and cross-cultural
management issues based on their experience of doing business in or with China. The
participants’ perceptions of problems varied depending on the size of their business, its
period of operation, the nature of the operation and the scope of the business.

Generally, China’s large market is the motivation for an enterprise’s entry to
China, and it was evident that partner selection and geographical location are the major
concerns regarding the entry strategy.47 Most of the businesses surveyed for this study

46

Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development
(Kluwer Law International, 1999) 3.
47
Yadong Luo, Foreign Parent Investment Strategies and International Joint Venture Performance:
Chinese Evidence (Temple University, 1996) 252; Keith W Glaister and Yu Wang, ‘UK Joint Ventures in
China: Motivation and Partner Selection’ (1993) 11 Marketing Intelligence and Planning 9, 9.
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rated negotiation as the preferred form of dispute resolution as far as the industrial
relations aspect of the legal environment was concerned. Respondents generally agreed
that the relationship with the relevant government authority is very important and that
networking played a significant role in the successful operation of their business. The
different understanding of law and attitudes towards disputes were rated as the main
issues. Also, differences linked to cultural backgrounds were evident in management
issues within joint ventures.

Amongst the questionnaire participants, 16 of them agreed to participate in a
follow-up interview and 7 participants actually undertook the interview. In answering
expanded questions based on the questionnaire, the interviewees generally agreed that
their business must function within a relatively new and incomplete legal system. The
research showed that bureaucratic factors in the administrative system are still a major
concern for foreigners doing business in China. A more detailed analysis of the findings
of the survey is contained in Chapter 8.

1.2.6 Methods and Methodology of the Research
This study examines legal, social and cultural aspects of foreign investment in China as
a means to explore the extent to which cultural and historical factors are relevant or
important in terms of the ways in which laws are developed in the PRC. It also
addresses the matter of the extent of the influence of those factors in terms of their
practical effects on day to day business practice, particularly for foreign investors.

The methods adopted in this research include a literature review to ascertain
existing views on the various aspects relevant to the research question, an historical
analysis of law and its development in China, a survey of a sample group of players in
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the activities central to the research, and case studies of the experiences of some
substantial foreign investors in China.

The nature of this study has required the adoption of a multi-disciplinary
approach in analysing the Chinese regulatory structures related to foreign direct
investment. In addition to the study of Chinese legal history and an analysis of the
current national legal framework on foreign investment, as well as procedural
administrative law and non-foreign investment laws, issues of social conditions and
culture are central to this thesis. The overall approach is based on traditional legal
methods, such as the analysis of legal provisions, combined with insight from other
disciplines, including the use of comparative and historical methodologies. This overall
approach allows a suitable method to be applied to a specific area of the analysis where
that technique is the most relevant. Each research strategy has its limitations and no
single strategy is adequate for the complete analysis undertaken.

The research sources used for this thesis include primary legal sources,
secondary sources, policies and formal reports. Secondary legal sources include texts,
journal articles, research theses, news reports and governmental speeches. Presidential
decrees, ministerial decrees and provisions, governmental reports and policy, and
relevant data are not always easily or publicly accessible. Often, the sources are not
stored in written form, but found only in official speeches. The literature references
have dealt with areas such as: foreign investment in China, the Chinese legal system,
Confucian philosophy and history, Chinese history, and business management.

Research methods in this study have included: a survey in the form of
questionnaires; individual interviews with persons actively involved as foreign investors
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in the PRC; and case study comparisons [German Volkswagen Group and American
Motor Corporation].

The survey, in the form of a written questionnaire, was conducted in Australia.
Participants were a sample group of Australian enterprises conducting business in
China. The questionnaire consisted of four main sections designed to collect data
relevant to entry strategies, operating issues and management issues. The analysis of the
responses provided information relevant to the research question. This method was
chosen as it was thought to be a useful means to collect primary data to illustrate the
experiences of foreign investors in China. Questions about cultural issues were included
in order to collect data about foreign investors’ communication with Chinese
governments and Chinese partners. Information from this part of the research
methodology elicited those foreign investors’ impressions (in 2005) about Chinese
negotiation and communication styles and demonstrated links to cultural factors
relevant to Confucian influences in modes of Chinese communication. It is suggested
that the same probably holds true today whilst accepting that there may have been a
degree of ‘westernisation’ in the attitude of the Chinese parties’ negotiation and
communication styles due to the ongoing exposure to Western influence. 48

In this thesis, it has been important to understand several points: firstly, China is
a country based on the civil law tradition, and because of that no Chinese legal cases are
quoted to support the thesis; secondly, since the majority of Chinese legal materials,
including laws and regulations, have not always been officially translated into English,
some materials have had to be translated into English by the present researcher; thirdly,
48

Raymond P M Chow and Oliver H M Yau, ‘Harmony and Cooperation: Their Effects on IJV
Performance in China’ (2010) 17 Cross Cultural Management 312, 326; 陈星星 [Chen Xingxing],
<< 最 会 谈 判 的 中 国 人 ： 中 国 式 的 谈 判 之 道 >> [Chinese: The Best Negotiators – The Chinese
Negotiation Styles] (北京邮电大学出版社 [University of Beijing Post and Telecommunication Press],
2007) 1.
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the changing nature and progressive development of international arrangements
governing foreign direct investment to some extent affects national policy and,
accordingly, updates of some material and data in this thesis has been required.
Considering the fact that policy changes are not always published, the analysis of the
updated materials is based primarily upon the official news and speeches available on
the official government websites. The statistics quoted are all from publicly available,
reliable and authoritative sources, and the fact that they counter commonly held
perceptions could be due to the fallibility of the latter. However, the researcher
concedes that statistics only present part of the picture, and that it is necessary to take
into account the whole picture that eventually emerges, rather than just the statistical
glimpse presented at a particular time.

1.2.7 Scope of the Study and Difficulties Experienced in the Research
In inter-disciplinary studies such as socio-legal research, it is important to establish the
causal relationships between social phenomena and legal practices so as to allow the
production of an analysis that is both accurate in its description of social reality and
significant to the study of law. One of the difficulties for this research was that the
Chinese system of law cannot yet be said to have a clear theoretical framework,
particularly in the area of foreign investment.

In the study of relations between culture and law, the term ‘culture’ has been
used in its widest sense. In sociological writing it refers to beliefs, attitudes, cognitive
ideas, values and modes of reasoning, and perception.49 In this research, the term ‘legal
culture’ is used to suggest the whole range of ideas, which exists in particular societies,
about law and its place in the social order. These ideas will indicate legal practices,
49

Roger Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law above n 1, 25.
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people’s attitudes to law and their willingness or unwillingness to litigate. Accordingly,
the relative significance of law in indicating wider trends of thought and behaviour
reflect the specific practices and forms of discourse associated with legal institutions.50

This research, which is centrally concerned with Chinese law and its cultural
aspects, was somewhat limited by the shortage of primary sources on the evolution of
Chinese law, the Chinese legal system and historical literature in either English or
Chinese languages. Some primary sources are not available for public access. For
example, most judicial decisions are difficult to access, particularly those involving
judgments made by the Judicial Committee. The Chinese government’s concern with
national security appears to be the reason for the withholding of such information.

1.3

Background of Economic Growth and Legal Reform in China

1.3.1 An Overview
China’s dramatically increasing economic development has established a major
presence in the global market since the commencement of its ‘Open Door’ policy in
December 1978. This policy of concentration upon economic development has
undoubtedly been a great success in terms of both national economic growth and
increasing international economic and political influence. A United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report in 2009, incorporating a survey and
assessment of global investment prospects, stated:

One of the striking features of FDI flows to the region during the past few years has
been the steadily growing importance of China and India as host economies. With its
inflows surging to a historic high ($108 billion) in 2008, China became the third largest
FDI recipient country (after the United States and France) in the world. And these two
largest emerging economies ranked numbers one and three, respectively, as the most
50

Ibid.
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preferred FDI locations in UNCTAD’s World Investment Prospects Survey 2009–2011.
Their strong performance, even during the current crisis, has reshaped the landscape of
FDI flows to the region as well as to the world at large.51

According to the Ministry of Commerce, the Department of Foreign Investment
Administration statistics of utilisation of foreign investment from January to February
2010 show an increase of 14.56 per cent from the same period in the previous year, that
is, from USD2.761 billion52 to USD3.163 billion.53 This shows that foreign investment
in China is still very active and has performed strongly despite the effects of the global
economic recession.

China has then, by virtue of its size and dynamism, become a powerful
economic presence in Asia and globally in the new millennium.54 An important result of
the implementation of the ‘Open Door’ policy was the involvement of foreign
companies in China’s economic transformation. China needed to attract not only foreign
technology and foreign capital, but also foreign management expertise, marketing
experience and marketing networks. 55 On 17 January 1979, Deng Xiaoping, when
meeting with the leaders in industrial and business communities, formally declared that:

More channels should be utilised to forge ahead our development, for instance,
through utilisation of foreign capitals and technologies, and through the factories run
by the returned overseas Chinese or people of Chinese origin … The absorption of
foreign capital should be launched by means of complementary trade, or joint
56
ventures.

51

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Transnational Corporations, Agricultural
Production and Development’ (World Investment Report 2009 No WIR2009, United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development, 17 September 2009) 51.
52
‘billion’ used here refers to US billion, i.e. 1000 million.
53
Department of Foreign Investment Administration, ‘Statistics about Utilisation of Foreign Investment
in China from Jan to Feb 2010’ (12 March 2010) Ministry of Commerce of the PRC
<http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Statistics/FDIStatistics/StatisticsofForeignInvestment/t20100312_1
19132.htm>.
54
Calla Wiemer, ‘Introduction: China’s Economic Presence’ in Calla Wiemer and Heping Cao (eds),
Asian Economic Cooperation in the New Millennium: China’s Economic Presence (World Scientific
Publishing, 2004) 1, 1.
55
Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law above n 46, 318–9.
56
Department of Foreign Investment Administration, ‘The First Speech Related to Absorption of Foreign
Capita’ (4 December 2008) Ministry of Commerce of the PRC
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Commenting upon the degree of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China, Wei and
Dutta suggest that:

When comparing borrowing from abroad to foreign direct investment (FDI), the latter is
an advantageous approach in terms of importing capital, goods, plant and equipment,
and technology. Under the FDI system, foreign investors directly share the risk of
investment. They stand to share profits or losses. Accordingly, as an economic plan for
accelerated industrialisation and thus accelerated growth of GDP.57

It is clear that the FDI sector has contributed significantly to China’s economic growth
since the late 1970s. As the country attracting the most FDI among the countries of the
developing world for consecutive years, China not only expanded the scale of FDI but
also optimised its structure. Companies with foreign investment in China are playing an
increasingly important role in China’s national economic growth, industrial and
technological advancement, export expansion and generation of job opportunities.58

1.3.2 Foreign Enterprises Operating in China
Absorption of foreign capital is an important component of China’s basic state policy of
opening up to the outside world.59 In the period from January to December 2010, the
number of newly established foreign investment companies in China was 27,406 — a
growth of 16.94 per cent compared to the same period in 2009. 60 The level of utilised
foreign investment in China was USD105.7354 billion in 2010, comprising a 17.44 per

<http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/News/Focus/Subject/wzzgxe/dsj30/t20081204_99>.
57
Wenhui Wei and Manoranjan Dutta, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in China: An Analysis of Source
Country and Sector of Utilisation’ in Calla Wiemer and Heping Cao (eds), Asian Economic Cooperation
in the New Millennium: China’s Economic Presence (World Scientific Publishing, 2004) 297, 299.
58
Department of Foreign Investment Administration, ‘Foreign Capital in China’s National Economic
Development’ (4 December 2008) Ministry of Commerce of the PRC
<http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/tzdt/zt/ztmc/wzzgx/lywzfzjj/t20081126_99626.html>.
59
Department of Foreign Investment Administration, ‘Foreign Investment and National Economy’ (26
November 2008) Ministry of Commerce of the PRC
<http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/tzdt/zt/ztmc/wzzgx/lywzfzjj/t20081126_99626.html>.
60
Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, ‘2010 年 1-12 月全国吸收外商直接投资情况’ [Absorption of
Foreign Direct Investment from January to December 2010] (18 January 2011) 中国商务部 [Ministry of
Commerce of the PRC]
<http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/tongjiziliao/v/201101/20110107370784.html>.
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cent increase compared to the same period in 2009. 61 According to the UNCTAD
Global Investment Prospects Assessment (GIPA) and based on a joint survey conducted
by UNCTAD in Geneva and Corporate Location Magazine in London, China was then
ranked in the top three foreign investment hot spots for the following four years, ahead
of India and the United States.62

China’s continuous economic growth provides massive opportunities globally to
business participants. In May 2005, the Asian headquarters of International Paper, the
largest paper and forestry product’s company in the world, moved from Hong Kong to
Shanghai.63 In July 2007, Coca Cola Amatil planned to build a global innovation and
technology centre along with its China headquarters in Shanghai. 64 Trans-national
corporations have continued to set up their Research and Development (R&D) centres
in China. A total of 490 of the world’s top 500 companies have invested in China and
they have established more than 1160 R&D centres.65 It is not surprising that Australian
enterprises also desired to participate in this enormous economic market. On 24 October
2003 Australia and China signed the Australia-China Trade and Economic Framework.
The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade stated:

The Trade and Economic Framework set the direction for the future development of the
strong and rapidly expanding trade and economic relationship between Australia and
China. The practical measures and co-operative activities contained in this Framework

61

Ibid.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Global Investment Prospects Assessment
(GIPA) Research Note 1: Results of a Survey of Location’ in Prospects for FDI Flows, Transnational
Corporation Strategies and Promotion Policies: 2004-2007 (Research Note No TD XI BP 5, United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 27 April 2004) 6.
63
Department of Foreign Investment Administration, ‘Foreign Capital in China’s National Economic
Development’ in Inflow of Foreign Capital in China 1978–2008 (4 December 2008) Ministry of
Commerce of the PRC
<http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/News/Focus/Subject/wzzgxe/wzfzjj/t20081204_99879.htm>.
64
Ibid 2.
65
Department of Foreign Investment Administration, <<投资中国系列报告>> [Invest in China Serials],
(2007) Ministry of Commerce of the PRC <http://fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/default.htm>.
62
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will make it easier to do business with China and provides for closer government,
66
business-business and people-people linkages.

Until its recent slowdown, China had experienced a sustained period of rapid
economic expansion, with GDP growth averaging 11.2 per cent between 2006 and
2010.67 Although growth in 2008 slowed to a seven year low of 9 per cent, and to 7.7
per cent in the first nine months of 2009, these growth rates remain very high by
international standards and China remains the single largest contributor to global
growth.68
China has continued efforts to reform and expand its economy regardless of the
recent international economic recession conditions. During the Tenth Five Year Plan
period, foreign investment of USD383 billion was actually used, including about
USD286 billion as FDI.69 China has become increasingly more outward looking and
active internationally and has become a favourite investment destiny for foreign capital
and multi-national corporations; however, the investment environment in China is still
under development, including the construction of the legal system, perfection of the
market economy system, establishment and implementation of relevant policies, and
further measures to encourage foreign investment. The Chinese government has not
only already promulgated and revised relevant laws, regulations and policy documents
according to the requirements of a market economy and undertaken to join the World

66

Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Trade and Economic Framework
between Australia and the People’s Republic of China’ (5 October 2004) Australian Government
<http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/framework/intro_economic_framework.html>.
67
‘中 华人 民共 和国 2010 年国民 经济 和社 会发 展统 计公布 ’ [Announcement of 2010 National
Economic and Social Development Statistics of the People’s Republic of China] (中华人民共和国国家
统计局 [National Bureau of Statistics of China] 28 February 2011). According to the National Bureau
Statistics of China, GDP rates were 12.7 per cent in 2006, 14.2 per cent in 2007, 9.6 per cent in 2008, 9.2
per cent in 2009 and 10.3 per cent in 2010.
68
Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘People’s Republic of China Country
Brief’ (8 April 2010) Australian Government <http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/china_brief.html>.
69
Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, ‘Investment Environment’ (13 July 2010) Ministry of Commerce of
the PRC <http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_Economy/Investment%20Environment/default.thm>.
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Trade Organisation (WTO),70 it has also made the establishment of laws, regulations
and policies more open, fair, standardised and transparent. Foreign investors expect that
the combination of the transformation of governmental functions, along with
improvement to the efficiency of services, will reduce the number of steps in the
assessment and approval of foreign investment proposals.

1.3.3 Some Substantive Practical Issues for Foreign Investors
The nature of the legal and business environments in China has been of great
importance to those enterprises that have been operating in China as well as to potential
foreign investors. Some practical problems of compliance with laws relating to foreign
investment enterprises and issues of performance of joint ventures are common
experiences of the foreign investor in the PRC. 71 Among the many issues that are
important and indispensable to a potential foreign investor wishing to do business in and
with China are an understanding of Chinese political and legal systems and sensitivity
to Chinese social and cultural issues.

Once the complete setup of a foreign business is achieved, many aspects of
domestic law will be applicable to its operation. For example, amongst the laws and
regulations that apply to Co-operative Joint Ventures (CJVs)72 are the Law of the PRC

70

Guojun Pan et al, ‘China’s Accession to WTO’ The People’s Daily Overseas Edition, 11 November
2001, 1. The Fourth Ministerial Conference of WTO held in the capital of Qatar, Doha, with the
consensus decision supporting China’s accession to the WTO on 10 November 2001.
71
Matthew Stephenson, A Trojan Horse in China (Harvard Law School, 2006) 191. Laws seem opaque,
unpredictable, and unfair. Legal institutions are inefficient, inaccessible to ordinary people, and subject to
corruption and political interference.
72
A Co-operative Joint Venture is a type of joint venture into which foreign investors and Chinese parties
insert every aspect of their arrangements into a written contract and the parties share profits and risks. A
co-operative enterprise can also obtain the status of a ‘Chinese legal person’ if it complies with the
provisions of Chinese law for a legal person.
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on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures 1988 73 the Detailed Rules for the
Implementation of the Law of the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures
199574 and the Interpretation of the Implementation of Certain Articles of the Detailed
Rules for the Implementation of the Law of the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative
Joint Ventures 1996. 75 These are specific laws and regulations governing any CJV.
Additionally, the general national laws are applicable. For instance, the Contract Law of
the PRC 199976 and the General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC 198677 also regulate
CJVs.

However, there are major issues of practical concern regarding ambiguities and
loopholes within and between the laws as well as the impact of government policy on
foreign investors’ operations. These include issues of compliance with China’s
company laws and laws for enterprises involving foreign investment in relation to
limited liability companies under both of those sets of laws. 78

73

<<中华人民共和国中外合作经营企业法>> [Law of the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Co-operative Joint
Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 40,
31 October 2000.
74
<<中华人民共和国中外合作经营企业法实施细则>> [Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the
Law of the PRC on Sino-Foreign Co-operative Enterprises] (People’s Republic of China) Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation, Order No 6, 4 September 1995.
75
关于执行<<中华人民共和国中外合作经营企业法实施细则>>若干条款的说明 [Interpretation of
the Implementation of Certain Articles of the Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Law of the
PRC on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) Ministry of Foreign
Trade and Economic Cooperation, 22 October 1996. It was issued by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation on 22 October 1996 and further explained in Articles 14, 18 and 44 of the
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Law of the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint
Ventures.
76
<<中华人民共和国合同法>> [Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 15, 1 October 1999. It was passed on 15 March at the 2nd
Session of the 9th National People’s Congress and was effective from 1 October 1999.
77
<<中华人民共和国民法通则>> [General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 1 January 1987. It was adopted by the 4 th
Session of the 6th National People’s Congress on 12 April 1986 and came in force on 1 January 1987.
78
Owen D Nee, ‘The Forms of Foreign Investment in the People’s Republic of China’ in Dennis
Campbell and Arthur Wolff (eds), Legal Aspects of Business Transactions and Investment in the Far
East, (Kluwer Publishing, 1988) 219, 221. The difficulty of understanding China’s laws governing
foreign investment is complicated by the fact that China has two separate legal systems, rather than one.
China’s foreign investment laws not only establish the procedures and conditions under which foreign
investment is permitted, they also stipulate the form of enterprise created and have specific laws to

26

Ch 1: General Introduction

Additionally, the unsettled legal environment resulting from an instrumental approach
to law is another factor of concern for foreign investors. This is so because the central
government makes policy decisions tied to the development of the economy. Wang,
referring to the policy emphasis on economic development observes that ‘… the Party’s
tolerance towards economic freedom decides the scope or usefulness of law in the
PRC.’ 79 These issues illustrate the fact that the function and standing of law are
uncertain as a result of the perceptions of the different needs of development. 80 This
research will suggest that this uncertainty can be linked to Chinese history and its
acknowledgement of the place of law in society.

1.4

A Specific Legal Regime for Foreign Investors in the PRC

Today, law in China serves as a means both to consolidate the achievements of
economic reform and to promote further development of economic reform by way of
standardising and institutionalising changes in the economic system. 81 Deng Xiaoping
said, in the Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central
Committee of the CPC, that law must be used to establish stability and order for
economic development.82

In China, Party policy decides the direction of economic reform and
development. Chen Shouyi, a prominent scholar in China, suggests that law is the fixing
regulate foreign exchange, tax, labour matters and a large number of other issues that would normally be
governed by general laws.
79
Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial Law above n 36, 14.
80
Donald C Clark, ‘Legislating for a Market Economy in China’ in Donald C Clark (ed), China’s Legal
System: New Developments, New Challenges (Cambridge University, 2008) 13, 13. In either the statedriven or market-driven model development in China, the goal is to serve the needs of the market
economy.
81
Rongheng Liu, Economic Structural Reform and the Construction of an Economic Legal System (Press
of Current Affairs, 1985) 3–4.
82
Xiaoping Deng, ‘Implement the Policy of Readjustment, Ensure Stability and Unity’ in Selected Works
of Deng Xiaoping (Foreign Languages Press, 1984) 335–55. See also ‘Communiqué of the Third Plenary
Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC’ in Selected Readings of Important Documents
since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Congress of the CPC (People’s Press, 1987) 10–11.
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and codification of policy and that it is necessary to stabilise, in legal form, Party
policies that in practice have repeatedly proven their effectiveness and whose
implementation should be continued.83 Therefore, law is a better tool than policy, as it is
capable of securing and institutionalising policies in a more universal manner, and
providing stability and order through the harnessing of state coercive forces for
economic development, and defining rights and duties in relation to the state as
represented by various administrative authorities.84

Competition among local authorities, to attract foreign investment by offering
preferential treatment and concessions (other than those granted or approved by the
central government), generated the possibility of conflict between central and local
authorities.85 The Chinese Constitution does not expressly give any exclusive powers to
the central government as it allows local government at the provincial level to make
local regulations and rules, provided that these regulations and rules do not contravene
the Constitution, or the law and administrative rules and regulations issued by the
central government.86 Therefore, it remains unclear whether locally granted preferential
treatments and concessions are legally valid, particularly when central government
policies change.

As in other areas of economic activities, various forms of foreign investment
developed and were often permitted by ad hoc policies ahead of legislative sanctions.
However, as foreign investment increased in China, so did the volume of Chinese laws
83

Shouyi Chen, ‘A Review of Thirty Years of Legal Studies in New China’ (1988) 2 Columbia Journal
of Asian Law 181, 181.
84
Law Development of Beijing University (ed), Basic Theories of Legal Science (Beijing University
Press, 1984) 212–21; Daying Wu and Zhongling Shen, A Basic Theory of Chinese Socialist Legal Science
(Publishing House of Law, 1987) 165–77.
85
王一帆 [Wang Yifan], <<吸引外资中的地方政府横向竞争战略分析>> [Competition for Foreign
Investment between Local Governments: A Strategy Analysis ] (苏州大学[Suzhou University], 2006) 18.
86
<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, art 100.
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and regulations both at the central and local levels. These laws and regulations have
resulted in a special legal regime for foreign investment enterprises. A unique feature of
these laws and regulations is that they deal with specific types and specific aspects of
foreign investment. There is no unified code for foreign investment. 87 The trend appears
to be towards uniformity while allowing certain special concessions for foreign
investment in order to attract foreign technologies and capital.

1.5

Economic Development and Legal Reforms

The application of ‘Open Door’ policy and FDI practice facilitated the link between
China and other nations not only at the economic level but also in other social aspects
such as political awareness and the most significant aspect — the nature and effects of
legal reform. The year 1978 is seen by Chinese scholars as the beginning of a new
epoch in modern Chinese history and a turning point in legal development in China.88
Under these historically important circumstances, Chinese legal practice becomes the
most important element of the foreign business person’s experience in their dealings in
China.

These experiences may start from the beginning of the investment project
approval procedure and extend to everyday business operations such as communicating
with various governments’ administrative departments. For example, the establishment
of a joint venture is subject to certain procedural requirements. The parties need
preliminary approval from the relevant government authority or local government

87

Jianfu Chen, ‘China: Constitutional Changes and Legal Developments’ in Alice E-S Tay and Conita S
C Leung (eds), Greater China: Law, Society and Trade (The Law Book, 1995) 139, 163–4.
88
Ibid 150. A legal system was declared a necessity for socialist modernisation. Party leaders also
repeatedly emphasised the importance of law for providing a social order conducive to economic
development.
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before formally applying for approval. 89 However, foreign investors encounter a
somewhat unpredictable investment environment as a result of China’s rapid transition
from a centrally controlled national economy to a market-oriented economic model.
Chinese laws related to foreign business and its interests have been developed
separately and have been largely insulated from the development of domestic laws. 90 At
the same time foreign investors are witnesses to an unprecedented commitment to the
modernisation of laws and the Chinese legal system as a whole.

Meanwhile, in addition to national economic reform, China is engaging in more
and more global business activities with other countries. As a result, the Chinese
economy and economic reform are increasingly linked to and affected by not only its
‘Open Door’ policy but by the broader process of globalisation, wider contact with
other countries and a deepening understanding of international experience and
practice. 91 However, there are major issues concerned with doing business in and/or
with China that involve the local legal environment.92 Foreign companies in China must
deal with a different legal system to that of their home country, and find that the law is
different in both appearance and practice. An understanding of legal practice and its
application in business is becoming significant for any foreign business people in China.
As Xin Ren suggests:

Understanding the penetration of law and social control in Chinese society has been as
difficult for scholars in the fields of legal and social studies as actually establishing
social control has been for China’s leaders. However, the distribution and penetration of

89

John S Mo, International Commercial Law (Butterworths, 1997) 455.
Ibid 319.
91
Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law above n 46, 1.
92
The perceived needs for foreign investment change from time to time. Such needs are reflected in state
industrial policies and local guidelines, issued often on an ad hoc basis, and foreign investment is then
guided into high priority areas. These policy documents also serve the purpose of transparency by
dividing and defining areas or projects into those encouraged, restricted and prohibited. Foreign
investment projects that do not meet these needs will have difficulties obtaining approval from Chinese
authorities. See Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law (Kluwer Law International, 1999) 319.
90
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the state’s power into the social fabric are far more subtle and complicated than
93
understanding institutional reorganisation and legislative stipulation.

Additionally, concerns about problems in the investment environment (such as
lack of predictability and unclear dispute processing) continue to be significant. These
are continuing, and possibly inevitable, hurdles arising from China’s economic
evolution.94 Appelbaum, Felstiner and Gessner observed that:

Business transactions are embedded in an environment of culture, practice and rule. The
construction and fate of business relationships within a nation-state may encounter
differences, for example, in modes of negotiation, enforcement of contract, and in
dispute processing where nation-state control and support are weak or absent, and
where the legal system and legal-cultural backgrounds of participants may diverge
95
considerably.

For foreign investors, China’s huge market is, on the one hand, a place where
their business can expand enormously and they feel that they cannot afford to miss the
opportunity. On the other hand, China’s legal system is difficult to become accustomed
to because it is not only operating in a complicated Communist social system but is also
permeated by a long history of traditions. It is apparent that China’s economic openness
and privatisation have not changed many of its bureaucratic traditions and lack of
democratic processes in its State-commanded, social control mechanisms. So, although
China has made every effort to attract foreign investment, foreign related business is
subject to a strict, multi-dimensional assessment and approval system.96
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Xin Ren, Tradition of the Law and Law of the Tradition: Law, State, and Social Control in China
(Greenwood Press, 1997) 1.
94
Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law above n 46, 318–9. This legal framework consists of the state policies,
national laws and national administrative regulations on various aspects of foreign investment and trade,
and local regulations and rules concerning, largely, investment incentives and economic preferential
treatment.
95
Richard P Appelbaum et al, ‘Introduction: The Legal Culture of Global Business Transaction’ in
Richard P Appelbaum et al (eds), Rules and Networks: The Legal Culture of Global Business
Transactions (Hart Publishing, 2001) 1, 1.
96
Ibid 350.
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1.6

The Existing Legal Environment for Foreign Investors

In this research the laws relating to business entities and foreign investment are
examined together with the practical manifestations of those laws as they affect current
business activities. Instead of a uniform legal framework for business entities, different
enterprises in China have been subject to various individual laws and regulations for
specific forms of enterprises operating in the PRC. These legal frameworks include a
fundamental law — the Constitution of 1982, 97 a basic civil law — the General
Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC 1986 (GPCL)98 and the basic corporations statute
— Company Law of the PRC 2005.99 These laws have effectively established a system
of legal persons in which economic entities are differentiated and accorded different
legal status and legal capacities in accordance with such variable factors as forms of
ownership and departmental and regional subordination relations.100 The establishment
of the civil law institution of legal personality was meant to provide formal legal status
to economic entities and to establish a uniform legal framework for all economic
entities.101

Within a particular type of ownership, economic and business entities are further
differentiated. They are subject to different individual statutes and administrative
regulations in accordance with administrative subordination relations, the regional
97

The current Constitution of the People’s Republic of China was adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth
National People’s Congress (NPC) and promulgated on 4 December 1982. China had three Constitutions
(adopted in 1954, 1975 and 1978) prior to Constitution 1982. This Constitution has been amended four
times, namely in 1988, in 1993, 1999 and 2004.
98
<<中华人民共和国民法通则>> [General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 12 April 1986. It was promulgated in 12 April
1986 at the Fourth Session of the Sixth NPC.
99
<<中华人民共和国公司法>> [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic
of China) National People’s Congress, Order No 42, 1 January 2006. It was passed on 29 December 1993.
This was amended in 2005 with the new Company Law of the PRC taking effect from 1 January 2006.
100
<<中华人民共和国民法通则>> [General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 12 April 1986, art 2–4. Economic equal
treatment for all business entities was formally written into this legislation.
101
Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law above n 46, 287.
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locations of enterprises concerned, forms of foreign investment and even the size of the
business. These statutes and administrative regulations prescribe not only governing
organisational structures but also provide, together with many other administrative
measures and regulations, detailed rights and duties as well as advantageous or
discriminatory treatment. This results in a number of difficulties including:

i)

ambiguous legal status of many economic entities,

ii)

lack of an abstract and general approach towards the legal status of economic
entities, and

iii)

creation of an unequal and unfair environment for economic competition
among different economic entities.

Discussing these problems, Corne has asked why law on its face does not or cannot
connect with reality, why it is haphazard and inconsistent in its implementation, and
why there is an absence of legal autonomy.102 He suggests that these problems result
from what might be termed as the ‘administratisation’ of law rather than the legalisation
of administration. Corne observes:

Law is basically regulatory in its functions but lacking in a sufficient state or social
structure on which to ground application. There has been, as a result of recent social and
political changes and adaptations — both western and Marxist — a normative dislocation
which creates an enormous and persistent gap between the law and the reality in which it
operates or is intended to operate. 103

Initially there was no legal framework for FDI in China. As foreign investment
proliferated the volume of Chinese laws and regulations grew at both at the central and
local levels. These laws and regulations have established a special legal regime for
foreign investment enterprises. A unique feature of these laws and regulations is that
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they deal with specific types and specific aspects of foreign investment, there being no
unified code encompassing all foreign investment.

Complications in the economic transition from a planned economy to a marketoriented system appear to stem from the legal system not keeping pace with the rapid
economic development. China’s enormous population makes it nearly the largest market
ever. Multi-national corporations (such as Citibank, Disney, Nokia, GE, Toyota and
Microsoft) have been successful in expanding their operations to China in order to
broaden their markets. However, barriers in the investment environment have caused
difficulties or even failure for investors’ further involvement. According to the authors
of an International Monetary Fund policy discussion paper, Tseng and Zebregs:

Corruption and legal environment are two important factors that have been found
significant in explaining FDI to many countries. In the case of China, many foreign
investors perceive the legal system as ambiguous, and legal disputes often are settled
through personal contacts rather than formal contracts that are enforced by the court.
The ambiguity in law has, in turn, contributed to corruption … this situation has
deterred foreign investment from Europe and the United States more than investment
from Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan Province of China. Familiarity with the local culture
helps in passing bureaucratic hurdles and that is one of the reasons why investors from
Europe and the United States have often sought local counterparts.104

Furthermore, during the process of the ‘Open Door’ policy reforms many
problems became apparent. A number were related to policy formulation and
implementation procedures but a significant proportion of problems were (and are)
institutional, caused by inherent contradictions within the Chinese political and
economic systems. 105 However, it seems inevitable for China, undergoing a rapid
economic transition within a short period of time, to have systematic problems such as
those between formulation of its policies’ and the legal framework. In addition to
complex legal practice, the underlying social conditions also have a powerful influence
104
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in practical terms. Hardly any business deal or company set up is concluded in China
without the help of personal connections and the ubiquitous business networks. 106
Business networks extend far beyond family structures and include seemingly unrelated
business activities as well as local administrations.107 In this regard Chen states:

The features of law in a given society and at a particular historical stage are shaped not
only by the prevailing environment of that time, but also by the cultural heritage of that
society, though the role of culture and tradition in shaping the law may be muted,
implicit and even unconscious. Thus a study of current Chinese law requires some basic
understanding of legal traditions in China.108

In these circumstances it is not surprising that China’s legal system today is a
result of the effects of historical and cultural factors. To expand on Jianfu Chen’s point,
the understanding of legal traditions in China must also extend to those foreign
investors in China who are directly involved with the practical effects of current laws
relevant to their business activities. It is suggested here that such an understanding will
greatly assist in the set up and operation of their projects, not simply in understanding
the meanings of the laws and regulations but, more importantly, knowing more about
how their Chinese partners are going to respond to those laws and regulatory processes
and to the systems and procedures sought to be introduced by their foreign investor
partners.

1.7

Reflections upon Historical and Social Influences

This aspect of the research constitutes a further examination of the proposition that the
development of the Chinese legal tradition was greatly influenced by both
106
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Confucianism and Legalism and suggests that Confucianism has had a stronger
influence on society than has Legalism. In support of this Chen, argued:

Traditional Chinese conceptions of law have been largely influenced by writings of
traditional schools of philosophy. Of these, three have had a particular influence,
namely, Run Jail (Confucianism); Fa Jia (Legalism); and Yin-Yang Jia, with
Confucianism being the dominant force since the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.)109

In this period the promotion of morality (Li), virtue (De), rightness (Yi), and
benevolence (Ren) was the basis of a government’s activities. 110 They were used to
regulate social relations, to curb the natural desires of human beings, and to cultivate
moral habits.

111

Confucianists opposed the replacement of moral influence by

punishment and the improper application of punishment.

112

This was because

Confucianists believed that human beings, whether their nature be good or bad, are able
to be educated. 113 Thus moral education and influence should be the first priority in
maintaining an ideal social order. Moral self-cultivation and self-control (reinforced
through socialisation within the family, clan, guild and other social institutions) were
other important social control agents in Chinese society. 114 The individual’s internal
ability to control his or her behaviour was regarded as one of the greatest qualities of
human virtue.115
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Historically, local units such as the lineage (tsu or zu), rather than the formal legal
system, handled much of the work of resolving disputes and maintaining order.116 In
terms of the official governmental structure, a magistrate was appointed to govern a
county-size area (Hsien or Xian).117 There was no idea of separation of powers; the
magistrate was responsible for almost everything going on within his territory.118 He
was assisted by a small personal staff and by a larger group of local constabulary. 119
Magistrates were usually transferred every three years mainly to prevent the building of
power bases by local officials.120 However, the short tenure in each area also meant that
a magistrate would have difficulty learning about local conditions and penetrating local
social and other networks.121

This research considers the extent to which local units continue to perform
similar functions today. 122 It has become obvious during this study that many of the
questions regarding Chinese law and social control may not be answered solely on the
basis of a study of the rule of law. This research suggests the additional need for an
examination of culture, customs, traditions, and people’s attitudes toward law and
authorities.123 This section of the research concludes that the legal tradition in China
was constituted by (and the fundamental governance of society was based upon) the
primary education of morality not on the rule of law and that the significance of that
distinction is highly relevant today.

116

任继愈 [Ren Jiyu], above n 113, 80.
马志冰 [Ma Zhibing], above n 41, 57.
118
Ibid.
119
Ibid 58.
120
Ibid 202.
121
张晋藩 [Zhang Jinpu], <<中国司法制度史>> [History of the Judicial System of China] (人民法院出
版社[People’s Court Publishing House], 2004) 1.
122
John H Barton et al, Law in Radically Different Cultures (West Publishing, 1983) 554–5.
123
Xin Ren, Tradition of the Law above n 93, 3.
117

37

Ch 1: General Introduction

This study explores Chinese legal tradition with respect to the function of law and
morality. The Chinese legal tradition in respect of both Confucianism (that emphasised
morality) and Legalism (that emphasised the rule of law) has resulted in the current
legal system being characterised by the influence of these two influential, and often
adversarial, schools of thought.

The Confucianist ideology provided the fundamentals for the substance of
traditional law and the Legalist school constructed the important framework of the
traditional legal system. 124 Although the Legalist school and Confucianism were
adversarial philosophies in terms of their political ideologies as to how Chinese society
should be ruled, they shared some important ideas, including that of the emperor’s
power over all facets of life — including law.125 However, Chinese imperial law bears a
strong, Confucian moral character. 126 From the traditional point of view, Chinese
society has highly valued self-sufficiency and self-reliance through internal restraint and
discipline. 127 Societal reliance on external control through formal legal procedure,
codified law and official social control agencies was regarded as morally inferior to
internalised self-constraint and seen as virtually a form of dehumanisation.128 Confucian
morality and imperial law were two parallel behavioural codes that combined to order
social conduct in Chinese society.129
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1.8

The Intersection of Philosophy and Political Power in China

The emphasis on the emperor’s superior power under the teaching of Confucius is a
major tradition in political power in China. The test of good government was based on
virtue and morality but not by law. Chen observed, ‘Law increasingly became an
administrative tool for determining and maintaining social order with the state at the
centre.’130 Certain fundamental features of the traditional legal culture clearly persist in
the contemporary legal system and social attitudes towards law.

No discussion of law in the PRC would be complete without examining the
relationship between the Communist Party and the legal system. The CPC has a central
role in China’s domestic and foreign policies and in any forecast of China’s future.
Chinese law must conform to Party policies, and Party policies still remain at the heart
of all laws. The CPC plays an important role in implementing policy through the
legislative process. The Party’s role in dealing with the judiciary has three dimensions.
Firstly, it conducts education programs to explain its ideology and the maintenance of
the Party line by the judiciary. Secondly, it selects a number of able cadres to run the
judicial organs. Thirdly, it constantly observes whether or not the judicial systems
strictly implement the law. 131 Through these mechanisms, the Party becomes the
guardian of the law.132
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1.9

Prospective Development of the Rule of Law in China

As a result of the rapid and large scale transition from a socialist planned economy to a
market economy, the nature of the reconstruction of the legal system in the PRC has
become significant in relation to economic development within China and in respect of
external concerns about China’s future political direction. These matters have been the
subject of significant study and debate. Studies of China’s current legal system and its
development and reform have involved both Chinese and western scholars. Chen points
out:

There are vibrant debates on key issues relevant to the future development of Chinese
law. Examples of these issues include (1) the pathway of legal modernisation in China,
(2) the relationship between traditional Chinese legal culture and the quest for legal
modernisation, (3) faith in law, (4) civil society and legal development, (5) judicial
reform, and (6) the contextual approach to legal research.133

Chen studied the work of Professor Zhu Suli, Dean of Beijing University Law
School and one of the most outstanding legal socialists in contemporary China. Chen
observed Zhu’s views on legal development in China including Zhu’s cautionary view
that while most Chinese jurists assume that legal modernisation is legal westernisation,
Western norms and practices are not necessarily universally valid and applicable. While
most Chinese jurists believe in the use of legislation to promote social and economic
transformation, Zhu points out that the spontaneous order and customary practices that
emerge from the rational choice of countless individuals cannot be easily dictated to by
the State’s legislative decrees. While most Chinese jurists advocate the Rule of Law,
judicial independence and the protection of people’s rights on an abstract and
philosophical level, Zhu calls attention to the social reality and the living conditions of
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the people. 134 While most Chinese jurists presuppose that enlightened legal ideas
constitute one of the most powerful forces behind legal and institutional progress, Zhu
relies on Marxist historical materialism in arguing that what ultimately matters are the
material and social conditions in which people live, and that the ‘modern’ rule of law is
a response to the commercialisation, industrialisation and urbanisation of society rather
than a liberation from despotism and authoritarianism.135

On the other hand, Jianfu Chen argues that there is indeed a home-grown
Chinese conception of the rule of law that has been promoted and practised in the last
twenty years or so. For many years, the proclamation that there must be laws for people
to follow and that these laws must be observed, that their enforcement must be strict,
and that law-breakers must be dealt with, has been held by party and government
officials to be the essence of, or a basic requirement for, the rule of law. This notion of
the rule of law is, however, vague and ambiguous.136 There are no requirements as to
how laws are to be made, whether the rulers are to observe the law, whether the
enforcement must also be impartial and independent, or how law-breakers are to be
dealt with (other than strictly).137

In his study of Chinese law, Peerenboom discusses the rule of law from the
perspective of a philosophical pragmatism that balances ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ theories on
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the rule of law138. Recognising that concepts of law are unavoidably contentious and
embedded in the context of local culture, Peerenboom suggests that despite the many
problems and contradictions inherent in development of law in China during the postMao period, this process can indeed be described as moving toward a rule of law
system. While Peerenboom acknowledges numerous obstacles (including the dilemma
of party rule, the institutional frailty of legal institutions, and the obstacles of path
dependency, he suggests, nonetheless, that China’s economic reforms make some form
of rule of law inevitable. Peerenboom views the development of China’s legal system as
an historical process of socio-economic change that makes unavoidable the gradual
progression toward a system which, while not necessarily matching the models of
Europe or North America, nonetheless qualifies as a rule of law system.139

Peerenboom notes that while China’s leaders have officially endorsed the rule of
law, they have not sanctioned the liberal democratic version. 140 Accordingly, to gain an
understanding of the likely path of development of China’s legal system and the reasons
for differences in its institutions, rules, practices and outcomes in particular cases, it will
be necessary to rethink the rule of law. The rule of law can be theorised in ways that do
not assume a liberal democratic framework and that include an exploration of
alternative conceptions of the rule of law that are consistent with China’s
circumstances.141 To that end, Peerenboom refers to four competing ‘thick’ conceptions
of rule of law namely: Statist Socialist, Neo-Authoritarian, Communitarian and Liberal
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Democratic.142 Peerenboom’s conclusions about the potential for the emergence of the
rule of law in China draw on his assessment of the interplay between law and economic
development. He asserts that law has played a central role in Chinese economic
development and will continue to do so.143 He suggests that law may play a yet greater
role in supporting political reform, particularly as the economy develops and Chinese
people seek expanded legal rights. 144 Peerenboom sees changing attitudes among
China’s population, driven in part by economic growth and in part by increased
exposure to international ideas, as demanding increased reliance on law and legal
procedures in the exercise of governance.145 Peerenboom’s is a hopeful projection, that
changing attitudes among the Chinese people will constrain the state to rely increasingly
on law and legal procedure.146

From another perspective, Cao suggests an examination of Chinese legal
language in terms of the ‘rule of law’ or ‘rule by law’ debate in contemporary China.
She observes that one of the most commonly used phrases in China today is fazhi. Fazhi
can be translated into English as both ‘rule of law’ and ‘rule by law’. In the Chinese
language, no convenient and easy distinction can be made between ‘rule of law’ and
‘rule by law’ as is possible in English. The rule of law in China has always been a topic
of academic and pragmatic interest. Its renewed interest has been highlighted by the
incorporation of Fazhi in the Chinese Constitution. In March 1999, the National
People’s Congress (NPC) of the People’s Republic of China adopted an amendment to
the Chinese Constitution, incorporating in Article 5 Yi fa zhi guo (governing the country
142
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in accordance with law) and Jianshe shehui zhuyi fazhi guojia (building a socialist rule
of law state). Prior to this, CPC in 1996 and 1998 set the aforementioned as part of its
policy for government. The Legislation Law of the PRC 2000 also includes Jianshe
shehui zhuyi fazhi (building a socialist rule of law).147

The emphasis upon Fazhi, in particular its inclusion in the Constitution, has
been viewed in legal circles in China as a major step forward in its modern legal
development.148 However, Cao suggests that Fazhi could also be seen as simply another
political slogan used by the Chinese government that does not carry any substantive
meaning — a kind of ‘semantic law’ — as is, she asserts, is the case with many
constitutional guarantees regarding the rights of Chinese citizens. 149 Language can
influence people’s world view and their construction of reality. Also, Cao asserts, it is
unprecedented that such prominence has been accorded to law and Fazhi, politically,
legislatively, and academically.150 Due to the lack of legal definition of Fazhi or Yi fa
zhi guo (a variant expression), a diverse range of opinions has been offered by Chinese
legal scholars, debating what Fazhi means or should mean. 151 Cao argues that in
contemporary China, Fazhi is still largely an ideal that is being debated and in the
process of finding a foothold whilst drawing upon western thinking along the way. 152 It
might be instructive to those with similar views to those expressed by Cao to examine
147
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the many Constitutions and laws of western countries that contain lofty ideals that are
not realised in practice. The institutional aspect of Fazhi, its elevated status and
legitimacy in the Constitution and the continued development and strengthening of the
legal machinery is noteworthy. It may be flawed and in need of improvement, but
Chinese law and legal processes have displayed or begun to display some of the
essential attributes of rule of law under the ‘thin’ theory.153

China’s legal reform has attracted attention from scholars, politicians and
international lawyers, who are interested in Chinese economic development and its
significant role on the international stage. Issues in relation to the Chinese legal system,
political reform and the application of the rule of law in China have attracted the
attention of numerous researchers. Those studies have contributed significant and
helpful projections or suggestions in regard to China’s legal evolution over the long
term. Nevertheless, it is this researcher’s view that, in the course of China’s current
legal reform, attention also should be paid to the effects of traditional embedded
customs that are still operating within the legal system in subtle ways. Careful
consideration of the social conditions within which the legal system is operating are,
this researcher suggests, worthy of significant attention for analysing the prospects of an
efficient and successful outcome of legal reform in China today.

This study examines how law in China has evolved in the light of cultural and
historical factors. Chinese law was indigenously developed from the secular
philosophies of social morality, namely Legalism and Confucianism. The patriarchal
relationships and behavioural norms within the extended family or clan were not only
reflected in the power structure of officialdom but also formed the basic foundation and
153
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standards for social conformity. 154 Law everywhere is evolutionary and this quality
seems to be even more evident in China in terms of its relationships with the
international community. Foreign investors’ activities in China must meet the challenge
posed by differences of legal culture and tradition because those differences will,
according to the findings of this research, continue to provide significant influence in
the future shaping of the legal system of the PRC. It is axiomatic that all legal
development is based upon the development of society and that such development
demonstrates that people and their relationships constantly change and develop over the
course of time.155

Some observers express concerns about legal-political development in China.
Alleged development of Chinese ‘economic nationalism’ is of concern to Françoise
Nicolas.156 Nicolas suggests that there is something dangerous about China’s apparent
recent exercise of more control over foreign investors. It appears that China is reluctant
to let foreign investors dominate or monopolise some sectors of the Chinese
economy.157 From the perspective of those who believe that the ‘market’ should be the
arbiter of everything, it seems that for a sovereign nation to decide to impose some
controls over the ‘market’, and in particular the market’s activities within that sovereign
state, is some sort of dangerous and radical behaviour. Nicolas also suggests that China
is seeking to reduce its dependence upon foreign investors. More constructively, James
Zimmerman provides valuable and very extensive information resources to any
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researcher on Chinese law, systems and policies as well as expanded discussion on
some of the matters raised in this study.158

John Mo brings to the examination of Chinese law a wide experience in the
study of international commercial law in particular and provides an excellent source of
comparative research. 159 Mo carefully explores Chinese law and practice relating to
foreign investment and makes it clear that China’s legal system will become more
transparent, fairer and more desirable as China’s market becomes more mature and
more open.160

On the question of the existence or otherwise of a rational set of laws in China in
earlier times, according to Kenneth Winston, the conventional view of early Chinese
law — being essentially that the rules made by the emperors were of low quality and
solely for the purpose of maintaining power with the ruler being all powerful —
oversimplifies and possibly debases the idea of the existence of an effective and
respected system of laws. He argues that these laws were more sophisticated and more
principled than is often recognised, a view shared by this researcher. 161

1.10 Conclusions
Another revolution occurred in China in the late 1970s after the end of the Cultural
Revolution. That revolution was the way that China, led by Deng Xiaoping, re-stated
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and re-organised its attitudes to economics and trade both internally and with the
western world. It has led to massive economic growth in China and such a lift in its
international trading status that it has become the leading economic power in the world.
This chapter has analysed the nature and extent of foreign investment in the PRC and
begun to introduce the legal regime that confronts foreign investors.

China’s systems of law were not well prepared for the onslaught of foreign
investors at the early stages of the ‘Open Door’ policy. These foreign investors were
generally accustomed to sets of laws that were quite consistent and predictable and
allowed them to conduct their business with confidence. However, Chinese laws often
appeared to be inconsistent — for example: in respect of the location of the foreign
business venture (hence the group of administrators performing regulatory functions);
the binding value (or otherwise) of the terms of a contract; or how dispute situations
were to be dealt with — and these uncertainties, coupled with the unique nature of a
communist regime with a ‘market economy’ policy, comprised a particularly
challenging situation for both existing or potential foreign investors and their Chinese
business partners.

This study will reflect upon those challenges, examine the way in which law has
evolved in China, and analyse how western law interacts with modern Chinese law. It
will be based upon the practical ways that laws related to economic activity are
interpreted by Chinese participants and seek to explain why those interpretations are
sometimes confusing to western foreign investors.

This chapter has introduced two very important aspects of the social and cultural
background of Chinese business people. These are the aspects of interaction and
networks. Chinese management characteristics are analysed in order to identify how
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those aspects are related to the experiences of foreign investors in the PRC.
Additionally, the chapter has begun the analysis of the importance of historical and
cultural factors in the make-up and practical manifestation of Chinese laws, particularly
in the areas of investment and contract law.

The following chapter discusses the ways in which the political and legal
structures of China have developed into their current form. The structure of the court
systems in China and their modes of operation are also discussed as are the roles of the
various dispute resolution mechanisms that operate in China’s legal system. The chapter
also commences an analysis of the sources of the laws that form the Chinese legal
system.
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Chapter 2
Political and Legal Systems in China
2.1

Introduction

The legal history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began in 1949. The socialist
elements of the Chinese legal system came primarily from Soviet sources. China started
to absorb the Soviet experience in every aspect of its socialist society from 1949. 1
However, the present legal system is mainly a product of the legal reform and
development efforts in the 1980s and 1990s.2 The current legal system operates as part
of five-tiered governmental structure including central, provincial, municipal, county
and village levels. 3 The various political, legislative, governmental, administrative,
judicial and prosecutorial structures and institutions of the PRC are set up in accordance
with these five levels.

To study and comprehend China’s foreign investment law and its application in
the prevailing social conditions, it is necessary to understand some important aspects of
the current legal and political systems of China, including the political party, lawmaking bodies, governmental institutions and the court system, and the interpretation of
laws and sources of judicial information.

This chapter sets out the legal and political structures in the PRC and some of
the historical background of those systems. Section 2.2 outlines developments in the
period from the late 19th century the early 20th century leading to the establishment of

1

Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial Law (Oxford University Press, 2000) 10.
Ibid 31.
3
Ibid 13.
2
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the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the subsequent formation of the Peoples
Republic of China (PRC). Section 2.3 details the political structure of the CPA and its
hierarchy. The law making institutions of the PRC and their manner of operation are
described in detail in section 2.4. Section 2.4.1 presents details of the Executive
structure and the roles of the members of the Executive and the Executive institutions.
Section 2.5 examines the sources of law in the PRC commencing with the 1982
Constitution of the PRC, and includes explanations of the roles of the National People’s
Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee, the PRC’s relationship with international
treaties and the role of case law. Section 2.6 provides a detailed description of the Court
system in the PRC. Section 2.7 examines the role of equity in Chinese law and its
emphasis within the conciliation processes in the Chinese legal system. Section 2.8
comprises a detailed analysis of the People’s Procuratorate — an office of public
prosecutors but with greatly extended powers within the court and judicial systems,
including supervision of the legal activities of the People’s Courts, the execution of
judgments, and the activities of prisons. Section 2.9 provides an analysis of the means
by which laws are interpreted in the PRC which is complemented by a discussion in
section 2.10 of the sources of judicial information. Section 2.11 discusses the dispute
and resolution processes in the PRC and uses a hypothetical dispute to illustrate some of
these processes. Section 2.12 provides a brief outline of the conciliation, arbitration and
appeal processes in Chinese law and section 2.13 summarises and concludes the
chapter.
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2.2

Modern China–Preceding 1949

Efforts to modernise the legal system were instituted by the Qing Empire in the earliest
part of the 20th century.4 It had become apparent that some aspects of the legal system,
such as the harshness of criminal procedure and the lack of commercial law, rendered
China’s law primitive in comparison to legal systems of other nations. One initiative
was the creation of a Law Reform Bureau in 1904, instilled with the task of translating
foreign codes and drafting new laws.5 Another move in the direction of modernisation
was the promulgation of an Imperial Constitutional Outline in 1908.6 However, before
any of the drafted laws were implemented the Qing Empire was overthrown in 1911.
Nevertheless, successive governments adopted some laws that were partly based on the
draft laws of the Qing reform movement.7

The CPC was established on 1 July 1921. Shortly afterwards, a politically
tumultuous period (referred to as the ‘New Democratic Revolution’) ensued,
encompassing three important struggles in which the CPC engaged. Included in this
period were the Second Revolutionary Civil War (1927–37), the War of Resistance
4

Between 1890 and 1910, legal reform was advocated by the Emperor and some leading scholars with
the intention of modernising the Chinese traditional legal system. The adoption of a Western-style code
marked a significant turning point in Chinese legal history as China, for the first time, moved away from
traditional Chinese society and Confucian philosophy. Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial Law (Oxford
University Press, 2000) 8 cited in P R Luney Jr, ‘Traditions and Foreign Influences: Systems of Law in
China and Japan’ Law and Contemporary Problems (Duke University, 1989) 52 (2), 131.
5
In May 1904, a Law Codification Commission was established (法律编撰馆) — an event seen by a
former Chinese judge at the Permanent Court of International Justice, Tien-His Cheng, as the
commencement of a new era. Shen Jiaben and Wu Tingfang were appointed commissioners to the
Commission.
6
In 1907, a constitutional committee, named the Committee for Investigating and Drawing up
Regulations of Constitutional Government (宪政编查馆) was established. In the following years until the
final collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1912, a series of edicts concerning the establishment of a
constitutional government and a series of constitutional projects and documents was issued by the Throne.
7
《暂行新刑律施行细则》[New Interim Provisional Details on the Criminal Code] (Republic of China)
12 September 1912. This provision was enacted by the Republic of China in 1912. It adopted some
advanced principles from the legal reform during the Qing dynasty with the aim of resolving some
problems in legal practice during the implementation of the new Criminal Code; 马志冰 [Ma Zhibing],
<<中国法制史>> [History of the Chinese Legal System] (北京大学出版社 [Beijing University Press],
2004) 262.
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against Japan (1937–45), and the Third Revolutionary Civil War (1945–49). In 1949
the CPC founded the PRC.

The origin of the current legal system can be traced to the period of the Chinese
Soviet Republic in the revolutionary period prior to the establishment of the PRC.8 The
first formal piece of legislation was the Common Programme of the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference (promulgated in 1949), which laid down the essential
principles of the Constitution which was subsequently adopted in 1954.9

2.3.

The Communist Party of China

The CPC is the only formal political organisation with power in China.10 There are three
levels of the CPC in descending hierarchical order include: the National People’s
Congress; the People’s Congresses at the provincial level; autonomous regions; and four
municipalities 11 directly under the Central Government (State Council) and People’s
Congresses at the level of municipalities other than those mentioned above. There also
are branches at local county levels or in some organisations such as State Owned
8

In the beginning of the PRC era from 1949, law-making mainly consisted of translating and borrowing
from Soviet Law. The connection between Soviet Law and the civil law system is that the civil law
system operated in Russia before the ‘October Revolution’ led by Lenin in 1917. See Kuihua Wang,
Chinese Commercial Law (Oxford University Press, 2000) 9–10.
9
The ‘Instruction of Central Committee of the CPC to Abolish the Kuomintang Six Codes and to define
the Judicial Principles for the Liberated Areas’ was issued in February 1949. This ‘Instruction’ was issued
as an opinion of the Central Committee of the CPC to governments at different levels and to judicial
cadres for further discussions. Opinions and conclusions were sought, but the ‘Instruction’ was
immediately implemented in March 1949 by an ‘Order of the North China People’s Government to
Abolish the Six Codes and All Reactionary Laws’. This Order was identical to the ‘Instruction’. In
September 1949, it was further implemented by the Common Programme of the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference, a document which served as a provisional constitution until the first
constitution of the PRC was promulgated in 1954.
10
There are eight other parties in China including the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang,
China Democratic League, China Democratic National Construction Association, China Association for
Promoting Democracy, China Peasants and Workers’ Democratic Party, China Zhi Gong Dang, Jiu San
Society and Taiwan Democratic Self-government League. They are all under the leadership of the CPC.
The CPC claims this political system of ‘multi-party’ cooperation and political consultation operates
under the leadership of the CPC as China’s basic political system. See <<中华人民共和国宪法>>
[Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s
Congress, 20 September 1954, Preamble.
11
These four municipalities are Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing.
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Enterprises, universities, schools, the army and village farming co-operative teams. The
Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC has
important decision-making power. Zhao, of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
examined the CPC Central Committee’s decisions-making on policies concerning all
major issues related to China’s economic and social development. 12 According to the
structure of the State, the Chinese Government separates powers among different
organisations. For example, the administrative power is held by the State Council and
the various local governments; legislative power is exercised by the NPC and local
People’s Congresses; judicial power is dispensed by the Supreme People’s Courts and
other People’s Courts at various levels.

However, the separation of power has been weakened as a result of the fact that
the CPC is an omnipotent political party in China and that most of the senior
government officials and representatives of the People’s Congresses at various levels
are held by the CPC members. Thus the CPC effectively has control of the legislative
and administrative systems.13

2.4.

The Law-making Institutions

The NPC is the highest organ of State power and, together with its permanent body, the
Standing Committee of the NPC, exercises the legislative power of the State.14 With
3000 members the NPC now convenes a meeting each year which lasts for about two
weeks. In theory, the NPC has the power to amend the Constitution and to enact and
amend basic laws governing criminal offences, civil affairs, the state organs and other
12

Zhikui Zhao, ‘The Power of Collective Wisdom’, (27 May 2011) Beijing Review
< http://www.bjreview.com.cn/print/txt/2011-05/27/content_361189.htm>.
13
Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial Law above n 1, 16.
14
<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, art 57.
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matters. 15 In practice however, the NPC has neither the ability nor adequate time to
consider draft bills for enactment. On the other hand, the Standing Committee of the
NPC is much smaller in size and meets every two months.16 Many of its members serve
on a full-time basis. To entrust the NPC Standing Committee with the legislative power
is a demonstration of China’s willingness to allow the NPC to exercise its legislative
power in the true sense. Compared with the legislative power of the NPC, the Standing
Committee may not amend the Constitution. However the Standing Committee is
authorised to:

(1) interpret the Constitution and supervise its enforcement;
(2) enact and amend laws, with the exception of those which should be enacted by
the NPC;
(3) partially supplement and amend, when the NPC is not in session, laws enacted by
the NPC provided that the basic principles of these laws are not contravened;
(4) interpret laws;
(5) annul those administrative rules and regulations, decisions or orders of the State
Council that contravene the Constitution or the law;
(6) annul those local regulations or decisions of the organs of state power of
provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under Central
Government that contravene the Constitution, the law or the administrative rules
and regulations.17

From the above provisions, it is clear that not only the NPC and its Standing
Committee have legislative power, but also the State Council and Local governments. 18
In regard to the law-making power of local government, such power may be exercised
only by the People’s Congresses of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities
directly under Central Government control. The People’s Congresses of cities where
provincial and autonomous regional people’s governments are located and the People’s
15

Ibid art 62.
Ibid art 3.
17
Ibid art 67.
18
Ibid art 89.
16
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Congresses of relatively large cities, with State Council approval, may also formulate
local regulations, which must not contravene the local regulations of their respective
provinces or autonomous regions or contravene the Constitution, the law and
administrative rules and regulations. Likewise, the People’s Congresses of the
provinces, autonomous regions and cities may not formulate any local regulations
contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, the law, and administrative rules and
regulations. At the same time, local regulations must be adopted in light of the specific
conditions and actual needs of the respective administrative areas.

Starting from the early 1990s all the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in China
gradually acquired the power to enact local regulation.

19

As provided in the

Constitution, the administrative rules and regulations created by the State Council must
not contravene the Constitution or the laws; otherwise the NPC Standing Committee
may declare such administrative rules and regulations null and void.20

In terms of the hierarchy of law-making power, Chinese law can be divided into
four categories:

(1) the Constitution;
(2) laws adopted by the NPC and its Standing Committee;
(3) administrative regulations adopted by the State Council;

19

<<全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于授权深圳市人民代表大会及其常务委员会和深圳市人民政
府分别制定法规和规章在深圳经济特区实施的决定>> [Decision of the Standing Committee of the
NPC on Authorising the People’s Congress of the Shenzhen City and its Standing Committee and the
People’s Government of Shenzhen City to Formulate Regulations and Rules Respectively for
Implementation in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s
Congress Standing Committee, 1 July 1992.
20
<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, art 67.
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(4) local regulations by the People’s Congresses of provinces, autonomous
regions and cities.
As provided by the Constitution, the legal superiority descends according to the
level of law-making authority. The Constitution governs the social, economic and
political sectors of the country. It is the fundamental law of China and has the highest
legal binding power. It states the country’s fundamental system and tasks. 21 No laws,
administrative regulations or local decrees may contravene the Constitution.22

The laws adopted by the NPC and its Standing Committee are the second level.
They are general in nature and therefore usually supplemented by more detailed rules at
the third (State Council) level. Rules and regulations enacted by the State Council or
other relevant ministries deal with specific matters, particularly economic activities, and
are applied nationwide. For example, the Law on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint
Ventures of the People’s Republic of China was enacted on 1 July 1979.23 Later, the
State Council promulgated Provisions on the Labour Administration of the Enterprises
of Foreign Investment and its Regulations in respect of the Registration of Joint
Ventures in the People’s Republic of China 1994.24 Three years after the adoption of the
1979 Equity Joint Venture Law, the State Council adopted Regulations for the
Implementation of the Law on Equity Joint Ventures of the People’s Republic of China

21

Ibid last paragraph of the Preface.
Ibid art 5.
23
<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法>> [Law of the People’s Republic of China on ChineseForeign Equity Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing
Committee, Order No 48, 15 March 2001. The EJV Law was adopted on 1 July at the 2nd Session of the
5th NPC. It was amended twice: on 4 April 1999 at the 3rd Session of the 7th NPC and recently in March
2001.
24
<<外商投资企业劳动管理规定>> [Provisions on the Labour Administration of the Enterprises of
Foreign Investment] (People’s Republic of China), Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation, Order No 246, 11 August 1994.
22
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1983,25 which provide more detailed provisions for the establishment and management
of equity joint ventures using Chinese and foreign investment.

Over the last two decades, the State Council’s legislative power has been
increased. In April 1984, the NPC Standing Committee passed a resolution requiring its
working committee to co-operate with the State Council and various ministries to
research and draft legislation for the implementation of the economic policies of
China.26

Ministerial provisions are more limited in nature and their application is
generally within the sphere of the function of the ministry in question. Very often, the
ministerial provisions are intended to supplement and implement regulations adopted by
the State Council. For example, immediately after the State Council promulgated the
Provisions for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment in October 1986, the Ministry
of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation, the People’s Bank of China and the
Ministry of Finance issued implementing rules covering such areas as examination and
confirmation of export-oriented enterprises and technologically advanced enterprises
with foreign investment, import and export licences, loans in Chinese currency, and
taxation. 27 These ministerial provisions have a nationwide application and may be
supplemented by local legislation which takes into account the conditions and
circumstances of the local area.

25

<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法实施条例>> [Regulations for the Implementation of the
Law of the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) State Council,
Order No 311, 22 July 2001. The EJV Regulations were promulgated by the State Council on 20
September 1983, and amended on 15 January 1986, 21 December 1987 and 22 July 2001.
26
Asian Development Bank, Development Management Progress and Challenges in the People’s
Republic of China (Asian Development Bank, 2002) 41.
27
<<鼓励外商投资高新技术产品目录>> [Catalogue of Encouraging Foreign Investment in High
Technology Products 2006] (People’s Republic of China) Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Science
and Technology, Order No 652, 31 December 2006. In order to encourage foreign investment in
advanced technology and manufacturing advanced equipment and parts, foreign invested enterprises were
exempted from import duty and associated added value tax.
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Local congresses and governments at various levels are permitted to enact laws suitable
to local conditions provided that such laws and regulations do not contravene the
Constitution or the laws or regulations adopted by Central Government. 28 In effect,
local governments may promulgate laws which vary slightly from those enacted by the
Central Government. These local laws are valid provided that they are in conformity
with the general principles and policies of the legislation enacted by the Central
Government. For example, as soon as the State Council passed provisions for the
encouragement of foreign investment in October 1986, 29 many provincial and local
governments promulgated similar regulations to give foreign investors more incentives
in comparison to the incentives offered by their local counterparts. These local
provisions carry a step further the standards adopted by the Central Government but are
still within the general principles of encouraging foreign investment involving advanced
technology or for the production of export-oriented goods. They are, therefore, valid
laws in so far as they are implemented in their respective localities.

The Constitution stipulates that law includes the administrative rules and
regulations enacted by the State Council which have nationwide applications. 30
Accordingly, such rules and regulations may be referred to by the court when dealing
with relevant cases. The question then arises, what constitutes administrative rules and
regulations of the State Council? It is true that the Constitution mentions both
administrative rules and regulations, but they are stipulated in the same category of
orders and decisions of the State Council. The logical interpretation is, therefore, that all

28

<<中华人民共和国立法法>> [Legislation Law of the PRC] (People’s Republic of China) National
People’s Congress, Order No 31, 15 March 2000, arts 63–64.
29
<<国务院关于鼓励外商投资的规定>> [Provisions of the State Council for the Encouragement of
Foreign Investment] (People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No 95, 11 October 1986.
30
<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, art 56.
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the provisions and measures adopted by the State Council, regardless of their form or
title, have the same effect and should be regarded as administrative regulations.

The Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China 2000 (Legislation Law
2000) was passed by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2000. 31
According to Paler’s study, this law ‘represents an attempt by the NPC to rationalise
China’s legal system, establish a uniform legislative hierarchy and consolidate its
authority over other important lawmaking institutions.’32
The passage of the Legislation Law 2000 offered a unique opportunity to
glimpse the institutional power struggles among major law-making institutions as they
engaged in arguments and reached compromises over fundamental issues of their
authority, purposes and responsibilities within an evolving legislative system. The
Legislation Law 2000 should be recognised as an attempt by the NPC to strengthen its
authority against that of the State Council and local government by addressing the
myriad of conflicts that jeopardised the coherence of China’s entire legal system and
challenged the NPC’s ability to play a unifying role in that system. The NPC succeeded
to some extent in reining in the discretion of the local authorities,33 but it made little
progress in establishing mechanisms to control the departmental protectionism rampant

31

<<中华人民共和国立法法>> [Legislation Law of the PRC] (People’s Republic of China) National
People’s Congress, Order No 31, 15 March 2000. It was adopted at the Third Session of the Ninth
National People’s Congress and promulgated by the President of the People’s Republic of China on 15
March 2000, effective from 1 July 2000.
32
Laura Paler, ‘China’s Legislation Law and the Making of a More Orderly and Representative
Legislative System’ (2005) 182 China Quarterly 301, 301.
33
<<中华人民共和国反垄断法>> [Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s
Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 68, 30 August 2007, art
8. This article states that administrative departments and organisations with authority under law or
regulation to manage public affairs are not allowed to abuse their administrative power and discretionary
power and any such competition should be prohibited and prevented; 杨仕兵,许艳艳[Yang Shibing and
Xu Yianyian], ‘对反垄断法中规范行政垄断的质疑’ [Questioning the Regulating of Administrative
Conduct in the Anti-Monopoly Law] (2002) 18 Journal of Wanxi University 49, 51.
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within the State Council.34 While many debates that emerged during the drafting of the
Legislation Law 2000 revealed a genuine recognition of the problems and resulted in
some innovative proposals, particularly on supervision, the extreme sensitivity and
volatility of the issues at hand meant the carving away of the draft Law’s most
substantive portions. Thus, while the Legislation Law 2000 documents the ideal of a
uniform legal hierarchy, it is likely to become a victim of the system it was intended to
reshape without more thorough structural reform.35 The Legislation Law 2000 has some
potential, however, if China’s leadership views it as a necessary stepping-stone on the
path to the creation of a better legal system, increasingly seen as necessary for China’s
international economic integration and even the Party’s legitimacy.
To some degree, NPC officials who have invoked the Law in the name of more
procedurally transparent and publicly consultative legislation have already demonstrated
its use in such a manner. For example, Legislation Law article 88 gives power to the
NPC, NPC standing Committee, State Council, people’s congresses of provincial
governments and autonomous regional governments to revoke regulations, departmental
rules and local government regulations. In judicial practice the Supreme People’s Court
issues guidelines to direct the people’s courts in dealing with administrative dispute
cases.36

34

Laura Paler, ‘China’s Legislation Law’ above n 32, 208; See Yongsheng Zhang, ‘How Will China’s
Central–local Governmental Relationships Evolve?: An Analytical Framework and its Implications’ in
Ross Garnaut et al (ed), China: The Next Twenty Years Reform and Development (The Australian
National University E Press, 2010).
35
Laura Paler, ‘China’s Legislation Law’ above n 32, 310.
36
<<关于审理行政案件适用法律规范问题的座谈会纪要>> [Memorandum Concerning Application
of Laws to Administrative Cases] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme People’s Court, Order No 96, 18
May 2004; <<张苏南与上海劳动教养管理委员会行政纠纷>> [Sunan Zhang v Shanghai Labour
Education Administrative Committee – Administrative Dispute] 江 苏 省 呸 州 市 人 民 法 院 [Jiangsu
Province Bizhou Intermediate People’s Court, People’s Republic of China] （2009）呸行初字第 33 号
(Administrative Trial No 33).

61

Ch 2: Political and Legal Systems in China

2.4.1 The Executive Branch
The positions and powers of the President and the Vice President are established in
Articles 79–84 in the Constitution 1982. The NPC elects individuals to fill these
positions for a term of five years with a limit of two consecutive terms. 37 Some of the
powers entrusted to the President are the promulgation of statutes, the appointment and
removal of various State Council members, the issue of pardons, proclamations of
martial law and states of war, as well as receiving foreign diplomats and ratifying or
abrogating treaties with foreign nations.38 The Vice President is to aid the President in
carrying out his duties, and may carry out presidential functions delegated by the
President.39

Section 3 of Chapter 3 of the Constitution 1982 deals with the State Council.
The State Council is the Central Government in China. The State Council is the
government of the PRC under the authority of Articles 85–98. It is the highest organ of
state power and of state administration.40 The State Council consists of the Premiers,
Vice-Premiers, State Councillors, Ministers in charge of ministries, Ministers in charge
of commissions, the Auditor-General, and the Secretary-General. The State Council’s
term of office is five years. 41 The State Council is given a number of functions and
powers including, but not limited to: the adoption of administrative measures, rules and
orders; submission of proposals to the NPC; the creation and execution of a plan for
national economic and social development; conducting foreign affairs and concluding

37

<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, art 79.
38
Ibid arts 80–81.
39
Ibid art 82.
40
Ibid art 85.
41
Ibid art 86.
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treaties and agreements with foreign nations; the protection of the rights of Chinese
nationals abroad; and exercising any other functions that the NPC may delegate to it.42

Under China’s socialist political and economic system, the government was
explicitly responsible for planning and managing the national economy. The State
Constitution of 1982 specifies that the state is to guide the country’s economic
development and that the State Council is to direct its subordinate bodies in the Sate
Council’s drawing up and carrying out the national economic plan and the state
budget.43

Although the NPC and its Standing Committee have the legislative power in
China, the State Council is empowered to perform the following legislative activities:

(1)

to adopt administrative measures, enact administrative rules and
regulations and make decisions and orders in accordance with the
Constitution and the law,

(2)

to submit proposals to the NPC or its Standing Committee,

(3)

to issue rules governing administrative affairs in respect of national
economic and social development, the state budget, urban and rural
development, education, science, culture, public health, sports, population
control, internal affairs, public security, judicial administration and
national defence,

(4)

to alter or annul inappropriate orders, directives and regulations issued by
the Ministries or Commissions.

44

Regulations of the State Council must be based upon the PRC Constitution and
its related statutes and must not be contradictory to them. At the same time the State
Council, as the highest state administrative organ, is responsible for leading and
managing administrative work in China. Therefore, the State Council guides local
42

Ibid art 89.
Ibid Framework, ch 10.
44
Ibid art 89.
43
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governments in their formulation of local rules and regulations as well as the enactment
of such regulations by local governments. Local ordinances, and local rules and
regulations of local governments must accord with the rules and regulations
administered by the State Council.

The figure below describes the hierarchical political, legislative, governmental,
administrative, judicial and prosecutorial structures and institutions in the PRC 45 with
Courts and geographical locations highlighted. It can be seen that the CPC’s
organisational hierarchy is very much integrated into the hierarchy of the administrative,
legal and governmental or congressional structure of the PRC.

It is clear that of the various executive, legislative and regulatory levels, the
State Council is very much at the centre of day to day administration and
implementation of law in China and whilst it does not occupy the highest nominal level
of power in the country, it seems to be the practical source of the major proportion of
decision-making in China today.

45

Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial Law above n 1, 14.
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Figure 2.1: Location Guide to Political, Government Institutions
and Judicial Structures in the PRC
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2.5

Sources of Law

2.5.1

1982 Constitution of the PRC

The current Constitution of the PRC, adopted in 1982, is the highest source of law in the
country. As previously noted, the Constitution establishes the framework of the
government, in addition to codifying the general principles of government and society
and listing the fundamental rights and duties of the people of China. Three prior
constitutions of 1954, 1975 and 1978 partially contribute to the composition of the
current Constitution.

The Preamble to the Constitution states some fundamental principles:
Both the victory in China’s New-Democratic Revolution and the successes in its
socialist cause have been achieved by the Chinese people of all nationalities, under the
leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism
and ‘Mao Zedong Thought’, by upholding truth, correcting errors and surmounting
numerous difficulties and hardships. The basic task of the nation in the years to come
is to concentrate its effort on socialist modernisation. Under the leadership of the
Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and ‘Mao Zedong
Thought’, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the people’s
democratic dictatorship and the socialist road, steadily improve socialist institutions,
develop socialist democracy, improve the socialist legal system, and work hard and
self-reliantly to modernise the country’s industry, agriculture, national defence and
science and technology step by step to transform China into a socialist country with a
high level of culture and democracy.46

From this passage it is clear that the leadership of the CPC is emphasised. Also,
the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and ‘Mao Zedong Thought’ is regarded as the
proper intellectual framework and ideology for leading the country to a socialist state
under the people’s democratic dictatorship.

46

<<中华人民共和国宪 法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s
Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, Preamble.
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Some of the general principles that are mentioned in the Articles of the 1982
Constitution include: ‘the power of the country lies with the people’, 47 ‘equality of all
nationalities in China’,48 ‘the principle of the rule of law, binding on the state as well as
all others’,49 and ‘state involvement in the economy’.50 As mentioned, the Constitution
also lists fundamental rights and duties, for example: ‘equality of citizens’ 51 ‘freedom
of speech, press, assembly, association, procession and demonstration’,52 ‘the right to
personal dignity’,53 ‘the right to criticise state organs’,54 ‘the duty and right to receive
an education’,55 ‘the duty to practise family planning’,56 and ‘the duty to pay taxes’.57

2.5.2 NPC Statutory Law and Other Legislative Enactments

Law that is to have general impact is enacted by the NPC or its Standing Committee.
The Standing Committee also enacts regulations, decisions and resolutions.
Administrative regulations are one type of legislative enactment by the State Council.
The State Council and its ministries or commissions can also make rules. At the local
level the People’s Congresses can enact local regulations and the local people’s
governments can make local administrative rules.

As to the national autonomous

regions, they are permitted to enact autonomy regulations and specific regulations. A
novel concept, the Basic Law, was developed for dealing with specific areas such as
Hong Kong which had a legal system of its own prior to its return to China. In these

47

Ibid art 2.
Ibid art 4.
49
Ibid art 5.
50
Ibid arts 14–15.
51
Ibid art 33.
52
Ibid art 35.
53
Ibid art 38.
54
Ibid art 41.
55
Ibid art 46.
56
Ibid art 49.
57
Ibid art 56.
48
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areas, known as Special Administrative Regions, the basic law of the former system is
maintained provided that the laws comport with the PRC Constitution.

2.5.3 International Treaties
The Constitution 1982 does not specify the relationship of international law to the laws
of the PRC.58 In practice, however, the legislative approach has been to automatically
incorporate international law as part of PRC law. However, if the PRC has made a
reservation to a provision of a treaty, this aspect or provision of the treaty is not
implemented in the law.

2.5.4 Case Law
Unlike common law jurisdictions such as the United States or the United Kingdom,
there is no strict precedent concept for case law. In theory, each case stands as its own
decision and will not bind another court. In practice, however, judges in lower People’s
Courts (that may be the Higher People’s Court, Intermediate People’s Court, or Basic
People’s Courts) often attempt to follow the interpretations of the laws decided by the
Supreme People’s Court.59 Moreover, higher level courts can use the finality of their
judgments on appeals as having a binding effect on the lower court that issued the first
judgment or order.

In China, not all court decisions or cases are published and available to the
public. In fact, the large majority remain unavailable, although the system of justice has

58

Xiaoli Gao, ‘International Treaties in Foreign-Related Civil and Commercial Application of Trial’, The
People’s Court Daily (Online), 13 February 2007
<http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=106005>.
59
Ronald C Brown, Understanding Chinese Courts and Legal Process: Law with Chinese Characteristics
(Kluwer Law International, 1997) 82.
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become more transparent in recent years with the publishing of more legal materials. 60
China’s legal system is based on civil law, with heavy influence from traditional
Chinese law, modern Japanese law, and German law.61 With no system of precedents,
interpretation of the applicable law is usually done on an individual basis by the judge
hearing the case.

The Supreme People’s Court and the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress will, on occasion, provide interpretations of various laws in which
ambiguities have become evident, or for which clarification is deemed necessary by the
Communist Party leadership. These interpretations are much less common that one
would expect of higher courts in common law jurisdictions, such as Australia, the
United States, or the United Kingdom.62

In addition, judgments themselves and the publishing of cases are highly
political processes, and the courts really lack the autonomy necessary to render unbiased
decisions that might conflict with Communist Party policy, values and, of course,
current laws. However, in recent years various judicial reform programs have supplied
cases as guidance for future court decision. For instance, the Supreme People’s Court
case guidance system advocated by the judicial reform movement indicates the future
direction of judicial reform in China.63

60

<<关于司法公开的六项规定>> [Six Provisions Concerning Judicial Transparency] and <<关于人民
法 院 接 受 新 闻 媒 体 舆 论 监 督 的 若 干 规 定 >> [Provisions Concerning People’s Court Accepting
Supervision from News Media] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme People’s Court, 8 December 2009.
61
Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial above n 1, 9.
62
Novexcn, ‘Cases and Court Decision in the People’s Republic of China’ (30 May 2011) Novexcn
Online <http://www.novexcn.com/cases_court_decisions_main.html>.
63
卢云云，周白 [Yunyun Lu and Bai Zhou], ‘案例指导的法律推理路径’[Guide the Path of Legal
Reasoning in Cases], (15 February 2006) 中国法院网[China Court Online]
<http://www.chinacourt.com.cn/html/article/200602/15/195317.shtml#>.
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Ongoing discussions on the importance a guidance system for cases are taking place. 64
In May 2011, Judge Gong Pixiang discussed what kind of cases should be the guiding
or precedent cases and argues that establishing a clear case guidance system must be the
primary aim.65

Sometimes a case will be chosen for publication in order to make a point, or set
an example for the public and build confidence in the justice system. At other times,
cases will be published to demonstrate the ‘rule of law’ to foreigners, or to set forth new
policies regarding foreign investment, or the activities of foreigners in China. A labour
dispute case published on the Supreme People’s Court case guidance website in 2009
details a Court decision and interpretation on whether an agency agreement forms a
labour relationship between an individual and a company (16 December 2003, China
Unicom Ltd Suqian Branch (China Unicom) and Chen Liangqin).66

It is generally accepted knowledge that the Government of China exerts strong
pressure on the courts in cases where they believe there is a national policy interest at
stake, or which it deems to be politically sensitive.67 Despite China’s recent revisions of
criminal law and criminal procedure, and civil law and civil procedure, trials are often
closed. They can be conducted days after charges are filed, or even months or years
later. Lawyers have been known to have been restricted from seeing their clients or even

64

<<中国特色案例指导制度研讨会精要>> [Case Guidance System with Chinese Characteristics
Essential Seminar] 光明日报 [The Guangmin Daily (Online)], 25 May 2011
<http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/14732866.html>.
65
Pixiang Gong, Judge of Jiangsu Provincial Higher People’s Court, ‘Case with Chinese Characteristics,
Improve the Guidance System in China’, The China Daily (Online), 18 May 2011
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqgj/jryw/2011-05-18/content_2651147.html>.
66
<<江苏宿迁中院判决中国联通有限公司宿迁市分公司与陈良芹等五人劳动争议案>> [China
Unicom Limited Company Suqian Branch Company v Chen Lianqin Five People — Labour Dispute], 江
苏宿迁中级人民法院 [Jiansu Suqian Intermediate People’s Court, People’s Republic of China] (2007)
宿豫民一初字第 1500 号 (2009) 宿中民一终字第 0461 号 [Civil Appeal No 0461] 21 August 2009.
67
<<中华人民共和国民事诉讼法>> [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s
Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 75, 1 April 2008, art 120.
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refused permission68 to attend politically sensitive trials altogether. Intimidation is also
known to play a role, and many lawyers are unwilling to take on clients involved in
trials considered sensitive, in order to protect their legal careers.69

These are some of the reasons why individual cases decided by courts in China
have much less significance than in other common law or civil law jurisdictions. It
should also be mentioned that cases in China also play an important role as a tool of the
Ministry of Propaganda, not only in its decisions as to what is to be published, but more
importantly, as to what is not to be published. It is known that all such decisions convey
some message to the public at large, however subtle it may be. This may be regarded as
a result of a legal system without the measure of independence that might be found (or
claimed to be in existence) in some Western judicial democracies. In China, publication
(or not) of cases is often used as a ‘tool’ to convey messages or to reinforce a policy,
rather than simply to illustrate or provide guidance for the implementation of justice.

2.6

The Judicial System of the PRC

2.6.1 The Court Hierarchy System
There is a hierarchy within the court structure consisting of the Supreme People’s
Courts at the national level, the Higher People’s Courts at the provincial level, the

68

<<罗秋林诉衡阳市公安局行政复议案>> [Qiulin Luo v Hengyang Municipal Bureau of Public
Security – Administrative Reconsideration Appeal] 衡阳市公安局 [Hengyang Municipal Bureau of
Public Security] 衡复决字 2005-5 号[Administrative Reconsideration Appeal No 2005-5]. This was the
first successful challenge by a solicitor whose application for interview with his client (who was in
custody) had been refused. Solicitor Luo initiated an administrative reconsideration appeal to the Bureau
of Public Security after being refused permission (on four occasions) to interview his client in a criminal
matter. His appeal was upheld and this case became the first case of a solicitor taking action against
authorities as a result of official denial of his lawful right to interview client.
69
<<关于加强对律师办理重大, 敏感, 群体性案件指导监督的意见(试行)>> [Opinions Concerning
Strengthening Supervision and Guidance of Lawyers Dealing with Influential, Sensitive and Class Cases
(Trial)] (People’s Republic of China) 三门峡市司法局 [Sanmenxia Municipal Bureau of Justice], 28
March 2006.

71

Ch 2: Political and Legal Systems in China

Intermediate People’s Courts at the municipal level, and the Basic People’s Courts at the
county or district level.70 The Basic People’s Courts are comprised of more than 3,000
courts at county level, which are further subdivided into about 20,000 smaller units
referred to as People’s Tribunals located in towns and villages. 71 There are 376
Intermediate People’s Courts and 31 Higher People’s Courts located in the provinces. 72
Additionally, there are a number of specialised courts, including those dealing with
railway transportation, forest affairs, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and maritime
matters. Jurisdiction is allocated partly through the Constitution, the Organic Law of the
People’s Courts 2007,73 the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China
1996,74 the Law of Civil Procedure 2008,75 and the Administrative Procedure Law of
the People’s Republic of China 1989.76

Litigants are generally limited to one appeal, on the theory of finality of
judgment by two trials.77 Cases of second instance are often reviewed ‘de novo’ as to
both law and facts. 78 Requests for appellate review take the form of appeals and
protests (in criminal cases). Appeals may be lodged by parties to the case either directly
70

Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial above n 1, 25; <<中华人民共和国人民法院组织法>> [Organic
Law of the People’s Courts of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National
People’s Congress Standing Committee, 1 January 2007; Guiguo Wang, ‘The Legal System of China’ in
Guiguo Wang and John Mo (eds), Chinese Law (Kluwer Law International, 1999) 1, 16.
71
Beijing University, ‘Legal System of China: A Brief Introduction to China’ (July 2011) LawinfoChina
Beijing University <http://www.lawinfochina.com/legal/index.asp>.
72
Albert H Y Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System of the People’s Republic of China (Butterworths
Asia, 1992) 107–8.
73
<<中华人民共和国人民法院组织法>> [Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the People’s Republic
of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 1 January 2007.
74
<<中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法>> [Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, Order No 64, 17 March 1996.
75
<<中华人民共和国民事诉讼法>> [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s
Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 75, 1 April 2008.
76
<<中华人民共和国行政诉讼法>> [Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 4 April 1989.
77
<<中华人民共和国民事诉讼法>> [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s
Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 75, 1 April 2008, art 10;
<<中华人民共和国人民法院组织法>> [Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the People’s Republic of
China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 1 January 2007,
art 158.
78
Ibid art 153.
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or through private lawyers. Protests are filed by the Procuratorate (which has functions
that include those of a Public Prosecutor (see section 2.8 below)) in criminal cases when
it is believed that an error has occurred in the law or facts as determined by the
judgment or order of the Court of first instance. In civil cases the Procuratorate does
not possess a right to file a direct protest, but it can initiate ‘adjudication supervision’
via a protest. ‘Adjudication supervision’ refers to a type of discretionary ‘post-final
decision’ review, which may occur in certain situations in criminal79 and re-trial in civil
cases.80

Under the Chinese Constitution, the People’s Courts of the PRC are the judicial
organs of the State. 81 The People’s Procuratorates are the State organs for legal
supervision. The judicial and the procuratorial organs of the State are created by the
People’s Congresses to which they are responsible and by which they are supervised.82
Being organs of the State, the judiciary and Procuratorate must apply the principle of
democratic centralism.83 The first Organic Law of the People’s Court was adopted in

79

<<中华人民共和国民事诉讼法>> [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s
Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 75, 1 April 2008, arts
203, 204.
80
<<中华人民共和国人民法院组织法>> [Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the People’s Republic
of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 1 January 2007,
art 179.
81
<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, art 123.
82
Ibid arts 129, 133.
83
<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, art 3; 师霞 [Xia Shi], ‘什么是党的民主集中制原
则？’ [What are the Principles of the Party’s System of Democratic Centralism?] (July 2011) 中国共产
党新闻网 [News of Communist Party of China]
<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64156/64157/4418487.html>; ‘Building of Political Democracy in China’
(White Paper, October 2005, Beijing, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of
China). The white paper states that China’s democracy is a democracy with democratic centralism as the
basic organisational principle and mode of operation. Democratic centralism is the fundamental principle
of organisation and leadership of state power in China. The Constitution of the CPC proposed six basic
principles of democratic centralism. They are: individual members complying with the Party organisation;
minority complying with majority; lower level organisation complying with higher level organisation;
every organisation of the Party and every member of the Party complying with the Party’s National
Congress and the Central Committee; each level of the leadership of the Party must be elected; the Party’s
National Congress and Central Committee are the highest levels of leadership and should listen to lower
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1954, and was amended in 1979, 1983 and 2007 respectively. Under the Organic Law
of the People’s Court, the judicial power is exercised by the Courts at four levels:

Figure 2.2: The Court Hierarchy System in the
People’s Republic of China
Supreme People’s Court
Original Jurisdiction over cases that have been assigned to it by law, or over
cases that it decides it should try. It has jurisdiction over appeals or protests
from the Higher People’s Court and Special People’s Courts.
Special
People’s
Courts

Maritime Court

Railway Court

Military Court

Forest Court

Higher People’s Court
Jurisdiction in the first instance in cases assigned by law, or transferred from
lower courts; or with major criminal cases which impact the entire province.
Courts also hear cases of appeals or protests against judgments and orders of
lower courts.

Lower
People’s
Courts

Intermediate People’s Court
First instance jurisdiction in some cases, including those transferred to it from
basic People’s Courts; major cases dealing with foreign parties; counterrevolutionary cases, criminal cases subject to sentence of life imprisonment or
death; cases where foreigners committed crimes. Also hears appeals and
protests.
Basic People’s Courts
Local level courts adjudicate criminal and civil cases of first instance.
Excluded from jurisdiction are criminal cases carrying penalty of death or life
imprisonment, as well as certain foreign civil cases. The courts can request that
more important cases be transferred to a higher court.

(Note: the arrows indicate paths of appeal but only one appeal to the next highest Court from
the initial hearing of a matter–see 6.1.5 below)

level organisations and individual member’s voices; the party’s committee at all levels should adopt a
system with collective leadership combined with individual responsibility.
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2.6.2

The Basic People’s Courts

The Basic People’s Courts, Intermediate People’s Courts and Higher People’s Courts
are generally referred to as ‘Local People’s Courts’. The Basic People’s Courts are
established at the county and district level.84 A Basic People’s Court is comprised of a
president, vice-presidents and judges. Every Basic People’s Court is divided into
divisions: criminal, civil, economic, and enforcement. Each division has a chief judge
and associate chief judges. Tribunals may also be set up in accordance with local
conditions and populations.85

2.6.3

The Intermediate People’s Courts

Local People’s Courts at various levels are responsible to the organs of state power that
created them.86 Cases involving foreign elements are heard in the Intermediate People’s
Court or above.87

2.6.4

The Higher People’s Courts

The Higher People’s Courts include Higher People’s Courts of provinces, autonomous
regions, and municipalities directly under supervision of the Central Government. The
Higher People’s Courts’ jurisdiction includes first instance matters as required by
regulations; first instance cases transferred by the local people’s courts; appeal cases

84

<<中华人民共和国人民法院组织法>> [Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the People’s Republic
of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 1 January 2007,
art 2.
85
Ibid arts 19–20.
86
<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, art 128.
87
<<中华人民共和国民事诉讼法>> [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s
Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 75, 1 April 2008, art 19.
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and cases under the supervision process of the people’s procuratorate. 88 Recently the
Supreme People’s Court reported details of the top ten intellectual property cases
involving foreign parties that had been submitted by the Higher People’s Courts.89

2.6.5

The Supreme People’s Courts

The Supreme People’s Court is the highest judicial organ and as the highest level in the
hierarchy of the People’s Courts, it supervises the administration of justice by the
People’s Courts at various levels and by the Special People’s Courts. 90 The Supreme
People’s Court is responsible to the NPC and its Standing Committee, and is situated in
Beijing.91 The President of the Court cannot serve more than two consecutive terms and
each term is of five years. 92 The NPC elects the president of the Supreme People’s
Court.

The Supreme People’s Court has three responsibilities:
(1)

handling cases that are of the greatest influence, appeals against judgments and
orders of Higher People’s Courts and deemed by the government that it should
try,

(2)

supervising the administration of justice by Local People’s Courts and Special
People’s Courts at all levels, overruling incorrect judgment of inferior courts
and reviewing those cases itself or directing the lower-level courts to conduct a
retrial, and

88

<<中华人民共和国人民法院组织法>> [Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the People’s Republic
of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 1 January 2000,
art 28.
89
Intellectual Property Protection Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, ‘The Supreme People’s Court
Published Top Ten Cases in Intellectual Property Rights — Judicial Protection’ (28 April 2011)
Intellectual Property Protection Ministry of Commerce of the PRC
<http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/newsarticle/news/headlines/201104/1219150_1.html>.
90
<<中华人民共和国人民法院组织法>> [Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the People’s Republic
of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 1 January 2000,
art 30.
91
Ibid art 17.
92
Ibid art 124.
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(3)

2.6.6

providing judicial interpretation of questions concerning specific applications of
93
laws in judicial proceedings, that must be carried out throughout the country.

Special Courts

Besides the general court system, the government has also set up other Special courts. 94
The special Courts are Military Courts, Maritime Courts, Railway Courts and Forest
Courts.
Under the current system, the jurisdiction of each Court is assigned by the law. 95
In general, the jurisdiction of Courts is subdivided both hierarchically and
geographically. Hierarchical jurisdiction refers to the principle that Courts should
exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the authorisation stipulated by law. This
requires that important cases be handled by Courts of a higher level such as the Higher
People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Court. Under the Civil Procedure Law2008,
Basic People’s Courts, subject to Articles 18–21 of the Civil Procedure Law, hear all
civil cases as courts of first instance. Prior to the adoption of the Civil Procedure Law
2008, all cases involving foreign interests had to be heard by an Intermediate People’s
Court as the Court of first instance. 96 The delegation of jurisdiction to the Basic
People’s Courts over cases involving foreign interests is a sign of gradual perfecting of
economic tribunals in China. It appears to be the case that with growing economic
exchanges with foreign countries there is an increasing need for the Basic People’s
Courts to share the caseload of Intermediate People’s Courts. Although the Higher

93

<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, art 32.
94
Ibid art 31.
95
Ibid arts 21, 22, 25, 28, 32.
96
<<中华人民共和国民事诉讼法(试行)>> [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China
(Trial Implementation)] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 1 October 1982, art
17(1), repealed on 9 April 1991.
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People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Court may serve as the court of first instance
for important cases in the relevant region or for the whole country respectively, they
basically serve as the courts of appeal.

2.7

The Position of Equity in the Chinese Legal System

In addition to the provisions of law, and similar to equitable principles in common law
jurisdictions, Chinese Courts also attach importance to fairness when deciding a case. In
practice in civil cases Chinese Courts always encourage out-of-court settlement. Whilst
the conciliation process is generally regarded as a reasonable form of alternative dispute
resolution it may appear to some to be against the principle of justice and fairness by
reason of the fact that one or both parties in dispute may be persuaded to retreat to some
extent from a strongly held belief in the correctness of their position. The people’s
courts argue that it is important for courts to uphold the principle of mutual consent
when conciliation is chosen by parties as a dispute resolution. Courts play an important
role in the conciliation process to ensure parties’ interests and rights being fairly
protected.97 The parties concerned may, with the Court’s assistance, have their dispute
resolved through conciliation. Article 85 of the Civil Procedure Law 2008 explicitly
stipulates:

In conducting civil proceedings, the People’s Court shall distinguish right from wrong
on the basis of clear facts and conduct conciliation between the parties on a voluntary
basis.98

Article 91 of the Civil Procedure Law 2008 further states that:

97

刘定国 [Liu Dingguo], ‘浅论法院调解和司法公信力的关系’ [Review: Relationship between
Conciliation of the People’s Courts and Judicial Public Confidence] (19 October 2009) 衡阳市蒸湘区人
民法院 [Hengyang Municipal Zhengxiang District People’s Court]
<http://zxqfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=84>.
98
<<中华人民共和国民事诉讼法>> [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s
Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 75, 1 April 2008, art 85.
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If no agreement is reached through conciliation or if either party backs out of the
settlement agreement before a conciliation statement is served, the People’s Court shall
render a judgment without delay.99

Conciliation may occur informally between the parties but can also be conducted
by other bodies such as grass-roots governments and by neighbourhood committees.
Such conciliation committees are required to follow the directives of the local
government and the People’s Court in the locality. It has been estimated that in 1993
there were about 950,000 conciliation committees with 6,000,000 conciliators in China.
In 1986, more than 7,370,000 disputes were settled through conciliation. 100 They
involved marriage, inheritance, maintenance, alimony, debts, real property, production
and management, tortious acts, and other civil and commercial disputes and minor
criminal cases.

2.8

The People’s Procuratorate

The judicial system of the PRC is established under Articles 123–135 of the
Constitution, and consists of the People’s Courts, the Supreme People’s Court, the
People’s Procuratorates, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Military Procuratorates
and other Special People’s Procuratorates.

Article 129 refers to the People’s

Procuratorates as ‘state organs for legal supervision.’ In 1983, the NPC amended the
Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorates, which included an enumeration of the
powers and functions of the procuratorates. The powers and functions of the People’s
Procuratorates create an organisation which initially performs functions similar to a
public prosecutor in the West, in that it oversees investigations by the public security
organs and decides which cases will be prosecuted. However, the oversight of the
procuratorates extends beyond investigation and trial, into the supervision of the legal
99

Ibid art 91.
Benjamin L Liebman, ‘China’s Courts: Restricted Reform’ in Donald C Clarke (ed), China’s Legal
System: New Developments, New Challenges (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 66, 67.
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activities of the People’s Courts, the execution of judgments, and the activities of
prisons.101 Strictly speaking, China’s judicial system only refers to the People’s Court
system.

According to Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC 1996, during a criminal
proceeding a People’s Court, People’s Procuratorate and public security organ shall
perform their tasks in accordance with their individual responsibilities as well as
cooperatively. 102 Hence, the People’s Procuratorate and public security organ both
execute judicial power, although their judicial functions are limited to a relatively
narrow scope. Thus broadly speaking, China’s judicial system is institutionally
comprised of three parts: the People’s Court system, the People’s Procuratorate system,
and the Public Security system (police). Corresponding to this, the judicial structure in
the broad Chinese sense not only refers to Courts, but also to the Procuratorates and the
Public Security system.

The presidents of Courts and the procurator-generals of Procuratorates are
selected and appointed by the People’s Congresses on the same levels. The judges and
procurators are selected and appointed by the standing committees of the respective
People’s Congresses, and assistant judges and assistant procurators are appointed by the
respective Courts and Procuratorates.103
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<<中华人民共和国人民检察院组织法>> [Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorates of the
People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 2 September
1983, art 19.
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<<中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法>> [Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, Order No 64, 17 March 1996, arts 3, 7.
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<<中华人 民共 和国 人民 法院组 织法 >> [Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the People’s
Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 1
January 2007, arts 11, 35, 37; <<中华人民共和国人民检察院组织法>> [Organic Law of the People’s
Procuratorates of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s
Congress, 2 September 1983, arts 21–24.
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2.9

Interpretation of Law

With a civil law tradition, China adopts the principle of legislative interpretation. The
Constitution entrusts the NPC Standing Committee with the power to interpret the
Constitution and laws.104 It issues interpretations of a law when the stipulations of a law
require clearer and more specific meaning or when a new situation arises after the
promulgation of the law which requires clarification of the rationale or basis for its
application.105 The State Council and People’s Congresses at various levels may enact
administrative regulations and local regulations respectively. 106 The basis of legislative
interpretation is that those who make the law know the meaning of the law and are in
the best position to interpret it. According to this theory, in addition to the NPC and its
Standing committee, other law-making bodies, including the State Council and the
standing committees of local congresses should also have the power to interpret the law.
All departments under the State Council and the people’s governments of provinces,
autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government may
make requests to the State Council for interpretation of administrative regulations.107

In China, judicial interpretation is described as the interpretation of the national
supreme judicial authorities on questions relating to specific application of laws in their
judicial practices according to the authorisation of the NPC. The Supreme People’s
Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, by virtue of the relevant decrees adopted
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<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, art 67(4); << 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 立 法 法 >>
[Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s
Congress, Order No 31, 15 March 2000, art 42.
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<< 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 立 法 法 >> [Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s
Republic of China) National People’s Congress, Order No 31, 15 March 2000, art 42.
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<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, art 89.
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<< 行 政 法 规 制 定 程 序 条 例 >> [Precedural Ordinance Concerning Making Administrative
Regulations] (People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No 321, 16 November 2001, art 32.
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by the NPC, both hold the power of formulating judicial interpretations.108 The Supreme
People’s Court is much more active in providing judicial interpretations, and has
become “the most frequent and important” form of interpretation of the law.109
Judicial interpretation has an extensive history in modern China, dating back to
1954 (shortly after the founding of the People’s Republic of China). Judicial
interpretation appeared along with the rapid progress in the fields of economic
construction and growth in national legislation after the first Constitution was
promulgated. It was a matter of urgency for the national supreme judicial authorities to
strengthen the interpretative work on the application of law in order to cope with the
problems that arose in handling cases.110 For this reason the Standing Committee of the
NPC passed the Decision on Interpretation of Law in 1955 which provided that those
questions connected with the specific application of laws and decrees should be
interpreted by the Supreme People’s Court.111 Thus the highest organ of State power
had, for the first time, formally conferred upon the supreme judicial organ the power of
enacting judicial interpretation from that time forward. This power was also confirmed
by subsequent legislation such as the Organic Law of People’s Court of the People’s
Republic of China in 1979. Furthermore, the Standing Committee of the 5th NPC at its
19th session adopted a resolution on improvement in the explanation of the workings of
the law that provided:
An interpretation of questions involving the specific application of laws and decrees in
court trials shall be provided by the Supreme People’s Court; and an interpretation of
108

The authority of judicial interpretation derives from the Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the
PRC. It was adopted at the Second Session of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People’s
Congress on 1 July 1979 and amended on 2 September 1983 and 31 October 2006.
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Kay-Wah Chan, ‘The Legal System of China’ in Patricia Blazey and Kay-Wah Chan (eds), The
Chinese Commercial Legal System (Lawbook, 2008) 89, 104.
110
<< 最 高 人 民 法 院 关 于 案例 指 导 工 作 的 规 定 >> [Provisions Concerning Case Guidance of the
Supreme People’s Court] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme People’s Court, Order No 51, 26
November 2010.
111
Jianxiong Zhai, ‘Features–Judicial Information of the People’s Republic of China: A Survey’ (2002)
National Library of China <http://www.llrx.com/features/chinajudicial.htm>.
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problems concerning the concrete application of laws and decrees in procuratorial
practices shall be prescribed by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. If there is any
difference in principle between them, it should be delivered to the Standing Committee
112
of the NPC for interpretation or decision.

This Resolution stresses not only the power of judicial interpretation by the
Supreme People’s Court but also bestows the same power upon the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate. Thus judicial interpretation has been considered as a formal source of
law. According to judicial statistical data, there were about 4000 judicial interpretations
by the Supreme People’s Court alone or jointly with the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate recorded in the period from 1949 to 2000.113 Shen explains:

Chinese jurisprudence commonly divides authoritative interpretation into three
categories: legislative, administrative and judicial. Generally speaking, legislative
interpretation means interpretation given by legislative authorities on laws and rules
issued by themselves; administrative interpretation refers to interpretations given by
administrative authorities on these rules and regulations; and judicial interpretations are
those issued by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate in
their judicial and procuratorial work.114

The theory of legislative interpretation requires restraints on the power of the
judiciary in relation to interpreting laws. The Court, in its primary role of
implementation needs an interpretive mechanism. Without ascertaining the meaning of
law, the power of implementation cannot be reasonably exercised. In this regard, the
more detailed an interpretation (ascertaining meaning) that is given by the legislature,
the easier it becomes for the Court to implement. As China’s legal reforms and
enactments of laws began without adequately qualified legal professionals associated
with law-making bodies, detailed interpretation by such bodies has not been possible.
As a result, the system has instituted what is, in fact, a shared interpretative power. The
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Xianming Xu (ed), A Textbook on Jurisprudence (China University of Political Science and Law
Press, 1994) 241–3; Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature
and Development (Kluwer Law International, 1999) 106–7.
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Resolution of the NPC Standing Committee on Strengthening of Legal Interpretative
Work 1981, adopted on 10 June 1981,115 prescribed:

(1) all articles in laws requiring further definition or supplementary stipulations shall be
interpreted or stipulated by law by the NPC Standing Committee;
(2) all questions arising from court trials concerning the specific application of laws and
decrees shall be interpreted by the Supreme People’s Court. All questions relating to the
specific application of laws and decrees in the procuratorial work of the procuratorate
shall be interpreted by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. In the case that there is a
difference in principle between the interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court and
the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the NPC Standing Committee shall be asked to
give an interpretation or decision;
(3) all questions on the application of laws or decrees that do not come under judicial or
procuratorate work shall be interpreted by the State Council and the responsible
department;
(4) all articles of law of local character requiring further definition or supplementary
stipulations shall be interpreted or stipulated by the respective standing committees of
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities that formulated those regulations. All
questions concerning the specific application of laws and regulations of a local
character shall be interpreted by responsible departments under the people’s
governments of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities.116

In practice, the NPC Standing Committee has not yet given any formal
interpretation of any law. The lack of action on the part of the NPC Standing Committee
in relation to law interpretation has left room for the Court to perform the function. The
Court, unlike the legislature, must hear cases and apply the law. Whilst without
instructions from the legislature, and with the authorisation of the 1981 Resolution
discussed above, the Supreme People’s Court has issued thousands of pieces of judicial

115

<<全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于加强法律解释工作的决议>> [Resolution of the NPC
Standing Committee on Strengthening of Legal Interpretive Work] (People’s Republic of China) National
People’s Congress Standing Committee, 10 June 1981. It was adopted on 10 June 1981 by the 19 th
Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 5th National People’s Congress.
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interpretation to guide the lower courts. 117 Such judicial interpretations have binding
force on all the courts in China and cover almost every aspect of the legal system and
thus play an important role in the enforcement of law in China.118 The scope of judicial
interpretation is so vast that the function of the Court regarding interpretation of law can
hardly be said to be different from its counterparts in other countries. However, the
status of judicial interpretation is still not the same as legislative interpretation. On
numerous occasions, the Supreme People’s Court announced invalidations of its
previous interpretations on the ground that they contravened laws subsequently adopted.
For example, the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s procurator jointly
announced in May and November 2010 that 37 previous interpretations had been
invalidated. 119 The Notification of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme
People’s Procuratorate Concerning Trial of Re-trial Cases in Public adopted in 1988
was invalidated as a result of the detailed interpretation concerning criminal procedure
of re-trial cases has been issued by the Supreme Court in 1998.120

The Chinese legal system has undergone substantial changes over the last three
decades.121 Before the policy of opening to the outside world and the introduction of
domestic economic reforms in the late 1970s, the Chinese legal system was essentially
based upon a planned economy and Marxist theory. Since then, the Chinese government
117

Dayun Xiong, ‘Legal System and Rule of Law in Contemporary China’ (Akashi Shoten) 124 cited in
Patricia Blazey and Kay-Wah Chan (eds), The Chinese Commercial Legal System (Lawbook, 2008) 104.
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<< 最 高 人 民 法 院 关 于 案例 指 导 工 作 的 规 定 >> [Provisions Concerning Case Guidance of the
Supreme People’s Court] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme People’s Court, Order No 51, 26
November 2010, art 7.
119
<<最高人民法院最高人民检察院关于废止部分司法解释和规范性文件的决定>> [Supreme
People’s Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, Decision on Abolishing Some Judicial Interpretations
and Regulatory Documents] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People's
Procuratorate, 22 December 2010.
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the People’s Supreme Court Concerning Enforcement of Criminal Procedure Law] (People’s Republic of
China) Supreme People’s Court, Order No 23, 29 June 1998.
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1978 is seen by Chinese scholars as commencing a new epoch in modern Chinese history and a
turning point in legal development in China. In that year, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh
Central Committee of the CPC declared that large scale nationwide mass political movements should be
stopped and the emphasis of the Party’s work should be shifted to socialist modernisation as of 1979.

85

Ch 2: Political and Legal Systems in China

has been learning from the experiences of foreign jurisdictions particularly in relation to
commercial law.122

With the inflow of foreign capital and technology as well as foreign commercial
concepts, the Chinese economic system changed from a purely planned economy to an
essentially market-oriented economy.123 In order to cope with the requirement of further
opening the domestic market and enlarging economic co-operation with foreign
countries, the pace of legal reform has quickened over recent years.124 A number of laws
were adopted, not only in the area of commerce, but in the field of public interest. For
instance, China passed its first Company Law of the PRC on 29 December 1993.125 The
law has its basis in China’s joint venture laws and the experience derived from the
operation of the company laws in Shenzhen and Shanghai. It provides limited liability
protection that did not exist under joint venture laws.126 Also, the Labour Law of the
People’s Republic of China was promulgated on 5 July 1994 and the Labour Contract
Law of the People’s Republic of China was passed on 29 June 2007.127 The latter law
provides a legal ground for employees’ rights and their protection. The trend has been
that China will make its laws — at least the commercial laws — compatible with the
122

Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development
(Kluwer Law International, 1999) 48–9.
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laws prevailing internationally and in conformity with international practice. Such a
development will inevitably affect the internal public law-making and enforcement of
laws by the courts and other bodies. Thus with China’s market becoming more mature
and more open, it is very likely that its legal system will become more transparent,
fairer and more desirable. However, the underlying philosophy of the system in practice
can be traced back at least two thousand years as a result of significant parts of the
culture matching the style and needs of the current Communist regime.

2.10 Sources of Judicial Information
Judicial information can be divided into two categories in the light of subject of
issuance. Their titles also vary and include circulars, replies to questions, instructions,
opinions, and so on. The categories are;
i) The Supreme People’s Court
ii) Official Gazette
The Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China
commenced in 1985. It is the sole official publication of law. Published four times each
year, it carries the important national legislation, official documents, judicial
interpretation and typical cases involving civil, criminal, economic, marine and
administrative matters discussed and adopted by the Judicial Committee of the Supreme
People’s Court.128 As part of its content, the judicial interpretations are, pursuant to the
provisions of the Supreme People’s Court, the authoritative statements and can be cited
in judicial documents and Court decisions. 129 For example, there are two bound
volumes of the gazette: ‘A Complete Compilation of the Gazette of the Supreme
128

<<中华人 民共 和国 人民 法院组 织法 >> [Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the People’s
Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 1
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Jianxiong Zhai, ‘Features–Judicial Information’ above n 111.

87

Ch 2: Political and Legal Systems in China

People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China: 1985–1994’130 and its continuation,
1995–1999.

131

These are the primary alternative sources for locating judicial

interpretations.

2.10.1 General Compilation of the Supreme People’s Court’s Decisions
Judicial interpretations prior to 1985 can be traced in another publication entitled, ‘A
Collected Edition of Judicial Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court of the
People’s Republic of China: 1949–1993’.132 This historical collection, compiled by the
research department of the Supreme People’s Court, contains seven parts involving:
general provisions, criminal law, criminal procedure law, civil law (including general
principles of civil law, marriage law, succession law and copyright law), economic law,
maritime law, civil procedure law, and administrative procedure law. It consists of
around 2200 judicial interpretations issued solely by the Supreme People’s Court or
jointly with other central state organs from October 1949 to June 1993, and is a very
useful archival source of early judicial interpretations.
In addition to the official publications mentioned above, a commercial collection
deserving of mention is: ‘A Complete Collection of Judicial Interpretations of New
China: October 1949 – June 1990’133 and its enlarged edition, June 1990 – June 1992.
This collection, dividing judicial documents into several parts covering criminal and
civil affairs, criminal and civil procedures, administrative law, lawyers and notarisation,
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and judiciary involving foreign interests, records a great many judicial documents
issued by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate as well
as other normative documents such as legislative interpretation, law, policy, circulars,
and replies that have been adopted or promulgated by NPC, the State Council and
Ministries and Commissions concerned. Additionally, there is an English list of
legislative enactments and judicial documents issued from June 1990 to June 1992, in
the end of the enlarged edition which may prove useful to foreign readers.
As Chen has pointed out, ‘As Chinese laws are mostly made in general and
vague terms, their interpretation by various authorities effectively forms an important
source of law.’134 Judicial interpretations by the Supreme People’s Court have binding
force on local People’s Courts at all levels and special People’s Courts. 135 In practice, it
has the same effect as laws and forms an important component of the legal system in
China.136

2.11 The Dispute Resolution Process
2.11.1 A Hypothetical Dispute Involving a Foreign Investor
To unravel some of the complexities of the legal system it may be instructive to take a
hypothetical example of a dispute occurring between a foreign investor — ABC
(Australia) Pty Limited (ABC) and its Chinese business partner — Sheng Wah
Industries Co (SWI) and to work through some possible legal processes available to the
parties in their attempts to resolve the issue between them.137
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2.11.2 The Background of the Dispute
SWI and ABC at the outset engaged in a number of meetings during which they
discussed all facets of the plan to work together to produce a range of goods, designed
by ABC and manufactured in China by SWI. One of the components of the final
products of the production process is manufactured in Malaysia under a pre-existing
contract between ABC and a Malaysian company (the imported components).
The negotiations between ABC and SWI progressed well. Registration processes
were commenced and a contract was drafted (with Chinese and English versions) to
express the terms agreed by the parties. The contract was signed by the parties and all
registration requirements were properly executed. The manufacture and marketing of
the products commenced.
For the purpose of this exercise the contract between ABC and SWI formed
another company SWAB Equity Joint Venture Co, a company that was registered under
the terms of the Equity Joint Ventures Law of the People’s Republic of China 2001138
(EJV law) as an Equity Joint Venture (EJV).139 The registration application of SWAB
Equity Joint Venture Co and all manufacturing, safety standards and environmental
requirements also satisfied all regulations and other approval requirements of the local
Municipal Government, which had given approval for the commencement of the
operation.
The contract between the parties was based upon the standard contract form as
appeared in the EJV Law. There was no provision in the contract that specifically
addressed the means by which equity values, that is, monetary equivalents of assets and
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so on brought to the venture by a party, were assessed other than that this was left to the
parties to negotiate and agree.
In this example, the equity of the partners was agreed between the parties in the
contract and included both actual monetary amounts contributed by each party and the
monetary value attributed to the manufacturing costs in the case of SWI and the
monetary value of the product designs and the imported components supply in the case
of ABC. The parties were to jointly share the costs of marketing and distribution of the
products. The business commenced operations and in six months was already selling its
product in China and overseas.

2.11.3 The Dispute
A dispute arose when SWI subsequently complained that ABC had over-valued the
Malaysian manufactured components, and it demanded that equity levels between the
parties be adjusted according to a new, and lower, value of the imported components as
suggested by SWI. Negotiations on this issue failed to reach a solution. SWI then began
paying ABC a lower level of profit payments according to SWI’s re-calculation of the
equity contribution by ABC.
Under the law and the contract, three methods of resolving the impasse were
available to the parties, comprising semi-formal conciliation, formal arbitration and
litigation. ABC refused to engage in conciliation or arbitration as it was entitled to do
under the contract and commenced a claim against SWI for breach of contract. SWI
countered by claiming misrepresentation at the contract formation stage.
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2.11.4

Referral to the Court

The dispute was notified to the Court and was heard in the Basic People’s Court in the
first instance. In the result ABC failed in its claim of breach of contract by SWI on the
basis that SWI had continued to fulfill its obligations under the contract. SWI was
successful in its counter claim, as ABC was found by the Court to have inflated the
costs of the imported components on the basis of a purported independent opinion as to
their value, which was supplied to the Court by SWI. The Court ordered a re-valuation
of the imported components for the purpose of the equity input and profit sharing
provisions of the contract.
In its deliberations the Court examined the question of whether any laws (other
than the EJV Law) applied to the dispute and in doing so satisfied itself that the
operations of SWAB Equity Joint Venture Co were not in breach of any other laws or
regulations.
ABC instructed its solicitor to file an appeal against the decision. The solicitor
advised ABC that only one appeal was available under Chinese law and that the matter
would be concluded at the appeal. ABC arranged to acquire another independent
opinion as to the value of the imported components. The papers were filed in the
Intermediate People’s Court. SWI’s solicitor was provided with a copy of an
independent valuation of the imported components acquired by ABC that gave a value
close to, but a little less than, that originally claimed by ABC in the contract
negotiations.

2.11.5

Informal Conciliation

In the period before the matter was to be heard in the Intermediate Court, the solicitor
for SWI indicated that her client was prepared to negotiate on the matter of the value of
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the imported components. The parties entered negotiations and subsequently agreed to a
new value of the imported components. The Appeal was withdrawn and the Basic
People’s Court and the Intermediate Court were notified that the dispute had been
settled to the satisfaction of both parties.
In the above example it can be seen that a number of aspects of the legal system are
pertinent.

2.11.6

Project Approval

In terms of the initial registration requirements of a project, there is an approval
(examination) process that must be completed. The monetary values involved and the
significance of the project in local, regional or national terms are some of the criteria
that are assessed to conclude which of the local, regional or national levels of
government are able to approve the project. In this hypothetical case the municipal
government was competent to approve the project and did so once all its registration
requirements were satisfied. As the Municipal Government was empowered to make
local regulations it was the authority that was able to approve the project or otherwise.

2.11.7 The Court’s Jurisdiction
The Basic People’s Courts and the Intermediate Courts in municipal or regional
locations are funded by the local and regional governments with judges in those Courts
being appointed by the relevant local and regional governments. In Chinese law there is
clearly no formal separation of powers requirement in operation to purportedly insulate
judicial powers from the powers of government(s). Whilst the concept of separation of
powers is a component of constitutional systems in many Western countries and is seen
to be an essential element of democratic government, the degree of separation may
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sometimes seem to be illusory. This is because in many cases the political party having
power in the parliament appoints members of the judiciary as a matter of course. In the
final analysis, the integrity of individual judges is the final test as to the independence
or otherwise of their decision-making by reference to prevailing government policies.

2.11.8

The Court’s Role in the Dispute

In the above hypothetical scenario, once having been notified of a dispute the Court had
a very wide authority to examine every detail of, not only the dispute factors, but also
all aspects of the registration process, compliance with all operational regulatory
requirements, and compliance with any other applicable laws regulating a particular
industry pursuant to the court’s power under the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s
Republic of China 2008.140
In this case, having satisfied itself that the operation was properly registered and
that its operations were in accordance with the law, including the Regulations for the
Implementation of the Equity Joint Ventures Law of the People’s Republic of China
2001, 141 it turned its attention to the details of the dispute and considered that the
dispute would be decided on the basis of the parties’ compliance or otherwise with the
General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China 1987 142 and the
provisions of the Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China 1999.143

140

<< 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 民 事 诉 讼 法 >> [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 75, 1 April
2008, art 7.
141
<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法实施条例>> [Regulations for the Implementation of the
Law of the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) State Council,
Order No 311, 22 July 2001.
142
<<中华人民共和国民法通则>> [General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 1 January 1987. It was adopted by the 4 th
Session of the 6th National People’s Congress on 12 April 1986 and came into force on 1 January 1987.
143
<<中华人民共和国合同法>> [Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 15, 1 October 1999. It was passed on 15 March at the 2nd
Session of the 9th National People’s Congress and was effective from 1 October 1999.
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2.12 Conciliation, Arbitration and Appeal Processes
It is the general case in China that when a matter is heard by a Court in the first
instance, only one appeal opportunity is available to a party. A matter would be reexamined in to by the (appeal) Court and the resulting judgment binding upon the
parties. Whilst it is possible for a question of interpretation of law arising during the
appeal process to be further examined within the Court system, this is a process in
which the parties would have no role. Such an investigation would be conducted on the
Court’s initiative and may be referred by the Court to a higher level Court, such as the
Supreme People’s Court. The outcome of such a process may ultimately be of benefit to
a party in the original dispute. In such a circumstance, the Court that heard the appeal
would notify the parties of the outcome of any review, modifying the judicial outcome
if necessary.
In the hypothetical case outlined above, mention was made of two other dispute
resolution processes available to the parties (but not mandatory). These were formal
conciliation or formal arbitration, the former being conducted within the Court and the
latter in an Arbitration Commission. In the conciliation process, both parties must
initially sign their agreement to be bound by the Conciliation Statement resulting from
such conciliation. No review process is available to the parties. Such is also the case
with the formal Arbitration process with the parties being bound by the Arbitrator’s
decision and with no right of appeal.144
The lack of availability of any further judicial consideration of the matter in
either case is perhaps one reason that parties in such circumstances may choose against
following those avenues of dispute resolution. However, both processes are much less

144

<< 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 仲 裁 法 >> [Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s
Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 31, 31 August 1994, art
52.
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costly than litigation in terms of both time and legal expenses and are very commonly
utilised in domestic dispute resolution.145 The long, drawn out and expensive litigation
path can often not only damage one or both parties financially but will also often lead to
an irrevocable breakdown of the parties’ relationship. 146 According to the China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, arbitration is a preferred
dispute resolution method for foreign investors. There are currently 174 arbitration
organisations.147
It is suggested in this research that for the Chinese, the non-litigious dispute
resolution pathway is a far more culturally effective means of resolving differences
whilst maintaining good, or at least ongoing and workable, relationships. This ‘nonlitigious’ aspect of the Chinese culture has a long-standing history and is believed, by
this researcher, to constitute a central element of the differences in approach of the
Chinese to business generally that has been experienced by new foreign investors in
China. This aspect is further explored in Chapter 7 of this study.

2.13 Conclusions
Three decades ago, when China launched the country’s impressive modernisation
programme, the importance of constructing a legal system commensurate with China’s
new economic reform was recognised. The Chinese legal system has been developing
within the changing economic, social and political environments. The legal system must
fulfill many functions including provision for orderly and efficient conduct of
145

Sabrina Wang and Matthew McKee, ‘Arbitration and Litigation in China: Which is better?’ (Briefing
paper series, Beijing, Lehman, Lee and Xu (a Chinese law firm),
<http://www.lehmanlaw.com/fileadmin/lehmanlaw_com/Publications/Briefing_Paper_Series/Litigation_a
nd_arbitration_in_China-Which_is_better.pdf>. 2.
146
Ibid.
147
‘寻找金钥匙 – 探索解决外国投资争议的方法’ [Seeking the Golden Key: Exploring Methods for
Foreign Investment Dispute Resolution] 中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会 [China International Economic
and Trade Arbitration Commission] <http://cn.cietac.org/magzine/93-1.shtml>.
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government not only at the central level but also at the provincial and local levels of a
vast land and population. It has certainly facilitated domestic industrial and commercial
development and international trade and investment. The development of law and legal
institutions has contributed to a raised awareness of law as well as an improved
consciousness of rights. Profound social and economic change has fostered this trend.
On first view, however, the legal and judicial system may appear to be
somewhat confusing and convoluted to the newcomer. The ‘newcomer’, for the purpose
of this study, is regarded as the foreign party (either an individual or a corporate entity)
that has commenced or planned to commence a business operation in China in cooperation with a local Chinese person or company.
This chapter has discussed the background of the legal system in China prior to
and subsequent to the CPC taking power. Then a major political change that occurred in
the late 1970s saw the beginning of a new era in the Chinese legal system with radical
policy changes, constitutional changes and the promulgation of new laws that, together,
formed the basis of a system that enabled the PRC to expand massively on the
international economic stage.
The Chinese law-making and judicial systems have been extensively discussed
here and show structures with unique characteristics. Clearly, the CPC has been careful
to avoid allowing slippage of its political control and continues to exercise such control
by holding a tight rein upon the court system, administrative and regulatory processes
and the law-making system. In terms of the activities of foreign investors, who continue
to take advantage of low production costs and substantial investment subsidies, there
appears to be a pragmatic acceptance of the CPC’s continuing control as the advantages
seem to outweigh the disadvantages. 148 This appears to have created a fairly stable
148

See Pitman B Potter, ‘Foreign Investment Law in the People’s Republic of China: Dilemmas of State
Control’ (1995) 141 China Quarterly 155, 185; Keping Yu, ‘Globalization and Autonomy in China’ (A
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investment environment that continues to grow at a steady rate. Quantifying such
growth, Yao Jingyuan, a chief economist with the National Bureau of Statistics of
China, said that over the past decade China’s foreign direct investment reached
USD653.14 billion at a steady annual growth rate of 9.5 per cent. 149 For local
enterprises without foreign partners, the sizes of the markets inside and outside of China
continue to be so enormous that their own growth into the future seems to be without
substantial risk. The inconvenience of high levels of administrative control and even
manipulation within the administrative and judicial systems in China do not appear, in
broad terms, to have adversely impacted upon either wholly local entrepreneurs or
foreign investors or combinations of the two.150
In respect of dispute resolution — an aspect of major importance in business
relationships and activity — the existing dispute resolution procedures, with an
emphasis upon non-litigious resolution, would not normally be the natural preference
for Western business practitioners. However, in the final analysis, the conciliation
processes in the PRC have developed to such a level and fit so well with Chinese ways
that it is confidently suggested here that foreign investors in the PRC would benefit
greatly from adopting such methods as standard operating procedure rather than
instinctively looking to the formal court system for satisfaction.
Additionally, the ‘once only’ restriction in respect of appeals at the formal court
level whilst initially appearing to be overly restrictive to the Western litigant can be

paper presented at the Fourth MCRI (Major Collaborative Research Initiative) Globalization and
Autonomy Team Meeting, Toronto University, 23-25 September 2005). Keping Yu is the Director of the
Centre for Chinese Government Innovations at Beijing University.
149
Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, ‘Foreign Investment Hits USD653 Billion in Decade’ (6 June
2011) Ministry of Commerce of the PRC
<http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/newsrelease/counselorsoffice/westernasiaandafricareport/201106/
20110607586735.html>.
150
See Yang Yao and Linda Yueh, ‘Law, Finance and Economic Growth in China: An Introduction’
(2009) 37 World Development 753, 762.
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viewed as something of a refreshing and certainly cost effective improvement upon the
normal Western court process.
Ultimately it is for foreign investors to decide whether the laws and regulations
controlling their proposed business activity in China are too restrictive upon them and
this will nearly always be decided by the assessments they make as to the effects upon
potential profits. The experience of the past 30 years shows that even with frustrations,
some dissatisfaction and failed enterprises, more foreign investors are starting business
with entities within the PRC and, with the continuing upgrading of foreign investment
laws, such growth is unlikely to cease.151

In China, foreign investment law is still under development. National laws,
particularly dealing with foreign direct investment, are limited. No doubt foreign
investors’ primary concerns are stability and the development of the Chinese legal
environment. This chapter has provided some consideration of these issues.
Nevertheless they are only part of the explanation. It is suggested here that a more
thorough understanding of the Chinese way of thinking and doing business (that are still
dominant in Chinese society today) would assist in understanding why things happen as
they do.

To assist in achieving such an understanding it will be useful to further explore
some historical background. The following chapter discusses aspects of Chinese history
to attempt to further explain the significance of the ways the Chinese do business.
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Bao Chang, ‘Investments in China Continue to Grow Steadily’ The China Daily in USA (Online), 16
March 2011 <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2011-03/16/content_12179981.htm>; United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, ‘World Investment Prospects Survey 2010-2012’
(UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2010/4) (September 2010) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
11–3 <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia20104_en.pdf>.
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Chapter 3
The Tradition of Chinese Law — Philosophies and Politicallegal Powers
3.1

Introduction

In the study of the nature and development of legal system of China it is essential to have a
fundamental understanding of China’s long history of legal culture and law. The features of
law in any given society are shaped by cultural heritage. 1 Although China is not a
westernised democratic society, its modernisation and reform starting in the late 1970s has
raised the question of whether these economic and legal developments will lead China in
the direction of political democracy and economic privatisation. It is suggested in this
research that in order to understand China’s legal system and economic reform today, we
need to know China’s legal tradition and the role of law in the past.

The Chinese legal tradition developed from both Confucianism and Legalism, two
influential schools of thought.2 This Chapter will not be able to deal with the historical legal
heritage of China in extensive detail but will present a brief background of the development
of legal history to provide a better understanding of the origins of the current legal system.
The traditions of Confucianism and Legalism are explored to endeavour to identify the
extent to which they are underlying influences in the modern Chinese legal system. Section

1

Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, its Nature and Development
(Kluwer Law International, 1999) 3.
2
Xin Ren, Tradition of the Law and Law of the Tradition Law, State, and Social Control in China
(Greenwood Press, 1997) 19.
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3.2 presents a background of the earliest legal history of China. Confucian world views in
their social and legal context are explored in section 3.3 Section 3.4 examines the scope of
Confucian influence and the Confucian inheritance, and explains the feudal Imperial
Examination System. The section also deals with the concepts of social stratification, and
hierarchy and law and ethics. Section 3.5 analyses the main features of the Legalist
philosophy, including the roles of the major players and the lack of individual rights of the
people. Section 3.6 summarises the outcome of the competing philosophies of Legalism
and Confucianism. Section 3.7 summarises and concludes the chapter.

3.2

Background of Early Chinese Legal History

China has a full and extensive history spanning several thousands of years of civilisation
and different kinds of laws and legal systems have been adopted in accordance with varying
social orders.3 However, one of the major misconceptions about traditional Chinese society
is that there was no law in traditional China.4 On the contrary, law in China has a long
history and abundant sources. 5 Traditional Chinese legal history and structure can be
characterised as: feudalism, imperialism, and rule under emperors. 6 Legal codes also
existed in traditional China, with the oldest surviving code being the Tang Code 7
promulgated in the seventh century AD.8 The Tang Code constituted the foundation for the
later developed codes of the Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties. These codes and
statutes of law regulated matters that would be considered under criminal law in the modern
3

Ibid 1.
Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law above n 1, 6.
5
Ibid.
6
Xiangmin Xu et al, History of Chinese Legal Thoughts (Beijing, 2004) 2.
7
The Tang Code first promulgated in 625AD, with 502 articles in total, contained not only legal provisions,
but also commentaries which traced the historical origins of various provisions.
8
Ibid.
4
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legal approach. Further, there was no jurisprudential distinction between criminal and civil
law, as penal sanctions occasionally applied to acts that would today be covered by civil
law. 9 The lowest ranking local official in ancient China who represented the central
government were the district magistrates. Each of these magistrates exercised all of the
powers of the state in collecting taxes, providing for defence, carrying out public works,
conducting religious ceremonies, supervising the local examination system for entry into
the civil service, and deciding lawsuits etc. 10 Disputes between individuals dealing with
family matters or land were generally settled through mediation.

11

Such informal

resolutions were conducted by respected leaders or elders in the villages, who applied
customary rules and concepts of morality to reach harmony between disgruntled
individuals.

In traditional China the emperor was vested with executive, legislative and judicial
powers. 12 The state structure over which Chinese emperors presided had the continuing
characteristic of being organised into three functionally differentiated hierarchies, each
comprising agencies extending from the central government down to regional and local
levels.13

9

Hongyi Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System of the People’s Republic of China (Buttherworth Asia,
1998) 1.
10
William C Jones, ‘Try to Understand the Current Chinese Legal System’ in C Stephen Hsu (ed),
Understanding China’s Legal System: Essays in Honour of Jerome A Cohen (New York University Press,
2003) 7, 9.
11
Bobby K Y Wong, ‘Dispute Resolution by Officials in Traditional Chinese Legal Culture’ (2003) 10
Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 1, 1,
<http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v10n2/wong102.html>.
12
Richard Louis Walker, China and the West: Cultural Collision (Far Eastern Publication, 1956) 148.
13
Charles O Hucker, ‘Political Institutions’ in John T Meskill (ed), An Introduction to Chinese Civilisation
(Columbia University Press, 1973) 551, 558.
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The traditional legal system continued from one dynasty to another for several thousand
years (see Table 8.1, 274). Traditional Chinese conceptions of law have been largely
influenced by writings of traditional schools of philosophy. 14 The most dominant of these
was Confucianism, which had at its heart an emphasis on the educational function of
morality (Li) in governing a state. 15 The traditional society and legal culture are often
described as ‘Confucian’. 16 Certain fundamental features of the traditional legal culture
clearly persist in the contemporary legal system and social attitudes towards law. 17

From the Chinese point of view, the central element of their legal system was a
body of rules promulgated by the emperor. 18 Traditionally law had been used as an
instrument to consolidate political power with administrative organs often having supreme
power over the law as they exercised power on behalf of the emperor. 19 The most striking
aspect of this system was its intimate connection with the administration system of the
central government. This system of government had developed in China after its unification
in the third century BC. It consisted of a strong central government headed by the emperor
who ruled through the highly centralised bureaucracy. 20 There was no separation of power
between the judiciary and administration. Social order very much relied upon the influence
of education in morality.21 Confucian thought had been the major part of social education

14

Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law above n 1, 7.
Ibid.
16
Ibid 4.
17
Ibid 7.
18
William C Jones, ‘Try to Understand’ above n 10, 9.
19
马志冰 [Ma Zhibing], <<中国法制史>> [History of the Chinese Legal System] (北京大学出版社 [Beijing
University Press], 2004) 21–2.
20
William C Jones, ‘Try to Understand’ above n 10, 8.
21
马志冰 [Ma Zhibing], above n 19, 21–2; William C Jones, ‘Try to Understand the Current Chinese Legal
System’ in C Stephen Hsu (ed), Understanding China’s Legal System: Essays in Honor of Jerome A Cohen
(New York University Press, 2003) 9.
15
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over thousands of years.22 These profound influences penetrated Chinese society in every
way, and it still shows within the way people think and act.

From observations in earlier chapters of the ways in which foreign investment in
China has been operating in the legal environment, it is difficult to avoid the inference that
the application of law continues to be significantly impacted by social conditions and
traditional customs. These informal norms appear to play a much more important role than
we might imagine. Menski asserts:

Equally important in social reality, however, was the un-codified system of Chinese cultural
norms, which is often subsumed under the label of morality or ‘Confucian ethics’, but is
manifestly a legal force of great relevance for understanding how ancient China (and, as we
shall see, modern Chinese law) actually functioned. 23

It is apparent that there is a need to consider the Chinese characteristics of law and
specific cultural aspects in order to assess the nature of the modern interplay between the
law and culture. Menski finds:

The Chinese characteristics of this interactive pattern, at first sight, appear to be that the
domination of the official state law is a central issue, while the spheres of religion and the
Chinese worldview seem far less important. But the formal structures of Chinese state law
have almost always been applied in such a way that a subtle balancing act between the
spheres of religion, society and state remains a core concern at all times.24

Civilisation flourished in China for thousands of years in relative isolation from the
rest of the world against the background of physical and cultural variety. There were three
broadly unifying features which were interrelated: dependence on irrigated agriculture; a

22

Fung Yu-Lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (The Free Press and Collier Macmillan Publishers,
1948) 48.
23
Werner F Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa
(Cambridge University Press, 2006) 439.
24
Ibid 441.

104

Ch 3: The Tradition of Chinese Law

centralised, bureaucratic administration; and a literary tradition.25 It has been said that in
China the creation of formal law is much easier than its application since informal legal
traditions continue to dominate modern, formal ones.26 The most important elements were
ethical philosophy and history.27

In Chinese history, the fifth Han Emperor, Wu (147 BC) found Confucianism well
suited to the conditions of ancient China. 28 In order to consolidate and strengthen the feudal
system, the Confucian school of thought or philosophy was adopted officially as the
prevailing orthodoxy and as a result a pattern of feudal legal thought was developed. 29
Probably the greatest traditional source of behavioural norms in Asia is Confucianism. 30

Table 3.1:

Chinese Dynastic Timeline31
Dynasty

Years

Yellow Emperor to Five Emperors Period

2698 BC–2000 BC

Xia

2000 BC–1500 BC

Shang

1500 BC–1000 BC

Western Zhou

1000 BC–771 BC

25

See John E Schrecker, The Chinese Revolution in Historical Perspective (Praeger Publisher, 2004) 1–10.
H Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2004) 302.
27
朱勇 [Zhu Yong] (Translated), Derke Bodde and Clarence Morris, <<中华帝国的法律>> [Law in Imperial
China] (江苏人民出版社 [Jiangsu People’s Press], 2003) 6–7.
28
Howard E Myer, ‘Hidden Goals in Chinese Industrialisation: Lessons from early Modernisation Attempts’
(1982) 17 Columbia Journal of World Business 74, 78.
29
徐祥民，刘笃才，马建红 [Xu Xiaming, Liu Ducai, Ma Jianhong], <<中国法律思想史>> [History of
Chinese Legal Thoughts] (北京大学出版社 [Beijing University Press], 2004) 188.
30
Ibid 302.
31
Bodo Wiethoff, Introduction to Chinese History: From Ancient Times to 1912 (Thames and Hudson, 1975)
179.
26
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Eastern Zhou

771 BC–249 BC

Spring and Autumn Period

771 BC–481 BC

Time of the Warring States

480 BC–221 BC

Qin

221 BC–207 BC

Western Han

206 BC–AD 8

Xin

AD 9–AD 23

Eastern Han

AD 23–AD 220

Three Kingdoms

AD 220–AD 280

Western Jin

AD 265–AD 317

Eastern Jin

AD 317–AD 420

Southern and Northern

AD 420–AD 481

Sui

AD 481–AD 618

Tang

AD 618–AD 906

Five Dynasties and Ten States

AD 907–AD 960

Liao

AD 937–AD 1125

Northern Song

AD 960–AD 1126

Southern Song

AD 1127–AD 1279

Western Xia

AD 990–AD 1227

Jin

AD 1115–AD 1234

Yuan

AD 1260–AD 1367

Ming

AD 1368–AD 1644

Qing
AD 1644–AD1912
Source: Bodo Wiethoff, Introduction to Chinese History: From Ancient Times to 1912 (Thames and Hudson, 1975) 179.

3.3

Confucian World Views in Their Social and Legal Context

In any interdisciplinary legal study a consideration of intellectual, conceptual and social
frameworks is important. It is particularly the case for a study of Chinese law. Several
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major elements of traditional Chinese philosophy appear to be central to an understanding
of the socio-legal environment of traditional Chinese law. Chinese philosophy can throw
light upon the background of Chinese thinking from ancient times down to the present
time.32 Chan suggests:

If one word could characterise the entire history of Chinese philosophy, that word would be
humanism – not the humanism that denies or slights a Supreme Power, but one that
33
professes the unity of man and heaven.

Confucianism is based primarily on the great books, all written or edited by
disciples of Confucius.34 Confucius was the first person in Chinese history to teach large
numbers of students. He was accompanied by such students during his travels in different
states. 35 There is no question that he was a very influential teacher and, what is more
important and unique, China’s first private teacher. 36 His ideas are best known through the
Lun Yu (or Confucian Analects), a collection of his scattered sayings which was compiled
by some of his disciples.37 It begins with the development of man’s personality and virtues
through the cultivation of humane and social relations and ends with the prerequisites for
government leading to the final achievement of an ideal world commonwealth. When the
right relations among men are established, it was easy, Confucius felt, to achieve a
harmonious family, a peaceful state, and eventually a global commonwealth.38

32

Clarence Burton Day, The Philosophers of China Classical and Contemporary (Perter Owen, 1962) 1.
Wing-Tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton University Press, 1969) 3.
34
Confucius is the Latinised name of the person who has been known in China as K’ung Tzu or Master
K’ung. He was born in 551 BC in the state of Lu, in the southern part of the present Shandong Province in
eastern China.
35
Fung Yu-Lan, A Short History above n 22, 39.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
38
W Warren Wagar and Council for the Study of Mankind, ‘Mankind and World Order in Chinese History’ in
W Warren Wagar (ed), History and the Idea of Mankind (University of New Mexico Press, 1971) 27, 28.
33
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It seems hard to believe that a philosophy that began 2500 years ago is still the dominant
influence on a major modern power. Chinese legal tradition indigenously developed a vast
bureaucracy for social control based on the philosophical teaching of Confucian moral
codes that was endorsed by Chinese imperial rulers for more than two millennia. 39That is,
in essence, the role that Confucianism has played in China. Confucianism affects individual
morality, the roles of family members, the roles of the individual in society, as well as the
manner in which government must act. In short, this ancient teaching dominated and
continues its influence in almost every aspect of daily Chinese life.

Confucius’ central beliefs in government tie directly into the traditional Chinese
belief in the Mandate of Heaven. When a new dynasty claimed power, it was said to have
claimed the Mandate of Heaven.40 However, Confucius did not comment on religion.

The Han was not the only dynasty in which the impact of Confucius was of great
importance. When Confucius was still under the age of 50, he was conscious of ordinary
moral values which he believed to be the most important part of a strong society. He chose
students who were known for their virtue, who were gifted in art or speech, who were
distinguished in government, or those who were eminent in literature. However, it is now
believed that Confucius just made these ideas prominent through the teaching of them. 41 It
was not until he was 50 or 60 years of age that he even became aware of supra-moral
values, those that deal with the ideas of heaven and spirituality beyond what one

39

Xin Ren, Tradition of the Law above n 2, 3.
See John T Meskill, An Introduction to Chinese Civilisation (Columbia University Press, 1973) 556.
41
Fung Yu-Lan (Translated by Derk Bodde), A History of Chinese Philosophy: The Period of the
Philosophers (Henri Vetch, 1937) 44–5.
40
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experiences on earth.42 From his view of the quest for individual perfection and familial
and societal relationships, as well as the way in which he taught, came his view of how
government should function.

Confucius sought to create, by the unification of the minds of humanity, a
homogeneous community of all humanity, in which there would be general and voluntary
agreement regarding the objects worthy of desire and in which the careless, the selfish, and
the anti-social would be subdued by the transforming influences of good example and
exhortation. 43 Measured against the standard of perfection, of course, the sage’s world
commonwealth remained a happy and wishful dream. 44 Even so, it had far-reaching
beneficial consequences for his people who for two thousand years recognised him as their
‘master teacher’.45

The fundamental idea was that there is a cosmic order of things involving a
reciprocal interaction between heaven, earth and humans. 46 Heaven and earth observe
invariable rules in their movement, but people are in charge of their own acts; and
according to the way in which they behave, there will be order or disorder in the world.47
The traditional Chinese concept of the social order is thoroughly discussed in the Li Chi
(Book of Rites).48 Li, as the key concept of Chinese legal philosophy, represents an ideal
model of self-controlled ordering. The ideal is that laws never be applied and that the courts
never render decisions; but that through exhortation and example (education and
42

Fung Yu-Lan, A Short History above n 22, 46.
Fung Yu-Lan (Translated by Derk Bodde), A History of Chinese, above n 41, 73–5.
44
John E Schrecker, The Chinese Revolution, above n 25, 18.
45
Fung Yu-Lan, A Short History above n 22, 39.
46
Ibid 6-7.
47
Shu-Hsien Liu, ‘Confucius’ in Donald H Bishop (ed), Chinese Thought: An Introduction (Motilal
Banarsidass, 1985) 14, 24.
48
Clarence Burton Day, The Philosophers of China above n 32, 38.
43
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experience) right action is attained. The philosophy explains how these societal, moral and
ethical values worked within the social context and begins to prepare the ground for their
legal application.49

The harmony upon which the world’s balance and human happiness depends has
two aspects. 50 It is first of all a harmony between human beings and nature. 51 Human
behaviour must be co-ordinated with the order of nature. Confucius believed that there were
aspects of heaven’s overwhelming power that could never be controlled by human power. 52
Natural disasters, such as drought and famine, continually occurred. The unpredictable
forces of nature could still destroy crops and render people destitute in spite of their efforts.
In the case of our ancestors, the predominance of nature over their destiny gradually
crystallised itself into a concept of an omnipotent Heaven. 53 The heart of Confucius’s
teaching is that the key to righteousness and welfare is the attainment and maintenance of
harmony. If human beings damaged the necessary harmony between man and nature, they
would fall into discord among themselves. 54 Virtue and morality so conceived were thus
more important qualities in administrators than any technical expertise.55

The second harmonious relationship that must exist is that between human beings.
Confucianism emphasised the duties and obligations of people rather than their individual
49

Ibid 447.
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rights. The focus is more on the interests and harmony of the family, clan, or the
community rather than the rights of the single person. 56 The ideas of conciliation and
consensus must be primary in social relations. All condemnations, sanctions and majority
decisions must be avoided. Contestations and disputes must be dissolved rather than
resolved or decided; the solution proposed must be freely accepted by each because s/he
considers it to be just. No one, therefore, should come away with the feeling that they have
‘lost face’. Education and persuasion must prevail, not authority or force.57

3.4

The Scope of Confucian Influence

The form of social order which for centuries represented the ideal in China was that
proposed by Confucianism. Confucianism as a philosophy has performed an important role
in China’s history.58 Kong Fu Ze, called ‘Confucius’, lived from 551 to 479 BC. He can
truly be said to have moulded Chinese civilisation in general terms, 59 yet it was more than
300 years after his death before his philosophy found acceptance.

Confucianism, with its emphasis on social rank and ethics catered admirably to the
needs of a strong centralised monarchy. A centralised, hierarchical bureaucracy that
identified itself with an ethical and political orthodoxy, was able to impose a ‘picture of
society’ upon the governed.60 This was a major departure from the established social order.
From the Han era (206 BC–AD 220) onward, Confucianism held a dominant position in
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China.61 It performed an important role in reinforcing the centralised monarchy and shaping
ideology. In AD 134 a famous Confucian scholar, Dong Zhongsu, proposed the banning of
all schools of thought except the Confucian school.62 This proposal was accepted by the
ruling emperor. 63 It was Dong who established the Confucian patriarchal conception of
‘letting a king be a king, a minister be a minister, a father be a father, and a son be a son’. 64
From this premise the three cardinal guidelines evolved. Rulers guide subjects, fathers
guide sons, and husbands guide wives. The most important relationships were often said to
be the three bonds: husband-wife, father-son and ruler-minister.65 Dong also established the
five constant virtues; benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and fidelity. 66 Dong
further advanced the theory of the integration of heaven and man. This conception asserted
that the emperor, as the son of heaven, was sacred and everlasting.

Dong strengthened the centralised monarchy by providing a theoretical basis for the
existence of monolithic rule.67 The philosophy of Dong Zhongshu is a mixture of theories
of Confucianism.68 The administrative bureaucracy in ancient China was composed of three
levels: the leading centre, the central organ, and the local organ. 69 From about 150 BC until
the beginning of last century, the emperor exercised supreme command in China through a
well-organised administrative bureaucracy. 70 This process was further reinforced by the
61
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direct influence of Confucianism in the administration of justice. 71 Confucianism had
absorbed many ideas from other rival schools including Legalism which will be discussed
later in this chapter.

Confucianism is not a religion in the strict sense, but Confucian values have
historically exerted a profound and lasting influence on China (and East Asia) over a period
of more than two thousand years. 72 It spread to the rest of East Asia as an exemplary
teaching of harmonious social and moral order. Confucianism was not an organised
missionary tradition, but by the first century BC it had spread to those East Asian countries
that were under the influence of Chinese literary culture.73 For this reason, for the purpose
only of comparison with western moral authorities, it may be regarded here as a religion.
In the 16th century, the first attempt by Catholic missionaries to gain admission into
China was made by the founder of the Chinese mission and also the most important figure
in its whole history, Matteo Ricci.74 In 1636, within a population of about 150 million, the
number of Christians in China was estimated to be 38,200.75 From his knowledge of the
bureaucratic structure of Chinese society, Ricci drew the conclusion that only a close link
with the ruling literary and official class, and if possible with its highest grades, could
provide the missionaries with a relatively respected and assured status in China. 76 In the
17th and 18th centuries, the philosophy of European Enlightenment challenged, under
rationalistic and scientific claims, the contents of the Christian faith. It was a process of
71
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secularisation in which a separation of Church and state firstly occurred, leading in the end
to the marginalisation of the churches. 77 A similar process of secularisation never took
place in China. Some of the reasons for that were, according to Franke:

Certain traditional Chinese customs and ways of thought were opposed to Christian
teaching. In particular, the thinking of the educated class formed by Confucianism was
agnostic and unfavourable to all metaphysic, and concentrated on this world and its
problems, and consequently made difficult the spread of a religious doctrine largely
oriented towards the next world. It also seems that in spite of adoption of the Christian
religion by educated Chinese, their traditional Confucian outlook remained predominant.78

This does not mean that Confucianism, as its dominant ideology, had not been
criticised. It had been blamed for all the ills of the traditional Chinese society during the
May 4th period (1919) 79 and, from a social-Darwinist point of view, it was deemed
responsible for China’s backwardness in terms of economic, technological, military and
political development. 80 Although criticised, it never had to go through a process of
secularisation as such, because Confucianism — as a form of social and political ethics —
had always been a secular way of thought. After Confucianism assumed a dominant
philosophical position in the Nan Dynasty (206 BC–AD 220), the rulers attached greater
importance to ethics than to law as a tool of management. 81 They believed that laws are
externally enforced while ethics are moral commitments established over time. 82 Thus,
although Confucianism as an institution disappeared with the end of imperial China, it
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formed and, to an extent as post-Confucianism, still forms the ethical basis of Chinese
society.

3.4.1 The Confucian Inheritance
Traditional Confucian thoughts have clearly shaped much of contemporary Chinese life
after it dominated education for more than two thousand years. The belief in rule by an
educated and functionally unspecialised elite was reflected in the attitude to education. The
Confucians not only emphasised that education rather than heredity was the basis of virtue,
but they also felt that nearly everyone was capable and worthy of receiving an education
and so being capable of being good. 83 The value placed on learning and propagating an
orthodox ideology that focuses on society and government, and the stress on hierarchy and
the pre-eminent role of the state were all carried over from traditional society. The
fundamental way in which Confucianism seeks to achieve a good society is through a
hierarchical system permeated with sense of responsibility by those above and obligation
from those below. 84 Some of the more radical and extreme policies of the 1950s and
1960s,85 such as attacks upon intellectuals and compulsory manual labour for bureaucrats, 86
can be understood as responses to deep-rooted traditional attitudes. The role of model
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workers and soldiers, 87 as well as official concern for the content and form of popular
literature and the arts can be seen in the Resolution Concerning Direction Guideline for
Construction of Socialist Spiritual Civilisation 1986 88 which promoted the upholding of
socialism and the Communist party through spiritual and moral education and also
reflecting characteristically Chinese themes. In the mid 1980s a number of Chinese writers
and political leaders identified the lingering hold of feudal attitudes, even within the
Chinese Communist Party, as a major obstacle to modernisation. 89 They identified such
phenomena as authoritarianism, unthinking obedience to leaders, deprecation of expert
knowledge, lack of appreciation for law, and the failure to apply laws to leaders, as feudal
legacies that had not been addressed in the early years of China’s revolution. 90

Throughout the centuries some 80 to 90 per cent of the Chinese population had been
farmers.91 Traditional Chinese society had been reliant upon agriculture. However, despite
the differences that separated Chinese from the north to the south, they shared a perception
of themselves as having not only a common political system but also a common cultural
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heritage.92 The national elite, which comprised perhaps one per cent of China’s population,
had a number of distinctive features. The upper members of the local elite might well be
competing for power with a county magistrate within their communities. 93 They were
dispersed across the country and often lived in rural areas, where they were the dominant
figures on the local scene.94 Although they held land, which they rented to tenant farmers,
they neither possessed large estates like European nobles nor held hereditary titles. They
achieved their highest and most prestigious titles by their performance on the central
government’s triennial civil service examinations. 95

These titles had to be earned by each generation, and since the examinations had
strict numerical quotas, competition was fierce. Government officials were selected from
those who passed the examinations, which tested for mastery of the Confucian Classics. 96
The examination syllabus was largely Confucian in nature. 97 Many members of the elite
would have been men who held the first or second degrees but had not succeeded in passing
the final metropolitan examination. The qualification gave them status in their local
communities as well as exemption from some taxes and from corporal punishment.98

At the top of the social hierarchy structure in China were still an emperor and a
hereditary dynasty. 99 The imperial state was staffed by a small civil bureaucracy. Civil
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officials were directly appointed and paid by the emperor and must have passed the civil
service examinations. 100 Since the Ming dynasty, officials were supposed to owe their
primary loyalty to the emperor and did not serve in their home provinces but were generally
assigned to different places for each tour of duty. 101 Although the salary of central officials
was low, the positions offered great opportunities for personal enrichment, which was one
reason that families competed so fiercely to pass the examinations and then obtain an
appointments.102 For most officials, office-holding was not a lifetime career. They served
one or more tours and then returned to their home districts and families, where their wealth,
prestige, and network of official contacts made them dominant figures on the local scene. 103

3.4.2 The Feudal Imperial Examination System
In 607, Emperor Yangli of the Sui Dynasty (AD 581–618) completed possibly his most
important contribution — the imperial examination system for the selection of officials.104
This Chinese imperial examination system was a method to evaluate ability and select
officials in dynastic China on the basis of merit rather than social position or political
connections.

Four Confucian books including the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, the
Analects of Confucius, and the Mencius became Chinese students’ main textbooks for more
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than 2000 years until the end of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911).105 In AD 5 Confucianism
received royal approval and became the guiding force in the lives and minds of Chinese
people in later centuries. 106 In the Ming Dynasty, the royal court confined examination
subjects to the four Confucian classics and their commentaries, and adopted a mandatory
answer format known as the ‘eight-part essay’.107

This civil service recruitment method and educational system was employed from
the Han dynasty until the Qing dynasty in 1905. 108 Imperial examinations in the Yuan
Dynasty (1271–1368) focused mainly on the Confucian classics annotated by the famous
scholar of Zhu Xi (1130–1200) of the Song Dynasty. This remained the same in the Ming
and Qing (1644–1911) dynasties.109 Zhu Xi’s commentaries and choice of classics became
the orthodox interpretation of Confucianism, maintained by the examination system and
imperial patronage. This orthodoxy remained in force for the next seven hundred years and
is often the foundation used by modern Confucian scholars. 110 Candidates were tested on
how well they had memorised the Confucian classics and internalised the code of ethics
embodied therein.111
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The Qing Dynasty followed the imperial examination system of the Ming Dynasty on the
whole, and developed it into a standardised and strict system. 112 A Committee on Education
was established in 1903, which in 1904 presented the throne with new policies to replace
examination with schools as the road to officialdom.113 While the civil service examination
system enabled the government to discover and make use of talent, it was also responsible
to a large extent for keeping China backward in science. The restrictive and conservative
examination syllabus bound the scholar to mainly literary studies.114 China’s civilisation
had experienced contact with the west that can be traced back to Han dynasty in the western
part of China with trading of silk with Rome and Britain. However, with the decline of
Rome and of the Han, contact faded.115 The scientific and technological superiority of the
West at the end of Ming period helped determine the relationship between China and the
West and had impact on the Chinese revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries116.

The concept of a state ruled by men of ability and virtue was an outgrowth of
Confucian philosophy.117 In late imperial China, the status of local-level elites was ratified
by contact with the central government, which maintained a monopoly on society’s most
prestigious titles.118 The examination system and associated methods of recruitment to the
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central bureaucracy were major mechanisms by which the central government captured and
held the loyalty of local-level elites.119 Their loyalty, in turn, ensured the integration of the
Chinese state and countered tendencies toward regional autonomy and the breakup of the
centralised system. The civil service, in short, had become a relatively autonomous and
self-perpetuating power bloc in the state system. The emperor had no choice but to share
his power with it and to accept the principles on which it insisted the state must function.120
The examination system distributed its prizes according to provincial and prefectural
quotas, which meant that imperial officials were recruited from the whole country, in
numbers roughly proportional to a province’s population. 121 Elites all over China, even in
the disadvantaged peripheral regions, had a chance at succeeding in the examinations and
achieving the rewards of office-holding.122

The examination system also served to maintain cultural unity and consensus on
basic values. The uniformity of the content of the examinations meant that the local elite
and ambitious would-be elite all across China were being indoctrinated with the same
values. Even though only a small fraction of those who attempted the examinations passed
them and received titles, the study, self-indoctrination, and hope of eventual success on a
subsequent examination served to sustain the interest of those who undertook the exercise.
According to Elman’s research, several tens thousands of Chinese competed triennially in
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the fourteen to eighteen provincial examinations (more than 150,000 in total in mid and late
Ch’ing provincial examinations), yielding the final three or four thousand candidates for the
triennial metropolitan and palace examinations in the capital.

123

Both the general

administration and censorial agencies of the traditional government were staffed chiefly
with men originally selected for state service on the basis of their individual merits as
demonstrated in competitive, public, written examinations. These examinations tested their
grasp of classical and historical literature and, in particular, of Confucian philosophical
principals and their ability to apply the precepts and precedents of the past to either timely
or timeless political and ethical problems.124 As a result the examination syllabus was a
determining factor in one’s social status. The men who had passed the exams and held
official positions formed the imperial bureaucracy. Because of their long and successful
training in moral texts they saw themselves as uniquely well qualified to govern. 125
Confucianism, therefore, played many roles connected with thought, society, administration
and politics in traditional China. 126 Its influence had been pervading aspects of China’s
society through political and educational activities.

In late traditional China then, education was valued in part because of its possible
reward in the examination system. The overall result of the examination system and its
associated study was cultural uniformity and identification of the educated with national
rather than regional goals and values. This self-conscious national identity underlies the
nationalism so important in China’s politics in the 20th century. Since the economic reform
in the late 1970s, state planning and intervention were gradually reduced and the economy
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was opened up to the forces of market competition. Nationalism had become part of the
ideology and held a particular appeal for both the Chinese government and the
population.127 However, Chinese nationalism is perceived as an international ‘China threat’
in the 21st century as a result of its strong economic growth. 128 Nonetheless, the
combination probably accounts for the many ways in which China’s leaders too have
continued to make use of the symbols of nationalism for their own political ends. 129

3.4.3 Social Stratification
Confucius believed that the only way to maintain order would be to arrange affairs so that
the emperor would continue to be emperor, the nobles to be nobles, the ministers to be
ministers, and common people to be common people.130 Traditional thought accepted social
stratification as natural and considered most social groups to be organised on hierarchical
principles. One way of describing the hierarchy was in terms of the social class structure in
the Confucian feudal system in the Zhou dynasty. At the top are the rulers, then come
peasants, then artisans, and finally merchants. This was based on the distinction between
those who worked with their minds and those who worked with their hands. The former
were assumed to be at the highest social level.131

In society at large, the highest and most prestigious positions were those of political
generalists, such as members of the emperor’s council or provincial governors. 132 Although
commerce has been a major element of Chinese life since the early imperial period and
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wealthy merchants have been major figures in Chinese cities, Confucianists disparaged
merchants. 133 It was from the family-oriented economic and political system that rulers
from the Han dynasty onwards pursued policies encouraging agriculture and restraining
commerce.134 Commercial success never won respect, and wealth based on commerce was
subject to official taxes, fees, and even confiscation. For example, in the Han dynasty a poll
tax was levied against merchants. This tax was double the amount other workers paid. 135
Upward mobility by merchants was achieved by cultivating good relations with powerful
officials and educating their sons in the hope they might become officials. Despite the fact
that the sons of the majority of families had little hope of ever becoming officials, the
content of the examination system dominated education. 136 Although dynasties were
founded by military conquest, Confucian ideology derogated military skill. Common
soldiers occupied a low position in society and were recruited from its lowest ranks. 137
Chinese civilisation, however, includes a significant military tradition, and generals and
strategists usually were held in high esteem.138

Most of China’s population was composed of peasant farmers, whose basic role in
supporting the rulers and the rest of society was recognised as positive in Confucian
ideology.139 The most basic fundamental constant is that Chinese civilisation has always
rested upon an agrarian, peasant base.140 Even though officials and intellectuals were the
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higher status rank in society ultimately it was the backbreaking labour of China’s peasant
masses that created the highly productive agricultural foundation on which China’s other
classes built the marvelous edifice that was Chinese civilisation.

The system by which officials were selected through regularly held imperial
examinations, gave opportunities to people on the lower rungs of the social ladder to
acquire power and wealth. Over the years, intellectuals in China made passing the imperial
examination and becoming an official their highest ideal. 141 As a result, in Chinese
communities, the primary factor generating prestige was education. Once a Chinese
intellectual achieved academic merit, there would be a bright future with fame and power
that would, in turn, alter the status and future situation of his family. 142 Another asset was
an extensive personal network that permitted one to grant favours and make introductions
and recommendations. There was no sharp line dividing the elite from the masses, and
social mobility was possible and common.

It would be incorrect to assume that Confucianism had no problems over the past
2500 years. For example in 1911, influenced by Western Enlightenment ideas of science
and democracy, many criticised the Confucian belief in supernatural powers, attributing
that belief to China’s backwardness. These critics began to advocate the view that the
Confucian notion of Heaven referred to the impersonal physical order of nature. 143 It was

141

Laurence Jacobs et al, ‘Confucian Roots’ above n 67, 30.
‘Historic Significance of Keju’ The China Daily, 23 February 2006
<http://proquest.umi.com.ezproxy.uow.edu.au/pqdweb?did=991610711&sid=1&Fmt=3&clientld=20901&R
QT=309&VName=PQD>.
143
Q K Wang, ‘The Confucian Conception of Transcendence and Filial Piety’ in Ruiping Fan (ed), The
Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China (Springer, 2011) 75, 78.
142

125

Ch 3: The Tradition of Chinese Law

criticised after the 1911 revolution and again after the socialist revolution of 1949. 144 In
view of Marxist dialectical materialism, Confucianism was incorrect and detrimental to
social development. Confucianism was criticised for imposing a reactionary metaphysical
straitjacket upon Chinese thought, and for its notion of society as well-ordered and
harmonious without recognition of the realities of material and social conflict.145 According
to Qing, the twentieth century has seen a decline in Confucian morality in mainland China
due to the denigration of traditional Chinese culture. 146 However, Chinese society is a
society of ritual and norms built on the principle of benevolence. In other words, traditional
Chinese society is a society grounded primarily on relationships, and is a society of the rule
of man.147 Confucianism is so ingrained after two millennia that it cannot be ignored. It still
forms the basis of most business practices in China. It manifests in China today as the
embedded phenomena of influential administrative power and massive use of networking in
doing business in China. These extending phases of Confucian influence have always
entailed an important bi-directional influence, digging deep furrows in the influenced
culture, while itself being qualitatively enriched and transformed. 148
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3.4.4 A Strong Sense of Social Hierarchy
It is impossible to do business in China and to not feel the effects of Confucian philosophy.
For example, strong feelings of a social hierarchy are still present in China. The long
existence of this system has produced a strong sense of order and relationship. These
concepts still permeate every sector of society including business. When a group picture is
taken, the most conspicuous position should be given to the one highest in rank in the
group. Any breach of the rule may offend the group leader. 149 The Confucian ethical
structure, with its lack of civil law, still influences current thinking.150 A strong sense of
family as the basic unit of production, with its rights of inheritance and views of the
extended family, still pervades much of Chinese thought.151 If Confucianism is officially
gone, its influence is still strong. As evidenced by Cao, the Confucian influence on modern
Chinese may not be as explicit and strong since Confucian thought ceased to be the
orthodox state ideology, but Confucius has always maintained a strong presence in Chinese
culture.152 It is important here to identify the aspects of Confucianism which are relevant to
those seeking to understand the Chinese business environment.

The centralised monarchy dominated China for 2000 years. The long existence of
an immense hierarchical system has produced a strong sense of order and relationship.
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These concepts still permeate every sector of society, including business. This sense of
hierarchy was strengthened, not weakened, with the introduction of Marxism in China.153

As explained above, Confucianism advocates Li (rites) as a basic doctrine. By
giving prominence to principle of Li, Confucianism calls for maintaining the established
social order. Accordingly, everyone has a fixed position in society and, provided each
person behaves according to rank, social harmony is achieved.

Chinese have a strong devotion to their hierarchical system. Everyone has a social
rank in the Chinese management culture, and all are expected to know where they fit into
the hierarchy and to behave accordingly. This culture originated from Confucian teaching
of Li that represents the cement of the entire normative socio-political order and the whole
network of hierarchy and authority on which the order is based. It is at the heart of
Confucius’ teaching. 154 There are diverse manners in which hierarchy is continually
reaffirmed in Chinese business culture. As evidenced by Turley’s study, showing respect by
varying our manner of communication dependent on the age, status or hierarchy of those
we are dealing with, is a natural skill in China.155 Instead of social equality and individual
freedom, Confucianism emphasises social hierarchy and order because social stability and
harmony—the very foundation of individual right—can be realised only through everyone
whole-heartedly doing their duty as defined by their position in the hierarchical society.156
Collectivism and deference to authority have, for many centuries, been so central to
life in China that the value placed upon ‘harmony-in-hierarchy’ has been suggested as the
153
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key to understanding Chinese social behaviour. 157 A foreign business person must
understand the implications of this strong sense of hierarchy to do business successfully in
China. Small events, which might be irrelevant in another culture, can become important.
The sense of hierarchy has several manifestations in Chinese business management. 158
Business meetings tend to be long, especially when senior managers or officials are
participating. The chairman is obliged to invite all of such managers to give their guidance
on all the various matters under discussion. The course of the meeting then takes the form
of a series of lengthy speeches rather than any open discussion. 159 It often destroys the
sense of participation, essential to the progress of a business. Since everybody is supposed
to behave according to rank, people are reluctant to present ideas that may lead to the
improvement of the business. This explains much of the inertia in Chinese business,
particularly in state-owned enterprises. The Chinese favour the reserved, the implicit, and
the indirect forms of communication. It is a value that can be traced deep into Chinese
antiquity to the philosophy of Confucius and his fundamental concern with achieving social
harmony.160

3.4.5 Law and Ethics
After Confucianism assumed a dominant philosophical position in the Han Dynasty, the
rulers attached greater importance to ethics than to law as a tool of management. These two
ideas are different in that laws are stipulated in explicit terms while ethics are established
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through use. That is, laws are externally enforced while ethics are moral commitments
established over time.

Ancient Europe relied on the law because the serf system was based on contractual
relations. Religious doctrines of a powerful European church were also a potent force. This
combination of contracts and church support exercised effective control over people’s
behaviour.161 In ancient China there were no contractual relations. The existence of contract
theory has even been explicitly denied for ancient China162 Under the centralised monarchy
the Chinese had a weak sense of religion. In China Neo-Confucianism prevailed over other
philosophies of state and religion during the Tang dynasty. 163 Unlike westerners who often
prayed to their God(s), the Chinese thought of heaven only when in trouble. In ancient
times, China only had criminal law and imperial decrees. In the fourth century BC at the
time of Shang Yang, the statutes mainly dealt with questions of administrative and criminal
law.164 Over the years, China did not produce a code of civil law akin to Roman law.165

According to the teaching of Confucius, the fundamental social unit is the family,
organised in a hierarchy under the almost absolute authority of its head. Public bodies and
the state itself were patterned along the same model and refrained from interfering in the
many aspects of social life reserved to the family. 166 In communities and collectives of
161
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various kinds, the individual’s duty was to live according to the rite or style of life which
fell to each according to his status. This is because China, throughout its long history, has
been collectivist in nature. Such societies tend to be characterised by participation in
intense social interaction that affords little privacy, leading to a corresponding stress on the
need to maintain harmony.167 The observance of these rites as laid down by custom was, in
China, the principle that took the place of law.

The impact of Confucianism on the modern Chinese judicial system remains
evident, even though the system was founded on Marxist ideology. Wang, Zhang and
Goodfellow suggest:

Confucianism maintains that the entire complex of moral convention is the cement of
society. Convention can be differentiated into five major areas of importance: hierarchy,
collectivism, ‘face’ protection, respect for tradition or age, egalitarianism. These values
must be appreciated as central to any study of Chinese national values and their particular
168
influence on ways of doing business today.

The ‘rule of man’ is a Confucian concept, in which Confucius argued that
government officials must set a good example for the governed, that the moral goodness of
a government, not the strength of the laws, is linked to the morality of the people. The most
important and lasting way that Confucius envisioned the hierarchy was in ethical terms,
with the most virtuous and perfected people at the top and the least virtuous, the worst, on
the bottom. 169 His primary concern was a good society based on good government and
harmonious human relations. To this end he advocated a good government that rules by
virtue and moral example rather than by punishment or force. 170 Other Confucian concepts
seen in the judicial system are: the importance of the people’s duties over their rights.
167
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Confucius used the rectification of names to advocate not only the establishment of a social
order in which names and ranks are properly regulated, but also the correspondence of
words and action or of words and actuality; 171 the concept of education as a primary
purpose of government — superceding punishment to prevent crime; and antilitigiousness.172 With regard to litigation, Confucius said:

In hearing litigations, I am like any other body. What is necessary is to cause the people to
have no litigations.173

The true aim of government was, in his view, not supposed to be brought about by
rigid adherence to arbitrary laws but rather by a subtle administration of customs that are
generally accepted as good and have the sanction of natural law. 174

3.5

The Legalism Philosophy

In the third century BC, during a turbulent period of Chinese history, the school of
‘Legalists’, basing its ideas upon man’s natural tendency towards bad behaviour, repudiated
traditional theory and emphasised the need to obey prescriptions of law (government by
law) rather than relying on the virtues of rulers (government by man).175 The concept of Fa,
‘law’ or ‘legal regulation’ was, however, justified with particular vigour by the school of
Legalists, taking a pragmatic view in terms of the instrumentality of law, and thus clearly
representative of the positivist approach to human law-making, as opposed to the
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Confucian reliance on self-controlled order.176 The Legalist school was the most radical of
all ancient Chinese schools. It rejected the moral standards of the Confucianists and the
religious sanction of the Moists177 in favour of power. Its aim was political control of the
state and the population, a control to be achieved through an extensive set of laws, backed
by generous rewards and severe punishments.178 The Legalists’ theories, as expounded in
the works of Han Fei Zi,179 stated the need for permanent laws which would be known by
servants of the state and to which individuals would, without exception, be subject. On the
whole, these theories express a concept of legislation and law very close to the western
ideal. These theories have however, remained completely alien to the Chinese mentality in
general. As Zhang observes:

Although Confucius also distinguished the rule of justice and the principles of other virtues,
he held that society should be governed by virtue and regulated by propriety... It is a
traditional belief in the West that social order should be maintained by law. This is a
continued belief in Confucian China that society should be governed by propriety rather
180
than by law.

The Legalists do emphasise law, but only as a means, and not the only means, of
achieving their ends.181 Han Fei Zi said power, or force, is the only thing that counts.182
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Severe punishments were visited upon those who opposed the ruler’s decrees or broke the
laws. 183 However, multiplication of punishments did not always have the effect that
Legalists had hoped for.184 Eleven years after he had consolidated the Chinese world with
the advocate of Legalist notion, the first Emperor Qin Chi Huang died. Legalism, as the
avowed philosophy of the Chinese state, was dead.185 As Menski asserted, they were too
radical a departure from accepted thinking, and the Legalists had only passing success.
They did not gain any general acceptance in China of the notion of permanent rules and the
concept of sovereign law.186
In Chinese history, Legalism (literally ‘School of Law’)187 was one of the four main
philosophical schools (the other three being Confucianism, Daoism188 and Moism) during
the Spring and Autumn Period (771 BC—481 BC) and the Warring States Period (480
BC—221 BC). This period, from 770 to 221 BC, was an era of great cultural and
intellectual ferment in China, and gave rise to the important ‘hundred schools’ of
thought.189

183

Ibid 157.
Ibid.
185
Ibid 158.
186
Werner F Menski, Comparative Law above n 23, 474.
187
H G Creel, Chinese Thought above n 181, 140. The Legalists do emphasise law, but only as a means, and
not the only means, of achieving their ends. The Legalists were not “legalistic” in the sense of being mainly
concerned with the letter of the law and its interpretation. Fung Yu-lan points out quite correctly that it is
wrong to associate the thought of the Legalist school with jurisprudence.
188
Daoism is one of China’s major religions indigenous to the country. The primary belief is in learning and
practicing ‘The Way’ (Dao) which is the ultimate truth to the universe. Also known as Taoism, Daoism traces
its roots to six century BC when Chinese philosopher Laozi wrote the iconic book Dao De Jing on the tenets
of the Dao. Daoism believes that life is generally happy but that it should be lived with balance and virtue.
189
Yang Lin et al, ‘Exploring Constructive Aggressive Communication in China’ in Theodore A Avtgis and
Andrew S Rancer (eds), Arguments, Aggression and Conflict: New Directions in Theory and Research
(Routledge, 2010) 82, 89.
184

134

Ch 3: The Tradition of Chinese Law

Legalism was a pragmatic political philosophy that did not address higher questions like the
nature and purpose of life.190 Legalism refers to a way of thinking which gained acceptance
toward the end of the Chou dynasty. The term ‘Legalists’ is used to denote a group of
thinkers in China who promoted the notion of fa meaning ranging from model, method,
technique, rule and regulation to law.191 It basically postulates that the inherent strengths of
the people are not sufficient to prevent chaos and political corruption, and recommends law
as the primary tool to amend this. Legalists’ preference for law as a tool of government was
based on the conviction that a government had to be concerned, not with the few
individuals in society who could discipline themselves without any outside influence, but
with the greatest majority.192 Shang Yang (400 BC—338 BC) regarded as the father of the
school of Legalism, believed that society could be governed best by means of a rigidly
administered system of rewards and punishments and he drew up a code of laws to be
enforced under dire threat of heavy penalties for violations.193 The trends that were later
called Legalism have a common focus on strengthening the political power of the ruler.
Law was only one part of that movement. The most important surviving texts from this
tradition are the Han Fei Zi (280 BC—233 BC)194 and the Book of Lord Shang.195 Unlike
Confucianism and Moism, it made no attempt to preserve or restore the customs and moral
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values of the past; it professed to have no use of morality whatsoever. 196 Legalism here has
the meaning of a political philosophy that upholds the rule of law, and is thus distinguished
from the western meaning of the word. As Creel suggests:

The legalist conception of law was in some respects much more similar to that of the West
than the Confucian one, but its objective was very different from what we commonly think
of as the objective of law. To us “the safeguards of the law” mean protection for the
individual against unlimited exactions by the government. The Legalists, however, regarded
law as an instrument for the complete control of all citizens by the government. They
wanted precise laws set forth and known to all.197

Legalist theory listed three things which the ruler must employ in order to govern
the world properly. One was Shih which means both power and position, the second was
Shu, methods and the third was Fa, law. 198 They show that the Legalist school was
concerned solely with things that are political in nature. 199 Creel gave some illustrations of
their meaning:
i.

Shih, power and position, was demonstrated by pointing out that even the sage emperors
were unable to make the people obey them until such time as they occupied the throne,
while even the most unworthy of rulers had secured obedience. Thus, it was concluded,
virtue and wisdom are of no account as compared with power and position.

ii.

Shu, administrative techniques. The Legalists were on their firmest ground as opposed to
the Confucians. The Legalists recognised that as states became larger and more
centralised and economic activity became increasingly complex, the administration of
government came more and more to demand specific technical knowledge and skills.

iii.

Fa, law. The Legalists regarded law as an instrument for the complete control of all
citizens by the government. In effect, this constituted the posting of an exact schedule of
rewards and penalties, so that citizens would know just what would happen to them if
they did wrong. Punishment should be severe and inevitable, so that the people will fear
them.
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Legalist thought assumed no class distinctions. Everyone was equal before law and ruler. It
insisted that law must be applicable to all. 201 However, the Legalist way of government
requires unselfishness and impartiality on the part of the ruler. According to Chan’s
examination:

The important things for rulers are either laws or statecraft. A law is that which is enacted
into statute books, kept in government offices, and proclaimed to the people. Statecraft is
that which is harbored in the ruler’s own mind so as to fit all situations and control all
202
ministers.

The Legalists reduced the nobles to a lower standard by discarding moral matters
and placing sole reliance on rewards and punishments for all alike, hence stern punishments
were necessary.203 Legalists stated that ‘strictness is the secret of control’. 204

The Legalist teaching emphasised the law as a means of rewards and punishments
for controlling and governing the state. Contrary to the Confucian belief of ruling by
persuasion, Legalists advocated strong force and centralised control through law in order to
govern the world properly. The origins and contents of Legalism are explained below.

3.5.1 Origins of Legalism
Legalism asserted that human nature is evil 205 and it is primarily associated with the
concept of punishment, indeed, severe punishment.206 The best known of the earliest codemakers207 was Shang Yang208 who, with a realist reform-oriented philosophy set out to turn
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the state of Qin from a backward state to a powerful state stressing the importance of
law.209 His scheme was based on three simple principles: a penal law written in black and
white; complete confidence in the justice of the code; and strict enforcement of the law. 210
Shang Yang became Prime Minister of the Qin under the rule of Duke Xiao of Qin211 and
he initiated two reforms in Qin aiming at consolidating the power of the central government
and enriching the state.212 The first reform was promulgated in 359 BC and Shang Yang
swept away the aristocracy and implemented a meritocracy — only those who achieved
highly could reach high places and birth privileges were reserved exclusively for the ruler
of the state.213 The second reform was announced in 350 BC and it destroyed the economic
base of nobles by breaking down the boundaries of the then prevailing land enclosures and
by encouraging the people to till any uncultivated land they could find. Land possession
would become public, and the state, by disclaiming ownership of land, would be contented
with collecting revenues from the farmers in the form of taxes. 214 Law and order was
achieved through tight social regimentation and the whole state was law-abiding.215 From
then on, Qin was taking its shape to become the most powerful state in China before it
eventually brought all of the six other states together (Qi, Chu, Han, Yan, Zhao, and Wei)
208
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under the First Emperor Qin Shi Huang 216 (literally ‘the First Emperor’). 217 Shang’s
teaching and policies of unifying the state certainly meant a victory for the Legalist school,
but such a glorification lasted only for a short while. From 207 BC onward, because of its
harshness and severity, it never again won official patronage in Chinese history. 218

3.5.2 The Role of the Ruler in Legalist Philosophy
The Legalist school developed in the late centuries of the Chou dynasty when the social
distinctions between the class of princely men on the one hand and small men on the other
were no longer so absolutely demarcated. 219 A government with high concentration of
power was needed. It was believed that it was unnecessary for the ruler to be sage or
superman. 220 Methods were promoted by Legalists as means for rulers to obtain high
concentration of power. This constituted the thought of the Legalist school. 221 To a Legalist,
neither moral influence could determine the social order, nor could the virtue of the ruler be
powerful enough to transform society or create order or disorder. 222 To him, a uniform law
was the only means to govern a state, and law must be universally applicable to all. 223 The
ruler needed to use political techniques (Shu) to prevent the usual drain of power to his
ministers and to employ his authority (Shih)—a structural and substantive domination of
others using physical power to command human resources and mobilise power—to ensure
216
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his total control over the officialdom. 224 The ruler also needed to impose law (Fa)—
rewards and punishment—not only to maintain social and political order but also to ensure
his absolute dominance of the state’s ideology and the populace’s thought. 225 Thus,
theoretically, by cloaking both his desires and his will, the emperor checked sycophancy
and forced his subjects to heed his dictates. Han Fei Zi said the ruler should treat his
ministers like domesticated animals and that the so-called ‘wise ruler’ is he who can
domesticate his ministers.226 Han Fei Zi once said that it is by means of strict penalties and
heavy punishments that the affairs of state are managed. 227 The ruler creates the law; the
ministers abide by the law; and subjects are punished by the law.228 Although the ruler was
expected to be paternalistic, the Legalists emphasised that being too kind would spoil the
populace and threaten the state’s internal order. 229 As Creel’s study concluded:

The empire can be ruled only by utilising human nature. Men have likes and dislikes; thus
they can be controlled by means of rewards and punishments. On this basis prohibitions and
commands can be put in operation, and a complete system of government set up. The ruler
need only hold these handles (rewards and punishments) firmly, in order to maintain his
supremacy … These handles are the power of life and death. Force is the stuff that keeps
the masses in subjection.230

Thus with law and authority, the ruler rules his people. He need have no special
ability or high virtue, nor need he, as the Confucianists maintained, set a personal example
of good conduct, or rule through personal influence.231
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3.5.3

The Role of Ministers in Legalist Thought

To aid the ruler and help prevent mis-governance, Shen Buhai (a minister from the state of
Han for 15 years) formalised the concept of shu, or the bureaucratic model of
administration that served to advance the ideal Legalist ruler’s program. 232 In Legalism,
non-activity maintains that the ruler must not let his power be seen, he must remain
actionless and the system of reward and punishment is based on minister’s promises and
accomplishments, not on ruler’s orders and abstract laws. 233 Ministers should not be too
wise, or they will cheat the ruler, therefore it is totally unnecessary to seek virtuous and
upright men as officials.234 If the ruler simply makes the law uniform and overawes them
with his power, they will not dare to be wicked. 235 Han Fei Zi urged rulers to control these
individuals by the two ‘methods’ of punishment and favour. 236 ‘Holding the actualities
responsible for their names’ means holding the individuals who occupy certain offices
responsible for carrying out what should be ideally accomplished in these offices. 237 A ruler
should make clear the laws governing the officials and should not rely either on his own
personal knowledge or deliberation or on those of his officials when discharging his
duties.238 The functions pertaining to an office had already been defined by law and were
indicated by the name given to it. Hence the ruler need not, and should not, bother about the
methods used to carry out his work, so long as the work itself is done and well done. 239
Bishop explains that:
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In assigning responsibilities to officials, the leader has to know the exact nature of such
responsibilities as well as the capabilities of the officials involved; that ideally, there should
be a close correspondence between responsibilities, symbolised by a title, and the
assignee’s capabilities, concretely demonstrated by his performance; that such a
correspondence is not only a measure of how successfully the problems encountered by the
people are involved, but also a method of controlling the officials.240

Thus, in Legalist theory, ministers and other officials were prevented from
performing some other official’s duties and were punished if they attempted to blind the
ruler with words or failed to warn the ruler of danger. This indicates that, for the purpose of
political control, the Legalists emphasised the theory of the correspondence of names and
actualities. 241 Therefore, the way of the enlightened sovereign consists of making laws
uniform and not depending upon the wisdom of men, in making statecraft firm and not
yearning after faithful persons, so that the laws do not fail to function and the multitude of
officials will commit neither villainy nor deception.242

3.5.4 The Purposes of Law
The laws supported by the Legalists were meant to defend the state, the emperor, and his
military. They were also reform-oriented and innovative. In theory, the Legalists were
primarily interested in the accumulation of power, the subjugation of the individual to the
state, uniformity of thought, and the use of force.243 The Legalists particularly emphasised
pragmatism over precedence and custom as the basis of law. Bary, Chan and Watson’s
research indicates that:
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Legalism in its earliest form was probably the outgrowth of a need for more rational
organisation of society and resources so as to strengthen the state against its rivals. This was
to be accomplished by concentrating power in the hands of a single ruler, and by the
adoption of political institutions affording greater centralised control… The state would be
ordered by an exhaustive set of laws defining in detail the duties and responsibilities of all
its members, which would be administered with complete regularity and impartiality.
Severe punishments would restrain evil, while generous rewards would encourage what was
244
beneficial to the strength and well-being of the state.

Guided by Legalist thought, the first Qin emperor, Qin Shi Huang, would weaken
the power of the feudal lords, divide the unified empire into 36 administrative provinces,
and standardise the writing system.245 Legalists expected human law-making to establish
and maintain order on earth and therefore positivist law-making should be employed and
would be sufficient. 246 Laws that are sufficiently stringent would no longer have to be
applied because their mere existence will be enough to deter wrong-doing. Thus harsh laws,
though painful in their immediate effects, lead in the long run to an actual reduction of
government and to a society free from conflict and oppression.247 Objectivity was one of
the primary goals of Shang Yang’s preference for law. A ruler should make clear the laws
governing the officials and he should not rely either on his own personal knowledge or
deliberation or on those of his officials when discharging his duties. 248 Based on promoting
the interests of the Qin state, the law served as a vehicle to both control the populace and
eliminate dissent.

3.5.5 Legalism and Individual Autonomy
Confucianism opposed rule by force rather than by persuasion; the Legalists advocated
strong centralised government which should exercise absolute power by the threat of harsh
244
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punishments.249 For a highly controlling state power the Legalist philosophers emphasised
the primacy of the state over individual autonomy. The lone individual had no legitimate
civil rights and any personal freedom had to strengthen the ruler. Creel notes:

The objective of the Legalists, however, was not wholly new. They sought, for the ruler of
the whole state, much the same kind of absolute power over his subjects as each feudal lord
had exercised in the good old days, before the people had begun to get notions about rights
250
and freedom, or to be corrupted by having these things talked about by the Confucians.

Han Fei Zi, in particular, could be very caustic towards the concept of individual
rights because he spoke from the ruler’s perspective and not from that of the people. 251
Fundamentally, the Legalists viewed the common people as of lower class and their actions
as evil and foolish. Legalists taught that every individual must be compelled to live, work,
think, and on the ruler’s demand, die, wholly for the state, without any regard for his
individual desires or welfare.252It is wrong to associate the thought of the Legalist school
with jurisprudence because in modern terms, what this school taught was the theory and
method of organisation and leadership.253

However, Legalism allowed the common people to progress in rank if they
performed well. According to Hsieh’s study, anyone who expected to have political and
social privileges had to earn them by fighting on the battleground. 254 To kill an armed
enemy soldier, for instance, would entitle a person to one grade of rank, one hundred units
of land, nine units of residence, and one slave. 255 According to Shang Yang’s The Book of
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Lord Shang,256 the people themselves wanted a ruler to generate order. Social cohesion in
the Legalist state mandated that the populace never escape punishment. The Qin dynasty
used the people, for example, to maintain vigilant mutual surveillance over one another
under threat of death.257 Han Fei Zi insisted that all men act from motives of selfishness and
self-profit, and so show calculating minds in their attitude toward one another.258 It is this
fact that makes the system of rewards and punishment possible.259

Compared with Confucian belief of governing a state primarily by virtue, Legalists
insisted upon two handles of the government—punishments and rewards. As Chan states:

By contrast, the Confucianists were dedicated to the cultivation of virtue, the development
of individual personality, government for the people, social harmony, and the use of moral
principles, moral examples, and moral persuasion. The Legalists were primarily interested
in the accumulation of power, the subjugation of the individual to the state, uniformity of
thought and the use of force.260

3.6

Power Politics between the Philosophies

Most Chinese philosophers and political thinkers such as Creel have had very negative
views of Legalism, blaming it for what today would be considered a totalitarian society. 261

256

William Theodore De Bary et al, Sources of Chinese above n 242, 136; Jan Julius Lodewijk Duyvendak,
The Book of Lord Shang: A Classic of the Chinese School of Law (The Lawbook Exchange, 2003) viii. Shang
Yang, prime minister of Qin and the original organising genius behind that state’s long drive to imperial
power, is the first of this type to achieve historic importance. The Book of Lord Shang purportedly sets forth
the policies which he successfully employed, though there is doubt as to how much of it is authentic as an
early Legalist work generally attributed to the eponymous Lord Shang. It is a foundational work of that harsh
tradition. The Book of Lord Shang teaches that laws are designed to maintain the stability of the state from the
people, who are innately selfish and ignorant. There is no such thing as objective goodness or virtue; it is
obedience that is of paramount importance. The philosophy espoused in this work is quite explicitly antiConfucian.
257
S Y Hsieh, ‘The Legalist’ above n 191, 83.
258
Fung Yu-Lan (Translated by Derk Bodde), A History of Chinese, above n 41, 327.
259
Ibid.
260
Wing-Tsit Chan, A Source Book above n 33, 251.
261
H G Creel, Chinese Thought above n 181, 140.

145

Ch 3: The Tradition of Chinese Law

It was a reaction against legalism that gave Chinese imperial politics its personalised and
moralistic flavor rather than an emphasis on the rule of law. However, this view of the Qin
may be biased, as most of the Chinese historical records were written by Confucian
scholars, who had been persecuted under the Qin.262

In later dynasties, Legalism was discredited and ceased to be an independent school
of thought. However, according to Chen, under the traditional influence of legal and
cultural heritage, law is as a tool for political, administrative, supplementary and social
stability.263 Both ancient and modern Confucian observers of Chinese politics have argued
that some Legalist ideas have merged with mainstream Confucianism and still play a major
role in government. The philosophy of imperial China has been described as a Confucian
exterior covering a core of Legalism.264 The mixing of Legalist and Confucian elements is
especially evident in the Chinese traditions concerning law and justice. 265 In other words,
Confucian values are used to sugarcoat the harsh Legalist ideas that underlie the imperial
system. However, Menski suggested the opposite ─ that it is necessary to consider to what
extent classical Chinese law developed a hybrid form of legal regulation that sought to
combine internalised Confucian idealism and external legalist force. 266 It is suggested that
the final stage of the conceptual development of Li in classical China is represented by its
incorporation into the administrative and legal structures of imperial China. 267
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Re-established as a favoured philosophy during Han dynasty, Confucianism has dominated
Chinese thought ever since.268 Confucius upheld what he considered to be best in the old,
and created a powerful tradition that was followed until very recent years. 269 The factual
co-existence of a system of formal, imperial codes with a focus on criminal laws, on the
one hand, and the officially informal, but in their own way formalised, local methods of
handling litigation and disputes of any kind creates a pattern of intensive interaction that is
indeed unique to traditional China.270 Traditional concepts have persisted and continued to
dominate the realities of Chinese life. Menski observes:

The Han empire (206 BC—220 AD) adopted all major elements from the bureaucratic
structures of Qin model of governance, but did not follow legalism as a state ideology. In
one of the amazing reversals of history, Confucianism replaced Legalism as the dominant
ideology. Already by 100 BC Confucianism was beginning to gain recognition as the
orthodoxy of the state.271

Social relationships continued to be governed in this way, similar to the way they
were in the past. No other individual in Chinese history has so deeply influenced the life
and thought of people as has Confucius as a transmitter, teacher, and creative interpreter of
the ancient culture and literature, and as a moulder of the Chinese mind and character.272

The rule of law is now commonly regarded as an obligatory step to establishing
China’s rightful place in the global community. Yet it is widely believed that there are no
indigenous roots for the rule of law though its adoption is seen as ideal for China. 273 The
Chinese legal tradition developed from both Confucianism and Legalism, two influential
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schools of thought. The Confucianist ideology provided the fundamentals for the substance
of traditional law. The Legalist school constructed the important framework of the
traditional legal system. 274 Even though Confucian and Legalist thought shared some
positions, such as the insistence that the emperor had superior power over all facets of life
including law, the two schools of thought had different ideas on how Chinese society
should be ruled. While the Legalists believed that the Emperor had to rely on the rule of
law to govern Chinese society, the Confucianists demanded that the ruler must appeal to the
moral order supported by a well-behaved bureaucracy of the ‘gentry’ class.275 By the time
of the Han dynasty (206 BC–AD 220), Confucianism was a popular political ideology and
was adopted as the official orthodoxy of law for the years up to the end of Qing dynasty
(1644–1911).
China had undergone a series social and political changes since the 20 th century
began. The Qing reform began a process of westernisation of Chinese law with a focus on
the area of criminal law and the reform of civil law began up to 1907. 276 Fundamentally, the
reforms were seen as challenging the traditional institutions and structures, ignoring the
traditional values as embodied in Confucian Li, and undermining the social function built
on centuries-old social morality and customs.277 The Chinese revolution of 1911 led to the
overthrow of the Qing dynasty. A Republic was established in 1912 by Sun Yat-Sen (1866–
1925) who stood out as the spokesmen for nationalism and republicanism concepts. 278 The
Republican government, though it overthrew the Dynasty, allowed the Qing laws to
continue to be used. All imperial laws formerly in force were repeatedly declared to remain
274
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effective unless they were modified by new laws or were contrary to the principles of the
Republic.279 However, neither the reform of westernisation of law or modernisation of the
state was to have a utilitarian and instrumentalist approach to foreign laws and legal
systems. A specific example of the ideological difference in action was in attitudes towards
Chinese traditions and customs. 280 It can be seen as an institutional alternative to the
traditional relationship between the rulers and the ruled. 281 However, the breakdown of the
traditional institutions and structures does not necessarily mean the total disappearance of
the influence of traditional conceptions of law on the contemporary development of law. 282
The Revolution of 1911 was followed by an era of chaos without central authority;
of internal conflict; of renewed foreign pressures; and, with the Japanese invasion of the
1930s and 1940s, of full-scale war and occupation that lasted until the Communist victory
of 1949. 283 The new government of the People’s Republic of China, facing problems of
poverty, unrepresentative and ineffective government, and national weakness since the fall
of Qing, re-established a stable political system and with comparative ease.284 Towards the
end of 1952 when the period for power consolidation was deemed to have passed, the
Communist party appeared to shift its focus towards economic construction. 285 The
necessary conditions for a planned economy and a gradual transition to socialism were
deemed to have been created in 1953.286 Chinese Communism with a highly centralised
political system had been established.
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This noteworthy achievement was partly due to political skills and a sense of organisation
as well as to the long-standing Chinese tradition of political unity and to the administrative
legacy.287 However, the Chinese were evidently aware that they could not just copy the
Soviet model and knew that China’s situation was very different from that of the Soviet
Union because of its enormous population and the fact that the country had historically
taken a different approach to state law. 288 Following China’s departure from Russian
models in the late 1950s China underwent the political movement of the Great Leap
Forward (1958–1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). 289 The political and
economical distraction of these movements continued until 1976. China started its
economic reform in late 1979 and focussed on building a socialist market economy as well
as a legal system since then, as discussed in following chapters. Despite any internal
problems, the CPC-led political system has proven exceedingly resilient to past and current
challenges. Nevertheless, the CPC is under stress and undergoing reluctant transition.290 It
has become necessary for the CPC to adapt to continually changing circumstances and to
make compromises with other participants in the political process when it is pragmatic to
do so. It is crucial for foreign investors to have a better understanding of how China’s
political system functions as well as its strengths and weaknesses. However, it is also
necessary to examine the role of indigenous value systems in the course of economic
development and legal reform. As Menski reported, the Confucian worldview of the
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common Chinese people had not just been blown away with the storm clouds of the
revolution.291

3.7

Conclusions

The foregoing examination of the traditional background of the development of law in
China shows some powerful underlying influences that can, it is suggested here, help to
explain the nature of not only the Chinese people and the way they regard and respond to
law but also the ways that laws are made by the State.
The obvious question arises about the China of today. Do these traditional attitudes
persist? It is suggested here that they do and it may well be the case that Chinese people
today expect that the State (replacing the emperors of the past) will rule with strength and
discipline and set good examples to the people whilst, at the same time, giving respect to
the inherent behavioural standards of the people themselves? If this way of thinking (and
being) does apply in modern China then it would help to explain what may be described as
a ‘gentle reluctance’ to take some aspects of the newly made laws — particularly those in
respect of doing business — too seriously.
If this is so, and if the authorities know it to be so, where does it leave the
government in its attempts to convince the international community and the WTO that it is
committed to imposing a rule of law in China so that the rest of the developed world, when
trading with China, can be confident of what they would describe as a ‘level playing field’.
The PRC government would want to be seen by the western free market as making
strong laws and ensuring that those laws protect the latter’s interests when they are in the
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role of foreign investors in China. The government also would not, it is expected, wish to
appear to the Chinese people to be imposing heavy or extra burdens upon them.
It seems a reasonable observation that the PRC government recognises that there are
benefits available for all parties in the exercise of foreign investment in China but that
foreign investors are not going to have the unfettered access and control that their colonial
predecessors often enjoyed in the ‘undeveloped’ world of past centuries. For example, the
Treaty of Nanjing 1842 292 has been portrayed as extraordinarily significant in shaping
modern Sino-foreign relations. The British consuls in the five treaty ports were only
appointed to be the medium of communication between the Chinese authorities and British
merchants, a formulation that was much too vague to justify a claim to consular jurisdiction
involving an exemption from Chinese law under extra-territoriality. 293 The Treaty of
Nanjing was an unequal treaty as a result of British’s capitalising on its military victory and
Qing China’s desire to get the menacing British forces to withdraw at almost any cost.294
The following chapter explores the practical manifestations of Confucianism in the
current legal system and the extent to which an understanding of these matters is important
in terms of an understanding of the current Chinese economic system, particularly for
foreign investors in China. The utilisation of such knowledge by foreign investors may well
minimise difficulties and maximise their effectiveness in conducting their business in the
PRC.
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Chapter 4
Implications of Traditional Culture for Foreign Investment
Laws in China Today
4.1

Introduction

This chapter discusses the ways in which an understanding of the role of the history of
Chinese legal tradition can provide an explanation for the coherence (and sometimes a
perceived lack of coherence) of the law and government in the current legal system in
China. This thesis has explored the relationship between modern foreign investment in
China and the laws of that country and, more specifically, the often unique application of
Chinese laws to foreign investment. It is suggested that an understanding of the nature,
background and influences upon Chinese law can contribute to the successful exercise of
investment in or with the China of today.

4.1.1 A ‘Confucian State of Mind’ in China?
In the Confucian world view, the state was not thought of as a piece of political
machinery for enforcing the law, but primarily as a means to encourage, spread, and
cultivate civilised behaviour. Its ultimate aim was the realisation of the Confucian maxim
that ‘all under heaven constitute one family and within the four seas all men are brothers’. 1
Confucius’ primary concern was a good society based on good government and harmonious
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human relations. To this end he advocated a good government that rules by virtue and
moral example rather than by punishment or force.2

But Chinese traditions recognised only those who conformed to Confucian ethics
and the civilised Chinese way of life. As a standard for his theory and a pattern for his
practice, Confucius confessed to taking the customs and manners of the Kingdom of Chou,
in the honest belief that they represented the best culture of the age. 3 In his own personal
life, he sought to exemplify those qualities that he so persistently built into his teachings on
ethical character as the foundation of all true living.4 Confucious explained that the best
possible way to safeguard order and harmony in society was self-controlled order, rather
than government-sponsored top-down guidance.5

According to Confucian teaching, morality, virtue, rightness and benevolence are
the basic roots of government (as discussed in chapter eight). They are used to regulate
social relations, to curb the natural desires of humans, and to cultivate moral habits. As
evidenced by Day’s examination of Confucian teaching, if good qualities are to be practised
by everybody, there must be a code of good manners, or Li, to include not only the rules of
personal courtesy but all the best social and governmental habits. 6 Confucianists opposed
the replacement of moral influence by punishment and the improper application of
punishment. Punishment may temporarily compel men to do what they should, but it is, at
best, a poor and unreliable substitute for education.7 As Confucius said:
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Lead the people with governmental measures and regulate them by law and punishment,
and they will avoid wrongdoing but will have no sense of honour and shame. Lead them
with virtue and regulate them by the rules of propriety (Li), and they will have a sense of
8
shame and, moreover, set themselves right.

This is because Confucianists believed that human beings, whether their nature is
good or bad, are able to be educated. As evidenced by Schrecker, the Confucianists not
only emphasised that education rather than heredity was the basis of virtue, but they also
felt that nearly everyone was capable and worthy of receiving an education and so, of
becoming good. 9 Thus moral education and influence should be the first priority in the
maintenance of an ideal social order. Moral self-cultivation and self-control, reinforced
through socialisation within the family, clan, guild and other social institutions, were other
important social control agents in Chinese society. The underlying assumption is that man
is by nature good, or at least capable of learning to be good, and therefore, society based on
Li, idealised self-controlled order, will have the capacity to shape individuals into socially
acceptable human beings who do the right things at the right time. 10 The individual’s
internal ability to control his behaviour was regarded as one of the greatest qualities of
human virtue. So the fundamental governance of society is based primarily on the
education in morality not on the rule of law. Chinese question whether the rule of law has
been an effective tool for political stability, economic development, and the protection of
human and civil rights.11 To some extent this explains that a rule of law system may not be
easily adopted in China as the Chinese believe that the ultimate solution is to educate
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people and that a harmonious society will fundamentally depend upon individual selfdiscipline rather than control only by reliance solely on a legal system. 12

Section 4.1 of this chapter introduces the proposition that within the way of life of
the Chinese people there is an ingrained and pervasive belief system that has resulted from
centuries of acceptance of some basic principles of human behaviour. In section 4.2, some
of the modern consequences of the survival of Confucian principles are explored, including
consideration of the particular case of foreign investors and their relationships with Chinese
partners. This section also discusses the traditionally non-litigious nature of the Chinese
and their negotiating style. In section 4.3, important aspects of the individual relationships
between foreign investors and their Chinese counterparts are analysed. Section 4.4
discusses aspects of dispute resolution including negotiation and conciliation processes.
The existence of centralised political power in the PRC and its influence in the foreign
investment system are discussed in section 4.5, with reference to the historical
underpinnings of that power. Section 4.6 chronicles the role of the Communist Party in
respect of law-making from the Maoist period to date. The chapter is concluded in section
4.7.

A recurring observation in this research has been the significance of Chinese history
and its influence on the Chinese legal system. Menski suggests:

Equally important in social reality, however, was the uncodified system of Chinese cultural
norms, which is often subsumed under the label of morality or ‘Confucian ethics’, but is
manifestly a legal force of great relevance for understanding how ancient China (and, as we
shall see, modern Chinese law) actually function.13
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The influence has been subtle, yet so permeating to society, that it continues to have
profound effects upon Chinese legal practice today. This is so despite the fact that China
has experienced stages of quite radical political change and development. Its implications
have been examined in several aspects in relation to foreign direct investment and the legal
framework.

4.1.2 The Historical Consequences of Confucian Teachings
For two millennia the Chinese (following Confucian principles), presented the
inspiring spectacle of a people gathered into one vast political body and united primarily
not only by regimentation from above but by a community of ideas, beliefs, and traditions.
Although they always represented a very large fraction of the whole human race, all
Chinese wrote the same language, read the same literature, and enjoyed the same way and
order of life.

Confucius’ teachings have been, without doubt, the greatest influence on Chinese
society, having a monumental effect on history and culture. Chinese culture has evolved as
a result of many historical influences including Confucianism to create, in modern times, a
business environment that operates on developing relationships of trust. 14 Menski explained
that the focus on the individual conscience and requirement to ascertain for oneself what is
right or wrong directs us to the social arena within which individuals act and interact that is,
the social dimensions of traditional Chinese societies.15 Glenn observes:

Guanxi or relations are thus the key intermediaries between the individual and larger
harmonious groupings, and remain so throughout Asia today. Grounded in natural human
14
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15
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affections, the entire society is meant to have a dynamic of its own, requiring little external
intervention or threat of force to make it coherent.16

There are differences between Guanxi and western relationship marketing. Wang
demonstrates these differences by examining the construction of the two concepts:

First, it distinguishes Guanxi from relationship marketing in terms of the personal and
particularistic nature of the relation. Second, it differentiates trust from Xinyong, its
counterpart in Chinese, based on a comparison of their roles in relationship building and
maintenance. Third, it discusses the unique meaning of Renqing, which is proposed as an
underlying mechanism that guides behaviour norms in Guanxi and a mediator between trust
or Xinyong and long-term orientation. Finally, it concludes by discussing the managerial
implications for international marketers who wish to succeed in the Chinese business
market and the importance of adapting Western relationship marketing principles to Guanxi
17
marketing.

A rational and practical attitude to law in China, that involves an understanding of
the effects of Confucian culture and legalism on the legal system in the course of its
evolution, is thus a vital ingredient of an entry strategy for foreign investment and
continued operations in China.

4.2

Influence of Chinese Culture on Foreign Investment

As discussed above, in essence Confucianism revolves around the concept of harmonious
relationships. This manifested in subtle ways involving relationships between people and
government, relationships between people at various levels of business and governmental
administration. When doing business in China, establishing a local contact or agent to act as
an intermediary is important. This can bring multiple benefits. The intermediary can act as
a reference, be an interpreter and navigate through the bureaucracy, legal system and local
business networks. One research exercise, concerning the failure of some leading Japanese
16
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158

Ch 4: Modern Implications of Traditional Law in China

technology firms operating in China, found that to succeed in China, Japanese companies
must establish local connections, networks and research centres as well as building brand
equity.18 Undoubtedly, for foreign investors, differences in culture are a general problem
when they do business in China. The differences may involve every aspect of an investors’
business in a joint venture, such as the relationship with Chinese parties, dispute resolution,
and settlement of the relationships within the executive. As Li, Lam and Qian state:

Foreign investors can encounter problems of institutional environments which are going to
influence firm behaviour and performance not only formal constraints including factors
such as economic, political and judicial rules but also informal constraints such as culture
19
and ideology in a society.

In practice, the successes or failures may often be the result of other factors.
However, an understanding of Chinese social and cultural background by foreign investors
can help them to handle the differences or difficulties encountered in Chinese society.
Professor John Child is the Chair of Commerce at the University of Birmingham and
consultant for major corporations in the areas of strategic alliances, organisational design,
organisational learning, and business operations in China. When asked, in relation to the
difficulties of achieving international joint venture success in emerging economies such as
China, what he considered the major impediments to success, he replied:

In all joint ventures, the major impediment to success is failure to achieve an adequate ‘fit’
between the two partners in two areas: strategy and culture. Strategic fit encompasses such
issues as compatible objectives, adequate resourcing and potential for delivery on promises.
Cultural fit covers the partners’ willingness and ability to work out a common system of

18
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organisation and management and to subsume differences, or work through them, to build
up trust.

20

In order to comprehend the Chinese social and cultural background, it is necessary to
analyse the effects of these social and cultural factors in Chinese society. In this research,
from the point of view of the influence of the philosophy of Confucius and the feudal
regime in Chinese history, three factors – the traditional non-litigious nature of Chinese
people, the importance of relationships and centralised political power - are identified and
analysed as to their effects on the social and legal environment faced by foreign investors.
It has been suggested above in chapter eight that the effects of these deeply rooted factors
on Chinese people and society will continue to have impact on the success or failure of
foreign investors.

4.2.1 The Traditional Non-litigious Nature of Chinese People
In the important area of dispute resolution, the Chinese style is to adopt negotiation rather
than litigation. An understanding of this approach is essential in the formation of
relationships with Chinese parties. A traditional non-litigious nature can be defined as a
preference/propensity for negotiated settlement of disputed matters rather than the exercise
of formal legal action. As Menski suggests, the nature of avoidance of the law in the
Chinese cultural context, means firstly, in a wider sense, avoidance of any form of litigious
activity as an indication of self awareness and as a threat to universal cosmic harmony. 21
This characteristic exists in Chinese people generally and reflects avoidance of disputes in
Chinese cultural traditions. It originates in the philosophy of Confucius, which explains the
20
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universal factors of inner and outer circles: the rules of behaviour proposed by Confucius
apply to one’s inner circle, that is, to family, friends, colleagues, and acquaintances. The
Chinese normally live outside or apart from the law. They do not seek out whatever rules
the law contains or seek to claim their day in court, but settle their disputes and regulate
their dealings with others according to their own idea of what is proper, without assertion of
their rights and with conciliation and harmony as goals in mind. 22 The Confucian tradition
stresses that man exists through his relationships with others and that these relationships are
hierarchical in nature and that social harmony rests upon honouring the obligations they
entail. 23 Importantly, as Menski pointed out, not only the formal legal system but in
particular the informal sector have always been characterised by a certain fluidity and
internal flexibility, which is conceptually required in view of the over-arching Confucian
assumptions about harmony and balance. 24

Li and surface harmony are important elements to balance inner and outer circle
and seeking a state of peace is the ultimate goal. According to Bary, Chan and Watson:

For Confucius the term Li, which basically means ‘rites’, embraced all those traditional
forms which provided an objective standard of conduct. Thus, while Li may in given
instances refer to ‘rites’, ‘ceremonial’, or ‘rules of conduct’, it has the general meaning
of ‘good form’ or ‘decorum’. Confucius insisted, however, that the observance of Li
should be neither perfunctory nor rigid and inflexible, but should be in keeping with
circumstances and also with that spirit of reverence and respect for others which the
25
ceremonies or rules of conduct were meant to embody.

The Li, in short, constitutes both the concrete institutions and accepted modes of
behaviour in a civilised state. 26 Proper etiquette preserves harmony and ‘face’.

22
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Therefore, the true emotions of a person do not matter as long as surface harmony is
maintained. For example, a public argument, or a boss reprimanding a staff member in
front of others would disturb surface harmony and cause a loss of face. This is why the
Chinese often use an intermediary to deliver bad news or unpleasant messages. As Tang
and Ward suggested, ‘face’ serves as the lubricant necessary to sustain harmony
amongst those living in situations where moving away is not an option.27

Despite the best endeavours, conflict can still break through the surface of
tranquility that the Chinese long to maintain. 28 According to a survey conducted by Tang
and Kirkbride, a comparison of Chinese and British attitudes towards dispute resolution
confirmed that the Chinese managers, both public and private, favoured the less assertive
‘compromising’ and ‘avoiding’ solutions, in contrast with the British officials who
preferred the more assertive ‘collaborating’ and ‘competing’ styles.29

This nature of avoidance of law is sustained in the Chinese legal system and it
seeks to rely on internalised, self-controlled order in the first place then, if that fails, tries
to keep the violation of harmony and order at the lowest possible level, given that
fomenting litigation is a negative act in itself. 30 These are manifestations of the moral
precepts and moral teaching of Li have been an integral part of, and formed the basis of,
ancient Chinese legal culture.

27
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4.2.2 The Chinese Negotiating Style
The traditional non-litigious nature of Chinese people is one of the effects of the
philosophy of harmony. Building up a good long-term relationship is preferred by
Chinese people to the legal obligations of the parties set out in a formal contract. Most
foreign investors have experienced this Chinese negotiating style. The purpose of
negotiation is often to emphasise interpersonal relations rather than a concentration upon
the details of a contract. As Brahm and Li suggest:

Chinese society is process-oriented. Consequently, for the Chinese, negotiations often
involve understandings and intentions not spelled out in the final contract … Because of
Confucian values and the Chinese emphasis on interpersonal relations, these requests
may have nothing to do with the contract terms at all. 31

In the case of Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive, according to the technical
executive director,

Although operations began in September 1985, the negotiations process had required
several years of patience dating back to 1978 … perhaps somewhat in the tradition of the
Confucian Dynamism, they are willing to take the long-term view and plan for a brighter
future.32

So ignorance of legal details in negotiation has its root in the long history of
Confucianism. As Li, Lam, and Qian noted, describing the establishment of the joint
venture ‘New World’ in Wuhan City:

New World set up good ties with the government in Wuhan City and other Chinese
cities. These relationships proved very helpful during later negotiations in China … they
(foreign investors) often quickly establish a JV, without careful negotiation and
33
contracting.
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Having a long-term perspective, successful foreign investors consider setting up JVs as
the first step in building lasting relationships. They will later rely on the rapport
established to solve problems resulting from issues such as lack of feasibility studies or
clear contracts.

4.3

Relationships with Chinese Parties

Guanxi (or relationship) is a key to a successful undertaking in the Chinese environment.
Although it is true that the need to develop relationships is not unique to China, it is
understood that relationships play a much greater role in Chinese society than in a
typically western society. To better grasp this need for cultural awareness, Hofstede
suggests:

International managers and management theorists require a deeper understanding of the
range of culture determined value systems that, in fact, exist among countries, and should
be taken into account when transferring management ideas from one country to
another.34

It is in the tradition of Confucian Dynamism, in regard to short-term versus longterm view, that the Chinese are willing to take the long-term view and plan for a brighter
future. As Myrna and Raffaele state:

In discussions with SVW expatriate management, it became obvious that the agreement
to enter China was made with full consideration of China’s long-term view. A long-range
35
plan was implemented that would cover ten, twenty or more years.

On the other hand, one important implication is that foreign firms strictly
pursuing dominant control over their local JV partners may fail to gain their local

34
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partners’ assistance for entry to a local market. As Posth (of Volkwagen Asia Pacific)
explained, it was necessary for Volkswagen to build up a long-term relationship with
Chinese parties, particularly with local governments. In this respect, Posth observes that:

Strategically … the Chinese respect the fact that we took a lot of risk. We made it clear
that we were willing to transfer our knowledge from the beginning. Not for one week or
one year, but permanently. Since then we have done a lot more than we promised in the
contract. But without the help of the Chinese government and the city of Shanghai we
would be a dead duck. We rely on our partners, and that is one of the simple secrets of
the success of Volkswagen in China. 36

Similarly, a good working relationship must have, at its core, an understanding of
different cultural norms. Child suggests:

We come back here to the question of whether the foreign partner seeks to dominate the
joint venture, bringing in its own practices, corporate culture and so forth, or is prepared
to work towards establishing a new culture for the joint venture, working with and
learning from the local partner so that the two ‘blend’ together, adopting the best
37
elements of both cultures.

It has been suggested that some Chinese partners might have political agendas
that affect their attitude toward a proposed joint venture and reduce the level of
reciprocity that one would normally expect. Wong, Maher, Jenner, Appell and Hebert
make a controversial observation by saying that:

An important reason for this is the Chinese belief that they have not been dealt with
fairly over the decades and that now is time to even the score. This has exacerbated their
cultural propensity to relentlessly pursue the addition, modification, or elimination of
38
contractual terms already agreed upon rather than focus on compliance.

This observation would appear to be an over-generalisation and, it is suggested,
does not represent a fair or rational assessment of reality. In the final anlaysis, business is
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about the pursuit of profit and in this respect the Chinese are no different to anyone else.
The history of the last decade has shown that the assertion by Wong et al, that the
popularity of foreign/Chinese joint ventures in China was declining, was incorrect as was
their comment about ‘even[ing] the score.’ 39

A strategy of co-operation with Chinese parties should be based not only on the
surface level of obligation but also an understanding of (and respect for) culture. The
foreign partner should expect to have to continue to depend on Chinese co-operation, or
at least acquiescence.

4.4

Dispute Resolution

Avoidance of open conflict in dispute resolution is another effect of the traditional nonlitigious nature of Chinese people, although some litigated means of resolving their
conflicts or disputes is provided. China offers mechanisms such as consultation,
negotiation, conciliation (or mediation), arbitration and litigation to settle disputes.
Mediation has been widely used in China as an effective means of dispute resolution, and
has now become embedded as an integral part of both the litigation and arbitration
process.40 Mediation, regarded in China as commendable, is the process of facilitating
agreement between two parties. Essentially, mediation seeks to resolve disputes in a way
acceptable to all parties without loss of face and it is primarily a method for defusing or
dispelling confrontations.41 Of the many forms of dispute resolution, litigation has never
been a popular mechanism. Less formalistic ways of resolving disputes are preferred in
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China. According to Wang, ‘in recent years, these traditional non-litigious methods have
often been accepted in foreign-related civil and commercial disputes.’ 42 For instance, it
is common to insert an arbitration clause in a joint venture contract. Such a clause directs
that if a dispute arises between the joint venture parties, the parties agree to take the case
to an arbitration commission for resolution rather than seeking to solve the problem in
the People’s Courts. This practice has become popular among foreign investors for three
reasons, namely the reduction of legal costs, the maintenance of business relationships,
and the avoidance of what is regarded by some as the uncertain, imperfect and prejudiced
Court system in China.43

Negotiation is the form of dispute resolution that is most attuned to Chinese
culture and attitudes because: (a) that culture favours harmony and good relationships
between people, and (b) most Chinese people would prefer a compromise that represents
control and involvement of the parties. Chinese people, when handling commercial and
civil disputes have generally had this attitude. Although negotiation has been mentioned
in a number of PRC Laws concerning foreign investment in China, there is no formal
requirement for negotiation. For example, Article 14 of the Equity Joint Venture Law
1979 provides that if a dispute cannot be resolved through consultation, it should then be
conciliated or arbitrated. The language of the above-mentioned provision was intended to
encourage parties to resolve their dispute through a less formal and less costly process
than litigation. Parties to a process of negotiation, conciliation or arbitration have more
autonomy to make a rational choices (or compromises) than they do within the process of
litigation. This may explain why negotiation, conciliation and arbitration are encouraged
42
43
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in Chinese law. Most Chinese would prefer not to take an action in the People’s Court.
Only in the last 20 years, after the introduction of various economic reforms, has
litigation of commercial disputes become more familiar to the Chinese people. However,
with civil disputes, people may still prefer to settle them by the other means. As Brahm
and Li asserted, ‘Chinese culture places a premium on harmony; open conflict is
something to be avoided.’ 44

4.5

Centralised Political Power

Although China is a vast country with an immense population, a long history and a splendid
historical heritage, her economic, political and cultural development was sluggish for a long
time after the transition from slavery to feudal society. This feudal society, began with the
Dynasties of Zhou (1122 BC to 256 BC) and continued to the Qin dynasty (221 BC to 207
BC), lasting for over 800 years. The feudal landlord state was the organ of power protecting
this system of feudal exploitation. 45 While the feudal state was torn apart into rival
principalities in the period before the Qin Dynasty, it became autocratic and centralised
after the first Chin emperor unified China, though some feudal separatism remained. 46 The
emperor reigned supreme in the feudal state, appointing officials in charge of the armed
forces, the law courts, the treasury and state granaries in all parts of the country and relying
on the landed gentry as the mainstay of the entire system of feudal rule. 47 One of the most
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remarkable features of Chinese history is its great age and continuity, having had over three
thousand years of unbroken cultural and political tradition.48

A reason for pursuing a centralised political system was to provide unity to the
nation and consolidate the feudal monarch’s power. As Zhou illustrates:

Chinese culture, tradition, custom, and social structure in the first stage had an astonishing
and remarkable impact on the whole of Chinese history. The main characteristic of Chinese
history in the first stage is the patriarchal system. The patriarchal system is the primitive
miniature of Chinese history and the base of its highly centralised political system which
49
lasted more than 2000 thousand years in China.

China is one of the few countries in the world that is overwhelmingly culturally and
ethnically homogenous. The unity of the sovereign State (and central imperial rule) was
paramount, and even the slightest challenge to it was to be prevented at all costs. The real
administrative and political power resided in the parallel organisational hierarchy. The
greatest fear for an emperor had always been the secession of nationality regions and the
consequent disintegration of the sovereign State and central rule. The main reasons for the
establishment and maintenance of a highly centralised political structure in China were the
need for arbitration in internal disputes and the need for national defence against external
invasions.50 This belief in the unity of China dates back to Imperial times. The Chinese
have consistently sought to unify themselves, and from the Sui Dynasty onward enjoyed
almost unbroken rule under a single government. To achieve these purposes, the executive
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enjoyed power to govern every aspect of life such as the political, economic, educational
and social life, and each was responsible to the monarch. Law as an instrument of
government played the role of strengthening the feudal system. Zhao observed that China’s
historical failure to develop the rule of law and, instead, adopting a highly centralised
political system, may be attributed to its historical legacy of highly centralised rule and its
political-philosophical emphasis on rule by virtues and virtuous men. 51

Certainly, both the centralised political system and the force of traditional thought
of Confucius were powerful means for a feudal monarchy to rule a vast country. On the one
hand, centralisation of political power weakened the effectiveness of laws. As Menski
observes:
Despite the hierarchical ordering and other formal remnants of legalism in the codes, it is
important to be aware that the administration of the entire system was thoroughly infused
with Confucian ideology which underpinned the legal administration of imperial China
for almost 2000 years down to 1912. It must also be remembered that legal administration
was not a separate government activity but an integral part of the administrative
machinery.52

For example, Bodde and Morris pointed out the facts that; the judicial system of
imperial China, like the governmental system as a whole, was a centralised monolith with
no division of powers; that there was no private legal profession; that at the lowest level of
the district or department, where all cases originated, the magistrate rarely possessed any
specialised legal training and handled the cases that came before him simply as one of
many administrative duties.53 On the other hand, the preference for avoidance of conflict
has a greater ingrained influence on Chinese people’s behaviour than do legal rules.
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Nowadays, even though the feudal system has been replaced, traces of these cultural and
social factors still remain in Chinese society and the Chinese people.
Foreign investors in China can expect to experience the shock of these differences
to their own cultural and political backgrounds. The experience of Shanghai-Volkswagen
Automotive Co Ltd is an example of the effect of the traditional non-litigious negotiating
style with Chinese parties in respect of cooperation, relationships and dispute resolution.
Additionally, the underlying influences of centralised political power are reflected in the
legal requirements for foreign investment proposals.

4.6

Law and the Communist Party in the PRC

It is often suggested that the Chinese traditional philosophies and the westernisation of
Chinese law at the end of the Qing 54 period had been replaced or abandoned since the
establishment of the PRC in 1949. 55 As Wing-Tsit Chan suggested, ‘Philosophy in
Communist China can be summed up in one word, Maoism.’ 56 Indeed, the sources of
Mao’s inspiration were Engels, Marx, Lenin, and Stalin and not the Confucianists. 57
However, the origin of the current legal system can be traced back to the period of the
Chinese Soviet Republic in the revolutionary period prior to the establishment of the

54
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PRC.58 In 1954, the first Constitution of the PRC59 was promulgated. It is the fundamental
law of China and has the highest legal binding power. It states the country’s fundamental
system and aspirations.60

The socialist elements of the Chinese legal system come primarily from Soviet
sources.61 The ideology or spirit of such laws was obviously influenced by the then Soviet
Union.62 The Soviet Union served as an ideal model for China. 63 In that period, the Chinese
government relied not only on the Communist Party and workers and peasants but also on
capitalists and intellectuals who agreed with the socialist system. The laws, including the
Constitution, were quite balanced in reflecting the interests of these sections of the Chinese
population.

From 1957 to 1976, with the exception of three to four years in the early 1960s,
China was deeply engaged in political movements.64 Its laws of that period reflected the
‘class struggle’ type of political environment. 65 At the same time, China adopted a highly
centralised, planned economic system. Economic plans and administrative orders, instead
of law, had binding force on local governments and enterprises of different sectors of the
economy such as manufacturing, distribution and service. 66 Laws thus became a tool of
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class struggle. 67 The role of law was reflected in the communist ideology during early
period of the founding of the PRC in which law was basically used as a political weapon
with the terroristic threat of force.68 Liu Shaoqi, the president of the PRC in 1956, said in
the Eighth National Congress of the CPC in 1956:

During the period of revolutionary war and in the early days after the liberation of the
country, in order to weed out the remnants of our enemies, to suppress the resistance of all
counter-revolutionaries, to destroy the reactionary order and to establish a revolutionary
order, the only expedient thing to do was to draw up some temporary laws in the nature of
general principles in accordance with the policy of the Party and the People’s
69
Government.

In fact, in the ten years of the Great Cultural Revolution,70 laws were not considered to be
necessary, let alone important, to society.

4.6.1 The Post-Mao Period
The situation did not change until the leader of Communist Party Mao died in 1976.
Pragmatic policies were adopted by the Chinese Government in 1978 when the government
announced that the country would, from then on, concentrate its efforts on economic
construction.71 That announcement was not surprising as at that time the Chinese economy
was on the verge of bankruptcy. This did not mean, however, that the Chinese government
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Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial Law above n 42, 11.
68
Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law Towards an Understanding above n 66, 36.
69
Shaoqi Liu, ‘The Political Report of the Central Committee of the CPC to the Eighth National Congress of
the Party’ in Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi Volume 2 (People’s Press, 1985) 253.
70
The Great Cultural Revolution was a violent mass movement that resulted in social, political and economic
upheaval in China starting in 1966 and ending officially with the death of Mao in 1976. It resulted in nationwide chaos, economic disarray, and stagnation.
71
Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial Law above n 42, 12. It took until 1979, when the Chinese Government
adopted a policy of opening up to the outside world to welcome foreigners and foreign capital, for the
Government focus to return to law-making. Much of this legal reform was primarily aimed at economic
reform and, in particular, the encouragement of foreign investment.
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had decided to change its political directions or ideology, quite the contrary. The 1982
Constitution stipulated the ‘four cardinal principles’ 72 as guiding principles for the
development of the country.73

On the economic front, however, the government realised the need to modify its
rigid economic system, including central planning and People’s Communes. Economic
growth requires capital and advanced technology as well as advanced methods of
management. The pragmatic policies therefore directed that those requirements be imported
from foreign countries and the neighbouring regions. In 1979, when the Chinese
government adopted a policy of opening up to the outside world to welcome foreigners and
foreign capital, the government had little choice but to begin making relevant laws.

As far as the Chinese current legal system is concerned, it is natural to pay much
attention to its Communist system. However, it should be realised that it too has grown up
in the soil of China and inevitably must be affected by the profound and deeply entrenched
Chinese culture. Blazey states:

In the world of business, customs and culture play a large part, so much so that the
prospective foreign investor cannot expect to meet with any success in China without an
understanding of how the Chinese undertake business and how it intermingles with Chinese
culture. Chinese culture has evolved as a result of many historical influences such as
Confucianism, to create a business environment that operates on developing relationships of
74
trust.

Economic reform has now been taking place for more than 30 years and social
conditions have been dramatically changed. There has been debate among those who are
72

The ‘four cardinal principles’ refer to upholding the pursuit of the socialist road, the proletarian
dictatorship, communist party leadership and adherence to Marxist-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought.
73
<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China)
National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, the Preamble.
74
Patricia Blazey, ‘Culture and Its Relationship to Undertaking Business in China’ in Patricia Blazey and
Kay-Wah Chan (eds), The Chinese Commercial Legal System (Lawbook, 2008) 57, 57.
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interested in Chinese law about whether a western legal system should be transplanted into
China.75

It is clear that a very large proportion of the legal reform that has been undertaken
has been driven by the needs of economic development. Much of this legal reform was
primarily aimed at the encouragement of foreign investment. 76 From 1978 to 1989,
numerous laws and administrative regulations were adopted to encourage foreign
investment and domestic economic reforms. In fact, since the late 1970s, the Chinese
Government has implemented hundreds of laws and regulations to govern China’s
economic development. 77 In the period from mid–1997 to mid–1999, the NPC and its
Standing Committee alone passed or issued over 327 pieces of legislation and decisions. 78
Issues in relation to political reforms were raised several times but no major law in this area
was adopted in that period. Regarding this, Keith observes that:

The specific connotations of “policy is the soul of law” varied with changes of Party line,
but it often related to the Party’s political need for extra-legal flexibility in dealing with
class enemies. Party policy was not only a priori to law, but, in the absence of law, policy
acquired the role and status of law.79

The situation changed with Deng Xiao Ping’s tour to southern China in 1992 during
which Deng worked hard to promote economic reforms and, in particular, the establishment

75

Ronald C Keith, ‘Chinese Politics and the New Theory of Rule of Law’ (1991) 125 China Quarterly 109,
118. “In light of widespread western condemnation of the Tiananmen Square event, it may seem somewhat
capricious to raise the issue of the “rule of law” as it is understood in China; however, prior to 4 June the
Chinese Communist Party sanctioned a provocative theoretical debate which featured the “rule of law” as
opposed to the “rule of man.”
76
Ibid.
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Ibid.
78
Rongxia Li, ‘Outstanding Results in Building A Legal System’ (16 August 1999) Beijing Review, 16
<http://202.194.48.102/englishonline/bjzs/BeijingReview/99Aug/Tlpa5bjr99-33e-9.asp?>.
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of a market economy with socialist characteristics.80 Since then a number of important laws
have been enacted in relation to commercial transactions, administrative litigation, the
judiciary system and others. These include: the Company Law of the PRC 1993, 81 the
National Compensation Law of the PRC 1994,82 the Contract Law of the PRC 1999,83 the
Copyright Law of the PRC 2001 amendment, 84 the Trademark Law of the PRC 2001
amendment, 85 and the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the PRC 2006. 86 Such laws have
contributed greatly to establishing the legal order of the domestic market and its
relationship with the international market by providing compatible legal prescriptions.

Economic exchanges with foreign countries and regions and China’s own effort to
join the WTO have gradually made the Chinese market an integrated part of the world
market. China is the largest economic/trading power among developing countries and in
2008 was the seventh largest merchandise exporter in the world.87 The Chinese economy
has become an inseparable part of the global economy. The interdependence between China
and the rest of the world makes it impossible for China to resist the cultural, political and
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邓小平 [Deng Xiaoping], ‘在武昌，深圳，珠海和上海等地的谈话要点’ [In Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai
and Shanghai, Talking Points] in <<邓小平文选第三集>> [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 3] (人民
出版社 [People’s Publishing House], 18 January 1992).
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82
<<中华人民共和国国家赔偿法>> [National Compensation Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, Order No 29, 29 April 2010.
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China) National People’s Congress, Order No 15, 1 October 1999.
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<<中华人民共和国著作权法>> [Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 27 October 2001.
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China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 27 October 2001.
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2006.
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legal influence of foreign countries on the one hand, and to welcome foreign capital and
advanced technology on the other.

Changes in the economic environment have also developed awareness and an
understanding of law in society in China. Law was defined as the total sum of the codes of
behaviour enacted or approved by the State to be implemented with the guarantee of the
State’s power of enforcement in accordance with ‘the interest and will of the ruling class’. 88
Whilst making the law, the ruling class must take into account the endurance and strength
of the ruled or the non-ruling class. In addition to the restraints of material conditions, law
is also subject to politics, morality, culture, history, tradition, science, and technology. 89 As
Professor Zhou asserts:

Law is the total sum of the social stipulations in the form of the will of the authority. It
serves as the basis for the judiciary in handling cases, has the characteristics of universality,
explicitness and certainty whose contents mainly stipulates rights and obligations, mainly
and primarily reflects the will of the ruling class, and eventually is subject to social and
material conditions.90

Hence, according to these theories, since China is ruled by the people, the will of
the ruling class is also the will of the people.91 Even though there has been influence of
Marxist theory on the legal system it seems that traditional Confucian thought still impacts
on current authorities and is crucial to the direction of the nation. For example, the former
President Jiang Zeming (in a speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the
Founding of the Communist Party of China in 2001) said:
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The fundamental task of developing a socialist culture is to turn people from generation to
generation into citizens with lofty ideals, moral integrity, better education and a good sense
of discipline. We should persevere in arming the people with scientific theories, guiding
them with correct public opinions, shaping their outlook with noble ideas, and inspiring
them with good cultural works … We should combine the rule of law with the rule of virtue
in order to lay a lofty ideological and ethical foundation for a good public order and a
healthy environment.92

It is not easy to distinguish clearly between the impact of Communism and that of
traditional values on contemporary Chinese politics. However, there have been and still are
existing party policies that reflect the traditional norms. For example, in the Communist
Party of China Sixteenth Central Committee of the sixth Plenary Meeting in 2006, in a
comprehensive analysis of the study of building a socialist harmonious society, made the
following decision:

Social harmony is the essence of socialism with Chinese characteristics and attributes. It is
the country’s prosperity, national rejuvenation and an important guarantee for the wellbeing of the people. Building a socialist harmonious society, our party looks to MarxismLeninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory as guidance to carry out the
scientific concept of development from the socialist cause with Chinese characteristics and
the overall layout of a well-off society. The overall situation of our major strategic task
reflects the building of a prosperous, democratic, civilised and harmonious modern socialist
country with the inherent requirements of the whole party embodying the common
aspiration of people of all ethnic groups.93

This suggests that there still is, in modern China, a very close nexus between ethical
and political theory as it was expressed in Confucianism.94

During the past 30 years, in line with decisions to completely reform its economy,
China has done much to establish a modern and internationally recognised legal system
92
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with an emphasis upon rule by law rather than rule by the CPC. In the 1993 Constitution
amendment, the concept of a ‘socialist market economy’ was introduced to replace the
‘planned economy’.95 In the 1999 Constitution Amendment, a provision was added to state
that the PRC ‘governs the country according to law and makes it a socialist country under
rule of law’.96

Party control over the judicial system has weakened. In Jiang’s research on Chinese
legal reform, he asserts that even though much of the work to develop laws is ‘on track’,
there are still many obstacles to be confronted in the course of legal reform. There is
tension between China’s old and new economic structures and between law and politics. In
particular there is still a substantial gap to be bridged between the creation of legal norms
and the enforcement of such norms.97 In fact, whilst China has been quietly reforming its
legal system for decades, China’s legal system is not as prominent as are those in the west.

The question of whether a westernised legal system is suitable for China may be a
central issue in any examination of the current Chinese legal system. As discussed in
previous chapters, China has developed its legal tradition for a long period of time and a
solid fundamental Confucian culture has influenced not only every aspect of Chinese
society and politics but also how the government rules society. Some might argue that the
rule of law is the ultimate answer for China. 98 However, it would be too simplistic to
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transplant the rule of law into China without consideration of China’s thousands of years of
history. Miyazawa agrees that law and culture are inter-related when he suggests that:

All laws are culture-laden, and even ostensibly universal law is actually based on unique
and local culture; people evaluate imported laws and indigenous laws on their relative
performance in facilitating efficient market transactions, as well as on their relative success
in enabling good society, and they rely on their own culture to discern the good from bad;
and through a global transmission of ideas and institutional information, a combination of
99
cultural law and universal law will emerge.

It is therefore not surprising, or controversial, that any study of Chinese law (and in
particular its practical manifestations) must take serious account of the cultural and
historical underpinnings of such law. To ignore these aspects would be to deny the
opportunity to either understand why things are happening in the way that they do and, for
business purposes, to possibly invite failure.

4.6.2 The Role of the Communist Party of China in Reality
China’s political system and decision-making processes are often a mystery to western
society. The CPC came into the dominant power since 1949 and has continued to rule as a
one-party state to the present. The CPC formally established in Shanghai on 23 July 1921
and operated upon the base principle of democratic centralism. 100 In theory the CPC’s
democratic centralism allows for debate and discussion of policy among Party members but
requires unquestioning support of policy once decisions are made. 101
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The party’s most powerful policy and decision making entity is the Politburo and its
Standing Committee. The rest of the CPC formal structure consists of layers of local,
municipal and provincial party congresses and committees. The contemporary CPC is
organised into an expansive, hierarchical network of organisations that reach into many
aspects of society. A wide variety of institutions including universities and schools, stateowned enterprises and private corporations frequently have party committees.
The Constitutional basis for the CPC’s leadership has been set down in different
(political, social, economic, legal, military, cultural and spiritual) aspects of the state.102 As
the Preamble of the Constitution states, ‘under the leadership of the CPC the Chinese
people will continue to adhere to the people’s democratic dictatorship and the socialist
road’. 103 The CPC’s centralised administration reflects the fundermental principals of
unification of the nation through strong control by the central government as has often been
the case in Chinese dynastic history. Despite China’s vast population and massive
geographical area, it has demonstrated efficient management of its very significant
economic development over the past few decades. At the same time however, such
centralised control of administrative systems has presented difficulties in accommodating
the needs of foreign investors. These matters will be explored in more detail in chapter 8.

4.7

Conclusions

The social organisation of any highly evolved civilisation is not a mere consequence of
natural evolution. Its structure is largely a result of conscious efforts built on the basis of
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philosophies. 104 China had created her notions of governing state and made success of
uniting the whole country over more than a thousand years of civilisation. The mixing of
Legalist and Confucian elements is especially evident in the Chinese traditions concerning
law and justice.105 It would appear that there is a resilient core of Confucianist thinking in
the culture of Chinese people that is so strong that it may have become be a serious factor
in the way that some laws are made in China and certainly in the effectiveness of some
laws in practice. Chinese legal development is in many ways sharply different from that
experienced in other civilisations.106 As Van der Sprenkel pointed out that there are three
unifying and interrelated features:
Dependence on irrigated agriculture; a centralised, bureaucratic administration and a
literary tradition, the most important elements in which were ethical philosophy and history.
A centralised hierarchical bureaucracy which identified itself with an ethical and political
orthodoxy, was able to impose on the governed a picture of society in which the unity of the
whole was exaggerated, its own role was overstressed and the value of Confucian thought
was overweighted in relation to that of other schools.107

The reforms that began in the late 1970s and accelerated in the 1990s have proven to be
appropriate to the needs and possibilities of Chinese society and led to remarkable success,
particularly in economics. 108 In respect of laws relating to Chinese doing business with
foreigners in China, there may be some reluctance by the Chinese people to readily adopt
certain parts of a system of rigid laws to govern their behaviour. There may even also be
some reluctance by the government, administrative authorities and Courts to enforce such
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parts of laws that conflict with the very nature of the people to which the laws (or parts of
laws) apply.
In the west, laws are invariably described as being a barometer of public attitudes,
opinions and moral standards. They are changed along with changes of political control of
states and with variations in people’s attitudes and standards as assessed from time to time.
Regrettably, those ‘assessments’ can often occur by way of superficial, media-led
campaigns or political manipulation of people’s fears or ignorance.
For western governments, academics or those engaged in business in the west to
suggest that western law-making, in terms of method or content, provides the only
acceptable standard of law-making that should be applied in China, or anywhere else in
what may be described as the ‘developing world’, is somewhat arrogant but, historically,
not unusual. Clearly, there are elements of the culture of China that manifest themselves in
different ways of dealing with relationships, including business relationships. Those
foreigners wishing to engage in business in China simply need to accept those differences.
For China’s government however, expressing those different approaches or attitudes in the
form of written laws may be difficult or even impossible.
The question has arisen about whether the centralised power of the CPC, in
managing the economy of the PRC and the whole process of foreign investment, is an issue
of real concern for foreign investors. As indicated above, the role of the CPC has been
placed at the centre of state administration. The leading role of the CPC in the country is
also demonstrated by the fact that the CPC leaders also hold the state leadership
positions.109 This centralised decision-making is often, in reality, not quite as dominant as it
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might appear by virtue of the making of national laws and regulations and the
administrative functions of ministries in Beijing.
The following chapter expands on the development and implementation of laws of
China that are directly and indirectly concerned with, or relevant to, foreign direct investors
in the PRC.
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Chapter 5
Foreign Investment and Development of Foreign Investment
Laws in China
5.1

Introduction

China’s absorption of foreign investment is an important component of China’s
fundamental principle of opening up to the outside world and a significant practical
expression of Deng Xiaoping Theory1. It is part of the massive task of building up the
‘socialist economy 2 with Chinese characteristics’. 3 According to statistics of foreign
investment released from the Ministry of Commerce, the value of approved foreigninvested enterprises in 2010 amounted to USD27.406 billion, up by 16.94 per cent year on
year, and the actual use of foreign investment reached USD105.735 billion, up by 17.44 per
cent year on year.4 Foreign investment has not only contributed to rapid economic growth

1

See Chapter 1 footnote 7.
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the Fourteenth National Congress of Communist Party of China, 14 November 1993, [2]–[4]. The socialist
market economy or ‘socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics’ is the official term used to refer
to the economic system of China after the reforms of Deng Xiaoping; it is also referred to as ‘socialism with
Chinese characteristics’. It consists of a mixture of socialist planning with a market economy. The socialist
market economy is a concept first proposed by Deng Xiaoping in order to incorporate the market into the then
planned economy of China. Following its implementation, this economic system has supplemented the
centrally planned economy in China and the high growth rates in GDP during the past decades have been
attributed to it. Within this model, privately owned enterprises are a major component of the economic system.
3
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Ministry of Commerce of the PRC,
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1.htm>.
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in China but also facilitated its legal reform since the various economic players’ interests
require legal protection. This chapter outlines the development of foreign investment in
China since the commencement of economic reforms and introduces the legal framework
applicable in the foreign investment sectors. Section 5.2 gives a background to China’s
‘Open Door’ economic policy in 1978 and a broad indication of how foreign investment
has grown in the ensuing period. Section 5.3 considers the growth of foreign investment
and China’s place in international economic ratings. Section 5.4 chronicles the
establishment and development of foreign investment laws and includes details of four
distinct stages in the development of those laws. In section 5.5, the legal sources of Chinese
foreign investment law are analysed including references to the Constitution of the PRC,
specific national FDI laws, national implementation regulations and rules for FDI, local
regulations, FDI provisions in other laws and regulations, international treaties and internal
regulations. Section 5.6 summarises and concludes the chapter.

5.2

Background of the ‘Open Door’ Policy and Foreign Investment

At the Third Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Eleventh Term of the China
Communist Party in December 1978, the ‘Four Modernisations’ (agriculture, industry,
defence, and science and technology) were added to the Revised Rules and New
Constitution of the Communist Party.5 To achieve these ‘modernisations’, 6 China engaged
in economic reform centred on the introduction of an open market economy. The reform

5
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Eleventh Term of the China Communist Party’, Xinhua News (Online), 18 January 2005,
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-01/18/content_1997321.htm>.
6
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Speech] in <<邓小平文选第二集>> [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping vol. 2] (人民出版社 [People’s
Publishing House], 18 March 1978) 85–6.
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covered most areas of the economy, including agriculture, corporate business, pricing
structure, financial structure, trade and direct investment, and distribution structure. 7 Since
the meeting, China has undertaken the promotion of various economic cooperation
programs with western capitalist countries.8 This policy of reform and openness, which is
still in full force, has brought drastic changes to the economy and society of China.
Attracting foreign capital and advanced technology was a core component of the ‘Open
Door’ policy as part of the aim to achieve economic reform in China. China is now the
largest exporter and recipient of FDI among developing countries. It achieved an average
annual real growth rate of around 9.5 per cent over the period 1978–2000.9 According to
the findings of Mo:

In 1996, there were about 281,298 foreign invested enterprises operating in China and the
total actual investment made there had amounted to about USD1,716.83 billion. Another
source reports that as of the end of June 1996, there had been 273,325 foreign-invested
projects in China. Of that number, 120,000 had started operations. In 1997, China’s export
and import trades amounted to USD325 billion, making it the world’s tenth largest trading
nation in terms of annual trading volume. Also in 1997, China actually absorbed about
USD45.2 billion in foreign investment, which suggests that there was already a strong trend
in the development of foreign investment in China.10

In 2007, China ranked as the world’s fourth largest economy, a position it had
occupied since 2006, when it overtook the UK to stand behind the USA, Japan and
Germany.11 In February 2011, China moved ahead of Japan to become the world’s second

7
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largest economy, behind the USA.12 By comparison to other developing countries with fast
economic growth such as India, Russia and Brazil, the International Monetary Fund
forecast that China would (in 2011) achieve a GDP growth of 9.6 per cent compared to
India with 8.2 per cent GDP growth, Russia with 4.8 per cent GDP growth, and Brazil with
4.1 per cent GDP growth.13

5.3

Economic Growth over the Past Thirty Years

While the government of the PRC actively encouraged foreign investment, the continued
inflow of foreign money and competition has led some PRC companies and government
agencies to debate whether the level of investment is too high. 14 Nonetheless, FDI has
continued to flow strongly into China, not only into traditional manufacturing ventures but
increasingly into the equipment manufacturing, electronic machinery, high-level
technology, entertainment, retail, and financial service sectors.15

As an example of the rapid growth, the Ministry of Commerce showed on 8 June
2005 that China’s actual FDI in 2005 amounted to USD72.4 billion, up 19.42 per cent over
2004.16 That increase revised the January 2005 estimate upward by USD12 billion. The
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13
International Monetary Fund, ‘World Economic Outlook Update’ (Report released by International
Monetary Fund, Washington, 17 June 2011), 2
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/update/02/pdf/0611.pdf>.
14
Ibid 84.
15
The US-China Business Council, ‘Foreign Investment in China’ (14 March 2005) The US-China Business
Council <http://www.uschina.org/statistics/2005foreigninvestment.html>.
16
Shanglin Luan , ‘China’s Actual FDI in 2005 Reaches $74.2 Bln’ (20 December 2008) Chinese
Government’s Official Web Portal <http://english.gov.cn/2006-06/08/content_304342.htm>.
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figures excluded FDI in the sectors of banking, insurance and financial securities. 17 Those
FDI figures indicated that the service sector had become a very attractive area for foreign
investors.18

By comparison, in 2010, the number of newly approved foreign–funded enterprises
in China was 27,406, and foreign investment actually utilised reached USD105.735
billion.19 China’s total import and export trade in 2010 was USD2972.76 billion with a
year-on-year growth of 34.7 per cent.20 Its exports were USD1577.93 billion and its imports
were USD1394.83 billion, up by 31.3 per cent and 38.7 per cent respectively. 21

Chinese investors directly invested in 2,786 overseas enterprises in 122 countries
and regions in January-November, 2010. The total Chinese direct investment overseas
amounted to USD 47.56 billion.22 The sources of this investment were, not surprisingly, for
the most part concentrated in Asia, with Latin America second and other regions trailing far
behind.23 Hong Kong (where investors from other countries as well as the mainland are also
based) held a clear lead, followed by the British Virgin Islands, South Korea, and Japan.

17

Shanglin Luan, ‘China’s FDI in 2005 Revised to $72.4 bln’ (6 September 2006) Chinese Government’s
Official Web Portal <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t257288.htm>.
18
Ibid.
19
Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, ‘News Release of National Assimilation of FDI from January to
December 2010’, (17 January 2011) Ministry of Commerce of the PRC
<http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Statistics/FDIStatistics/ExpressofForeignInvestment/t20110117_13020
1.htm>.
20
Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, ‘Brief Statistics on China’s Import and Export in December 2010’ (30
January 2011) Ministry of Commerce of the PRC,
<http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/statistic/BriefStatistics/201101/20110107386812.html>.
21
Ibid.
22
Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, ‘Briefings on China’s Direct Investment Overseas from January to
November 2010’ (26 December 2010) Ministry of Commerce of the PRC,
<http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/statistic/foreigntradecooperation/201101/20110107347849.html>.
23
Kerry Brown, The Rise of the Dragon, above n 11, 54.
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US investment in China ranked fifth in 2005.24 After falling sharply in 2003, most likely as
a result of caution prompted by the ‘Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome’ (SARS)
outbreak, US investment recovered in 2004 with a 23.1 per cent and 7.2 per cent increase in
contracted and utilised investment, respectively. 25 US investment (as a 6 per cent share of
the total contracted FDI in China) reached USD17.72 billion from January to December in
2008.26
In 2004, FDI ventured northward and inland from traditional investment centres
such as the Pearl and Yangzi River deltas and Beijing. 27 From the end of 2006, foreigninvested projects were being set up in the western region of China.28 According to a report
from the Ministry of Commerce, in respect of attracting FDI in the first six months of 2010,
China had attracted foreign funds of USD51.43 billion, an increase of 19.6 per cent
compared to the same period of 2009.29 In terms of regional distribution, FDI increased by

24

Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, ‘China’s Absorption of Foreign Fund from January to November in
2005’ (23 July 2006) Ministry of Commerce of the PRC
<http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/statistic/foreigninvestment/200607/20060702700699.html>.
25
The US-China Business Council, ‘Foreign Investment in China’ (14 March 2005) The US-China Business
Council <https://www.uschina.org/statistics/2005foreigninvestment.html>.
26
‘2008 年 1-12 月外商直接投资利用外资分国别/地区分析表’ [Foreign Direct Investment from January to
December 2008: An Analytical Chart of Utilisation of Foreign Investment according to Countries and
Regions] (22 January 2009) 中 国 投 资 指 南 [Invest in China, Ministry of Commerce of the PRC]
<http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/wstztj/lywzfgbdqtj/t20090122_101099.htm>.
27
Foreign Investment in Central and Western Edge Industry Directory, 23 July 2004. According to the
February 2002 release of Provisions on Guiding the Direction of Foreign Investment (State Council Decree
No 346) the policy, for the implementation of the national western development strategy in the central and
western regions, was to: encourage foreign investment, introduce advanced technology, equipment,
development of the central and western areas of comparative advantage industries and technologically
advanced enterprises; promote the optimisation and upgrading of industrial structure; and promote the central
and western regions to improve the overall quality of the economy, in accordance with the state's industrial
policy, announced in June 2000, of foreign investment in central and western parts.
28
汪旭晖 [Wang Xuhui] ‘外商对华直接投资的区位变迁及影响因素分析兼论我国引资政策的调整’
[Foreign Direct Investment Region Evolution in China and Influencing Factors: Adjustment of China’s FDI
Policies] (2006) 4 国际贸易问题 [Journal of International Trade Affairs] 1–7; <<中西部地区外商投资优势
产业目录>> [Catalogue Concerning Preferential Industries for Foreign Investment for the Central and West
Regions] (People’s Republic of China) National Development and Reform Committee and Ministry of
Commerce, Order No 4, 23 December 2008.
29
Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, ‘2010 年 1–6 月全国吸收外商直接投资快讯’ [News of Absorption of
Foreign Direct Investment from January to June in 2010] (19 July 2010) 中国投资指南 [Invest in China,
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19.1 per cent in the eastern part of China, 11.8 per cent in the central region and 31 per cent
in the western part.30

This shift in FDI flows can be attributed to government incentives intended to spur
investment in north-eastern and western China; rising land, labour, and living costs in
popular coastal investment destinations; and the desire of companies to secure a
competitive footing in the domestic consumer market as these areas became more
developed and as China opened its retail and distribution sectors. 31 Automobile maker, Ford
Motor Co and foreign automotive parts makers, like Tenneco Automotive Inc and Lear
Corp, have set up production facilities in western China.32

FDI in China in the last three decades has been one of the key interfaces of China’s
engagement with the outside world. In bare numerical terms, it has been an outstanding
success.33 The challenge for China over the next five years will be to move to a greater
openness while maintaining some of the advantages the existing regime has provided. 34

Ministry of Commerce of the PRC]
<http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/wstztj/lywzkx/t20100719_124024.htm>.
30
Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <<2010 年 1 – 6 月全国吸收外商直接投资情况>> [Between January
to June 2010 Information on National Attracting Foreign Direct Investment] (15 July 2010) Ministry of
Commerce of the PRC
<http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/column/print.shtml?/tongjiziliao/v/201008/2010080755393>.
31
<<中西部地区外商投资优势产业目录>> [Catalogue Concerning Preferential Industries for Foreign
Investment for the Central and West Regions] (People’s Republic of China) National Development and
Reform Committee and Ministry of Commerce, Order No 4, 23 December 2008.
32
The US-China Business Council, ‘Foreign Investment in China’ (14 March 2005) The US-China Business
Council <http://www.uschina.org/statistics/2005foreigninvestment.html>.
33
Kerry Brown, The Rise of the Dragon, above n 11, 114.
34
Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy Transitions and Growth (MIT Press, 2007) 422.
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5.4

Establishment and Development of Foreign Investment Laws

Since the end of 1978, by adopting the ‘Open Door’ policy China has transformed
important aspects of its economic and political structures, promoting international trade and
welcoming foreign investment into China. The associated law reform in China was initiated
at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China in late 1978. The Plenum moved not only towards a tentative policy on the need to
reform the state-planned economy but also to build a legal system that would support
economic growth.

Law schools that had been closed since the late 1950s were reopened, and legal
specialists who had been disgraced during the Cultural Revolution were invited to resume
their academic and professional activities. One such specialist, Professor Mingxuan Gao of
the People’s University Law School, resumed his legal career in 1979 and became actively
involved in drafting the first Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China 1979.35 The
establishment and development of a legal system to deal with foreign investment should be
considered as one of the most important elements of this reform. The Table 3.1 shows the
chronological development of major laws and regulations in relation to FDI.

Table 5.1: Major Laws and Regulations Related to Foreign Investment Since 1978
Year

December 1978

Regulations Enacted

Plenary Session Events
The 3rd full meeting of the Central
Committee of the 11th Term of the
CCP – Decision was made to
concentrate on economic

35

Professor Mingxuan Gao was born in 1928. He is a PhD supervisor specialising in criminal law. Professor
Gao is also the vice-director of the Criminal Research Committee of the Legal Committee of China. He has
published more than ninety influential academic texts and 200 articles on Criminal Law, Criminal Legal
Theory etc. Gao is an influential academic in contemporary China.
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July 1979

July 1979

1980

1980
July 1982
August 1982

December 1982

March 1984
July 1985
April 1986

April 1986
October 1986
December 1987

April 1988
April 1989
July 1991

July 1994
June 1995
June 1995
September 1995

The Law of the People’s Republic of
China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint
Venture
Provisional Regulations on Foreign
Exchange Control of the People’s
Republic of China
Tax Income Law on the ChineseForeign Equity Joint Venture of the
People’s Republic of China
Economic Contract Law of the
People’s Republic of China
The Trademark Law of the People’s
Republic of China

The Constitution of the People’s
Republic of China

The Patent Law of the People’s
Republic of China
Foreign Economic Contract Law of the
People’s Republic of China
The General Principles of Civil Law of
the People’s Republic of China
The Law of the People’s Republic of
China on Wholly Foreign Owned
Enterprise
Provisions of the State Council for
Encouragement of Foreign Investment
Technology Contract Law of the
People’s Republic of China
The Law of the People’s Republic of
China on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative
Joint Venture
Administrative Procedure Law of the
People’s Republic of China
Foreign Investment Enterprise and
Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law
Law on Administration of the Urban
Real Estate of the People’s Republic of
China
Interim Provisions on Guiding Foreign
Direct Investment
Guideline Catalogue of Foreign
Investment Industries
The Arbitration Law of the People’s
Republic of China

development in order to achieve
China’s modernisation.
Established Special Economic Zones
in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and
Xiamen.
Amended in October 2001

Amended in October 2008

Repealed in 1999
Amended in October 2001
Article 18: foreign enterprises, other
organisations and individuals are
permitted to invest in China
according to provisions of China’s
law and have various co-operations
with Chinese enterprises and other
organisations.
Amended in August 2009
Repealed in 1999

Amended in October 2000

Repealed in 1999
Amended in October 2000

Regularly updated, the latest update
in October 2007
Regularly updated, the latest update
in October 2007
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October 1999
March 2000
October 2001
January 2002
January 2006
August 2006
January 2008
April 2008

The Contract Law of the People’s
Republic of China
Legislation Law of the People’s
Republic of China
The Copyright Law of the People’s
Republic of China
Computer Software Protection
Regulations
The Company Law of the People’s
Republic of China
The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the
People’s Republic of China
The Labour Law of the People’s
Republic of China
The Civil Procedure Law of the
People’s Republic of China

For all laws, there have been more than 200 pieces of legislation enacted at the
national level alone since 1979,36 not to mention administrative regulations and provincial
and municipal enactments. Judicial caseloads are averaging nearly 5 million per year
nationwide and according to the Supreme Court Annual Report 2010 there were 144
million cases filed in China. 37 The number of additional disputes resolved through
mediation and arbitration is burgeoning. In 2010 there were 3.593 million first instance
case withdrawn as a result of mediation before the courts. 38 The number of law firms has
multiplied with more than 5000 having been established since 1990, bringing the total to
more than 9000.39

National laws and regulations along with local regulations combine to provide a
relatively comprehensive Chinese FDI legal system. In China, foreign investment has not
36

Pitman B Potter, ‘Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture and Selective Adaptation’ (2004) 29 Law
and Social Inquiry 465, 495.
37
王胜俊 [Wang Shengjun], <<2010 年最高人民法院工作报告>> [The Supreme Court Annual Report
2010] (Report delivered at the Fourth Full Meeting of the Third Session of the Eleventh NPC, Beijing, 11
March 2010) 1.
38
Ibid section 3.
39
Ibid 1226.
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always proceeded smoothly and there have been upward and downward trends. These
trends can be divided into four stages.

5.4.1 Introducing the ‘Open Door’ Policy – the Initial Experimentation Period
During the first four-year experimental period, the Chinese government adopted cautious
and conservative attitudes toward foreign investment. It seemed that both foreign investors
and the Chinese government were more interested in experience rather than substantial
output. In an interview recorded by Central China Television in 2002, Guangsheng Shi, the
Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, revealed the extent of foreign
investment in China and indicated that between 1979 and 1982, the amount of FDI into
China was quite limited.40 It amounted to 930 projects with FDI approval resulting in an
actual investment of USD1.769 billion.41

In 1979, China adopted its first ever foreign investment law, the Law of the People’s
Republic of China on Equity Joint Ventures 42 (EJV Law). Although the EJV Law is not a
complex piece of legislation, its long-term impact should not be underestimated. It was the
first time that the Chinese government had adopted a legislative approach to the regulation
of foreign investment instead of applying the traditional Communist Party’s policies or
governmental unpublished internal directives. Also, the EJV Law embodied basic
principles for the Chinese FDI legal system, which has greatly influenced the development

40

Guangsheng Shi, ‘Talking About: “Made in China’’’ (Television Interview) (31 October 2002) China
Central Television <http://www.cas.ac.cn/html/Dir/2002/10/31/0823.htm>.
41
Ibid.
42
<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法>> [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign
Equity Joint Venture] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order
No 48, 15 March 2001.
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of the legislation.43 The EJV law established, for the first time, investment arrangements by
shares between foreign parties and Chinese parties. Subsequently the Law of the People’s
Republic of China on Cooperative Joint Ventures was enacted in 1988 and the Law of the
People’s Republic of China on Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises passed in 2000.

Another noteworthy decision made by the Chinese government in the early 1980s
was the establishment of the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) system. In 1980, the Chinese
government announced the establishment of SEZs along the south-coast, Shenzhen, Zhuhai
and Shantou in Guangdong Province, and Xiamen in Fujian Province. 44 The SEZs served as
windows of opportunity for both China and foreign investors and enjoyed special taxation
and other preferences. Various experimental practices, such as a low tax incentive policy to
attract foreign investment, were first introduced in SEZs were later adopted nationwide by
the Central government in its strengthening of the economic model for the rest of China. 45

Before 1978 China was economically isolated from the rest of the world. China was
basically a socialist state conducting a planned economy. 46

In an economy that for decades had been dominated by state central plans, foreign
investment has had a positive impact on the Chinese economy. The benefits of FDI were
recognised by the highest legal authority in the 1982 Constitution of China. For the first
time ever the Constitution allowed foreign investors ‘to invest in China and to enter into
43

Jian Zhou, ‘National Treatment in Foreign Investment Law: A Comparative Study from a Chinese
Perspective’ (2000) 10 Touro International Law Review 39, 39.
44
Jung-Dong Park, The Special Economic Zones above n 7, 3.
45
江泽民 [Jiang Zemin], ‘正确处理社会主义现代化建设中的若干重大关系’ [Rightly Handling Important
Relationships in the Process of Socialist Modernisation] (Speech delivered at the Closing of the Fifth Full
Meeting of the Fourteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Beijing, 28 September 1995)
中国共产党历次全国代表大会数据库 [Statistics of All Previous National Congress of the Communist Party
of China] <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64567/65397/4441712.html>.
46
Jung-Dong Park, The Special Economic Zones above n 7, 32.
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various forms of economic co-operation with Chinese enterprises and other economic
organisations’ in accordance with the laws of China. 47 It also ensured that foreign investors’
‘lawful rights and interests are protected’.48 China had, by its constitutional and legislative
changes, made significant and effective changes to its laws to increase, regulate and
improve foreign investment within its borders and enhancing its international economic
reputation.

5.4.2

A Boom Economy – a Period of Fast Growth

With the recovery and development of the domestic economy, Chinese domestic interest
groups demanded further reforms and greater opportunities to access foreign resources.
Deng Xiaoping’s call for accelerated reform and development defined the major thrust of
subsequent economic policy. 49 The creation of ‘socialist market economic system’ was
written into the Communist Party official policy documents. 50 The Chinese government
further committed China to the expansion of economic and technological exchanges and
co-operation with foreign countries. Naughton, in an analysis of the transitions and growth
of the Chinese economy, states:

At the beginning of the 1990s a third wave of opening of the Chinese economy was
announced by … the creation of another SEZ (Special Economic Zone). The Pudong (east
Shanghai) special zone served as an advertisement, as well as a commitment device, by
51
creating an SEZ in the heart of China’s most developed region for the first time.

47

<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China)
National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, art 18.
48
Ibid.
49
Robert F Ash and Y Y Kueh, ‘Introduction’ in Robert F Ash and Y Y Kueh (eds), The Chinese Economy
Under Deng Xiaoping (Oxford University Press, 1996) 1, 2.
50
<<中共中央关于建立社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定>> [Decision Concerning a Number of
Issues of Establishment of Socialist Market System] (People’s Republic of China) The Third Full Meeting at
the Fourteenth National Congress of Communist Party of China, 14 November 1993.
51
Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economic above n 34, 409.
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The CPC openly proclaimed that foreign funded enterprises were a necessary element for
the development of China’s Economy. 52 In 1983, Hainan Island was declared open to
foreign investors with a special incentive policy that was more generous than the policies of
the SEZs. 53 The Hainan Island Administrative Region enjoys the most preferential
treatment and allows foreign investors to invest in a broad scope of industries. 54 In mid1984 the Chinese government opened 14 coastal cities and ports to foreign investors. 55
These cities and ports ranged from Dalian in the North to the port of Beihai in the South.
Economic and technological development zones were accordingly established in most of
these 14 open cities and ports. 56 The opening up of the coastal cities was effective in
attracting extensive foreign investment in a short period with the number of FDI projects in
those areas equalling the total investment of previous years in the whole country.
According to the Ministry of Commerce, the actual utilisation of FDI between 1979 to 1990
was USD20.692 billion, and the total utilisation of FDI in 1993 alone had reached
USD27.515 billion, well in excess of the 1980s period.57

52

<<关于进一步扩大对外开放提高利用外资水平的若干意见>> [Opinions Concerning Further Expansion
of Opening to Foreign Countries and Improvement of Utilisation of Foreign Investment] (People’s Republic
of China) State Council and Central Committee of Communist Party of China, Order No 6, 14 April 1998; 赵
晋平 [Zhao Jinping], ‘综合评价利用外资对经济增长的促进及作用’ [Assessment of the Role of Foreign
Investment on Acceleration of Economic Growth] (2001) 7 宏观经济观察 [Observation of the Microeconomy] < http://gc.jsamr.com/Html/1/Menu/362/Picture/13747/>.
53
<<关于加快海南岛开发建设问题讨论纪要>> [Memorandum Concerning Discussion about Issues of
Accelerating the Development of Hainan Island] (People’s Republic of China) State Council and Central
Committee of Communist Party of China, Order No 11, 1 April 1983.
54
‘伟大的战略决策,深深的思念缅怀’ [Great Stragical Decision, Deeply Memorial] (2007) 2 今日海南
[Hainan Today] <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/68742/71093/index.html>.
55
<<沿海部分城市座谈会纪要>> [Memorandum of Meeting of Some Coastal Cities] (People’s Republic of
China) State Council, 4 May 1984.
56
‘State Council Decided to Open 14 Costal Cities in 1984’ (19 July 2008) Hexun News
< http://news.hexun.com/2008-07-19/107552998.html>.
57
Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, ‘Overview of China’s Absorption of Foreign Direct Investment’ (16
March 2011) Ministry of Commerce of the PRC
<http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/tzdt/zt/ztmc/wzzgx/default.html>.
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In 1985, the government decided to open up the country’s three most fertile river delta
areas, namely, the Yangtse River Delta in Shanghai (including Hangzhou and Nanjing); the
Zhujiang (Pearl) River Delta centered at Guangzhou; and the Xiamen, Zhangzhou,
Quanzhou Delta in the southern province of Fujian. 58 In fact, foreign investors have
explored markets beyond SEZs or special areas to the inland provinces. As foreign
investment has increased, local governments have acquired more and more authority to
examine and approve proposed foreign investment projects. The central government in
Beijing decentralised approval power—with some limits—to local governments. For
example, State Council had given authority to provincial level governments and respective
industrial departments to approve foreign investment projects 59 As a result, investment
projects of less than USD30 million (which make up the majority of FDI projects) could
apply for, and gain approval, at the provincial level.60

The framework of the Chinese FDI legal system was developed during this period.
Following a few years of experimental practice, the promulgation of the Regulations for the
Implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity
Joint Ventures 2001 61 (EJV Implementation) provided detailed and practical rules for

58

‘A Notification Concerning A Memorandum of Openness of the Yangtse River Delta, Pearl River Delta and
the Xiamen, Zhangzhou, Quanzhou Delta from State Council’ (China Communist Party, 1985).
59
<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法实施条例>> [Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of
the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No
311, 22 July 2001,art 6; <<国务院关于鼓励外商投资的规定>> [Provisions Concerning Encouragement for
Foreign Investment] (People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No 95, 11 October 1986, art 17.
60
<<国家工商行政管理局关于中外合资经营企业注册资本与投资总额比例的暂行规定>> [Interim
Provisions of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce Concerning the Proportion of Registered
Capital and Total Amount of Investment of Chinese-foreign Equity Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of
China) State Administration for Industry and Commerce, Order No 38, 17 February 1987, art 3.
61
<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法实施条例>> [Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of
the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture] (People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No
311, 22 July 2001.
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EJVs. 62 The EJV Implementation enumerates the market access categories for joint
ventures, lays out application procedures and approval agencies, 63 lists mandatory contents
of joint venture agreements,64 and regulates management,65 labour,66 JVC dissolution and
liquidation, 67 land use, 68 transfer of technology, 69 taxation 70 and foreign exchange, 71 and
dispute resolution procedures.72

In 1986 and 1988 respectively, China enacted the Law of the People’s Republic of
China on Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise 1986 (WFOE Law) 73 and the Law of the
People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures 1988 (CJV
Law). 74 The enactment of CJV Law and WFOE Law, together with the EJV Law,
completed the basic legislation for the three main forms of access for FDI in China: equity
joint ventures (EJVs), cooperative joint ventures (CJVs) and wholly foreign owned
enterprises (WFOEs). Accompanying the major framework legislation, numerous

62

The EJV Regulations were promulgated by the State Council on 20 September 1983, and amended on 15
January 1986, 21 December 1987 and 22 July 2001.
63
<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法实施条例>> [Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of
the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture] (People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No
311, 22 July 2001, art 6[1], [2].
64
Ibid, art 11.
65
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67
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68
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69
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70
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71
Ibid, art 23.
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Ibid arts 11[12], 97, 98, 99, 100.
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<<中华人民共和国外资企业法>> [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Wholly Foreign Owned
Enterprise] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 41, 31
October 2000. The WFOE Law was adopted at the Fourth Session of the Sixth National People’s Congress on
12 April 1986. It was amended on 31 October 2000.
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The CJV Law was adopted on 13 April 1988 by the First Session of the Standing Committee of the Seventh
National People’s Congress. The Implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chineseforeign Cooperative Joint Ventures (CJV Implementation Rules) was promulgated on 4 September 1995. An
Interpretation on Implementing Certain Articles of the Rules for the implementation of the Law of the
People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures (CJV Interpretation) was issued
in 1996. The CJV Law was amended on 31 October 2000.
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regulations and rules, supplemented with notices from authorised agencies, provided
practical guidance for FDIs.

The Chinese government adopted policy-oriented provisions that declared general
incentive policies in attracting foreign investment. In 1986, the State Council promulgated
the Provisions Concerning Encouragement for Foreign Investment 1986,75 which reiterated
the government’s attitude toward FDI and gave greater preferential treatment to foreign
investment.76

5.4.3

A Cooling Off Period–from Controlling to Regulating

Despite the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, FDI in China continued to grow. After
more than two decades of practice, the Chinese government had gained extensive
experience and knowledge in regulating FDI. In 2001, the National People’s Congress
amended the EJV Law. In 1991, the Foreign Investment Enterprise and Foreign Enterprise
Income Tax Law 1991 77 was adopted. Under sustained pressure from the international
community, China also began to construct a legal system to regulate intellectual property
rights and obligations. The Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China 1990 78 was
amended in 2001, which was followed by amendments to the Computer Software

75

<<国务院关于鼓励外商投资的规定>> [Provisions Concerning Encouragement for Foreign Investment]
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Perspective’ (2000) 39 Touro International Law Review 6, 6.
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1991.
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<<中华人民共和国著作权法>> [Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 27 October 2001.
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Protection Regulations 199179 in 2002. The Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China
199280 and the Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China 1993 81 were amended by
the NPC to more closely reflect international standards. More significantly, the Company
Law of the People’s Republic of China 199382 (Company Law 1993) was amended in 2006,
providing a legal framework for Chinese business organisations. According to the Company
Law 1993, limited liability companies with FDI are subject to the provisions of the new
law, except where specific foreign investment statutes provide otherwise. 83 FDI enterprises,
to some extent, began to be treated in the same manner as domestic business.

Since the late 1970s, arbitration has been the most popular form for dispute
resolution in joint venture agreements. According to Statistics from the China International
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), there were 16,593 cases filed
from 1990 to 2010, of these cases 49 per cent was foreign related dispute. 84 As China is a
society with a non-litigious culture 85 and an unpredictable judicial system, resolving
disputes using an arbitration tribunal is an acceptable alternative to both foreign investors
and local partners. In order to provide greater accountability and legal certainty for
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<<计算机软件保护条例>> [Computer Software Protection Regulations] (People’s Republic of China)
State Council, 1 January 2002.
80
<<中华人民共和国专利法>> [Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 25 August 2000.
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<<中华人民共和国商标法>> [Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 27 October 2001.
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<<中华人民共和国公司法>> [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 42, 1 January 2006.
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Ibid art 18.
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China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, ‘贸仲受案数据统计 1990-2010’
[Statistics of Cases Filed 1990-2010] 中国国际贸易仲裁委员会 [China International Economic and Trade
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arbitration, China enacted its first Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China 86 in
1994.

The economic boom demonstrated the benefits of the ‘Open Door’ policy for
China’s development. To push the economic reform forward, China amended its
Constitution in 1993, declaring a ‘socialist market economy’. 87 The Chinese government
indicated its future plans for FDI would include managing foreign investment through
rational economic regulations rather than through politically implicated controls. This is
evident from the fact that China promoted the establishment of a socialist market economic
system and emphasised that the functions of government are regulating and administrating
the market through laws and management systems rather than direct interference. 88
Through this approach, China aimed to reduce the perception of unreasonable government
interference and provide greater certainty for foreign investors. The improvement of the
legal environment and more open policies had the effect of promoting foreign investment
inflow during the 1990s. The amount of approved foreign investment fund into China in
1992 was greater than the amount of the approved foreign investment fund in the previous
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<<中华人民共和国仲裁法>> [Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 1 September 1995.
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Characteristics] (江泽民在中国共产党十四次全国代表大会上的报告 [Report delivered at the Fourteenth
CPC National Congress], Beijing, 12 October 1992)
88
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thirteen years.89 Since 1993, China has been the second largest FDI recipient in the world.
By the end of 1996, China was utilising around USD40 billion a year. 90

5.4.4

Rationalised Economic Development–after the Asian Financial Crisis

There is no doubt that the Asian financial crisis91 had an impact upon China’s economy
since south-east Asia is China’s main source of FDI and largest export market. As
Naughton’s research revealed, FDI to China falls into four large and quite stable source
groups.92 By far the largest is the group including Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau free
ports or tax havens. 93 The Asian financial crisis provided a warning to the Chinese
government that it was time to reform China’s financial system, state-owned enterprises
and governmental institutions to avoid a similar crisis in China. For example, from the mid1990s, Chinese authorities began to cut the formerly close ties that bound government and
state-owned enterprises.94 Even as the rate of FDI into China reduced, China has continued
to place greater emphasis on ensuring that the new foreign investments are consistent with
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its industrial development goals.95 Consequently, China has implemented new policies that
introduce further incentives for investments in high-tech industries and inland areas. In
2007, that China published a revised list in the Guideline Catalogue of Foreign Investment
Industries 2007.96

The 2007 Guideline Catalogue restated that foreign investment in basic
infrastructure and high-technology industries would be particularly encouraged, while
investment in domestic trade and service sectors would be restricted or prohibited. 97 At the
same time, China eased some restrictions on the operation of FDI, such as allowing
conversion of foreign exchange under the current account.98 The Guideline Catalogue has
been updated by the government on several occasions.99 In response to the increasing size
and complexity of FDI in China, legislation governing foreign investment has also
significantly expanded. By the 1990s, with economy having ‘grown out of the plan’, the
most important tasks were to improve the legal and regulatory environment, create a ‘level
playing field’, and reduce some of the most obvious distortions in the economy. 100 China
today claims relatively comprehensive statutes and regulations for FDI. According to
Naughton:
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China has a generally favourable regime for foreign investors today. Taxes are moderate;
investment protection agreements are in place with most countries, an apparatus for
arbitration is available; and most legal provisions are adequate in principle.

101

Due to the poor legislative coordination between the Central government (State
Council) and local government and between different governmental agencies, the increase
in legislation has inevitably resulted in confusion and inconsistency in the Chinese FDI
legal system. Foreign investors are often confused by the overlapping or conflicting
rules.102 It is therefore necessary for investors to understand the FDI legal sources and their
hierarchical structures.

China’s National Development and Reform Commission announced the issuing of a
new and substantially revised edition of the Guideline Catalogue of Foreign Investment
Industries 2004 on 31 October 2007 and it came to effect on 1 December 2007.103 As a
guide for examination and approval of FDI projects, the Chinese government divides
foreign investment projects (including EJVs, CJVs and WFOEs) into four categories
(‘encouraged’, ‘permitted’, ‘restricted’, and ‘prohibited’) under the Provisions on Guiding
Direction of Foreign Investment 2002.104 The Guideline Catalogue provides basic guidance
for foreign investment in China. According to Nicolas’s study:

Recent policy moves can be perceived as the next logical step with more emphasis placed
on domestic development. This is in line with the directions indicated in the 11th Five Year
101
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Plan issued in 2006. In accordance with the country’s development needs and WTO
commitments. The latest amendment is perfectly in line with China’s overall development
strategy, the objective of which is to promote quality of investment rather than sheer
quantity. As a result, technological development is now prioritised together with
environment friendly activities, while export-oriented foreign investments are, if not
discouraged, not as actively encouraged as was the case in the past. In early November
2007, China’s NDRC and the MOFCOM jointly released a substantially revised Catalogue
for the Guidance of FIEs. The revised catalogue, which was approved by the State Council
and took effect on December 1, 2007, reflects a major shift in China’s FDI policy away
105
from outright encouragement to more selectivity.

The 2007 Catalogue can only be understood in light of the policy it implements. It
embodies the decision at the highest levels of the PRC to make substantial changes in
China’s approach towards foreign investment. This approach was stated in detail by the
Recommendation of National Economic and Social Development of the 11 th Five Year Plan
of the People’s Republic of China issued in 2006. 106 As Nicholas recognized, that Plan
states that China will move from emphasising the quantity of FDI to emphasising the
quality of that investment.107

The 2007 Guideline Catalogue is another step in Beijing’s plan to reform the FDI
environment in China. It is consistent with other measures which eliminated the tax break
for foreign invested enterprises,

108

limited foreign merger and acquisition (M&A)

activity,109 and eliminated many supports for export oriented enterprises. 110 It appears that
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China is serious about making this change and foreign investors need to become familiar
with this new system. Foreign investors should understand that the system is undergoing a
dramatic change.

5.5

Legal Sources of Chinese Foreign Investment Law

The Provisions on Guiding Direction of Foreign Investment 2002 were promulgated by the
State Council. 111

The regulations provide guidelines for the direction of foreign

investment, enabling foreign investment to conform to the planning of Chinese national
economic and social development and for enhancing the protection of the legal rights and
interests of investors.112 For example, the State Council passed the Provisions Concerning
Encouragement of Foreign Investment113 in 1986. The purpose of the regulations was to
improve the investment environment, absorb foreign investment, import advanced
technology, improve the quality of manufactured goods, expand exports to earn foreign
exchange and develop the national economy. 114

Perhaps most significantly, the principal governmental organisations are responsible
for administering China’s foreign investment laws. 115 The State Planning Commission, the
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and the State Economic and Trade
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111
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Commission promulgated the Interim Provisions on Guiding Foreign Direct Investment.116
The Investment Guidelines apply to all forms of foreign investment in China and, in a
detailed catalogue, enumerate those sectors of foreign investment which are encouraged,
permitted, restricted and prohibited. The significance of this is dramatic given the
Investment Guidelines’ comprehensive sweep and the insight that they provide into the
administrative process in China.

EJVs, CJVs and WFOEs have been commonly used by foreign investors in
China.117 The EJV Law, the CJV Law and the WFOE Law are the major laws to regulate
these activities. These three laws have been progressively reviewed and updated. For
instance, the EJV Law was adopted on 1 July 1979 at the 2nd Session of the 5th National
People’s Congress. It was then amended twice, in April 1990 and March 2001. The
implementation of the EJV Law was promulgated on 20 September 1983 and then amended
on 15 January 1986, 21 December 1987 and 22 July 2001. 118

The laws regarding foreign investment in China establish a multi-stage approval
process for foreign investment projects. For example, in creating a foreign invested
enterprise with a Chinese partner, the first step is to enter into a letter of intent outlining the
joint venture, in order to establish the basis for the review and approval process.119 The
Chinese party will then be responsible for obtaining approval for the business from the
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industry bureau, which supervises the specific industry in which the project is involved. 120
The industry bureau may then consult with the State Planning Commission, particularly for
larger projects, to insure conformity with the appropriate annual and five-year plans. The
Chinese and foreign parties will then prepare a joint feasibility study, which is reviewed by
the Industry Bureau and, for larger projects or those involving certain equipment, the State
Planning Commission. 121 The parties then enter into a joint venture contract or form a
foreign invested enterprise, pursuant to documents approved by the Ministry of Foreign
Trade and Economic Cooperation. Foreign exchange arrangements, as deemed necessary,
must be made with the appropriate branch of the State Administration for Exchange
Control.

Thus, a foreign-invested project receives certification of approval only if the proper
examination (assessment) and approval authority has reviewed and approved a formal
application, feasibility study and organisational documents. Although the Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and the State Planning Commission are
permitted to delegate their examination and approval authority to relevant provincial and
municipal counterparts, the delegation must not violate thresholds for specific provinces,
120
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121
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municipalities and regions promulgated by the State Council in Beijing. 122 In general,
foreign-invested enterprises with total investment in excess of USD30 million must be
approved at the central government (State Council) level.123

Where specific aspects of a business transaction are addressed, China’s legal
structure seeks to require foreign parties to agree to contractual provisions that are clearly
favourable to the Chinese side. For example, the regulations promulgated by the State
Council in 2002 to govern technology transfers, the Ordinance of the People’s Republic of
China on Technology Import and Export,124 applies. This law requires that a licensor of
technology warrants that the licensed intellectual property is suitable for the objective of
the project and requires the licensor to be responsible for all infringement costs. 125 Among
other things, restrictions on the licensee’s power to develop and improve the technology, on
the licensee’s ability to acquire similar technology from other sources and the continued
use of the technology after the contract’s expiration, all require special approval. 126
Furthermore, the time limit for the general maintenance of confidentiality may not exceed
the duration of the contract unless the examining and approving authorities specifically
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permit otherwise. Such terms set out in the Technology Transfer Law could effectively turn
a licensing arrangement into a sale of technology.

There are several characteristics which are quite clear from the record of law
creation and the pattern of administration of China’s laws on foreign investment. First,
there is a definite policy in China that foreign investment should be strictly on Beijing’s
terms.127 Duffy’s research shows that:

… certain industries, such as broadcasting, telecommunications and entertainment are
essentially closed to foreign ownership or control. Initially, there was a strong emphasis at
the national level on technology transfer and the development of export-oriented industries,
which could generate hard currency. There was and still is significant concern that state
assets should not pass into foreign hands at inadequate valuations. A strong bias continues
towards central government control, reflected in the relatively low threshold for central
government approval. The concern is to protect domestic business operations from foreign
competition in sectors where the need for foreign technology was not perceived by central
128
planners.

The central legislative mechanism has operated to enact relatively schematic laws and
regulations that direct the parties to the rigorous administrative review process. Where
specific matters of significant international business negotiations have been addressed, a
rather one-sided approach has often been taken. For example, Japan Suzuki Motor
Corporation took advantage of the opportunity presented by lack of regulation on foreign
enterprise mergers and acquisitions in China and acquired a 20 per cent share of a listed
state-owned enterprise, Northern Tour Motor Company, and successfully operated within
the Chinese company. This transaction involved legal issues related to state-owned
enterprise operation and information disclosure. In order to prevent this kind of merger and
acquisition, the State Council and State Security Supervision Commission issued the

127
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Notification Concerning Suspension of Transferring State-Owned Share and Legal Person
Share to Foreign Enterprise in 1995.129

The general thrust of the legislation was not permissive, and one could not conclude
that what was not prohibited was therefore permitted. Rather, the administrative process
was put in place to allow China to gain experience in managing foreign investment. Since
the early 1990s, China has progressed extensively in legislating the foundational rules for
its reformed economy.130 Although there was consensus that experimentation with marketdriven techniques was worthwhile, the extent of permitted movement toward market
socialism was by no means clear. In fact, the experience under China’s investment laws has
been more successful than many would have expected. In large measure, this can be said to
have resulted from administrators of the laws at the State Planning Commission and the
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation approaching their task in a
remarkably pragmatic manner.

For instance, Chinese law generally does not permit the importation and sale of a
product which is the intended output of a new joint Sino-foreign investment project. Yet,
pre-production sales are often critical for adjusting the intended product to local
requirements or preferences. After considerable internal debate, pre-production sale of
129
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imported products has been permitted up to 30 per cent of planned output, decided on an ad
hoc basis after considerable negotiation and debate.131

New questions concerning the legal environment have arisen which can have
profound macro-economic and political implications. Business structures and financing
techniques can be proffered by the overseas party about which the administrators have little
or no experience. Effectively, the administration of China’s laws on foreign investment is
an ongoing dialogue between China and the outside world that is designed to allow foreign
investment to flow into China, while the national debate over how best to use and regulate
this foreign investment continues. Much of China’s work in the establishment of laws and
legal institutions related to the economy has doubtless been intended to promote economic
growth.132

Investment laws are developing in the context of the debate as to the pace of
economic reform and the role foreign investment will play. To protect state enterprises
inexperience in dealing with foreigners, the law initially focused on tilting the playing field
against the foreigners by requiring that certain key contracts contain provisions (which in
other countries are often the subject of intense negotiation) more favourable to the Chinese
party. At the same time, the political climate in China was such that foreign investment was
only officially welcome if it brought significant advantages to China, such as advanced
technology or export earnings. But the reality of transactions was often very different from
the political ideal. Internal directives allow the regulators to strike a negotiated balance
between the political objectives and the practical realities. A practical problem for legal
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system reformers is that while it is plausible that legal institutions matter, it is not clear
what their exact form should be.133

Many governmental directives are permissive, allowing regulators to approve
provisions in legal documentation which are otherwise proscribed. By making the
directives internal, at least three objectives are achieved. Duffy states:

First, there is a kind of plausible denial should other parties seek similar relief, since the
basis for the exception in a given situation can often be distinguished from the case in hand.
Second, the lack of publicity has the effect of avoiding a more generalised knowledge of the
flexibility in the system, since once a relaxation of standards is published, it becomes the
new paradigm. Third, internal directives can avoid some of the political ramifications of
taking a pro-investment stand, which has not yet achieved broad political consensus.134

On the other side of the coin, these internal directives can provide a quick means of
disseminating an anti-investment stand without facing external pressure from trade
negotiators for foreign governments seeking to promote open access to the Chinese
economy. Clarke asserts:

Thus, while we can of course assess China’s current economic legislation and institutionsbuilding in terms of their current regulatory content, we should also contemplate whether
China is creating an environment that will allow new institutions to arise and existing
institutions to adapt or disappear.135

The important point to recognise is that these internal directives are not a sign of an
absence of law, but an important artifice permitting the regulatory process to remain
flexible and pragmatic in a rapidly evolving and highly political environment. They are also
not an excuse for graft and corruption, since they have objective meaning and can be
readily and intelligently discussed with regulators. Lubman suggested:
133
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At the time FDI first appeared on the legislative landscape, policy toward law was just
beginning to emerge from its Maoist coma. The National People’s Congress had barely
begun to meet regularly again, law was no more than a post hoc expression of policies, and
its implementation was just as flexible. A standard feature of Chinese governance has long
been the use of secret directives or regulations, addressed principally to officials charged
136
with implementation.

Finally, over time, when the principles involved have been validated by experience
and achieve political consensus, they could be promulgated in public form. Indeed, many of
the recently published Investment Guidelines make manifest a number of permissions and
restrictions which had previously only existed as internal instruments or directives.

Prior to the publication of the Investment Guidelines, these positions were not well
understood and were the subject of internal directives. However, an idea that the
administrative process has become completely transparent is somewhat optimistic. As
Brooks and Hill suggest:

When foreign investors face regulatory obstacles, they may be able to resolve their
problems by complaining directly to the county head or mayor. Domestic investors,
especially small private ones, are generally not so fortunate. Not only are there preferential
policies for FDI, but policy transparency and simplified administrative procedures are not
equally available to domestic investors.137

It can be expected that there will be considerable negotiation and administrative
interpretation that may give rise to internal directives that, in turn, may reach a sufficiently
broad consensus to be officially promulgated. Policy transparency problems are of concern
not only to foreign investors but perhaps more so to domestic entities.

Another major contributor to the notion that China does not have meaningful laws
regarding foreign investment arises from the country’s regionalism. Fast-developing coastal
136
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and other prosperous areas have sought ways to move their local economies forward
despite the central government’s wishes to control inflation and spread development to
other poorer regions. This provides clear evidence that the uneven allocation of FDI is a
result of not only regional preferential policies, but of the business environment, including
infrastructure, supply of public utilities, geographic location and, possibly more
importantly, the institutional climate.138 Many problems China faces today are associated
with entrenched localism.139 Qin points out:

Local governments have been given power to adopt measures necessary to boost local GDP
growth and are allowed to benefit directly from such growth. As a result, they have been
heavily involved in the investment in and operations of local enterprises. To promote their
economic interests, local governments often provide subsidies to local firms or otherwise
protect them against outside competition.140

The extent to which these regional tensions colour the foreign investor’s views of
Chinese law cannot be underestimated. As we have seen, Chinese law sets limits on the size
of projects that can be approved at the municipal or provincial level. In most cases, the
upper limit for provincial approval has been a total investment of USD30 million. 141 Prior
to 1992, the vast majority of foreign invested projects in China did not exceed this
threshold.
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China’s latest Company Law has removed requirements on minimum registered capital for
a range of company types and allows companies to pay up their capital in two years in
accordance with regulations. 142 Investment companies can pay their capital requirement
over five years.143 Under the Company Law, companies are mainly incorporated in the form
of limited liability companies or joint-stock limited companies. For limited liability
companies, the minimum registered capital was lowered to USD5000. 144 For joint-stock
limited companies, the minimum registered capital requirement is USD800,000. 145 In
addition, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC)146 set the minimum
amount of registered capital in relation to the extent of the total investment for EJVs. 147

When the underlying economic transaction presents significant political and
economic concerns, the Chinese government and particularly those ministries which
administer foreign investment, such as the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation, are aware of the problems and deal honestly and patiently with them. 148
Where greater transparency is possible, they are willing to provide it. 149 China has taken
concrete steps to implement its transparency commitments. These include efforts to open
up the rule-making process to more public participation and to standardise the procedures
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for granting administrative permissions.150 But the complexity of both the task at hand and
the political environment in which the regulators work cannot be underestimated. The best
course for an investor is to fully engage in the process, press every case to the fullest and
make maximum use of its business experience and management skills. The outcome will
benefit both overseas investors and the Chinese economy.

Sources of Chinese foreign investment law are complex. There is no uniform
foreign investment law that governs all types of foreign direct investment. On the contrary,
each form of FDI (EJV, CJV and FWOE) is regulated by a specific series of laws and
regulations. Similar to many areas of law in China, while there are laws, regulations and
rules at the national level in relation to foreign investments, there also are local regulations
and rules.151 Furthermore, in the general Chinese legal system, FDI is subject to a different
legal approach to that which governs domestic business. The main sources of Chinese
foreign investment laws are categorised below.

5.5.1

Constitution

The most important legal document in the People’s Republic of China is the Constitution. It
has the highest level of binding legal power that is, binding upon everyone conducting any
activity in China. The country’s legal and political system and tasks are outlined in the
Constitution.152 No laws, administrative regulations or local decrees may contravene the
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Constitution. 153 The Constitution 1982 has been amended three times by the National
People’s Congress of China (NPC) in 1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004. 154

Foreign investment first found its constitutional recognition and protection in 1982
when the NPC adopted the new Constitution. The Constitution 1982 includes:

The People’s Republic of China permits foreign enterprises, other foreign economic
organisations and individual foreigners to invest in China and to enter into various forms of
economic cooperation with Chinese enterprises and other economic organisations in
accordance with the law of the People’s Republic of China .
All foreign enterprises and other foreign economic organisations in China, as well as joint
ventures with Chinese and foreign investment located in China, shall abide by the law of
the People’s Republic of China. Their lawful rights and interests are protected by the law of
the People’s Republic of China.155

This was the first time that Communist China’s Constitution allowed foreign
investment and provided the legal basis for foreign investment protection. Ironically, China
had adopted several foreign investment legislative documents 156 before the enactment of
the Constitution 1982. However, in a country lacking a tradition of rule of law, no one
challenged the constitutionality of the unauthorised legislation on foreign investment before
the ratification of the new constitutional provision. In 1993, the NPC amended Article 15 of
the Constitution 1982, thereby abandoning a planned-economy and adopting a “socialist
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market economy” 157 as the fundamental economic system for China. The constitutional
amendment provided a more favourable legal and economic environment for FDI
indicating China’s movement toward a market economy. A provision was added to state
that the PRC “governs the country according to law and makes it a socialist country under
rule of law”.158

5.5.2

Specific National FDI Laws

Under the Constitution, the NPC of China and its Standing Committee are eligible to enact
national laws regarding FDI. The EJV, CJV and WFOE pieces of legislation constitute the
general legal framework for FDI in China and provide for three main modes of FDI in
China. They have been commonly used by foreign investors in China. 159 Other forms
include foreign investment share enterprise and co-operative development.160

5.5.3

Implementation Regulations and Rules for FDI

The three primary FDI laws only provide general structures for the modes of FDI.
According to the Constitution 1982, the State Council and its ministries have used their
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delegated legislative power to adopt numerous rules to implement laws and make
regulations.161

The EJV Law and its regulations, the Regulations for the Implementation of the Law
of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 2001 (EJV
Regulations) were adopted by the State Council.162 Compared with the 15 articles of the
EJV Law, the 118 articles of the EJV Regulation Implementation represent a
comprehensive guide for establishing, operating and terminating an EJV in China. 163 The
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on
Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures 1995

(CJV Implementation) were

promulgated in 1995 to implement the CJV Law (CJV Implementation Rules). 164 To
supplement the CJV Implementation Rules, the MOFTEC issued an Interpretation on
Implementing Certain Articles of the Rules for the Implementation of the Law of the
People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures 1996 (CJV
Interpretation) on 22 October 1996.165 Also, like the EJV Law and the CJV Law, there is a
set of implementation regulations/rules for the WFOE Law. The Detailed Rules for the
Implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Wholly Foreign
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Owned Enterprise 1990 (WFOE Implementation) was promulgated by MOFTEC on 12
December 1990 and amended on 12 April 2001. 166

Other national implementation rules and regulations for FDI have occasionally been
adopted by the ministries of the State Council in accordance with the development of new
situations.167 The rules and regulations at the State Council level (including ministries and
departments of the State Council) are numerous and very important in regulating the
management of FDI. According to the Constitution 1982, the State Council and its
ministries are authorised to issue regulations that are applicable nationwide. For example,
the Provisional Regulations Governing the Establishment of Investment-type Companies by
Foreign Investors 1995 was promulgated on 4 April 1995 by the ministry of Foreign Trade
and Economic Cooperation. 168 In 1990, the ministry of Foreign Economic Relation and
Trade Promulgated the Contract Management Regulations for Sino-Foreign Equity Joint
Ventures 1990, which provides requirements and approval procedures for the management
of a joint venture other than that provided in the EJV Law or its implementation
regulations.

The establishment of an EJV, CJV or WFOE is subject to examination and approval
by the relevant governmental authority or authorities. 169 The Provisions on Guiding
Direction of Foreign Investment 2002 was promulgated in 2002.170 The guidelines provide
the direction of foreign investment and enable foreign investment to conform to the
166
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planning of Chinese national economic and social development and enhance the protection
of legal rights and interests of investors.171 A Guideline Catalogue of Foreign Investment
Industries 2007172 was approved and updated by the Government to be used as the basis for
the examination and approval of foreign investment projects in China. 173 The Guideline
Catalogue of Foreign Investment Industries 2007 requires that foreign investment projects
must either be ‘joint ventures’ or have a ‘Chinese controlling shareholding’ or ‘Chinese
majority shareholding’. Joint-venture projects mean that they must be Sino-foreign equity
or contractual joint ventures. Projects with Chinese controlling shareholding are those
where the Chinese parties have a stake of over 51%, while projects with Chinese majority
shareholding are those where the Chinese parties have a larger stake than any foreign
partners.174

5.5.4

Local Regulations

According to the Constitution 1982, the People’s Congress of provinces, autonomous
regions and municipalities may adopt local regulations pertaining to FDI that do not
contravene the Constitution 1982, statutes, administrative rules and regulations. 175 Some
municipal governments may, with authorisation from the Standing Committee of the NPC,
promulgate local regulations and rules regarding FDI, subject to approval from the standing
171
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committees of People’s Congress at the provincial level. For example, for the provinces and
cities having SEZs, their People’s Congresses and the standing committees thereof are able
to, in accordance with an empowering decision of the NPC, enact regulations to be
implemented inside the SEZs.176 Furthermore, the provincial level People’s Congresses and
their standing committees in the SEZs are authorised to promulgate regulations for the
SEZs and ETDZs. Accordingly, Shanghai, Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang and other
provincial level congresses have adopted regulations for the SEZs and ETDZs located in
their provinces. Apart from local regulations there are also local rules. Local rules are
enacted by the people’s governments of the provinces, autonomous regions and
municipalities directly under the Central Government and the large cities in accordance
with their own laws, administrative regulations and local regulations. 177

5.5.5

FDI Provisions in other Laws and Regulations

FDI enterprises are treated as special legal entities in the Chinese legal system. As a result,
Chinese laws and regulations have special provisions governing FDI enterprises in order to
distinguish them from domestic enterprises. For example, there are special provisions for
foreign investment enterprises in the Regulations of Foreign Exchange Control of the
People’s Republic of China, which provides that FDI enterprises should handle their
foreign exchange through special channels and procedures. 178 The dual legal system,
although not necessarily unfavourable to foreign investors, causes non-national treatment of
FDI enterprises.
176
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5.5.6

International Treaties

China has entered into various bilateral treaties with other countries, including bilateral
agreements concerning the mutual promotion and protection of investment and bilateral
agreements on investment insurance. China has signed bilateral agreements on investment
insurance with the United States, which allow US investors to obtain insurance against
political risks in China from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

In addition, China is currently a signatory to several multinational FDI-related
treaties.179 In 1998, China joined the Multi-lateral Investment Guarantee Agency under the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which provides insurance to
investors from member countries against political risks to foreign investors in China. 180 In
1990, China signed the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States, which established the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID).181 ICSID provides facilities for conciliation and arbitration of
investment disputes between contracting States and nationals of other contracting States.
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According to Chinese law, treaties that China has entered into or has ratified automatically
become effective in the domestic legal system and are implemented as national laws. 182

5.5.7

Internal Regulations

In China, administrative branches at all levels have adopted numerous internal regulations
to implement the laws and regulations.183 Article 89 (1) of the Constitution 1982 and article
56 of the Legislation Law have given legislative power to the State Council. According to
Chen, the State Council is, de facto, the most powerful law-making institution in China.184
The Council’s deliberations are widely used as guidance for the administration of foreign
investment, especially in approval procedures. For example, the Provisional Measures on
the Trial Establishment of Sino-Foreign Joint Venture Foreign Trade Companies were
promulgated by the MOFTEC on 30 September 1996.185 These measures were designed to
further open up China to the outside world and to promote the development of China’s
foreign trade. 186 Tightened restrictions have been imposed on both Chinese and foreign
parties applying for establishment of foreign trade joint ventures. 187 Most of these
regulations are not published and some are even confidential documents that are only
available to government agencies. The practice has a long history in communist China.
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During the thirty-years of a planned economy, the government, dominated by the
Communist party, carried out economic plans mostly by internal regulations. Since the state
controlled and managed all enterprises, production and supply, it was not necessary to
publish these internal regulations. There are now new regulations on the formation of
administrative regulations that require that they be published for public comment at least 30
days before their promulgation and permit those drafting such procedures to seek public
comment whenever they feel it to be appropriate.188

In order to make progress with its foreign investment program and to avoid waiting
upon the slow process of drafting a complete legislative framework, the Chinese authorities
adopted three strategies: (1) adopting new laws and regulations in a piece-meal fashion,
correcting prior mistakes as they became evident; (2) trying out new proposed laws and
regulations through internal guidelines that were made available to Chinese officials
responsible for conducting foreign investment negotiations or on occasion adopting such
new laws only in SEZs as an experiment; and (3) adopting model forms or precedents of
foreign investment contracts that can be used with minor variations for many different
investments. Although only the published laws and regulations are legally binding, the
bureaucratic structure of the Chinese government and the foreign investment approval
processes are such that the unpublished guidelines and model forms are treated by Chinese
negotiators with much the same respect as laws.

Thus, the practical framework for the regulation of foreign investment in China is
much more than just China’s published laws and regulations. It also includes future laws

188

<< 行 政 法 规 制 定 程 序 条 例 >> [Precedural Ordinance Concerning the Making of Administrative
Regulations] (People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No 321, 16 November 2001, arts 12, 16.

228

Ch 5: Foreign Investment and Development of Foreign Investment Laws in China

that are expected to be published (but appear only as ‘internal’ guidelines available to
Chinese negotiators); it includes legislation from the SEZs, which is applied by ‘analogy’;
and it includes model contract forms that have been drafted or approved in prior
transactions by the controlling ministry or government agency. 189 For example, the
administration of Beijing Economic-Technological Development Area publishes its
investment guideline regarding any application for foreign investment project under
USD100 million. According to this guideline, the format and content of the agreement of
the parties and constitution of the proposed joint venture, are expected to use the model
sample. 190 A textual analysis limited to only China’s published laws and regulations
therefore would lead one to believe that there is both more uncertainty and greater
flexibility within the system than in fact exists once one reaches the negotiating table. 191

However, the development of Chinese economic law encounters several problems.
The main problems are the creation of a legal duality, the harmonisation of economic laws
and legal definitions.192

After adopting a market-oriented economic system, China has made great efforts to
reduce the use of confidential internal documents and to replace them with published
regulations. However, the whole system has for a long period been influenced by the
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ideology of the planned economic system along with many unpublished internal
regulations. This has attracted criticism from other countries. This transparency issue
occupied a prominent position in China’s WTO accession negotiations. 193 For foreign
investors, the existence and use of unpublished internal regulations may add additional,
considerable risk to their investment.

5.6

Advantages and Disadvantages of Major Types of Foreign Direct
Investment

EJVs, CJVs and WFOEs have been the most commonly chosen forms of foreign direct
investment in the early years of the economic reform period in the PRC. Since the late
1980s, equity joint ventures and wholly foreign owned enterprises became predominant and
recent years have seen a proliferation of wholly foreign owned enterprises.194 The rise in
popularity of wholly foreign owned enterprises is largely due to relaxed foreign investment
restrictions after China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2001 which
dismantled some barriers to foreign investment in the retail, trading, wholesale and other
sectors.195
The WFOE structure gives the foreign investors full business control and profit
rights.196 One of the main attractions of this investment structure is that it takes less time to
establish than a joint venture because the foreign company does not need to select a suitable
193
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local partner or negotiate joint venture contract arrangements. In addition, the WFOE
structure gives foreign companies greater control over their operations as no local partner is
involved in management and human resources decisions. However, not all sectors are open
to WFOEs. Foreign investors in industries subject to foreign investment constraints such as
telecom and publishing may consider investing through WFOEs established as consulting
companies.197 These types of companies contractually control most business aspects of the
licensed business which is formally owned by Chinese investors or, where allowed, a joint
venture.198
EJVs or CJVs remain as the preferred investment structures for many companies.
Joint ventures are preferred when investors want to enter industries in which the Chinese
government restricts foreign investment. Both forms of joint venture engage both local and
foreign investors and both parties share any risks and losses of the venture projects. A CJV
is more flexible than an EJV as parties have more freedom when negotiating terms for the
former than the latter.199 A joint venture may also be preferred when the foreign company
needs a partner to share the capital investment burden as well as possessing familiarity with
Chinese local conditions and culture. Although many joint ventures have proved to be
effective vehicles for entering China, the structure has certain statutory features that
diminish its attractiveness to foreign investors. A joint venture requires unanimous approval
from its board of directors on major decisions including capital changes, mergers and
demergers, amendments to the articles of association as well as other matters contractually
agreed by the partners.
197

<<外商投资产业指导目录>> [Guideline Catalogue of Foreign Investment Industries] (People’s Republic
of China) Ministry of Commerce National Development and Reform Commission, Order No 57, 1 December
2007, sections 4, 15.
198
Ibid.
199
Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial Law above n 112, 127.
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5.7

Alternative Vehicles for Foreign Direct Investment in China

Alternative investment options include a foreign invested company limited by shares and a
joint stock company,200 with its capital divided into shares of equal value, and voting rights.
The creation of this kind of company is by promotion and free share float. When
established by share float, the promoters must subscribe to at least 35 per cent of the
shares201 and at least one of the promoters must have been profitable in the three years prior
to the float. 202 This structure has the advantage of allowing Chinese partners to invest
through companies or as individuals. This structure also facilitates capital formation by
allowing the issuing of additional shares to existing or new shareholders.
The foreign invested partnership is a new vehicle that was established pursuant to
the Partnership Enterprise Law of the Peoples Republic of China 2006203. This structure is
particularly attractive to the private equity and venture capital industries for establishing
renminbi funds.

Foreign investors with multiple projects and large capital investment needs should
also consider establishing a foreign invested holding company. 204 While a holding company
may be registered as either WFOE or JV, there are special requirements in terms of capital

200

<<关于设立外商投资股份有限公司若干问题的暂行规定>> [Interim Provisions Concerning a Number
of Issues of Establishing Foreign-Invested Company Limited by Shares] (People’s Republic of China)
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Order No 1, 1 October 1995, arts 1–2; <<关于上市公
司涉及外商投资有关问题的若干意见>> [Opinions Concerning Some Issues of Listed Company Related to
Foreign Investment] (People’s Republic of China) Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and
China Security Supervision Committee, 8 November 2001, arts 2–3.
201
<<中华人民共和国公司法>> [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 42, 1 January 2006, art 83.
202
Ibid, art 6.
203
<<中华人民共和国合伙企业法>> [Partnership Enterprise Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 55, 27 August
2006.
204
<<关于投资举办投资性公司的规定>> [Provisions Concerning Establishing Foreign-Invested Investment
Company] (People’s Republic of China) Ministry of Commerce, 23 November 2004, art 3.
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contribution. A holding company’s foreign shareholder must either have a total
capitalisation of at least USD 400 million worldwide and have contributed at least USD 10
million in its PRC invested enterprises or must have invested a minimum USD 30 million
in China.205 This structure can also raise the investor’s profile because it allows the words
“holding company” and “China” to be included in the company’s name.

5.8

Conclusions

China’s ‘Open Door’ economic policy, commenced in 1978, has led to a phenomenal
growth in foreign investment in the ensuing period. That growth has been matched by
enormous growth in all other terms of trade. The statistical information provided in this
chapter demonstrates the very substantial achievement of China over the past thirty years in
its place in the world’s economic structure. It is rapidly moving toward the role of the
world’s largest economy and for this reason has acquired global responsibilities that were
probably unforeseen thirty years ago. One significant part of those responsibilities is the
ways in which China deals with FDI within its own borders and the way it has developed
and upgraded its legal regime to deal with such investment may be a useful indicator of the
way it will cope with its leading role in the global economy.

The radical policy changes that commenced in 1978-79 were accompanied by a
very significant modernisation of the laws of China including the establishment and
development of a range of foreign investment laws. These laws have been continually
reviewed and upgraded over time and there were some identifiable and distinct
developmental stages that have been discussed in this chapter. An initial experimental
205

Ibid.
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period included legislation specific to joint business ventures between foreigners and
Chinese partners as well as the creation of special economic regions and government
incentives. These economic zones were very widely expanded in the mid 1980s. In the late
1980s and early 1990s the PRC had become very experienced in dealing with foreign
investment and had reached the point of creating laws to address concerns of international
partners in such areas as intellectual property protection and foreign investor income
taxation.

A large and growing body of laws, regulations and policies related to foreign
investment has been discussed in this chapter with very detailed information related to the
sources of such laws. It is useful to note the differences in law-making processes between
China and western ‘democracies’. In general terms it can reasonably be said that China’s
law-making processes retain a significant degree of flexibility and adaptability to changing
circumstances.

The huge growth in foreign investment in China over a relatively short period has required
a rapid growth in the development and implementation of a series of applicable laws. The
purpose of these laws has been to create the capacity to deal with all of the financial and
other ramifications of a very substantial growth in the types of operations and the very large
monetary amounts involved. The control of the activities of foreign investors by way of
appropriate taxation regimes and procedural requirements has simply been a part of the
process.

As a result of the nature of the political structure in China, the pre-existing methods
of ‘management’ of the economy by government have, on the one hand, presented
234
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challenges in designing sets of laws with sufficient levels of transparency and certainty
with which ‘western’ investors could feel comfortable and on the other, were laws that the
Chinese – with their traditional ways of doing business - were able to accommodate.

More substantive practical aspects for foreign investors concerning the
implementation of law and its administration are discussed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 6
Practical Legal Factors in the Administration of FDI Law
6.1

Introduction

Since China began economic reform in the late 1970s, FDI has played a significant role in
China’s economic development and initiated other aspects of development, including
further development of the legal system. In order to comply with the requirements of the
World Trade Organisation (WTO) (of which China became a member in 2001), the Chinese
government has made very significant efforts to adjust its legal system to accord with
western standards. In attempting to satisfy the perceived requirements of both common law
and civil law countries, it has radically changed its previously piecemeal and inconsistent
economic laws.1

Apart from problems arising in the course of this dramatic economic transition
(such as market size, labour costs, quality of infrastructure and government policies), 2 one
important aspect that has been of concern to foreign investors is whether their rights are
legally protected. 3 The reality is that whilst China has made rapid progress towards

1

Patricia Pattison and Daniel Herron, ‘The Mountains are High and the Emperor is Far Away: Sanctity of
Contract in China’ (2003) 40 American Business Law Journal 459, 459.
2
Wanda Tseng and Harm Zebregs, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in China: Some Lessons for Other Countries’,
(Policy Discussion Papers, No 02/3, International Monetary Fund, 4 March 2002).
3
China Briefing, ‘US China Business Council Survey Reveals Top Ten Concerns for Foreign Investment into
China’ (19 November 2010) China Briefing <http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2010/11/19/uscbc-surveyreveals-top-10-concerns-for-foreign-investment-into-china.html>.
The US China Business Council released its ‘2010 Member Priorities Survey Results for US investors’ on 17
November 2010 after interviewing a cross section of leading American companies. The survey listed the top
10 investor concerns surrounding the Chinese market. Human resource issues, licensing and business
approval, as well as competition with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are considered the top three issues that
hinder American investment in China from further growth. Other concerns that are ranked from fourth to
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developing a more open and transparent legal system, in many sectors the regulatory
framework has failed to keep pace with the transition from a command system towards a
situation more akin to a free market economy. 4 Some of the major difficulties in this regard
are problems arising from: conflicting national law and local regulations, the manner of
exercise of administrative discretionary power, and the government’s desire to encourage
foreign investment whilst maintaining a significant level of control over the changing
economic environment.5 In this analysis of practical factors for foreign investors in China,
section 6.2 provides an outline of the commercial law regime in China, including the extent
of the influence of communist jurisprudence and legal protection for foreign investors.
Section 6.3 examines some practical legal concerns for foreign investors, including the
existence of conflict between national laws and local regulations. In section 6.4 the
seemingly ever-present and often difficult problem of discretionary power in administration
of laws is discussed with particular reference to the commercial law regime, ambiguity in
the drafting of laws, the issue of apparent lack of transparency in decision-making and the
confusion that follows when more than one regulator is involved in making decisions in
respect of a foreign investment project or proposal. Section 6.5 concludes this chapter.

6.2

The Chinese Commercial Law Regime

Commercial law in a developing country such as China operates very differently to its
counterparts in developed countries. The law and the legal system will be under-developed

tenth are related to China’s intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement, cost increases, market access in
services, transparency, protectionism risks, government procurement, and standards of conformity
assessment.
4
Ian McCubbin, ‘The Legal System and Business Environment’ (Paper presented at Australia-China Free
Trade Agreement Conference, Sydney, 12–13 August 2004) 6.
5
These issues will be discussed in Chapters 7 and 9.
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and the legal system itself may be based on civil law rather than common law (as is the case
in China).6 In December 1978, the Communist Party of China (CPC) announced 7 a shift of
the CPC’s focus from political movement, as witnessed in the Cultural Revolution, to
economic development. To fulfil the goal of ‘Four Modernisations’, the CPC adopted the
‘Open Door’ policy, to attract foreign investment, so as to gain the capital, skills,
knowledge and technology necessary for economic development (as referred to in Chapter
5).

To push for economic development and attract foreign investment, the Chinese
government needed to transform its economy from a state planned economy to a socialist
market economy. Within such a socialist market economy, private individuals (including
foreign investors) are encouraged to be involved in the national economy, while under the
general guidance and control of the central government. To facilitate the development of a
market economy, there must be a legal system that both protects the interests of economic
participants and facilitates economic activities. A formal and rationalised legal system
would make many aspects of economic activities more predictable, and hence encourage
entrepreneurship and wealth creation.

China has achieved impressive progress over the past 30 years in building up a legal
framework for foreigners to conduct business in China and the quantity of legislation and
regulation is increasing. A full array of laws and regulations, related to foreign investment

6

Patricia Blazey, ‘Overview of China’s Economic Growth, Society and Politics’ in Patricia Blazey and KayWah Chan (eds), The Chinese Commercial Legal System (Lawbook, 2008) 1, 1.
7
<<中国共产党第十一届中央委员会第三次全体会议公报>> [Communique of the Third Plenary Meeting
of the Eleventh Central Committee of Communist Party of China] (22 December 1978) 中国共产党历次全国
代表大会数据库 [Statistics of All Previous National Congress Meeting of Communist Party of China]
<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64563/65371/4441902.html>.
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is now in place. While there are no exact statistics on the amount of legislation that has
been passed by the central and regional governments in relation to foreign investment, there
now appear to be several thousand legislative and regulatory instruments on foreign related
trade and investment in China.8 China has accomplished far more by way of rule-making
than it has by way of institution-building.9 The commercial regulatory reform in China has
been accompanied by distinctive features of the Chinese regulatory state in both its origin
and actual functioning.10

With such a detailed body of law, how is it that foreign investors or their lawyers
become confused about the Chinese legal system? To accommodate the development of the
socialist market economy in a relatively short period, the legal system had to be quickly
established. Many problems in China’s institutional environment related to commercial law
and foreign firms are rooted in deficiencies in China’s legal and enforcement regime in a
number of areas. 11 Often, rules have been implemented with little assessment of their
suitability and effectiveness. This has caused the commercial law regime to be continuously
revised. For example, although China has made every effort to attract foreign investment,
foreign related business is subject to a strict multilevel and multi-dimensional examination
and approval system. This system not only controls business establishment, but also the
offering of investment incentives.12 As a result, the commercial law regime is still in a state

8

Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial Law (Oxford University Press, 2000) 83.
Donald C Clarke, ‘Legislating for a Market Economy in China’ in Donald C Clarke (ed), China’s Legal
System: New Developments, New Challenges (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 13, 13.
10
Leng Jing, ‘Commercial Regulatory Reform in China during Transition: An Alternative Path to the
Regulatory State’ in John Gillespie and Albert H Y Chen (eds), Legal Reforms in China and Vietnam: A
Comparison of Asian Communist Regimes (Routledge, 2010) 226, 226.
11
David Ahlstrom et al, ‘Managing the Institutional Environment: Challenges for Foreign Firms in Post WTO
China’ (2003) 68 SAM Advanced Management Journal 41, 42.
12
Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development
(Kluwer Law International, 1999) 250.
9
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of flux and has been found to be confusing to foreigners. This will be explored in detail in
Chapter 8.

6.2.1 Influence of Communist Jurisprudence
On the surface, the commercial law regime of the PRC — like its counterparts in the
Western world — provides rules that govern and regulate economic relations. However, it
must be remembered that the Chinese commercial law regime, or Chinese law in general,
had its origin in the traditional communist theory of law. Jurisprudence in socialist
countries seems to have a common view with regard to law. The law is said to be part of the
superstructure of the society and nothing more than an instrument of the ruling class. 13 So
the rule of law — where law acts as a restraint on state power — cannot exist under a
communist legal system. The notion of the rule of law, as understood by westerners, is
regarded by the Chinese Communist regime14 as merely a tool of the bourgeoisie.

Laws and regulations within communist jurisprudence, therefore, are intended to be
instruments of policy enforcement. 15 There is an alleged tendency among senior CPC
officials to look at law merely as a pragmatic means of achieving certain goals such as
implementing Party policy or instigating economic reform rather than looking at the very

13

Patricia Blazey, ‘Overview of China’s Economic’ above n 6, 48. The law, in Mao’s Eyes, did not resemble
anything akin to the Western conception of the rule of law. Mao adopted the Marxist approach to law as a tool
to remould society, to suppress class enemies and enforce party policy rather than to protect individual rights.
14
Benedict Sheehy, ‘Fundamentally Conflicting Views of the Rule of Law in China and the West and
Implications for Commercial Disputes’ (2006) 26 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business
225, 225.
15
Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law above n 12, 35. ‘Instruction of the Central Committee of the CPC to Abolish the
Kuomintang Six Codes and Define the Judicial Principles for the Liberated Areas’ February 1949, ‘Law is the
will of the state compulsorily and openly enforced through military forces by the ruling class. Law, like the
state, is a tool for protection of the interests of certain ruling classes’.
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nature or quality of law itself. 16 If that is the case, then laws and regulations are not
intended as expressions of immutable general norms that apply consistently across all forms
of economic activities, but as tools to achieve immediate policy objectives of the Party. In
other words, laws are not a restraint on state power but an instrument of it. As a
consequence, the development of the legal system is not a desirable end in itself. Rather it
is a means to develop the socialist market economy, to promote prosperity and ultimately to
support the socialist system.

6.2.2 Protection for Foreign Investors under Chinese Law
In the past 30 years, China has made substantial progress in economic development,
particularly in the foreign investment environment. China is known as one of the best
places for foreign investment in the world. 17 At the beginning of China’s reform and its
opening up to international investment, government policies provided a good environment
for the foreign investment companies, such as preferential policies in enterprise income
taxes. 18 With the ongoing development of the economy the Chinese government paid

16

Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial Law above n 8, 38–9.
‘Investing in a Rebound: The 2010 A T Kearney Foreign Investment Confidence Index’ (2010) (Report No
ATK.0410.126, Global Business Policy Council), 1–2
<http://www.atkearney.com/images/global/pdf/Investing_in_a_Rebound-FDICI_2010.pdf>.
The Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index is a regular survey of global executives conducted by AT
Keraney. The Index provides a unique look at the present and future prospects for international investment
flows. Companies participating in the survey account for more than $2 trillion in annual global revenue.
China remains the top-ranked destination for foreign investors, a title it has held since 2002; United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International
Production and Development (World Investment Report 2011, No UNCTAD/WIR/2011, 26 July 2011,
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), 4 <http://www.unctad-doc.org/files/UNCTADWIR2011-Full-en.pdf>. China hadUSD106 billion Foreign Direct Investment inflows in 2010 and was ranked
second within the top twenty countries.
18
<<中华人民共和国外商投资企业和外国企业所得税法>> [Foreign Investment Enterprise and Foreign
Enterprise Income Tax Law] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, Order No 45, 1 July
1991, art 7. This legislation provided income tax incentives for foreign investment enterprises. For foreign
investment enterprises located in special economic zones the income tax rate was 15 per cent of the company
profit being half of the normal income tax rate in other non-special economic zones areas.
17
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increasingly more attention to the construction of the system of laws, including the foreign
investment laws that are part of that system. Foreign business persons in the PRC, like
prudent investors anywhere, would naturally be concerned to know about the operation of
the Chinese commercial law regime and how it is applied in practice. A well-developed
legal system creates an environment of certainty, where commercial interests of foreign
investors should be well protected.

An examination of the commercial law regime of the PRC and local practice by the
regulators would have the capacity to confuse foreigners. However, it would be inaccurate
to conclude that the Chinese commercial law regime is incapable of offering protection to
the commercial interests of foreign investors. It must be understood that the Chinese legal
system has developed under a unique historical and jurisprudential background, and is in an
early stage of development. The protection offered by the current regime, whilst not yet
perfected, has come a long way from the situation that existed 20 to 25 years ago. The
lawful rights and interests of foreign investors are protected by the Constitution and laws of
the PRC. However, because of the speed of development, some aspects of law making may
be still less than satisfactory. The effect of communist jurisprudence on the Chinese legal
system should also be emphasised. To traditional Chinese communists, law held no special
sanctity and was often just a mere tool of party policy and propaganda. 19

From the time when the CPC announced policies of economic reform and ‘Open
Door’, law has been seen as an instrument to regulate the socialist market economy.
Although China is, to an extent, trying to distance itself from that view, the shadow of

19

Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial Law above n 8, 37.
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Marxist-Leninist jurisprudence is still exerting20 a significant degree of influence.21 Bearing
in mind China’s unique historical and jurisprudential background, it is therefore possible to
rationalise and justify some aspects of the Chinese commercial law system and commercial
practice that may seem to be confusing at first sight.

As the Chinese commercial law regime is still in its developmental stages, and laws
are often used as instruments for implementing economic policies, regulatory efforts are
often piecemeal. This leaves the legacy of a plethora of legislation and regulations at
central and local government levels, fragmented amongst various functional departments,
making it difficult for foreign investors to comprehend the state of the law. 22

Another aspect of the Chinese commercial law regime is that it gives regulators
wide discretion in the exercise of their powers. Chinese legislation and regulations are often
drafted in a general form, leaving concrete details to discretionary interpretation by the
administrative organs. For instance, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce
and its provincial and municipal level bureau have the power to exercise administration on
registration of commercial licences, trade marks and anti-monopoly operation activities.23
The Municipal level of the Administration Bureau for Industry and Commerce has
discretionary power to settle cases that attract administrative penalty fines between
20

<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China)
National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, Preamble. The Constitution Preamble asserts that the basic
task of the nation in the years to come was to concentrate its effort on socialist modernisation. Under the
leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong
Thought, the Chinese people of all nationalities would continue to adhere to the people’s democratic
dictatorship and follow the socialist road.
21
Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial Law above n 8, 11. The new judicial system of the PRC was
influenced by Soviet law, Marxist ideology and the Chinese Communist Party’s interpretations of law and
justice.
22
Ibid 45.
23
<< 工 商 行 政 管 理 机 关 行 政 处 罚 程 序 暂 行 规 定 >> [Interim Provision Concerning Administrative
Organisations for Industry and Commerce Exercising Administrative Penalty Procedure] (People’s Republic
of China) State Administration for Industry and Commerce, Order No 58, 17 October 1996, arts 6–8.
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RMB100,000

(approximately

USD15,000)

and

RMB1

million

(approximately

USD150,000). 24 In order to prevent abuse of such administrative power, the State
Administration for Industry and Commerce in Beijing passed a Guideline to restrain and
supervise the exercise of such power.25 However, such lack of details in the legal regime
creates uncertainty in the implementation of law, a situation that a foreign investor may
find confusing and disturbing. Furthermore, there is also a lack of transparency in the
application of law. When regulators are exercising discretion, they often follow important
guidelines which are often unpublished and kept away from outsiders 26 (those outside the
regulating entity) further introducing uncertainty to the investment climate. Uncertainties in
the legal regime have allowed the law to be used, not to encourage foreign investment as it
originally intended, but for ulterior purposes. Hence, there is significant incongruence
between the overall legal regime and its interest and actual local practice, as evidenced by
such local practices as preferential treatment, corruption, and jurisdictional greed.

Recent developments go some way toward easing foreign investors’ concerns about
the apparent contradictions between the Chinese commercial law regime and local practice.
The introduction of the Administrative Litigation Law 1989 27 provides evidence that the

24

Ibid art 71.
<<关于工商行政管理机关正确行使行政处罚自由裁量权的指导意见>> [Guiding Opinion Concerning
Administrative Organisation for Industry and Commerce Rightly Exercising Administrative Discretionary
Power] (People’s Republic of China) State Administration for Industry and Commerce, Order No 31, 22
February 2008.
26
According to article 14 of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Public Government
Information 2007, there is information that is not permitted to be published based on the State Secrecy Law of
the People’s Republic of China. Article 9 stipulates that following the interests of national security and related
matters, the leak could harm national political, economic, defence, foreign affairs and other areas of security
and interests, and should be identified as a national secret.
27
<<中华人民共和国行政诉讼法>> [Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 4 April 1989.
25
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Chinese government is committed to further reform of the legal system so it can better
provide the protection demanded by foreign investors.

6.3

Practical Legal Factors Concerning Foreign Direct Investment

6.3.1 The Dilemma of National Laws and Local Regulations
Three decades of rapid economic growth has fuelled China’s transition from a centrally
planned economy to a market oriented economy, necessitating the development of a legal
system capable of fostering and protecting economic development. Before 1978 in China,
the economic institutions for agriculture and industry operated essentially under a centrally
planned system.
In order to implement the Communist Party of China’s Fourteenth National
Congress task of economic reform and to accelerate the reform pace of opening up and
socialist modernisation, the Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee discussed the
establishment of a socialist market economic system.28
Now, after 30 years of reform, China’s economic system has changed dramatically.
Public ownership, as the mainstay of a variety of economic sectors, shapes the pattern of
development and has deepened rural economic reform. Since China’s reform commenced
in 1978, its legal system has undergone an unprecedented expansion with the promulgation
of a myriad of commercial and civil laws at national and local levels. 29 While the emphasis
on lawmaking contributed to the growing authority and capacity of the National People’s

28

<<中共中央关于建立社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定>> [Decision Concerning a Number of
Issues of Establishment of the Socialist Market System] (People’s Republic of China) The Third Full Meeting
at the Fourteenth National Congress of Communist Party of China, 14 November 1993.
29
Kay-Wah Chan, ‘The Legal System of China’ in Patricia Blazey and Kay-Wah Chan (eds), The Chinese
Commercial Legal System (Lawbook, 2008) 89, 90.
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Congress (NPC) during this period, numerous contradictions, tensions and ambiguities
materialised within the law-making system as a whole. Largely as a result of a shifting
distribution of authority among the NPC, the State Council and sub-national (primarily
provincial) People’s Congresses, the legislative arena is populated by self-interested
participants with uneasy power relationships who engage in institutional turf wars at
virtually every stage of the lawmaking process.30
Faced with the possibility of legislative disorder derailing modernisation, China’s
leadership in the early 1990s began to consider a ‘law on law-making’ to set out a clearly
defined uniform legal hierarchy.
The Legislation Law 2000 31 represents a significant attempt to produce a more
orderly and open legislative system in China. Virtually unique in the world as a law on lawmaking, it deals with matters of a constitutional nature. Moreover, it represents an attempt
by the NPC to solidify its position in relation to other lawmaking and regulatory
institutions, namely the State Council and provincial governments. 32 China is a unified
multi-ethnic country with a unitary political system. 33 To ensure that the legal system
remains unified, yet at the same time adapts to uneven economic, political and cultural
development or different locations, China practices a unified, multi-level legislative system.
For instance, the NPC and its Standing Committee exercise the state’s power to make

30

<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China)
National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, art 58; <<中华人民共和国立法法>> [Legislation Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, Order No 31, 15
March 2000, arts 7, 78.
31
<<中华人民共和国立法法>> [Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 31, 15 March 2000.
32
Ibid arts 56, 63.
33
<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China)
National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, Preamble.
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laws.34 The NPC enacts and amends basic laws pertaining to criminal offences, civil affairs,
state organs and other matters. 35 The Standing Committee enacts and amends all laws
except for basic laws that should be enacted by the NPC.36 When the NPC is not in session,
its Standing Committee may partially supplement and revise laws enacted by the NPC,
provided that the changes do not contravene the basic principles of law. 37 The State Council
formulates administrative regulations in accordance with the Constitution and other laws
and records these regulations with the NPC.38 In line with the specific conditions and actual
needs of administrative regions — and on condition that they do not violate the
Constitution or other state laws and administrative regulation — the People’s Congresses of
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central government,
as well as their standing committees, may enact local statutes and record them with the
NPC Standing Committee and the State Council.39
In light of their specific conditions and actual needs, and on condition that they do
not conflict with the Constitution, other laws and administrative regulations or local statutes
passed by their provinces or autonomous regions, the People’s Congresses and their
standing committees of large cities may enact local statutes.40 These are then submitted to
the standing committees of the People’s Congresses of their provinces or autonomous

34

Ibid arts 58, 62, 67.
Ibid art 62.
36
Ibid art 62[3].
37
Ibid art 67[2].
38
Ibid art 89[2], 90.
39
<<中华人民共和国立法法>> [Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 31, 15 March 2000, art 63.
40
Ibid arts 63–67.
35
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regions for approval before they take effect. In addition, these standing committees must
record the local statutes with the NPC Standing Committee and the State Council. 41
The Legislation Law 2000 addresses substantive and procedural aspects of the legislative
process and its content is designed to affect the quality of law making in China in the
future. Overall, the Legislation Law 2000 endorses a more open and consultative legislative
process. Importantly, it sanctions — though does not require — the use of public legislative
hearings as a new mechanism for incorporating greater citizen participation in the
legislative process. 42 The emergence and spread of public legislative hearings in China
represents a ground-breaking governance reform, primarily taking root in urban areas at the
local level.
While the Law does not yet mandate their use, local People’s Congresses and
administrative bodies have started experimenting with hearings, signalling the potential
development of a new governance norm in which public participation plays a more valued
and institutionalised role in the legislative process.43

Laws and regulations governing foreign investment were passed and amended in the
course of China’s economic transition in order to meet the needs of the legal system, to
protect the interests of participants, and to facilitate economic development in practice.
Accordingly, a legal framework regulating foreign investment has gradually been
established. Local regulations and rules, largely concerning investment incentives and
preferential economic treatment, were enacted in addition to national laws and national

41

<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China)
National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, arts 63–64.
42
Ibid art 34.
43
Laura Paler, ‘China’s Legislation Law and the Making of a More Orderly and Representative Legislative
System’ (2005) China Quarterly 301, 302.
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administrative regulations on various aspects of foreign investment. 44 However, as a result
of many of the laws and regulations having been amended or further supplemented by other
regulations at national or local level without a view to an overall simultaneous
harmonisation being achieved, foreign investors have been confused by inconsistencies
between regulations at national and local levels. For example, the national level and local
level’s protection of famous trademarks and well known brands can be confusing for
foreign investors. The Trademark Law 2001 specifies that a famous trademark is protected
and no registration of any similar trademark applied to any product will be approved as it
would result in public confusion.45 The main aim of this provision is to protect the famous
trademark in all different geographical areas and includes different products and different
industries. However, Jiangsu Province passed an administrative regulation 46 to protect a
famous trademark with conditions that targeted a similar trademark being used in a
business name and product packaging. 47 This regulation was used to protect Jiangfsu
province’s industries but was not consistent with the provisions of the Trademark Law
2001.

44

Major national laws concerning foreign direct investment include <<中华人民共和国中外合作经营企业
法>> [Law of the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China)
National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 40, 31 October 2000; <<中华人民共和国中外合
资经营企业法>> [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] (
People’s Republic of China ) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 48, 15 March 2001;
<<中华人民共和国外资企业法>> [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Wholly Foreign Owned
Enterprise] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 41, 31
October 2000.
45
<<中华人民共和国商标法>> [Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 27 October 2001, art 13; <<驰名商标认定和保护
规定>> [Provision Concerning Identification and Protection of Well-known Trademarks] (People’s Republic
of China) State Administration for Industry and Commerce, Order No 5, 17 April 2003, art 6.
46
<<江苏省著名商标认定和保护办法>> [Measures Concerning Identification and Protection of a Famous
Trademark of Jiangsu Province] (People’s Republic of China) Jiangsu Province Government, Order No 157,
10 August 1999.
47
Ibid art 13.
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For reasons stated above, laws and regulations in China were made using a ‘scatter
approach’, with rules being implemented with little foresight as to their effectiveness. Many
of these new laws dealt with the implementation of a market economy. 48 There are
hundreds of laws and regulations related to foreign investment that have been issued at the
national level, and many hundreds of rules and regulations issued at the local level. 49 With
such a disparate group of laws, it was no surprise that foreign investors did not have a
complete picture of how the rules were to be enforced. A simple description of the written
law alone is not enough to understand why local entities behave as they do. It is important
to realise that in all international dealings with China that the Chinese have their own
history and culture and use legal concepts and institutions in ways that are different from
those of the west.50 It is essential that foreign investors understand how the legal system
operates and how laws are applied in practice.

Additionally, although market reforms have opened the way for private business in
China, the Chinese government and bureaucracies still play key roles in most business
activities, beyond areas (such as tax collection) that are common functions of all
governments. Foreign and domestic companies in China have long complained of the
interference of government in business activities.51

Also, as the foreign investment law regime is still evolving, the central government
may wish to test the effects of a law or regulation in one area before the rule is introduced

48

Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial Law above n 8, 43.
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Congresses issued 4271 administrative rules.
50
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nationally.52 Model areas are selected and special rules are implemented within those areas.
Therefore, the central government may delegate some authority to local officials so that
they can exercise the authority in accordance with local circumstances. However, in
allowing local authorities the flexibility to adapt laws and regulations to local
circumstances or be used as a model for national law, those laws become uncertain and
foreign investors can often be confused or even feel that they are disadvantaged.

The Equity Joint Venture Law 2001 (EJVL 2001) specifies that an Equity Joint
Venture (EJV) must be approved by the State department in charge of foreign economics
and trade. Article 8 of the EJVL 2001 regulations authorises provincial level government,
or an administrative body created by the State Council to be entrusted with the authority to
approve EJVs. During the early stages of China’s economic reform, when China was trying
to attract capital mainly from Hong Kong and Taiwan, authority to approve EJVs was
subsequently granted to the neighbouring Special Economic Zones (SEZs): Shenzhen,
Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen and Hainan.53 The central government was setting up a model for
laws in preparation for national adoption.

As the economic reform continued, the need to test laws and regulations increased.
Subsequently the State Council gave the authority to approve EJVs to 14 coastal port cities,

52

The National People’s Congress granted Shenzhen Municipal People’s Congress and its Standing
Committee legislative power on 1 July 1992. It was a landmark for Shenzhen. In 15 years Shenzhen
developed its own rules and regulations (totaling 296) to build the framework document. Strong laws and
regulations not only promoted the development of the city, but also provided a reference for national and local
legislation.
53
In 1980, the Fifth National People’s Congress approved Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen Special
Economic Zones. In October 1980, the State Council approved 2.5 square kilometres in the lake within the
Xiamen Special Economic Zone. The lake became the birthplace of the Xiamen Special Economic Zone. On
15 October 1981, construction began on the Xiamen Special Economic Zone. In 1985, the State Council
approved the Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta and Fujian Delta as coastal open economic zones. In
1988, Hainan province was approved as a special economic zone.
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five Coastal Open Economic Zones, the Pudong New Area, Shanghai, and five inland cities
along the Yangtze River.54

Problems were created when local authorities started to compete for jurisdiction
over foreign investors and to attempt to further their own interests by the introduction of
local laws and regulations. Conflict of laws between central and local levels results at least
in part from the central government assigning its rights to both levels. The other reason is
the lack of legislation concerning the maintenance of consistency of implementation of law
where the local authority is permitted to make local regulations relating to centrally made
laws. The central-local relationship in legislation shifts with the development of the market
economy. The more power central government releases, the more discretionary power local
governments enjoy in all aspects of governance, and the exercise of such discretion is
inevitably strongly swayed towards perceived local interests.

6.4

Discretionary Power of the Administration

The existence of discretionary power allowing the administrative organs to apply laws is
also confusing to foreign investors. Even though in western countries connections may be
relevant in business, bureaucrats are expected to be impartial in making administrative
decisions. This is largely achieved by means of well established administrative procedures
and regulations (including the ways that such regulations should be interpreted) and the
54

In 1990, the Central government (State Council) decided to open the central development of Pudong. In
1992, it was further extended to the five cities along the Yangtze River in Yueyang. Shanghai, Tianjin,
Beihai, Zhanjiang, Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Ningbo, Nantong, Lianyungang, Qingdao, Weihai, Yantai, Dalian,
Qinhuangdao and another 14 coastal cities were include to open up the Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River
Delta, South Fujian Triangle, Liaodong Peninsula, Shandong Peninsula, the Bohai Rim region and other
coastal open economic zones. Special economic zones, coastal open cities and coastal open economic zones
utilise special preferential policies, attract foreign investment, and develop an export-oriented economy and
promoting China's development of coastal and inland areas.
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means to challenge administrative decision-making by various processes.55 These processes
usually include internal review systems in the first instance that allow the person
challenging a decision to have the process re-examined (often by a more senior officer than
the one making the challenged decision) to discover whether there was any error in the
decision-making process. Even if the reviewer confirms the original decision, the aggrieved
person may have the right to apply to have the decision tested by an external administrative
appeals process through a tribunal or court. Freedom of information legislation 56 may often
allow a person wishing to challenge a decision to acquire more information related to the
decision-making that may assist in mounting a successful challenge. In the case of
challenges to other government or government agency decisions an ombudsman system 57
allows decisions to be reviewed by an independent ombudsman who may, by criticising
certain decisions, bring pressure to bear upon the government department or private
corporation to vary its decision. Additionally, there exists the right to challenge the
interpretation of a law or regulation through the court process.

In China, the art of using connections (Guanxi) as detours around the formal system
exists everywhere in Chinese administration. Bjorkman and Kock discussed the role played
by social relationships when penetrating a foreign business network. They suggested that,
in particular, the Chinese and the experienced non-Chinese respondents stressed the
importance of personal relationships, which were seen as a pre-requisite for most
information and business exchanges.58 This is a direct result of the broad discretion given to
55

Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW); Administrative Decisions Tribunal Regulation 2009
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253

Ch 6: Practical Legal Factors in Administration of FDI law

bureaucrats under the Chinese commercial law regime. Good contacts with local officials
can often be a central element in the success of foreign ventures.

After an EJV has been registered, it may be eligible for certain incentives if it can
be categorised with a specific status. For example, under the Provisions Concerning
Encouragement for Foreign Investment 1986, a joint venture may be granted
‘technologically advanced enterprise’ status.

59

The stated criteria for granting

‘technologically advanced enterprise’ status include the use of advanced and efficient
equipment and technology and the production of a newly developed or advanced product,
technology transfer or licence agreement. 60 The benefit of obtaining this status includes
lower income tax, a limit on land fees, and priority in provisions of infrastructure and short
term loans. 61 However, as the authority has wide discretion in granting ‘technologically
advanced enterprise’ status, in reality such status is not made with reference to any set
criteria but by the EJV’s connections (Guanxi) with local officials. Because the law grants
bureaucrats unfettered discretion in granting such status, 62 administrators are open to
exercise this discretion in a partial way. For example, according to the Shanghai High
Technology Enterprise Identification Measures, the power to decide and identify whether
an enterprise meets the criteria of a ‘high technology enterprise’ is held by the Office of
Shanghai High Technology Enterprise Identification. 63 This office decides whether the
eligible enterprise should undergo further inspection based on the documents they provided.

59

<<国务院关于鼓励外商投资的规定>> [Provisions Concerning Encouragement for Foreign Investment]
(People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No 95, 11 October 1986, art 3.
60
Ibid art 18.
61
Ibid arts 5–9.
62
Ibid art 18.
63
<< 上 海 高 新 技 术 产 业 开 发 区 高 新 技 术 企 业 认 定 办 法 >> [Shanghai High Technology Enterprise
Identification Measures] (People’s Republic of China) Shanghai Scientific Technology Committee, 9
September 2009, art 3.
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Decisions related to identification will be made on the basis of the second stage inspection
and examination by the same office.64 This establishes the practice of seeking preferential
treatment through connections, and evolves to become institutionalised corruption.

Although official Chinese policy welcomes foreign investment as critical to the
country’s economic development plans, the Chinese government continues to maintain
barriers and controls on foreign investment, channelling it toward areas that support the
government’s development policies. China encourages foreign investment in priority
infrastructure sectors, such as energy production, communications, and transportation, and
restricts or prohibits it in sectors where China’s planners have determined that China does
not have a specific need or where China wants to protect the local industry.65
The Interim Provisions on Guiding Foreign Direct Investment 1995 66 were released
to the public on 20 June 1995 and the Guideline Catalogue of Foreign Investment
Industries 2007 67 was issued on 1 December 2007. China has issued updated foreign
investment guidelines and provided a revised Guideline Catalogue of Foreign Investment
Industries for sectors in which foreign investment is encouraged, restricted, or prohibited.68
The latter essentially categorises EJVs into industries where foreign investment is
‘encouraged’, ‘permitted’, ‘discouraged’, or ‘prohibited’. For EJVs within the ‘encouraged’
64

Ibid arts 9, 15.
<<指导外商投资方向规定>> [Provisions on Guiding Direction of Foreign Investment] (People’s Republic
of China) State Council, Order No 346, 1 April 2002.
66
<<指导外商投资方向暂行规定>> [Interim Provisions on Guiding Foreign Direct Investment] (People’s
Republic of China) State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
and State Economic and Trade Commission, 20 June 1995.
67
<<外商投资产业指导目录>> [Guideline Catalogue of Foreign Investment Industries] (People’s Republic
of China) Ministry of Commerce National Development and Reform Commission, Order No 57, 1 December
2007.
68
<<外商投资产业指导目录>> [Guideline Catalogue of Foreign Investment Industries] (People’s Republic
of China) Ministry of Commerce National Development and Reform Commission, Order No 57, 1 December
2007.
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industries, approval by the relevant authority would be easier than EJVs within the
‘permitted’ or ‘discouraged’ industries. If such a guideline were to remain as an internal
document, a foreign investor would be unable to assess the proposed EJV’s probability of
approval. Such uncertainty surrounding approval would certainly have the effect of
discouraging foreign investment. According to the 2007 investment guidelines, the Chinese
government still prohibits foreign investment for projects with objectives not in line with
national economic development under the state plan.69 Compared with its predecessor, the
updated Guideline Catalogue makes amendments on five facts as stated below.

Firstly, the updated catalogue promotes the policy of reform, and was created to
fulfil other undertakings made by China to the WTO. Additional service sectors, including
logistics and outsourcing, are added to widen the scope of foreign investment. There are
also references to the reduction of limitation provisions in foreign investment
regulations.70Secondly, the Chinese government encourages foreign investors in the ‘clean’
industries. It advocates support for foreign investors committed to protecting the
environment and using regenerative energy. The catalogue is added to encourage investors
to save resources and enhance the environment.

Thirdly, the Chinese government adjusted the export policy. In view of China’s
growing trade surplus and rapid expansion of reserves of foreign currency, and in order to
balance imports and exports, and particularly to promote the importation of high

69

National Development and Reform Commission issued the 11th Five Year Plan on Foreign Capital
Utilisation in November of 2006, which stated that China will change foreign investment emphasis from
quantity to quality.
70
<<外商投资产业指导目录>> [Guideline Catalogue of Foreign Investment Industries] (People’s Republic
of China) Ministry of Commerce National Development and Reform Commission, Order No 57, 1 December
2007, arts 5, 7.
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technologies and high-tech equipments, a general provision that foreign investment devoted
to exporting 100 per cent of its products be an ‘encouraged category’ was removed in the
New Catalogue. 71 Fourthly, the earlier catalogue’s references to focusing on China’s
western regions were abandoned. In the updated catalogue, different regions in the China
now have the same footing in respect of encouraged investment in line with the policy of
further utilising foreign investment.72 Lastly, Chinese authorities do not readily permit the
entry of foreign investment into the area of national security and other sensitive areas of the
economy.73

The updated catalogue reflects the attitude and policies of the Chinese government
towards foreign investment. Under the 2007 catalogue foreign investment in traditional
manufacturing sectors and export oriented projects will no longer be encouraged. 74 The
reason for this change is to improve the quality of utilisation of foreign investment. Instead,
foreign investment in high technology, new materials production, high-tech equipment,
modern agriculture and high-end services (such as modern logistics) is encouraged.75 The
revision of the catalogue demonstrates that China seriously aims to upgrade and optimise
its industrial structure in and aims to use foreign capital to achieve a sound and healthy
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economic development rather than allowing China to be simply used by foreign investors.
China has shown, therefore, that it is committed to making changes in its approach towards
to foreign investment and the 2007 catalogue is one of the steps already undertaken.

6.4.1 Discretionary Power in the Chinese Commercial Law Regime
There is an understandable tension between traditional communist jurisprudence, where
law is seen as an instrument to implement policy, and the need for an objective set of rules
to develop a market economy.

In this regard, the Chinese government is faced with a dilemma. A concrete,
objective set of laws and regulations would assist China with long term economic
development by increasing certainty, and greater certainty in law would ultimately attract
more foreign investment and economic progress. However, detailed rules would — in the
short term — limit the flexibility of the government and the CPC to implement changes to
policy to adapt to the economy. Against this backdrop, the Chinese government decided to
favour short-term flexibility over long-term benefits. The law must be flexible enough to
deal with different situations and the varieties of human behaviour. In other words,
regulators must be given enough discretionary power to adapt rules and regulations to local
circumstances. For instance, provincial governments in practice have often further
delegated their approval powers to lower level authorities to allow them to deal with
matters in accordance with their own local needs.76

As part of the evolution of the Chinese commercial law regime, special economic
zones or areas serve the purpose of trying out, within some confined areas, the experiences
76

Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law above n 12, 351.
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of Taiwan and other Asian countries in the operation of Export Processing Zones with a
view to subsequently applying the successful experience to the whole nation.77 Up to 1992,
approximately thirty special zones or model areas had been established. The central
government often picked model areas, and special rules were implemented within those
areas. For practical purposes, these areas may be seen as places where foreign investors
may enjoy various preferential economic treatments and non-financial concessions relating
to economic freedom, including reduced income tax rates, special concessions for import
and export duties, flexible labour management, special fees for land use, better access to
domestic markets as well as simplified administrative processes regarding the examination
and approval of foreign investment projects.78

In addition, as the Central Government has delegated some authority to local
officials so that they are able to exercise authority in accordance with local circumstances
and as a result of competition to attract foreign investment, local authorities have offered
preferential treatment and concessions and established all kinds of open areas not properly
authorised by the Central Government. For example, the Ministry of Land and Resources,
the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Supervision jointly
carried out an inspection of abuse of national land resources by the establishment of high
technology development areas in China in 2003. 79 The purpose of this inspection was to
prevent local government from over-developing economic areas and causing agricultural
land to be commercialised. According to statistics, there were 3837 economic development
77

Jinyan Li, Taxation of Foreign Investment in the People’s Republic of China (Kluwer Law International,
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zones nationwide, only 232 of which had been approved by State Council and 1019 had
been approved by provincial level governments. The remaining 2586 economic
development zones had been approved by local governments. 80

As a result, the

devolvement of the permission to local authorities — with flexibility to adapt laws and
regulations to local circumstances — and the overall use of the exercise as a model for a
future national law has led to a substantial increase in uncertainty and confusion for foreign
investors.

An investor may have operations within the jurisdiction of two or more competent
authorities. The problem is amplified when local authorities start to compete for jurisdiction
over foreign investors. For example, it has been reported that the Chinese government has
recently closed down about 1200 unauthorised development zones, where local authorities
start to regulate foreign investments without authorisation from the central government.81
The ambiguity of the laws and regulations continues to give bureaucrats broad discretionary
power in approving foreign investment project.

6.4.2 Ambiguity in Legal Drafting
A common feature of the Chinese commercial legal system is that rules are drafted in an
ambiguous fashion. The PRC’s economic statutes often paint a broad picture, leaving many
matters unclear. This could be rationalised in two ways. Because of the rapid pace of legal
and economic development, the Chinese authorities may genuinely not have time to
consider every facet of the legislation, while there may be a pressing need for some
regulation in the market economy. However, such approach is fraught with danger. The
80
81
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passage of the General Principle of Civil Law 1986 82(GPCL) is one major example in this
area. From the beginning of the introduction of the economic reform policy, China was
working on a comprehensive civil code. However, that proved to be very time consuming
and there was considerable pressure to promulgate a civil code to institutionalise economic
relations, particularly from Japanese investors, who were reluctant to invest in China until a
civil code was in place. For instance, a study in 2005 revealed that one of the earliest
Japanese investments was established by Yamaha Motor in 1980 but it was dissolved in
1984.83 The same study of Japan’s investment in China suggested that slow expansion into
the China market was more beneficial for investment because the China market was
immature in terms of economic development and the legal environment.84 In 1986 China
promulgated the GPCL which was not a comprehensive civil code, but a statement of
foundational legal concepts and principles. It lacked the detailed provisions of a typical
civil code.

Two of the major reasons for the uncertain nature of the regulatory framework are
inappropriate drafting and excessive discretion given to regulators. Does this mean that
Chinese law is incapable of protecting the interests of foreign investors? There are
sufficient reasons to believe that the PRC is serious in addressing these problems within the
Chinese legal system. The Administrative Procedure Law of the PRC 1989 (APL 1989)85
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and the Regulation on Administrative Reconsideration 2007 (RAR 2007)86 (promulgated in
2007) address the problem of managing the excessive discretion given to regulatory
bodies.87 This Regulation can be equated to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review)
Act in Australia.88

Under the APL 1989, foreign investors may judicially challenge the legality of
decisions made by administrative organs. Such decisions may include the imposition of
fines, infringement of property rights, and denial of licences. However, the APL review
does not extend to the lawfulness of the underlying regulations upon which administrative
decisions are based. RAR 2007 facilitates challenges to the legality or merits of decisions.
Challenges are heard within the administration but are independently scrutinised. As is the
case with APL 1989, the legality of the underlying statute cannot be challenged. It is hoped
that the administrative law regime can place effective limits on the power of the regulators
to ensure an effective market economy. From the perspective of a foreign investor, limits
on the arbitrary exercise of discretionary power would allow more certainty in investment
decisions, certainty that would be beneficial to China and foreign investors alike in the long
term.
The Legislation Law 200089 aimed to provide a uniform standard of drafting across
government in all levels. It requires laws and regulations to pass through a standard
procedure,90 so they can be reviewed and amended before being promulgated. Hence, there
86
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is less need for redrafting laws and regulations. This results in some diminution of
confusion about Chinese commercial laws for foreign investors due to inadequate
legislative drafting. Conflicts between national laws and local regulations occur as a result
of many administrative bodies exercising legislative power under the Legislation Law
2000. 91 In order to prevent such legislative confusion the State Council passed the
Regulation Concerning Procedure of Making Administrative Provision in 2001.92

When foreign investors and lawyers examine the Chinese commercial legal regime,
they may be confused by the ambiguous rules, broadly defined discretion, lack of
transparency and excessive fragmentation of authorities that exist in the Chinese context.
China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2001 raised expectations from
foreign countries as to China’s transparency in terms of its legal and administrative
systems. 93 They may be even more confused as to why foreign investors have to, for
example, find the right connections with officials, or submit two smaller proposals for
investment rather than one. In the ten years since China joined the WTO, there have been
steps taken by the Chinese government to fulfil the commitment of transparency in the legal
system and the administrative system.94
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Provision] (People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No 321, 16 November 2001; <<行政法规制定
程 序 条 例 >> [Administrative Regulations Formulation Regulations] (People’s Republic of China) State
Council, Order No 321, 1 January 2002; <<中华人民共和国行政复议法实施条例>> [Regulations on
92
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Compared to the situation 30 years ago, China has made significant progress in relation to
the development of commercial law. The first group of foreign investors had to contend
with ad hoc policies that were often adopted prior to legislative guidance being issued.
Even when the EJV Law was promulgated in 1979, implementing regulations were not
enacted until 2001. By comparison, the current Chinese commercial law regime provides
much more certainty than was the situation at the beginning of the economic reform
program. More importantly, it seems that China is serious about improving its commercial
law regime. Improvements to the legal system —such as the APL 1989, the RAR 2007 and
the Legislation Law — are directed to address the shortcomings of the Chinese commercial
law regime and the legal system in general. As Vice President Xi Jinping said in his speech
on the second World Investment Forum of the United Nations,

China will continue to work to create an open and transparent legal environment. China’s
socialist market economy is the rule of law and economy. China’s investment environment
95
is open and transparent legal protection.

Even on a theoretical level, the definition of commercial law as a set of objective
regulations represents a major departure from the traditional communist theory of the law.
So even though the current Chinese commercial law regime may not be able to offer
complete protection for the commercial interests of foreign investors, if the current pace of
reform is continued, the enthusiasm about investing in China can hopefully be even more
justified in the long term.

Administrative Reconsideration of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) State
Council, Order No 499, 29 May 2007; <<中华人民共和国政府信息公开条例>> [Regulations of the
People’s Republic of China on Public Government Information] (People’s Republic of China) State Council,
Order No 492, 17 January 2007; <<中华人民共和国反垄断法>> [Law of the People’s Republic of China on
Anti-Monopoly] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No
68, 30 August 2007.
95
Jinping Xi, ‘Opening Keynote Speech at the World Investment Forum’ (Speech delivered at the Second
United Nations Conference on the World Investment Forum, Xiamen, 7 September 2010).
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Additionally, other laws and regulations in China are often drafted in such a way as to
allow policy makers and implementing officials to interpret and implement them in a way
that serves their purposes in regulating the economy. As a result of the use of such vague
and ambiguous wording in laws or regulations, the administrative authority can interpret,
and re-interpret, their meaning, either in official documents or on an ad hoc basis.96 This
gives the regulators wide discretion to interpret the meaning of the terms to suit current
policies. The ongoing uncertainty surrounding such ad hoc interpretation usually ensures
that in practice the law is very confusing resulting in uncertainty for foreign investors.

The law related to EJV provides a good example of this. The administration of the
Law on Chinese-foreign Equity Joint Ventures 2001 (EJV Law), 97 promulgated by the
NPC, illustrates how confusion and uncertainty for foreign investors can result. The EJV
had been the most popular form of investment for foreign investors between 1987 and
2000.98 The EJV Law specifies that an EJV must be approved by ‘the State department in
charge of foreign economics and trade’. 99 Article 8 of the EJV Regulations 100 enables

96

Xianming Xu, A Textbook on Jurisprudence (China University of Political Science and Law Press, 1994)
241–3. Chinese jurisprudence commonly divides authoritative interpretation into three categories: legislative,
administrative, and judicial. Generally speaking, ‘legislative interpretation’ means interpretation given by
legislative authorities on laws and rules issued by them; ‘administrative interpretation’ refers to interpretations
of these rules and regulations issued by administrative authorities; and ‘judicial interpretations’ are those
issued by the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate in their judicial and procuratorial
work.
97
<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法>> [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign
Equity Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order
No 48, 15 March 2001.
98
潘镇，鲁明泓 [Pan Zhen and Lu Minghong], ‘在华外商直接投资进入模式的选择：文化的解释 一项对
3452 家外资企业的实证研究’ [Foreign Direct Investment in China Entry Form Selection: Cultural
Explanation A Practical Research of 3452 Foreign Invested Enterprises] (10 May 2009) 南京师范大学商学
院 [Nanjing Education University School of Commerce] <http://sxy.njnu.edu.cn/?uid-1158-action-viewspaceitemid-96>.
99
<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法>> [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign
Equity Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order
No 48, 15 March 2001, art 3.
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province-level government, or an administrative body created by the State Council to be
entrusted with the authority to approve EJVs.

The EJV Law specifies that any proposed EJVs must be sent to an authorised
agency for examination and approval.101 The EJV Law, however, contains nothing about
the criteria for approval of an EJV, apart from Article 1 which provides that the
establishment of EJVs must be in accordance with principles of equality and mutual benefit
and subject to approval from the Chinese government; but what the words ‘principles of
equality and mutual benefit’ mean is unspecified. This leads to the examination and
approval authority having very wide discretion to approve or reject the formation of an
EJV.

Subordinate regulations do not seem to confine discretion for the authority either.
The Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on
Sino-foreign Joint Equity Enterprises 1983 (EJV Regulations),102 promulgated by the State
Council, provide some guidelines as to the type of investment permitted in EJVs.

The EJV Regulations provide that EJVs should: have advanced technical equipment
and scientific management; provide benefits in terms of technical innovation; increase

100

<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法实施条例>> [Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of
the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) State
Council, Order No 311, 22 July 2001.
101
<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法>> [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign
Equity Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order
No 48, 15 March 2001, art 3.
102
<<中华人民共和国中外合作经营企业法实施细则>> [Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Law
of the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Order No 6, 4 September 1995.
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income in foreign currency; and enable training of technical and managerial personnel.103
They also provide that an EJV: cannot be in detriment to China’s sovereignty, violate
Chinese law, be in conflict with the requirements of the development of China’s national
economy, contribute to environmental pollution; or impair the rights and interests of one
party through unequal agreements.104

Whilst the EJV Regulations represent an improvement over the EJV Law, they still
contain too many vague and ambiguous terms that give the approval authority broad
discretion in approving EJVs. For example, there is no definition as to what constitutes
‘advanced technical equipment’,105 or what kind of EJV would not be conforming to the
requirement of development of China’s national economy. In reality, the main criteria for
the relevant authority to approve an EJV is drawn from priorities expressed in the current
state plan, as declared by the CPC, and internal foreign investment guidelines that are not
publicly issued. This lack of transparency causes and exacerbates problems in the fair
administration of the law, and lowers the level of confidence of those who are subjected to
what may appear to them to be preferential or discriminatory treatment by regulators.

6.4.3 Perceived Lack of Transparency
In order for the central government to communicate prevailing policy and to ensure the
bureaucrats adhere to these policies, internal documents may be issued. These documents
usually provide technical details necessary for the concrete application of the primary law
103

<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法实施条例>> [Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of
the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No
311, 22 July 2001, art 3.
104
Ibid art 4.
105
Ibid art 41.
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and employ material missing from the legislation and regulations. They are of particular
importance to foreign investors as they show how the primary law is to be applied.

However, whilst they could reasonably be expected to be used as guidance for the
interpretation of statutes along with published legislation regarding implementation, in
some instances they have been issued to redefine or even contradict the primary statutes to
suit changes in the economic climate. For example, the Economic Contract Law 1981
specified invalidity of some contracts including a contract not complying with the relevant
legislation, regulations and administrative rules and national policies. 106 Contracts are
declared to be invalid as a result of breach of administrative rules.107 Provincial municipal
level governments make administrative rules according to local economic policies.
Following the introduction of the law, 10 to 15 per cent of contracts were invalidated. 108

These internal documents were often revealed to only a very limited segment of the
Chinese bureaucracy, and explorations during this research indicate that such documents
are not generally available to the public. They do come to light on occasions when they are
applied in matters before the court and in this way can become available to the public.
Cases that are complicated or with new factual elements are recommended and collected by
the provincial Higher People’s Court and notified to the Supreme People’s Court as special
cases that have interpreted laws or new factual circumstances. The Supreme People’s Court
publishes a judicial bulletin or gazette to reflect such interpretations. The Provision

106

<<中华人民共和国经济合同法>> [Economic Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s
Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 13 December 1981, art 7.
107
Ibid art 4.
108
武雪丽[Wu Xueli] ‘合同法关于无效合同的立法规定及其影响研究’ [Study of Legislative Provision of
Contract Invalidity and its Impact in Contract Law] (2001) 1 审判参考 [Judicial Reference]
<http://www.law110.com/lawstudy/320226.htm>.
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Concerning Work of Judicial Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court provided that
judicial Interpretations shall be published in the Supreme Court bulletin or gazette or the
Court Daily. 109 It is only in recent years that these interpretations of cases have been
published through four publications including the People’s Daily, the People’s Court Daily,
the Legal Daily and the Court Gazette.110

For foreign investors, attempting to find out the content of these rules may require
many visits to a relevant agency and even then may often not result in disclosure.
Therefore, as foreign business persons face barriers in gaining access to the internal
documents, they may be confused as to the state of the applicable law, and what actions
they can or cannot take. In addition, as the information contained in these internal
documents is so valuable, it has the potential of permitting bureaucrats to give preferential
treatment, and so has a very real capacity to lead to corruption.111

Because the Chinese government recognises law as an instrument to pursue policies,
the existence of discretion, as illustrated previously, allows administrative organs to apply
laws in a way that is consistent with the spirit of the rules. This manner of implementation
is completely different from what Westerners would expect from the ostensibly familiar
principles that are embodied in the law. Hence, in the eyes of a foreign investor, there is a

109

<<最高人民法院关于司法解释工作的规定>> [Provision Concerning Work of Judicial Interpretation of
the Supreme People’s Court vol 3] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme People’s Court, Order No 12, 23
March 2007, art 25.
110
<<最高人民法院裁判文书公布管理规定>> [Provision Concerning Public and Management of Judicial
Documents] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme People’s Court, 15 June 2000; 沈解平，黄再再，金权
[Shen Jieping, Huang Zaizai and Jin Quan], ‘论最高人民法院发布案例之判例化改造’ [Discussion on Case
Precedent Reform of Public Cases from the Supreme People’s Court] (10 December 2010) 中国法治监督
[Chinese Rule of Law Supervision] <http://www.zgfzjd.cn/detail.php?type=22&id=590>.
111
陈恒志[Chen Hengzhi], ‘试析裁量行政行为及其司法审查’ [A Analysis of Discretionary Administrative
Conduct and its Judicial Examination] (14 February 2011) 人民法院频道 [People’s Court Channel]
<http://court.gmw.cn/html/article/201102/14/1378.shtml>.
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serious incongruence between what is perceived to be the law and what the regulators do in
practice.

6.4.4 Jurisdictional Greed
Jurisdictional greed refers to the phenomenon where regulators desire to exercise regulatory
powers over subjects where that was not what was originally intended when the power was
conferred. As discussed above, in some cases there may be more than one competent
authority exercising a power (often wide and discretionary) that may apply in a given
situation or matter. Therefore there is a potential for a number of regulators to compete to
regulate an entity such as an EJV. In reality, given the well entrenched practice of seeking
preferential treatment through the use of Guanxi,112 it would be to a bureaucrat’s advantage
to exercise his or her regulatory power as widely as possible, because the wider his or her
jurisdiction, the more likely that he or she would receive favours from people who wish to
establish Guanxi. The creative interpretation of the discretionary power is one of a number
of ways in which a regulator may seek to expand its jurisdiction and for key individuals to
reap whatever rewards may flow from that expansion.

The authority for approval of EJVs at different levels of government is limited.
Internal documents from the State Council have specified threshold levels for local
authorities. Below these levels, the local entrusted office can approve the EJV, with only an
obligation to lodge a notice to MOFCOM for the record. Provincial level governments and
administrative bodies are allowed to approve EJVs with total investment not exceeding

112

Scott Wilson, ‘Law Guanxi: MNCs, State Actors, and Legal Reform in China’ (2008) 17 Journal of
Contemporary China 25, 51.
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USD30 million,113 whilst governments below the provincial level can approve EJVs with
total investment not exceeding USD10 million.114 For investments between USD30 and 100
million, the EJV can only be approved by MOFCOM. Investment exceeding USD100
million would have to be approved by the State Council.115

However, some local authorities accept application for EJVs exceeding that level by
creatively applying the criteria in the internal guidelines. For example, if a foreign investor
intends to invest USD50 million into an EJV, then on the surface, the EJV would need to be
approved by MOFTEC at the central level. However, if the foreign investor proceeds with
two similar, but separate EJVs, each with total investment of USD25 million, then the local
authority would be able to accept applications for the EJVs. This splitting of EJVs is a
common practice. The foreign investor or their Chinese partner may want the EJV to be
approved by the local, rather than central, authority. It could be due to better Guanxi
between the investor and the local regulator. However, a decision to split an EJV proposal
to bypass the central authority may have adverse consequences.

Although MOFTEC is not policing such a situation, if it ever became necessary for
the foreign investor to resort to the help of the central authority it could not expect much
help as it had already contrived to avoid its original jurisdiction. For example, if a dispute
arises between the foreign and Chinese partner and MOFTEC is asked if the joint venture
agreement is legally valid and binding, it may respond that it is not. Alternatively, the
foreign investor may face future obstacles if the joint venture is to expand beyond the local
113

<< 商 务 部 关 于 下 放 外 商 投 资 审 批 权 限 有 关 问 题 的 通 知 >> [Notification Concerning Issues of
Authorising Power to Approve Foreign Investment] (People’s Republic of China) Ministry of Commerce,
Order No 209, 10 June 2010, art 1.
114
Ibid arts 1, 4.
115
Ibid.
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area. For example, the foreign investor may not be treated favourably by MOFTEC if the
foreign investor decides to form a foreign investment holding company within China, or if
the EJV is to be listed on the stock exchange.

These adverse consequences may, therefore, encourage foreign investors to think
twice before attempting to bypass the central ministry’s authority. This is an illustration of
how local and central authorities’ competition for jurisdiction over the approval of EJVs
can present serious problems for investors and, of course, potentially huge losses.

6.5

Conclusions

The discussion in this chapter has shown that whilst the commercial law regime in China
has been undergoing continual reform, there remain serious matters that may affect foreign
investor confidence. Aside from any business relationship problems that may arise, the laws
and regulations that impact upon foreign investors may begin to have their effects from an
early stage in a project. A foreign investor, having decided upon a particular business
activity and having created a working relationship with a Chinese partner, may find during
the registration and approval process that even the setting of the locality of the investment
activity or business can create problems. An issue may arise as to the extent to which a
local regulatory authority is authorised to give approval to the project, and whether such
approval is lawful by reference to national laws and government policies. The ambiguity or
lack of certainty of national laws and regulations and the potential conflict of local
regulations, with national laws are an often present danger, particularly when a dispute
occurs within the partnership.
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The existence of discretionary decision-making power at any stage in a project, from
registration and approval through to operational aspects, can expose the business partners
to, at the very least, project threatening delays and, in the worst case, to corruption by
official decision-makers. The commonly occurring situation where multiple approvals are
required from different regulators simply exacerbate or multiply these risks. Additionally,
the balancing by government of the need to attract foreign investment as against its desire
to maintain tight control creates a situation where changes in interpretation of laws can
occur at any time. Foreign investors would be well-advised to take into account of all these
potential pitfalls as part of their risk assessment strategies when contemplating projects in
China.

At the heart of all trading and business activities is, in the western view, the contract
between the parties involved. The enforceability of a contract and general certainty as to
outcome as well as the procedures in respect of any disputes are, for the most part, core
components in the conduct of business in the view of most western business operators.

Difficulties arose when contract laws, that were developed to cope with the influx of
foreign capital, conflicted with the traditional Chinese methods of conducting business. The
contract often meant different things to a western investor and its Chinese business partner
or operative. Further difficulties arose as between the foreign investor and the Chinese
business partner at different geographical locations and in respect of the level of
government or administration concerned.

The following chapter contains an analysis of the development of contract law in
China during the past thirty years and some concerns that have arisen for foreign investors.
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Chapter 7
Development of Contract Law in China
7.1

Introduction

The legal framework regulating foreign investment has been gradually developed in the
past three decades. As a result, law relating to the market economy has become a major
component of the Chinese legal system. In 1999 the Contract Law of the People’s Republic
of China 1999 (Contract Law 1999)1 was passed by the National People’s Congress. This
law not only unified and expanded the previous major legislation related to the contractual
system, but also embraced certain underlying principles, including freedom of contract and
good faith that were not manifested in preceding contract statutes. This chapter aims to
scrutinise the development of contract law and provide some insights into its administration
from the perspective of foreign investors. It examines the premise that the role of this law is
to serve the needs of economic development. The analysis is divided into a number of
sections following this introduction. Section 7.2 examines the evolution of new contract
law in China. Section 7.3 deals with difficulties in the administration of the new contract
laws with specific attention to foreign investment contracts, government contracts, the
interpretation of contracts and inconsistencies between laws. Section 7.4 explores the
processes for the approval and registration of contracts including approval requirements
generally and for foreign investment contracts, and the registration procedures. Section 7.5

1

<<中华人民共和国合同法>> [Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 15, 1 October 1999. It was passed on 15 March at the 2nd
Session of the 9th National People’s Congress and was effective from 1 October 1999.
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discusses the enforcement of contracts, and section 7.6 summarises the analysis with
observations and conclusions.

7.2

The Evolution of the New Contract Law 1999

The foreign investment law regime has played a significant part in the course of legal
reform in China. It is not only an initial motivation for the economic development but also
an experimental trial for legal transition. As Chen asserts:

As foreign investment proliferated in China, so did the volume of Chinese laws and
regulations both at the central and local levels. These laws and regulations have in fact
established a special legal regime for foreign investment enterprises. A unique feature of
these laws and regulations is that they deal with specific types and specific aspects of
foreign investment; there is no unified code for foreign investment.2

The development of contract law in China is an example of how China’s legal
reform evolved in the changing economic situation. Contract law has been developed since
the late 1970s as a result of the commencement of the ‘Open Door’ policy, and
accompanied the consequent growth of the economy.3

Contract law in China began its life in the early 1950s but has only seen real and
substantial development since the 1980s. After the founding of the PRC, the concept of an
economic contract was introduced into China from the former Soviet Union. As a product
of a planned economy, an economic contract required that only non-natural legal persons or
units4 could become parties to a contract. It was used in contrast to a civil contract, to

2

Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development
(Kluwer Law International, 1999) 332.
3
Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial Law (Oxford University Press, 2000) 50.
4
Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law above n 2, 278. Before the late 1970s the major functions of contract were to
carry out national planned economic tasks through state owned enterprises. Individual citizens could not be
parties to such a contract. Individual economic activities were normally in very small scale. They were settled
immediately or conducted by relying upon trust between the participants.
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which individuals could become parties. The purpose of a contract at that time was only to
indicate the quota of national economic tasks assigned to the particular State Owned
Enterprise (SOE) in question.5

Despite the government’s endeavours to develop Chinese contract law in the 1950s
and early 1960s, a contract was primarily regarded as an administrative and allocative
mechanism controlling economic transactions between production units in order to carry
out State economic plans. 6 Table 4.1 below shows the chronological developments in
contract law. The basic purpose of a contract was to implement the quotas and allocations
of goods and services fixed by the State. The understanding of a contract and its legal
functions during that period was extremely limited and rudimentary.

After the economic disasters following the Cultural Revolution and as the new
market-oriented economic policy began to take shape, the role of contract law was, once
again, emphasised. In 1978 and 1979, various government agencies promulgated several
interim rules and regulations to fill the vacuum in contract law. Such development reached
its height in 1981 with the promulgation of the Economic Contract Law 1981 (ECL 1981),7
followed by the Foreign Economic Contract Law 1985 (FECL 1985)8 and the Technology

5

Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial Law above n 3, 50.
The prevailing politico-economic system determines the usefulness of contracts. With this conception of
contract law, the first set of regulations on contracts in the PRC — ‘The Provisional Measures concerning the
Making of Contracts among Governmental Institutions, State-owned Enterprises and Cooperatives’ — were
issued in September 1950.
7
The first major contract law in post-Mao China was the Economic Contract Law: <<中华人民共和国经济
合 同 法 >> [Economic Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China)
National People’s Congress, 1 July 1982. Initially it was issued by the 4th Plenary Session of the 5th NPC on
13 December 1981 and effective on 1 July 1982. It was repealed by the Standing Committee of the 8th NPC
on 1 October 1999.
8
<<中华人民共和国涉外经济合同法>> [Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People’s Republic of
China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 1 July 1985. It was the second set of
6
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Table 7.1: Development of Contract Law Since 1949
Year of Event

Events Related to Contract Law

1949

The People’s Republic of China was established under a Communist government.

1954

The Communist Party of China embarked on the drafting of a new civil code.

1956

The draft civil code was completed, but it was not enacted due to anti-rightist
movements and the Cultural Revolution. The political unrest lasted until 1978.
China started again to overhaul the civil code. It enacted the Economic Contract
Law (ECL 1981), which was the first of three new pieces of legislation on contract
law.
China enacted the second new piece of legislation: the Foreign Economic Contract
Law (FECL 1985). In addition, the General Principles of Civil Law was enacted.
The Technology Contract Law 1987 (TCL 1987) was enacted. This and the two
other new contract laws (the ECL 1981and the FECL 1985 were not intended to be
a comprehensive set. They were enacted piecemeal to solve the immediate needs of
the economic reform that began in 1979.
The Economic Contract Law was amended. Also, the drafting process of a new
Contract Law started, which was intended to replace the three pieces of legislation
of the 1980s.
The unified Contract Law was passed on 15 March 1999, and became effective on
1 October of the same year. It was supplemented by the Interpretation on Several
Issues Regarding the Application of the Contract Law (1)9 in December 1999 and
the Interpretation on Several Issues Regarding the Application of the Contract Law
(2)10 in 2009 and which was issued by the Supreme People’s Court.

1981

1985
1987

1993

1999

The Economic Contract Law 1981, Foreign Economic Contract Law 1985 and
Technology Contract Law 1987 were repealed.

Contract law is an essential part of every commercial law system. This became particularly
vital in China as the planned economy was transformed into a market oriented economy.
Laws regulating the sale of goods, business organisations, banking and property contain the

contract regulations. It was issued by the Standing Committee of the 6th NPC on 21 March 1985 and effective
on 1 July 1985. It was repealed by the Standing Committee of the 8 th NPC on 1 October 1999.
9
<<最高人民法院关于适用<中华人民共和国合同法 >若干问题的解释(一)>> [Interpretation of the
Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Regarding the Application of the Contract Law (1)] (People’s
Republic of China) Supreme People’s Court, Order No 19, 19 December 1999.
10
<<最高人民法院关于适用<中华人民共和国合同法 >若干问题的解释(二)>> [Interpretation of the
Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Regarding the Application of the Contract Law (2)] (People’s
Republic of China) Supreme People’s Court, Order No 5, 9 February 2009.
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general principles of contract. Contract law has an important impact on Chinese economic
reform. It has been used not only as a tool to implement Chinese economic plans and
policies effectively but also to attract foreign capital. The Chinese government understood
that it needed to provide legal security for foreign investors in order to enforce any
commercial promises. Therefore contract law has played and will continue to play a
significant role in the Chinese economic and legal system.

The regime of contract law in China started to take shape in the early 1980s after
China had been through the political turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. The contract rules
and regulations prior to 1980 were predominantly used for carrying out governmental
economic plans and not for their legal functions. The initial Chinese contract law
framework included four key pieces of legislation: the ECL 1981, the FECL 1985, the
GPCL 198611 and the TCL 1987. These laws and their associated regulations and a number
of other statutes were formulated during the early stages of Chinese economic reform. The
primary role of the legislation12 was to promote state economic policies with the nature of
planned allocation of resources. Also, the legislation divided contracts into two categories,
that is, economic contract and civil contract. The ECL 1981, FECL 1985 and TCL 1987
regulate economic contracts while the GOCL 1986 governs civil contracts. For example, in
accordance with the ECL 1981, economic contracts refer to transactions between artificial

11

<<中华人民共和国民法通则>> [General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 1 January 1987. It was adopted by the 4 th Session
of the 6th National People’s Congress on 12 April 1986 and came into force on 1 January 1987.
12
江泽民 [Jiang Zemin] ‘加快改革开放现代化建设步伐，夺取有中国特色的社会主义事业的更大胜利’
[Facilitating Steps Towards Openness, Reform and Modernisation, Accomplishing Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics] (江泽民在中国共产党十四次全国代表大会上的报告 [Report delivered at the Fourteenth
CPC National Congress], Beijing, 12 October 1992); 陈甦 [Chen Su], ‘中国 60 年间经济法制的形成与发展’
[Formation and Development of the Chinese Economic Legal System in the Past Sixty Years] 中国法学网
[Chinese Legal Study] <http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showarticle.asp?id=2612> para 17.
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legal persons only and do not include contracts between natural persons.13 Thus these early
contract statutes did not govern a broad sector of contractual relationships.14

Since the late 1980s there has been an enormous increase in Sino-foreign business
relations with a high degree of business transaction complexity. The result was that these
four contract laws had become incompatible with the prevailing economic reality. As an
example, a foreign technology contract was outside the ambit of both the TCL 1987 and the
FECL 1985. The former only covered technology contracts formed between Chinese
domestic parties, while the latter did not govern the category of technology contracts. 15

Moreover, inconsistency between the various contract statutes made their
application even harder. As an illustration, the FECL 1985 had the underlying principle of
‘equality, mutual benefit, consultation, and agreement,’ 16 whereas the GPCL 1986 was
based on the notion of ‘voluntariness, fairness, equal compensation, and good faith.’ 17
Although the ECL 1981 was revised in 1993, the revision was far from satisfactory. The
ECL 1993 failed to eliminate the discrepancies that had existed between the preceding
contract laws. For instance, the ECL 1993 abolished from its predecessor a certain mode of
terminating a contract, but the other contract statutes retained such a method of contract
discharge.
13

<<中华人民共和国经济合同法>> [Economic Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s
Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 1 July 1982, art 2.
14
王家福 [Wang Jiafu], <<合同法>> [Contract Law] (中国社会科学院出版社 [Chinese Social Science
Press], 1986) 141.
15
<< 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 技 术 合 同 法 >> [Technology Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 23 June 1987, art 2; <<中华
人民共和国涉外经济合同法>> [Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 1 July 1985, art 2.
16
Ibid art 3.
17
<<中华人民共和国民法通则>> [The General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 1 January 1987. It was adopted by the 4th Session
of the 6th National People’s Congress on 12 April 1986 and came into force on 1 January 1987, art 4.
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The Chinese government realised that an incoherent and obsolete system of contract law
would impede its on-going economic reform and that the restructuring of the contract law
system was necessary. 18

On 15 March 1999, the Contract Law 1999 was adopted by the Second Session of
the Ninth National People’s Congress (NPC) and scheduled to take effect on 1 October
1999. The promulgation of Contract Law 1999 constituted not only a major development of
China’s contract legislation, but was also an important step in China’s enactment of its
much-anticipated Civil Code.19 The Contract Law 1999 provides general provisions in its
Chapters 1–8 for governing all types of contractual relationships, as well as particular
provisions in Chapters 9–23 for further regulation of particular categories of contracts. As
the statute that deals specifically with contracts, the Contract Law 1999 was expected to
play a crucial role in regulating China’s burgeoning market economy and contribute to
China’s further legal development. Wang sums up the effects of the new Contract Law
1999:

Three of the main pieces of PRC legislation on contract that operated prior to 1 October
1999 will no longer exist on and after that date because they are repealed by the Contract
Law. These three pieces of legislation are the Economic Contract Law of the PRC, the
Foreign Economic Contract Law of the PRC and the Law of the PRC on Technology
Contracts. The Contract Law will be the major law on contract on and after that day, but
because two other Contract Laws that existed prior to 1 October 1999 will not repealed by
the Contract Law, these two laws will continue to operate before, on and after that date.
These two laws are the General Principles of Civil Law which came into force in 1987, and

18

史际春, 姚晖 [Shi Jichun and Yao Hui], ‘中国法学会民法学经济法学研究会 1996 年年会综述’
[Chinese Legal Study Association, Civil Law and Economic Law Study Research Team Annual Report 1996]
(1996) 6 中国法学 [Chinese Legal Study] 2.
19
<<中华人民共和国民典(草案)>> [Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China (draft)] (People’s
Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee Legislative Affairs Commission, 6
March 2006.
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the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods, which
became effective in China in 1988.20

The previous contract law structure of the 1980s, having three separate contract
statutes, reflected China’s gradual progress in understanding and regulating commercial
activities. In the early 1980s, owing to the restrictions of the planned economy, inadequate
research on contract law and immature legislative skills, it was practically impossible to
produce modern comprehensive contract legislation. As a result, the ECL 1981 was enacted
to accommodate society’s need for regulation of the vast amount of domestic economic
contracts during that period. Later on the FECL 1985 and the TCL 1987 were passed to
deal with aspects of contract problems which were not dealt with by the ECL 1981.

After more than 10 years since the enactment and implementation of the ECL 1981,
the FECL 1985 and the TCL 1987, serious problems of structure and substance were found
in the system. The numbers of contracts formed and contractual disputes were enormous.
More than four billion new contracts had been registered with the State Administration of
Industry and Commerce and its local bureaux every year nationwide, and the People’s
Courts in China were handling about three million contractual disputes annually. 21

Firstly, there was serious doubt about the appropriateness of the categorisation of
contracts into domestic economic, foreign economic and technology contracts, each of
which are dealt with separately by three different laws. As China developed its market
economy and as the market became sophisticated, the differential treatment between
domestic and foreign economic contracts also became a cause for concern.

20

Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial Law above n 3, 52.
Asia Pulse, ‘China develops draft unified contract code for agreements’, (Nationwide Financial News,
Beijing, 20 August 1998) in Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial Law above n 3, 51.
21
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Secondly, the application of contract law depends on two factors: whether there is foreign
participation, and the subject matter of the contract. 22 While the ECL 1981 and the FECL
1985 regulated different contracts according to the parties’ nationalities, the TCL 1987 was
distinguished from the other two pieces of contract legislation by regulating contracts on
the basis of their various types of subject matter. However, the TCL 1987 did not regulate
all contractual relationships relating to technology. Where one party to a contract was a
foreign party, the TCL 1987 did not apply and the FECL 1985 became the relevant law. In
civil contracts where one or both parties were individuals, such contracts were left out of
the then prevailing contract legislation.

Thirdly, many important fundamental contract doctrines were absent from this
contract law legislation. For example, offer and acceptance rules, which are important for
the determination of the formation and existence of a contract, were not written into any
contract legislation.

Fourthly, many doctrines were created and adopted in response to the old planned
economy. Such doctrines could no longer function well and serve the needs of the market
economy in China then or into the future. For example, the fact that the laws provided for
too many circumstances where a contract was void had hindered the smooth operation of
commercial transactions, a hindrance that was seen to be detrimental to the development of
a market economy.23

22

Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law above n 2, 279.
<< 关 于 修 改 经 济 合 同 法 的 决 定 >> [Decision Concerning Amendment of Economic Contract Law]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 2 September 1993; Grace Li,
‘The PRC Contract Law and Its Unique Notion of Subrogation’ (2009) 4 Journal of International
Commercial Law and Technology 12, 13.
23
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The new Contract Law 1999 is a massive document, comprising 23 Chapters, 428 Articles
and some 40,000 words (compared with a total of 155 Articles in the 3 existing contract
laws). The ECL 1981, the FECL 1985 and the TCL 1987 (with the problems described
above) were repealed on 1 October 1999 when the new law came into effect.

7.3

The Dilemmas of Administration of Contract Law

Fundamental property rights in China are weak and sporadically enforced. Under China’s
Constitution, land, factories, natural resources, and other physical assets belong to the state.
However, economic transformation in China has created different types of economic
entities such as Chinese-foreign joint ventures, wholly foreign owned enterprises and
privately owned enterprises. The Chinese government accordingly amended the
Constitution in 2004 and stated that China has a state-owned economic system co-existing
with multiple types of ownership including private ownership.24 Private ownership created
under the law is protected as an important part of the national economic system. 25 Even
though state-owned enterprises occupy the major part of the national economy, the private
sector has increased its importance in the country. State-owned enterprises are facing
unprecedented challenges. 26 The decentralisation of government in recent years raises
doubts as to whether ultimate ownership of individual assets rests with the central
government or with increasingly powerful regional units. This state of affairs has led to
frequent battles among government agencies over which one has the right to enter into a
24

<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China)
National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, art 6.
25
Ibid arts 11, 13; <<国务院关于鼓励支持和引导个体私营等非公有制经济发展的若干意见>> [Opinions
Concerning Encouraging, Supporting and Guiding Development of the Private Non State-Owned Economy]
(People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No 3, 19 February 2005.
26
Christopher A McNally, ‘China’s State-Owned Enterprises: Thriving or Crumbling?’ (2002) East-West
Centre of US Congress, 2 < http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/api059.pdf>.
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particular joint venture with a foreign company. The Law on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint
Ventures 1979 did not specify which type of Chinese parties were allowed to enter into a
joint venture with a foreign party.27 The Foreign Economic Contract Law 1985 stated that
Chinese enterprises or other organisations could enter into contract with foreign parties but
this did not include private individuals.28 Later, the uniform Contract Law 1999 resolved
these issues and stated that parties to a contract may include natural persons, corporations
and other organisations.29

Differences in the administration of contract law vividly illustrate the difficulties
westerners confront when making business deals in China. In most western countries a
signed contract is generally legally binding. In China, most major contracts must be
approved by the government. For example, the Association of Light Industries approves
contracts signed in the leather, furniture, and clothing industries. 30 Failure to obtain this
approval renders a signed contract null and void. Because of these uncertainties, negotiating
with potential joint venture partners can be extraordinarily difficult. Foreigners are never
certain that a contract provision once agreed upon will not be amended unilaterally by the
Chinese partner.

27

<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法>> [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign
Equity Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order
No 48, 15 March 2001.
28
<<中华人民共和国涉外经济合同法>> [Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People’s Republic of
China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 1 July 1985.
29
<<中华人民共和国合同法>> [Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 15, 1 October 1999 (passed on 15 March 1999 at the 2nd
Session of the 9th National People’s Congress and effective from 1 October 1999), art 2.
30
<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法>> [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign
Equity Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order
No 48, 15 March 2001, arts 2, 3; <<关于外国（地区）企业在中国境内从事生产经营活动登记管理办法
>> [Administrative Measures Concerning Registration for Enterprises from Foreign Countries (Regions)
Engaging in Operational Activities in China] (People’s Republic of China) State Administration for Industry
and Commerce, Order No 10, 15 August 1992, art 2.
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This situation arises largely because of fundamentally different attitudes toward a business
contract. The westerner views it as a future commitment.31 The Chinese counterpart sees it
as a description of the current situation and merely a plan for the future.32 According to the
latter, the contract needs to be updated and modified as the situation changes. The problems
arising from this basic difference in perception are compounded by the fact that, in practical
terms, foreigners have little effective recourse to Chinese courts in disputes over such
matters sometimes due to the unavailability of updated policies or language obstacles. 33 All
these factors contribute to the dilemma facing even the largest, most important investors in
China: how to develop a long-term corporate strategy in a business climate where contracts
can be overturned at the whim of the central authorities or, in some cases by the Chinese
partner, and where overtly preferential treatment is given to investors with the best
‘Guanxi’.34

Efforts by the Chinese government to tighten up the rules that govern business
transactions are often precise on paper but vague in implementation. In 1994, China’s first
Company Law 1993 took effect.35 This law established regulation of securities, accounting
rules, and enforcement of judicial decisions. It also provides for limited liability. This
would surely appear to be a step in the right direction, but the absence of a body of case law

31

Roderick W Macneil, ‘Contract in China: Law, Practice and Dispute Resolution’ (1986) 38 Stanford Law
Review 303, 321.
32
Mike Saxon, American’s Guide to Doing Business in China: Negotiating Contracts and Agreements,
Understanding Culture and Customs, Marketing Products and Services (Adams Media, 2006) 191–6.
33
Serena Liu, ‘Structuration of Information Control in China’ (2011) 5 Cultural Sociology 323, 339.
34
(关系) [Guanxi] literally means ‘relationships’ and stands for any type of relationship. In the Chinese
business world, however, it is also understood to mean the network of relationships among various parties that
cooperate and support one another.
35
<<中华人民共和国公司法>> [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 42, 1 January 2006. It was issued on 29 December 1993,
amended on 25 December 1999, 28 August 2004 and 27 October 2005. This law became effective on 1
January 2006.
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makes it only a modest start. In order to resolve some difficulties arising in the course of
implementation, the People’s Supreme Court published an interpretation of matters related
to the application of the Company Law 1993.36

Such uncertainty in the business climate is especially treacherous for foreigners who
lack the language and cultural skills necessary to negotiate creatively with their Chinese
partners. Contracts between foreigners and mainland Chinese investors do not possess the
implicit guarantees of performance contained in those signed by members of the ‘bamboo
network,’37 wherein repeated interaction facilitates trust. Because of this, western firms are
strongly inclined to invest in short-term, low-risk projects, a fact that creates a further
advantage for overseas Chinese entrepreneurs.

7.3.1 Foreign Investment Related Contracts
One of the purposes of the new unified Contract Law 1999 was to accord the same
treatment to domestic and foreign contracts. However, parties to a foreign investment
contract remain free to choose foreign law to determine contractual disputes,38 unless any
law requires otherwise.39

36

<<最高人民法院关于适用<中华人民共和国公司法>若干问题的规定(一)>> [Provisions Concerning
Several Issues of Application of Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) Supreme People’s Court, Order No 3, 27 March 2006.
37
Murray Weidenbaum and Samuel Hughes, Bamboo Network: How Expatriate Chinese Entrepreneurs Are
Creating a New Economic Superpower in Asia (Martin Kessler Books Free Press, 1996) 1. Following in the
tradition of generations of expatriate Chinese merchants, they began establishing small business. Today these
small businesses have expanded into conglomerate business empires. Entrusting corporate divisions almost
exclusively to relatives, and dealing extensively with fellow expatriates, these entrepreneurs have formed
close-knit and formidable business spheres throughout South-east Asia that are collectively called the
‘Bamboo Network’.
38
<<China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Rules>> (People’s Republic of China)
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade and China Chamber of International Commerce, 11
January 2005, art 49. Article 49 promulgates the execution of the award. Where one party fails to execute the
award, the other party may apply to a competent Chinese court for enforcement of the award pursuant to
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The General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC 1986 utilises two concepts: foreign civil
relationship40 and foreign contract.41 Foreign civil relationships, according to an Opinion of
the Supreme People’s Court (for Trial Implementation) on the PRC General Principles of
Civil Law,42 are those where one or both of the parties are non-Chinese entities, where the
subject matter is located overseas, or where the facts — whereby the relationship is created,
altered or terminated — take place overseas.

The concept of a foreign economic contract under the existing law is a narrower
one, consisting of only those contracts made between a PRC and a non-PRC entity.43 It
appears that, until further detailed rules have been made to provide otherwise, the narrower
concept remains applicable to foreign contracts under the new law.

Joint venture companies and wholly foreign-owned enterprises established in China
are not foreign entities,44 and their contracts with another Chinese entity must be governed
by Chinese laws.

Chinese laws, or apply to a competent court for enforcement of the award according to the 1958 United
Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards or other international
treaties acceded to or concluded by China.
39
<<中华人民共和国合同法>> [Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 15, 1 October 1999, art 126.
40
<<中华人民共和国民法通则>> [General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 12 April 1986, art 142.
41
Ibid art 145.
42
<<最高人民法院关于贯彻执行<中华人民共和国民法通则>若干问题的意见(试行)>> [An Opinion of
the Supreme People’s Court (Trial Implementation) on General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme People’s Court, 26 January 1988, [178].
43
<<最高人民法院关于适用<中华人民共和国涉外经济合同法>若干问题的解答>> [Explanation of the
Supreme People’s Court on Certain Questions Relating to the Application of the Foreign Economic Contract
Law] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme People’s Court, Order No 27, 19 October 1987.
44
<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法实施条例>> [Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of
the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No
311, 22 July 2001, art 2; <<中华人民共和国外资企业法>> [Law of the People’s Republic of China on
Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing
Committee, Order No 41, 31 October 2000, art 8; <<中华人民共和国中外合作经营企业法实施细则>>
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The categorisation of contractual disputes in which a foreign law may be chosen to apply
was given a generous meaning in the above explanation by the Supreme People’s Court and
includes disputes as to the making, interpretation of the contents, performance, liability for
breach, alteration, transfer, suspension, discharge or termination of a contract. 45 But parties
cannot ignore the new law when the contract has provided for a foreign governing law as
some of the provisions of the new law will still apply. Sino-foreign equity and co-operative
joint venture contracts, and Sino-foreign co-operative contracts for the prospecting and
exploitation of natural resources, to be performed in China, are governed by PRC laws.46
Questions as to the ownership, transfer, leasing, mortgage and use of immovable properties
are governed by the law of the country where the property is located. The Supreme
People’s Court issued the Provisions Concerning Application of Laws for Several Issues in
the Trial of Cases of Foreign related Civil or Commercial Contractual Disputes 2007 and
specified that in matters related to immovable properties, the principle of closest connection
applies which means that laws related to the location of the properties shall apply. 47

[Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign
Cooperative Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No 6, 7 August 1995, art 4.
45
<<最高人民法院关于审理涉外民事或商事合同纠纷案件法律适用若干问题的规定>> [Provisions
Concerning Application of Laws for Several Issues in the Trial of Cases of Foreign Related Civil or
Commercial Contractual Disputes] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme People’s Court, Order No 14, 11
June 2007, art 2. This provision deals with foreign related civil or commercial contractual dispute matters and
which substantial laws should apply. Article 2 of this provision specifies that contract disputes include those
related to formation of contract, validity of contract, performance of contract, alteration of contract, transfer of
contract, termination of contract, and breach of contract.
46
<<中华人民共和国合同法 >> [Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 15, 1 October 1999, art 126; <<最高人民法院关于审理涉外
民事或商事合同纠纷案件法律适用若干问题的规定>> [Provisions Concerning Application of Laws for
Several Issues in the Trial of Cases of Foreign related Civil or Commercial Contractual Disputes] (People’s
Republic of China) Supreme People’s Court, Order No 14, 11 June 2007, art 8.
47
<<最高人民法院关于贯彻执行<中华人民共和国民法通则>若干问题的意见(试行)>> [An Opinion of
the Supreme People’s Court (Trial Implementation) on General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme People’s Court, 26 January 1988, [186]; <<最高人
民法院关于审理涉外民事或商事合同纠纷案件法律适用若干问题的规定>> [Provisions Concerning
Application of Laws for Several Issues in the Trial of Cases of Foreign related Civil or Commercial
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7.3.2 Government Contracts
A basic question raised by representatives at the National People’s Congress was whether
the new law applied to a contract between the government and a company or individual.
One view was that the new law should apply if the contract was made in the course of the
government’s economic activities. Article 2 of the new Contract Law 1999 simply defines a
contract as one made between natural persons, legal persons and other organisations if the
two parties are of equal status or standing. 48 In the instances where the government is
entering a contract this means that the government does not exercise its sovereignty as a
state, but rather as an entity in the private law regime. In this case the new Contract Law
1999 applies. If it is an administrative act of the government then it is not governed by the
Contract Law 1999. Parties that contract with the government will now have to try to cover
this point in their agreement.

There is a broad range of administrative contracts in China. For example, contracts
in respect of state-owned land-use utilise ‘rights transfer contracts’, contracts for public
works utilise ‘executive employment contracts’.49 The state-owned land-use rights transfer
contracts are granted in order to comply with the national land policy and the performance
of such contracts is subject to the command and supervision of the land administrative

Contractual Disputes] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme People’s Court, Order No 14, 11 June 2007, art
5[4].
48
<<中华人民共和国合同法>> [Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 15, 1 October 1999, art 2.
49
<<中国人民共和国城市房地产管理法>> [Law on Administration of the Urban Real Estate of the
People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 5
July 1994, arts 7, 8, 9, 14; <<城镇国有土地使用权出让和转让暂行条例>> [Interim Ordinance Concerning
Transfer of Urban State-Owned Land Use Right] (People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No 55,
19 May 1990, arts 7–8; <<中华人民共和国劳动合同法>> [Labour Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 65, 29 June 2007,
art 2.
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authorities with respect to the land use and duration of the grant. Any breach of these
contracts would be susceptible to penalties imposed by the authorities.50

In these types of administrative contracts, where there is a specific law or regulation,
the specific law prevails. But in the absence of any specific law or regulation governing
such contracts, the Contract Law 1999 applies. The specific laws and administrative
regulations referred to include but are not limited to the Law on Administration of the
Urban Real Estate 1994, Interim Regulations Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of
the Rights to Use of the State-Owned Construction Land Use Right through Bid Invitation,
Auction and Quotation 2007.51

7.3.3 Interpretation of Contracts
For a long time in Chinese legal history, the rules on contract interpretation had been
inadequate. In ancient China, the ‘Yamen’52 combined both the administrative and judicial
power and there was no single judicial unit.53 The judge, who was the head of ‘Yamen’ was
also the Governor and did not, in ancient China’s history, need specific contract
interpretation rules.54
Even in the contract laws in 1980s, the doctrine of contract interpretation had not
50

<<中国人民共和国城市房地产管理法>> [Law on Administration of the Urban Real Estate of the
People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 5
July 1994, art 65.
51
<<招标拍卖挂牌出让国有建设用地使用权规定>> [Interim Regulations Concerning the Assignment and
Transfer of Rights to Use of the State-Owned Construction Land Use Right through Bid Invitation, Auction
and Quotation] (People’s Republic of China) Ministry of National Resources, Order No 39, 21 September
2007.
52
‘Yamen’ in Chinese pinyin is any local office and residence of a bureaucrat of the Chinese Empire. The
term has been widely used in China for centuries. Within the ‘Yamen’, the bureaucrat administered the
government business of the town or region. Typical responsibilities of the bureaucrat included local finance,
capital works, judging of civil and criminal cases, and issuing decrees and policies.
53
Philip C C Huang, Civil Justice in China: Representation and Practice in the Qing (Stanford University
Press, 1996) 185–9.
54
Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law above n 2, 219–22.
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been adopted. The Contract Law 1999 was the first time that interpretation rules were
written into Chinese law. The two primary functions of the interpretation rules are to
determine ambiguities in the contract and to supplement the contract in respect of any
omissions. In the Contract Law 1999, there are three provisions to serve these two
functions. Article 125 is a specific rule to deal with the ambiguities, Article 41 sets down
the rule of contra proferentem and Article 62 appeared to attempt to serve both functions.
As has been widely accepted in China, the contractual obligations arise primarily
from the agreement of the parties. Interpretation is thus the means of defining the scope of
contractual obligations under the principle of party autonomy. 55 The function and role of
the judges, during this process, is to seek the true meaning which the contractual parties had
agreed. 56 Article 125 thus acknowledges that an interpretation is to determine the ‘true
meaning’ and the ‘true meaning’ should be sought by reference to the relevant provisions of
contract, their purpose, transaction usage and the principle of good faith.
However, this provision is too vague to be implemented by the judges in practice.
The case of Shenzhen Bai Industrial Corporation Limited v Zhongjian Construction Pty
Limited Shenzhen Branch Company and Zhongjian Corporation Pty Limited Contract
Dispute 57 is an example of defining party’s obligation under the principal of party
autonomy. Shenzhen Bai Industrial Corporation Limited (Plaintiff) took legal action against
Zhongjian Construction Pty Limited Shenzhen Branch Company and Zhongjian

55

王利明 [Wang Liming],<<合同法研究第一卷>> [Studies in Contract Law vol 1] (中国人民大学出版社
[People’s University of China Press], 2002) 405–12.
56
江平 [Jiang Ping], 中国新合同法全书 [Encyclopedia of Contract Law of China] (中国人民公安大学出版
社 [People’s Public Security University Press], 1999) 205–7.
57
<<深圳百实业有限公司诉中建工程有限公司深圳分公司和中建工程有限公司购销合同纠纷案>>
[Shenzhen Bai Industrial Corporation Limited v Zhongjian Construction Pty Limited Shenzhen Branch
Company and Zhongjian Corporation Pty Limited Contract Dispute] 深圳 罗湖区人 民法院 [Shenzhen
Municipal Luohu District People’s Court] (2009) 深罗法民二初字第 8 号 [(2009) Civil Trial No 8].
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Corporation Pty Limited (Defendants) to Shenzhen Luohu District People’s Court on the
ground of a claim for payment of RMB337,658 (USD52,000) and contractual fine
RMB75,635.39 (USD11,600) based on their goods supply contract in January 2008. 58 The
Luohu District Court found the fact that the plaintiff and defendant had signed a contract
through which the plaintiff supplied concrete to the defendant in January 2008 and that both
parties agreed upon price, quantity and payment arrangements in the contract. 59 The
plaintiff performed the contract accordingly and the defendant received the supplied
concrete. However, a dispute occurred when both parties conducted account settlement. As
a result the defendant refused to pay the claimed amount arguing that there was fault in the
quality of the concrete supplied by the plaintiff causing construction problems. 60 The
plaintiff provided evidence to the court including a contract signed by both parties, quantity
receipts and an account settlement sheet signed by the defendant’s managerial staff Mr
Guan. 61 The defendant argued that the quality of the concrete was not good as cracks
appeared in the construction and denied Mr Guan’s signature represented the company. 62
However, the defendant failed to provide evidence to the court within the required period.
The Luohu District Court’s judgment held that the contract between the parties was genuine
and represented their free will and that it was a valid contract that was binding upon the
parties. The defendant argued that the supplied concrete was faulty but failed to provide
evidence in support of that claim. The Court held that Mr Guan was the responsible staff
member for all construction material in the company and that a third party had a reasonable
expectation of him acting on behalf of the company. As a result, the plaintiff’s claim was
58
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Ibid para 2.
60
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61
Ibid para 3.
62
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upheld and the defendant was ordered to pay the claimed amount to the plaintiff within ten
days.63
The defendant appealed the Luohu District People’s Court decision to the Shenzhen
Intermediate People’s Court in 2009. 64 On appeal, the appellant claimed that the final
accounts of both parties had not yet been settled. The appellant claimed that the respondent
did not supply the concrete on time and had already breached the contract. 65 Additionally,
the appellant claimed that the plaintiff had supplied faulty concrete that caused construction
problems and provided evidence to the appeal court that included expert inspection and
analysis reports on the quality and strength of the concrete. The appellant argued that Mr
Guan’s signature on the settlement sheet did not represent the appellant and that the
decision of Luohu District Court should be dismissed.66
The Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court found that the decision by the first
instance court was correct and confirmed that decision.67 The Court found that, according
to the arrangement in the contract, both parties agreed that the procedure of accepting the
concrete was to be conducted by Mr He. However, Mr Guan was the chief responsible
person in the company and that his signature on the settlement sheet should be regarded as
an authority from the appellant.68 The Court found that appellant’s provision of evidence of
expert reports to the appeal court was not new evidence and the appellant had failed to

63

Ibid 4.
<<中建工程有限公司深圳分公司和中建工程有限公司诉深圳百实业有限公司购销合同纠纷上诉案>>
[Zhongjian Construction Pty Limited Shenzhen Branch and Zhongjian Construction Pty Limited v Shenzhen
Bai Industrial Corporation Limited Contractual Dispute Appeal] 深 圳 市 中 级 人 民 法 院 [Shenzhen
Intermediate People’s Court] (2009) 深中法民二终字第 989 号 [(2009) Civil Appeal No 989].
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Ibid para 3.
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Ibid para 6.
68
Ibid.
64

293

Ch 7: Development of Contract Law in China

satisfy its burden of proof in the first instance so the appeal was not upheld. 69 The
Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the
Luohu District People’s Court.70
The main features in this case involve a number of questions, including validity of
the contract, performance of the contract and breach of the contract. According to Articles
107 and 130 of the Contract Law 1999, where one of the parties of the contract did not
perform the contract or performed the contract contrary to the arrangement, it is deemed to
be breach of the contract.71 In this case, the contract between the parties was genuine and
signed in good faith. Both courts confirmed the validity of the contract. 72 The defendant’s
failure to pay the plaintiff constituted breach of contract. 73 According to the Company Law
2006, Zhongjian Construction Pty Limited Shenzhen Branch was not a legal person
therefore its parent company, Zhongjian Construction Pty Limited was jointly liable to pay
the claimed amount to the plaintiff.74
The Contract Law 1999 has an interesting provision on the resolution of
inconsistencies between two language versions of a contract. If the two versions are agreed
to have equal validity, the words used in the two versions are to be regarded as having the
69

Ibid.
Ibid para 7.
71
<<中华人民共和国合同法>> [Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 15, 1 October 1999, arts 107, 130.
72
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[Shenzhen Bai Industrial Corporation Limited v Zhongjian Construction Pty Limited Shenzhen Branch
Company and Zhongjian Corporation Pty Limited Contract Dispute] 深圳 罗湖区人 民法院 [Shenzhen
Municipal Luohu District People’s Court] (2009) 深罗法民二初字第 8 号 [(2009) Civil Trial No 8]; <<中建
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[Zhongjian Construction Pty Limited Shenzhen Branch and Zhongjian Construction Pty Limited v Shenzhen
Bai Industrial Corporation Limited Contractual Dispute Appeal] 深 圳 市 中 级 人 民 法 院 [Shenzhen
Intermediate People’s Court] (2009) 深中法民二终字第 989 号 [(2009) Civil Appeal No 989].
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<<中华人民共和国合同法>> [Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 15, 1 October 1999, art 130.
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<<中华人民共和国公司法>> [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 42, 1 January 2006, art 14.
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same meaning. If the words used are nevertheless inconsistent, they will be interpreted
according to the purpose of the contract.75 The People’s Supreme Court exercises its power
to interpret the meaning of particular provisions in the event that a contractual dispute could
not be concluded. For example, if the parties have not committed a contract to writing or
orally but from the performance of their actions it is possible to infer that they had the
intention to conclude a contract then the People’s Court may hold that a contract was
concluded ‘in another form’ as specified in the first paragraph of Article 10 of the Contract
Law 1999, unless otherwise provided in law.76

7.3.4 Problems addressed by the New Contract Law 1999
‘Triangular debts’ are often problematic and Article 73 of the Contract Law 1999 was said
to facilitate dispute resolution in such matters.77 The Article provides that a creditor may
apply to the court to collect a debt due to the debtor from a third party, if the debtor delays
in collecting an amount due from the third party. This might suggest that the third party will
be required to pay the creditor directly. But the position is not entirely clear.

The legislation does not contain an express requirement to firstly obtain a judgment
against the debtor but presumably the creditor needs to prove its debt if it is to succeed.78
However, in the process of execution of a judgment, if the debtor has delayed collecting
amounts due from third parties, the enforcement division of the court can exercise its power
75

<<中华人民共和国合同法>> [Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 15, 1 October 1999, art 125.
76
<<最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国合同法》若干问题的解释>> [Interpretation on Several
Issues Concerning the Application of Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) Supreme People’s Court, Order No 5, 9 February 2009, art 2.
77
Ibid art 73.
78
<<中华人民共和国民法通则>> [General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 1 January 1987 (adopted by the 4 th Session of the
6th National People’s Congress on 12 April 1986 and came into force on 1 January 1987), art 84.
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to freeze the debtor’s accounts until the debtor pays the debt. 79 Article 223 of the PRC Civil
Procedure Law 2008 already empowers the court to seize a judgment debtor’s assets,
including income, to satisfy a judgment.80

By way of exception, Article 73 of the Contract Law 1999 introduces the concept of
a debt that belongs to the debtor personally. 81 For example, A is a debtor of creditor B. A is
also a creditor of another personal debtor C which is due. If the debtor A fails to claim this
obligatory right in order to fulfill the debt owed to B, the contract law gives the right to B to
exercise A’s right to claim the debt from C. There is no explanation of which kinds of debt
fit this category. This concept would be novel to lawyers trained in common law which
does not generally regard a debt as creating a personal right or obligation incapable of
transfer or attachment, as it generally does not matter to whom money is paid.

Another concern was that there have been several serious incidents involving poorly
constructed contracts. Additionally, the question of prohibitions upon sub-contracting
needed to be addressed by the Contract Law 1999. Inconsistencies among the existing laws
were a concern which a unified law could address. Some of these inconsistencies related to
the differences between the ECL 1981 and the FECL 1985. The Contract Law 1999 was
intended to result in domestic and foreign contracts being accorded the same treatment. 82 In
the last twenty years China has developed its policies in respect of equal treatment to

79

<<中华人民共和国民事诉讼法>> [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s
Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 75, 1 April 2008, art 220.
80
Ibid art 223.
81
<<中华人民共和国合同法>> [Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 15, 1 October 1999, art 73; <<最高人民法院关于适用<中华
人民共和国合同法>若干问题的解释(一)>> [Interpretation Concerning Several Issues of Application of
Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (1)] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme People’s Court,
Order No 19, 19 December 1999, art 11.
82
Ibid art 2.
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foreign investors. Substantial laws and procedural laws have been passed to eliminate the
gap between Chinese enterprises and foreign investors. 83 These laws state that foreign
investors’ interests are regarded as equal to Chinese enterprises and natural persons. For
example, the Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture is a legal person and has the same
rights as a Chinese enterprise.

Another welcome development was the acceptance by the NPC that an updating of
the existing laws was necessary to accommodate developments in China’s market
economy, as the existing laws, particularly the ECL 1981, were very much influenced by
concepts relevant to a planned economy. 84
But though it was strongly advocated by some, 85 the principle of freedom of
contract has not been incorporated into the Contract Law 1999. The Commission on
Legislative Affairs was of the opinion that it was inappropriate to simply state the principle

83

<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法>> [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign
Equity Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order
No 48, 15 March 2001, art 2; <<中华人民共和国公司法>> [Company Law of the People’s Republic of
China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, Order No 42, 1 January 2006, art 2; <<中华
人民共和国民法通则>> [General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s
Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 1 January 1987 (adopted by the 4 th Session of the 6th National
People’s Congress on 12 April 1986 and came into effect on 1 January 1987), arts 5, 8; <<中华人民共和国
民事诉讼法>> [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China)
National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 75, 1 April 2008, art 5; <<中华人民共和国行政
诉讼法>> [Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China)
National People’s Congress, 4 April 1989, arts 70–71.
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<<中华人民共和国合同法>> [Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 15, 1 October 1999 (passed on 15 March at the 2nd Session of
the 9th National People’s Congress and effective from 1 October 1999), art 13.
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谢怀 [Xie Huai], ‘新合同法笔谈’ [New Contract Law Talks]
<http://www.gsrtvu.edu.cn/library/%B7%A8%C2%C9%B7%A8%B9%E6/LWJC/MSF/1285.htm>; 梁慧星
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in the law.86 The new law states instead that parties have a right, of their own free will and
free from interference by any unit or person, to enter into contracts according to law. 87 This
is not the same as providing for the binding effect of the contents of a contract. The new
law also has a provision empowering the State Administration of Industry and Commerce
and other relevant government departments to supervise contracts, within the scope of the
department’s jurisdiction, in order to deal with illegal activities that injure the national or
social interests.88 The intention was to prevent the loss of state-owned assets, and to reduce
and prevent fraud.89

An interesting example of realism was the resolution of the issue of whether oral
contracts should be given legal force. The proposition was that such oral contracts were
hard to prove and so the law should require contracts to be made only in writing, in order to
avoid dispute. However, to refuse legal recognition of orally made contracts did not help in
the solution of ensuing problems.

7.4

Approval and Registration of Contracts

If approval or registration is required by a law or administrative regulation in relation to the
effectiveness, transfer or termination of a contract, that requirement must be complied

86

<< 关 于 修 改 经 济 合 同 法 的 决 定 >> [Decision Concerning Amendment of Economic Contract Law]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 2 September 1993.
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Ibid art 4.
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Ibid art 127.
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<<中华人民共和国合同法>> [Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 15, 1 October 1999, art 54; <<最高人民法院关于贯彻执行<
中华人民共和国民法通则>若干问题的意见(试行)>> [An opinion of the Supreme People’s Court (Trial
Implementation) on the General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s
Republic of China) Supreme People’s Court, 26 January 1988, art 68.
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with.90 However, to deprive a contract of effect, a law or administrative regulation may
need to state the requirement specifically. A mere requirement of approval or registration
may not have such an effect. On 13 May 2009, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued
an Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of the Contract Law (2)
(Interpretation)91 that aimed to clarify some of the vague and controversial provisions in
the existing Contract Law 1999. The Interpretation covers aspects of the formation,
validity, performance, termination of a contract and liabilities for breach of contract. Article
8 of the Interpretation provides that if a contract requires approval or registration under any
law or administrative provisions before it becomes effective and, if the responsible party
fails to apply for such approval or registration, such failure shall be deemed to be ‘actions
which violate the principals of honesty and creditworthiness’ under Article 42(3) of the
Contract Law 1999. The Court can then order the other innocent party to apply for
registration or approval on its own and the responsible party shall be liable for losses and
expenses as a result of its failure.

This provision is important as many agreements in China are required to be
registered with or to gain approval from the relevant authorities in order to take effect.
These include joint venture contracts, loan agreements with foreign banks or mortgages
involving foreign source funds. This provision will provide wider protection to foreign
parties who will now be able to complete the registration or approval process on their own.

90

<<中华人民共和国合同法>> [Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 15, 1 October 1999. It was passed on 15 March at the 2nd
Session of the 9th National People’s Congress and was effective from 1 October 1999, arts 44, 87, 96.
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Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Regarding the Application of the Contract Law (2)] (People’s
Republic of China) Supreme People’s Court, Order No 5, 9 February 2009.
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However, it is unclear whether the relevant authorities will entertain such unilateral
submission by one party to the agreement.92

7.4.1

Approval Requirements for Foreign Investment

The Ministry of Commerce of People’s Republic of China (MOC),93 which is empowered
by the State Council, exercises a power to approve a project involving foreign investment
in China. The State Council is the organisation with the greatest administrative power and
is a powerful part of the Central Government in China. According to the Constitution of the
PRC, the functions and powers of the State Council allow it to perform the following
legislative activities:
i)

To adopt administrative measures, enact administrative rules and regulations and make
decisions and orders in accordance with the Constitution and the law;

ii)

To submit proposals to the NPC or its Standing Committee;

iii)

To issue rules governing administrative affairs in respect of national economic and social
development, the state budget, urban and rural development, education, science, culture,
public health, sports, population control, internal affairs, public security, judicial
administration and national defence;

iv)

To alter or annul inappropriate orders, directives and regulations issued by the Ministries
94

or Commissions.

This exercise of the executive power is the most significant power in relation to
administrative and legislative functions with respect to foreign investment. The procedural
requirements related to approval, registration, and form selection are some of the effects of
this executive power. As Mo states:

92

Ibid.
Ministry of Commerce of People’s Republic of China replaced the Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) in 2003.
94
<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China)
National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, art 89.
93
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An inseparable part of the legal framework for foreign investment is the power to approve
foreign investment proposals. In China, this power is exercised by relevant government
departments.95

It is a measure of the importance to the PRC of every aspect of foreign investment,
including its monitoring and future directions, that the government at the highest levels
retains such overview and control.
The regulations for the Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the PRC
on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 1995 96 stipulate that the establishment of a joint
venture in China is subject to examination and approval by the MOC. The source of the
foreign investments is examined as a practical general standard. If the investment comes
from outside the territory of China, it is usually characterised as a foreign investment even
if it originates from Chinese nationals or companies. A corporation is created or registered
through the State Administration for Industry and Commerce by obtaining initial approval
from the Ministry of Commerce.97
The MOC, which is in charge of examining and approving a proposed foreign
investment project and registrations of companies and business organisations, will examine
the substantive validity of all the application documents and the incorporation
documentation. 98 The State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC) will not
approve the application unless it is satisfied with the procedural and substantive validity of
the information in the document, including but not limited to, the company name, the
business purpose, the qualification of the legal representative, the qualifications of directors
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John S. Mo, International Commercial Law (Butterworths, 1997) 453.
<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法实施条例>> [Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of
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311, 22 July 2001, art 6.
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and the supervisors.99 Furthermore, any later changes to the registered information are only
effective upon the approval of the relevant registration authorities.100
Upon approval of a joint venture, MOC issues an Approval Certificate. 101
Alternatively, the people’s governments at the provincial and local levels and including
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government,
or relevant ministries or bureaux under the State Council, (referred to as ‘the entrusted
office’) may be entrusted with the power to examine and approve the establishment of joint
ventures that comply with the undermentioned conditions.102 The establishment of foreign
investment is subject to certain procedural requirements. For example, the parties need
preliminary approval from the relevant government authority or local government before
formally applying for approval.103 For example, a foreign investment proposal involving
real estate development requires the approval of a transfer of the land-use right contract
from the Administrative Bureau of Land of the municipal level government before the
project application for approval certificate from the Ministry of Commerce and its
authorised departments can be granted. The parties are also required to submit a feasibility
study on the proposed project for the purpose of demonstrating its benefits to the Chinese

99

Ibid art 7.
Anyuan Yuan, ‘Foreign Direct Investments in China — Practical Problems of Complying with China’s
Company Law and Laws for Foreign-Invested Enterprises’ (2000) 20 Northwestern Journal of International
Law and Business 475, 482.
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China) State Council, Order No 6, 7 August 1995, art 5 ; <<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法实施条例
>> [Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures]
(People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No 311, 22 July 2001, art 6;
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economy and providing evidence of their ability to carry out the project. 104 If a project is
deemed to be strategically important to the Chinese, the government is likely to delay
approval of the project until some form of Chinese control is secured in the project.105 On
the other hand, the government may choose to seek substantial benefits promised by a joint
venture at the expense of losing control of the venture to foreign interests. For example,
when a Chinese party with 51 per cent share in a Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture is
planning to sell all its shares to the foreign investor, such transfer of shares will change the
Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture to a Foreign Wholly Owned Enterprise. According to
the Guideline Catalogue of Foreign Investment Industries 2007, some industries are
prohibited from participation in a Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise. 106 Therefore, such a
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(People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No 311, 22 July 2001, art 3;
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transfer can be successful only if approval is granted by the Ministry of Foreign Economic
and Trade Cooperation.107
From these approval procedural requirements, the power is exercised by relevant
government departments. The common feature of the review authorities is that the power so
exercised is part of the executive power and is confined to the power of the relevant local
government in the Chinese political hierarchy. It is an inseparable part of the legal
framework for foreign investment.

7.4.2

The Registration Procedure

The Joint Venture Law 1995 states that the registering body for joint ventures is the SAIC
or any of its local and regional bureaux. Joint Ventures must register within 30 days of
receiving the approval certificate. This is in accordance with the provisions of the Measures
of the People’s Republic of China for the Administration of the Registration of ChineseForeign Equity Joint Ventures.108 The SAIC approves or rejects the registration within one
month of receipt of the application documents. 109 When approved, a business licence is
issued and joint venture operations can commence on the same day.110
If a joint venture desires vary its operation in such ways as: moving to a new
geographic site; varying or transferring its registered capital; or extending the contract
period, it must, along with the requisite approval documents, register the changes with the
107
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109
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SAIC where the joint venture is located.111 In instances where the chairman of the board of
directors or the general manager is changed, the joint venture must immediately register the
change and ensure that the business licence is amended. 112 These procedural administrative
steps require attention and time from the managing personnel and constitute a cost to the
joint venture.

7.5

The Enforcement of Contracts

Since the promulgation of the Contract Law 1999, the issue of contractual enforcement has
been a central focus along with other issues.113 Dispute resolution mechanisms are often
utilised as contractual enforcement either to compel performance in the face of actual or
threatened non-performance or to address damages or other remedies for failed
performance. Traditional methods of dispute resolution include mediation, arbitration,
litigation and injunctive relief and compliance with awards and judgments. The Contract
Law 1999 promulgates a range of detailed provisions to ensure contractual enforcement.
For instance, Article 12 provides standard forms of contract to ensure that contractual
parties cover every detail of the business arrangement from the formation of the contract,
performance of contract, termination, remedies for breach of contract and so on.

The Chinese view of contract formation is quite inconsistent with the western
conception of a finalised contract. Foreign investors often find it difficult to enforce even
111

<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业登记管理办法>> [Measures of the People’s Republic of China for
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Mo Zhang, Chinese Contract Law: Theory and Practice (Brill Academic Publishers, 2006) 1. Issues that
must be dealt with for foreign partners doing business in China include, among others, whether China has a
sound legal system, whether private interests will be protected effectively under the socialist system of China
and whether a contract will be honoured and enforced in China.
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simple, implicit contracts. Most firms entering China are not accustomed to doing business
without clear contracts. Pattison and Herron point out:

Westerners view contract formation as the culmination of a negotiating process and period.
The contract is the ‘end result’. From the Chinese perspective, the ‘final’ contract signifies
that a relationship exists and terms-negotiations may now continue. The ‘final’ contract
signals the beginning for real contract negotiations.114

Ahlstrom, Young, Law and Law give some historical explanation of this contradictory
conception referring to the infancy of Chinese contract law when compared to the long
established contract law tradition in the West suggesting:
China launched its Economic Reform and Open Door Policy in the late 1970s, drawing
many foreign firms to its shores. However, most firms knew little about doing business in
China and less about the way in which it’s institutional and legal structure could affect a
firm’s success. Many were surprised by the lack of legal infrastructure and commercial
tradition to guide business transactions. The institutional environment, including property
rights, contract law, company law and arbitration and numerous commercial customs differ
considerably from that of the West, and this has a number of implications for firms and
investors as they move into China.115

Jenner adds further historical context to the emergence of modern contract law in China:
Traditionally, it is expected that the guilds, clan organisations, and other non-governmental
groups resolve contract disputes and decide when the end of an agreement will be supported
or maintained. The courts would get involved only as a last resort, usually in response to the
116
seizure of property or disorderly behaviour.

After economic reforms began in the late 1970s, contract enforcement once again
became an important issue as commercial activity started to expand outside the state-owned
sector. Traditionally, guild and clan associations play an important role for the enforcement
of contracts. 117 As a result, contracts were not well codified, and people in China
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Patricia Pattison and Daniel Herron, ‘The Mountains are High and the Emperor is Far Away: Sanctity of
Contract in China’ (2003) 40 American Business Law Journal 459, 460.
115
David Ahlstrom et al, ‘Managing the Institutional Environment: Challenges for Foreign Firms in Post
WTO China’ (2003) 68 SAM Advanced Management Journal 41, 42.
116
William J F Jenner, The Tyranny of History: The Roots of China’s Crisis (Allen Lane, 1992) 98.
117
Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial Law above n 3, 37; David Ahlstorm et al, ‘Managing the Institutional
Environment: Challenges for Foreign Firms in Post WTO China (2003) 68 SAM Advanced Management
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traditionally accept this degree of ambiguity. 118 The uniform Contract Law was enacted in
1999 in order to bring Chinese business practice into some kind of conformity and
consistency. Failure to fulfil contractual obligations is still a common contract dispute. It is
said that in China signing a contract signifies the beginning of negotiations. 119 How
contracts are dealt with and treated in the general business culture will be another matter.
For example, foreign investors contracting a business with Chinese partners, would have a
different attitude towards performance of contract. Foreigners may expect every step in the
contract to be followed to the letter while the Chinese parties would possibly view the
contractual arrangement with more flexibility because the Chinese see a contract as an
intention of doing business together rather than detailed requirements of the business
activities.120 From this point of view, enforcement of contract might involve more than just
the dispute resolution system itself.

Even though the availability and effectiveness of such dispute resolution forms a
critical component of contract enforcement, effective contract enforcement should be
considered on a broader systematic basis. It should include not only the overall contractual
arrangement and its context but also the existence of a traditional contractual legal
environment including the broader relationship between the parties and attitudes towards
contractual relationships. China is seeking to create a business-friendly environment

Journal 41, 42; Carol H Shiue and Wolfgang Keller, ‘Markets in China and Europe on the Eve of the
Industrial Revolution’ (2007) 97 The American Economic Review 1189, 1216.
118
Mingjer Chen, Inside Chinese Business: A Guide for Managers and Worldwide (Harvard Business Press,
2001) 142.
119
Camille Schuster, ‘How to Manage a Contract in China’ (2005) 107 Business Credit 69, 69.
120
Jonathan Reuvid and Yong Li, Doing Business with China: A Guide to Investment Opportunities and
Business Practice (GMB Publishing, 2006) 32; Chunlin Leonhard, ‘Beyond the Four Corners of a Written
Contract: A Global Challenge to US Contract Law’ (February 2008) A paper prepared after the Conference of
Asian Pacific American Law Faculty, 9
<http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=chunlin_leonhard&sei-redir=1>.
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characterised by predictable legal enforcement of contract rights. Significant efforts have
been made to develop a national business atmosphere in which contract enforcement is
reliable and consistent with international commercial standards and practice.121

Nevertheless, prospective foreign investors should be aware that from a cultural
perspective, informal dispute resolution tends to be more consistent with important
elements of Chinese culture and tradition including Confucian ethics and the characteristic
desire for harmony. The Chinese view of dispute resolution is grounded in Confucian
ethics. 122 The underlying principle of Chinese cosmology is harmony with nature and
among persons. 123 Confucian ethics promotes several cardinal relationships — between
father and son, ruler and subject, husband and wife, elder and younger brother, and friends
— in order to achieve stable social order. The Chinese characteristic of non-litigiousness
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. There is a marked preference to resolve
disputes through alternative dispute resolution methods rather than through litigation. 124 In
fact, most business contracts in China include a clause stipulating that negotiation should be
employed before other dispute settlement mechanisms are pursued.125 Cultural realities and
other considerations explain why informal dispute procedures are included in a well
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Geofrey L Master and R Terence Tung, ‘Effective Enforcement of Contract Rights in Chinese Sourcing
Contracts’ (26 March 2010) Mondaq Business Briefing [8].
122
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structured contract. For example, parties may be contractually obligated to address and
escalate matters within their respective management groups — in order to avoid or resolve
disputes without litigation — using other more formal mediation arrangements that are
legally justifiable whilst still maintaining sensitivity to Chinese cultural and social norms.
This is related to a traditional non-litigious culture for resolving commercial disputes apart
from such factors as inefficiency, cost and time.

There is often significant concern from foreign investors about whether there is
adequate legal protection for their business operation and about potential major difficulties
in the development of their business. Having studied Chinese Uniform Contract Law
(UCL) [Contract Law 1999], Gillies and Kapterian observe that:

While there are still gaps in the UCL and its application in the courts is still very new, the
enactment of a general contracts code in China is an important step in modernising China’s
contract law and commercial relationships. The general obligations which will be grounded
by the requirements of fairness and good faith will provide a basis for the development of a
contract law suitable for China’s ongoing engagement with the global economy and its
entry into the WTO. On the negative side, it may be argued that the UCL has not gone far
enough to protect the integrity of everyday commercial transactions. Provisions still allow
the government to supervise and approve contracts, and in so doing, to interfere with their
formation and transaction. The principle of freedom of contract is accordingly
126
attenuated.

The extent to which people and organisations are allowed to have very broad
freedom of contract is one that can throw up its own set of problems leading to the dilemma
in societies where the law has been deformed in practice. Perhaps the underlying reasons
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Peter Gillies and Gisele Kapterian, ‘Chinese Contract Law’ in Patricia Blazey and Kay-Wah Chan (eds),
The Chinese Commercial Legal System (Lawbook, 2008) 177, 198.
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for such deformation, as demonstrated in the case of the United States of America in recent
years,127 are substantial justification for China exercising caution.

Unfettered freedom of contract can allow excesses and contractual arrangements
that have the potential to harm others, including other organisations and even governments.
It can be argued that a government, acting responsibly, should properly exercise a measure
of control over such potential excess. Given the potentially devastating consequences of
unfettered freedom it might be suggested that the Chinese government is taking a more
responsible approach than some western law-makers. The dangers for individuals,
corporations and even governments has been demonstrated by the recent world
international economic crisis that grew out of the excesses of US financiers with apparently
little or no governmental control over their activities.

7.6

Conclusions

In light of the western view of the centrality of the contract to all types of business ventures,
this chapter has discussed in great detail the development of contract law in China over the
period of economic expansion and growth of foreign investment in the PRC.

Foreign investor involvement in the course of economic development in China has
no doubt been a significant accelerative factor for legal reform. In developing legal reform,
China has wanted to demonstrate stable economic development upon the world’s
127

Peter Schiff, ‘There is No Pain-Free Cure for Recession’ Wall Street Journal, 27 December 2008, A11
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123033898448336541.html>. Recession fears caused America to embrace
greater state control of the economy and to administer unimaginable federal deficits from 2008. With faith in
the free markets taking a back seat to fear and expediency, almost the entire political spectrum agreed at the
time that the federal government must spend whatever amount is necessary to stabilise the housing market,
bail out financial firms, restore liquidity to the credit markets, create jobs and make the recession as shallow
and brief as possible.
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competitive economic stage. Nevertheless, in the environment of very impressive annual
growth rates and enormous volumes of trade, the fact that economic transition is still under
way may easily be forgotten. Business in China can still be a risky venture for foreign
investors, especially for small and medium-scale investors with no significant political
support. Foreign investors frequently complain that contract law in China seems to be
intangible as far as its enforcement and administration are concerned. In contract disputes,
litigants raised concerns about difficulties in enforcing judicial judgments and also about
their observations that, when it is necessary for courts to adjudicate the substantive
contractual rights and obligations, it is not uncommon for Chinese courts to invalidate
private contracts, sometimes on formal grounds, thus frustrating the expectations of the
parties.128

There is no simple answer as to why existing legal mechanisms so often seem less
than satisfactory when it comes to undertaking business activity, particularly in the case of
foreign investment in China. However, the importance of the underlying political, moral
and social environments has often been neglected, even though their influence in the course
of social transformation and evolution are profound. In China, a deepening legal reform had
been promoted and undertaken since economic transformation commenced, and the
development of Contract Law has played a significant role in respect of the legal reform
process. The Chinese court system has developed to a point where it is possible to resolve
most practical contractual disputes. However, as contract laws were evolving in the 1980s,
in particular those related to foreign investment, it became obvious that there was a lack of
consistency within and between them as they applied to different fields of activity of
128
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foreign investment. Difficulties in the administration of the new laws were also being
experienced in contracts with government and the interpretation of contracts generally.

It was not surprising that the PRC government was struggling in its efforts to set in
place a system of laws that would work effectively to satisfy the needs of investors who
were familiar with western legal regimes that had been tried and tested over a great many
years. Additionally these new laws in China were to operate in a completely different
political and social environment to those operating in most western legal systems at the
time.

This study has shown that the ways that Chinese business operators conduct their
business activities is a major difficulty for the introduction of a consistent and predictable
regime of western style business laws, and there seems little doubt that this factor prevails.
The task of reversing those traditional habits has proven to be difficult to achieve; until it is
achieved, foreign investors ignore it at the risk of frustration and possible failure. The
question that arises is whether it will ever be fully achieved. It could be said that there are
features about the traditional ways that do not need to succumb to the letter of the law. If
this is to be an ongoing state of affairs, then what is required is adjustment by those foreign
investors seeking to do business with Chinese counterparts.

Registration of contracts and approval requirements have been areas where foreign
investors have been vulnerable in the past. The pre-existing reliance upon the Chinese party
to correctly complete such registrations has proved costly on occasions where proper
approval had not been granted before the business commenced. For example, J P Morgan
approached Liaoning Securities Co. Ltd, a company that was close to financial bankruptcy
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as a result of unpaid bonds for a joint venture cooperation in 2005 after encouragement
from the People’s Bank of China for that course of action. J P Morgan aimed to obtain 50
per cent share of Liaoning Securities Co. Ltd. This project failed because the 50 per cent
share proposal was not approved by the Security Supervision Commission of China. 129
Provisions of the Contract Law 1999 give nominal protection to foreign partners by
allowing them to perform the registration or approval process. However, the registration
processes are still cumbersome and subject to long delays — something that the prudent
investor needs to factor in to the overall process.

Enforcement of contracts continues to be a vexed issue in Chinese business with
foreign investors. In an attempt to address the issue the government introduced standard
forms of contract in relevant laws that encouraged the parties to address as many different
aspects of the business relationship as possible including dispute resolution processes.
However, these have had limited success. The very deeply entrenched Chinese view of the
meaning of a contract — as a starting point for a business relationship rather than the ironclad set of rules to which each party is bound — is so long established that it is not to be
easily swept aside, no matter what the written law states.

By its law reform activities China has shown that it recognises that disputes
involving foreign parties needed to be properly dealt with. In the period January to April
2010, Australian direct investment in China had reached USD644 million and China’s total
direct investment in Australia nearly USD60 billion. 130 Whilst this demonstrates that
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Australian economic investment in China has been continuing to grow since the Trade and
Economic Framework between Australia and the People’s Republic of China signed in
Canberra on 24 October 2003,131 it would also seem to indicate that Chinese investors do
not appear to experience serious impediments when investing in Australia. This may well
be the result of there being far more predictable legal and business environments in
Australia as compared to those in China For this reason, the challenges that Australian
investors are likely to face in China, in particular as they enter new industrial sectors and
regions, need to be closely examined and understood. One clear example of such challenges
is the perception that firms often must engage in transactions where personal connections
appear to be of greater importance than their Chinese partner’s operational capabilities. 132

Active economic and investment activities by Australian investors and those from
other countries in China have required legal protection for Chinese participants and for
foreign investors alike. Contract Law 1999 has provided such protection to an extent.
However, difficulties in terms of implementation and enforcement of the Contract Law
1999 remain as areas of concern for foreign investors.

Some of the practical effects of the above-mentioned factors upon western business
operators (particularly Australian business-people) in China have been assessed by direct
surveys of, and discussions with, such investors. In the following chapter, this research
encompasses the outcome of such enquiries that shows the relevance of these aspects for
foreign investors and the need for awareness of them. Whilst knowledge of the practical
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circumstances referred to in this chapter may not, of itself, provide a solution, such
knowledge can, it is suggested here, be of importance to the foreign investor in managing
its strategies in dealing with the legislative and administrative systems of the PRC.

315

Chapter 8
A Research Survey of Australian Enterprises Operating in
China
8.1

Introduction

For the purpose of acquiring knowledge as to the ways in which the legal environment in
China practically affects those who have chosen to engage in business activities in that
country, this research included enquiries with a group of Australian enterprises that were
operating in China at the time of the survey.

A secondary purpose of the survey and interviews was to ascertain whether the
responses contributed answers to two of the central questions of this study, those being (i)
whether or not social and cultural factors and differences between western business
operators and their Chinese business partners played a significant role in how Chinese laws
manifested in practical terms, and (ii) how such laws were perceived by both western and
Chinese partners.

A survey questionnaire was conducted and interviews were undertaken with the
group members. The survey sought to identify some practical, surface issues about the
foreign investment environment in China concerning aspects of the legal environment and
the administrative system. The primary research methodology involved anonymous

Ch 8: Research Survey

questionnaires followed by interviews with senior personnel of a sample of seven
companies that were operating their businesses in China. Questionnaire participants
initially responded to 35 questions in the questionnaire relating to concerns about the legal
and administrative environment in China and matters related to cross-cultural management.

Section 8.1 introduces the nature of, and reasons for, the research questionnaire and
interviews. Section 8.2 discusses the background of the economic relationship between
Australia and China, and thus the environment in which Australians enter into business
relationships with Chinese partners. Section 8.3 gives an outline of the nature of the
research survey. Section 8.4 begins to reveal how the survey responses need to be read in
light of the attitudes of Chinese partners and the cultural environment in which the business
relationship exists. In section 8.5, some major factors affecting foreign investors are
explored including the role of the Chinese bureaucracy, the value of interpersonal
connections, the issue of corruption and the interaction between formal and informal law.
Section 8.6 discusses the impact of China’s admission to the World Trade Organisation
upon foreign investors and Chinese policies. Section 8.7 summarises and concludes the
chapter.

8.2

Background of Growing Economic Interests between China and
Australia

The broad picture of the development of economic activities between China and Australia
in recent decades is the backdrop against which those Australian or Australia based
business operators have been steadily increasing since China commenced rapid economic
growth as a result of economic reform commenced in the late 1970s. Australian Bureau of
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Statistics figures for 2009 regarding Australian merchandise trade 1 with China shows that
exports to China were valued at AUD42.353 billion (USD38.128 billion), representing
growth of 31 per cent over the previous 12 months; while imports from China were
AUD35.782 billion (USD32.204 billion), representing growth of only 1.5 per cent. 2 In
merchandise trade between China and Australia in 2010, exports to China reached
AUD58.340 billion (USD52.506 billion) (a year on year growth of 37.2 per cent), and
imports from China were AUD39.249 billion (USD35.324 billion) (a year on year growth
of 9.7 per cent).3 It is evident that the trade and investment relationship between Australia
and China has developed substantially. China’s transformation has offered opportunities for
Australia. According to Australian statistics, in the 12 months to June 2009, the total value
of merchandise traded between Australia and China (imports and exports together) was
AUD76 billion. This level has grown by an average of 22% per year in the ten years to
2009, making China Australia's largest trading partner (ahead of Japan and the United
States).4
Although Australian investment is not as competitively substantial as those from the
United State of America, Japan or the European Union countries, Australian investment in

1

Australia Bureau of Statistics, ‘International Merchandise Trade, Australia, Concepts, Sources and Methods
2001’ (30 May 2001) Australia Bureau of Statistics
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/66f306f503e529a5ca25697e0017661f/A989C7DBDBC06507CA2
56A5B001BD77F?opendocument>.
In international merchandise trade statistics, the objective is to record goods entering and leaving the
economic territory of a country. In practice, what is recorded are goods that enter or leave the statistical
territory, which is the territory with respect to which data are collected. According to the UN guidelines, the
statistical territory of each country, as defined by the country itself, should constitute the basis upon which the
trading partners of each country compile their statistics of trade by countries.
2
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘China Fact Sheet’ (15 September 2010) Australian Government
<http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/chin.pdf>.
3
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘China Fact Sheet’ (June 2011) Australian Government
<http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/chin.pdf>.
4
Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Expanding Links with China and India’ (4102.0–Australian Social Trend,
Australian Bureau of Statistics, 24 September 2009)
<http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4102.0Main+Features10Sep+2009>.
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China has been rising since the 1980s. 5 For example, Australian mining giants such as BHP
Billiton and Rio Tinto have a strong presence in China.6 They include Australia’s advanced
sectors for trade and investment including mining, construction, transportation, banking,
insurance, accounting and legal services.
Also, in August 2002, the Australian Liquefied Natural Gas Corporation (ALNG)
was chosen as the resource supplier for the Guangdong LNG project for China.7 Contracted
Australian investment in China has expanded steadily in recent years. China and Australia
released a joint statement during the official visit by China’s Vice Premier Li Keqiang to
Australia (29 October 2009 to 1 November 2009). It recognised that:
The combined GDP of our two economies is greater than USD5 trillion, the two sides
agreed that China and Australia enjoy strong economic complementarity, and it serves the
common interests of both sides to advance economic, trade and investment cooperation on
the basis of reciprocity and mutual benefit. Australia is a long-term stable supplier of
mineral and energy resources to China. China is a competitive supplier of goods to
Australia.8

Additionally, the launch of bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations in
Beijing in April 2005 marked a significant milestone in the economic relationship. 9
However, Australian investment in China has remained fairly modest relative to overall
growth in bilateral trade between the two countries. For example, by the end of 2005 China
was Australia’s 20th largest investment destination (AUD2.043 billion) with the focus of
5

Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Reference Committee, Opportunities and Challenges: Australia’s
Relationship with China (Commonwealth of Australia, 2005) 170.
6
The Economic and Commercial Section, “Two-Way Investment”, (8 December 2004) The Consulate
General of the PRC in Sydney
<http://sydney2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/bilateralcooperation/inbrief/200412/20041200009122.html>.
7
Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Australia, ‘Australia Wins Bidding to Supply LNG to China’
(24 November 2003) Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Australia <http://au.chinaembassy.org/eng/jmhz/t46233.htm>.
8
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Australia-China Joint Statement’ (30 October 2009) Australian
Government <http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/joint_statement_091030.html>.
9
Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Australia’s Economic Interests’, Australian Year Book 2008 (8 September
2008) Australian Bureau of Statistics
<http://www.abs.gov.au.2048/ausstats/abs@.nsf/bb8db737e2af84b8ca2571780015701e/5FA2780A9EDF41F
6CA2573D20010A92D?opendocument>.
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that investment on manufacturing, mineral exploration, legal, banking and education
services, whereas China was the 18th largest investor in Australia (AUD2.275 billion).10

The relationship between Australia and China has been more active and substantial
in respect of export and import activities and investment involvement. China is Australia’s
largest trading partner, with total trade (goods and services) in 2009 valued at AUD$85.1
billion, an increase of 15.1 per cent over the previous year. At the end of 2008, total
Australian investment in China had been AUD6.9 billion, making China our 14th largest
investment destination.11

The Australian resources sector is the largest and most high-profile investment
category in China. 12 The potential for greater investment growth is strong. For China,
Australia offers strong economic credentials backed by a highly skilled and multilingual
workforce, a dynamic services sector, sophisticated telecommunications and IT systems
and an open regulatory environment.13
For Australia, China offers a large market and a fast growing economy and
continues to improve its overall investment climate through regulatory, legal, financial, and
taxation reform.14 According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics:
In 2006, China cemented its place as Australia’s second largest trading partner and one of
its fastest growing export markets - bilateral trade in goods and services reached a record

10

Australian Embassy in China, ‘Trade and Investment’ (5 September 2008) Australian Embassy in China
<http://www.china.embassy.gov.au/bjng/relations2.html>.
11
Australian Embassy in China, ‘Trade and Investment’ (June 2011) Australian Embassy in China
<http://www.china.embassy.gov.au/bjng/relations2.html>.
12
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Opportunities and Challenges: Australia’s
Relationship with China (Commonwealth of Australia, 2005) 194.
13
Commonwealth, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia Report of the Australian Parliament
Delegation to the People’s Republic of China and Hong Kong, 1 December 2009, 7
<http://www.aph.gov.au/house/info/pro/42p_reports/china_hongkong_delegation_report.pdf>.
14
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Opportunities above n 12.
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$50b. Australia exported goods and services worth $24b to China. Major Australian
merchandise exports to China included iron ore, alumina, wool and copper ore.15

The Trade and investment relationship between Australia and China is substantial
and has developed well since the 1970s when both countries established their diplomatic
relations. 16 Two-way merchandise trade has grown from AUD113 million (USD96.05
million) in 1973 to AUD78.2 billion (USD70.38 billion) in 2009. China is Australia’s
largest trading partner, with total trade (goods and services) in 2009 valued at AUD85.1
billion (USD76.6 billion), an increase of 15.1 per cent over the previous year. 17

China has become increasingly more important for Australia as a result of its
increasing economic, political and strategic weight in the Asia-Pacific region and in the
global economy. It is reported that China is one of the countries that retained their positions
as the largest recipients of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the South, East, South-East
Asia and Oceania region.18
China has been highly successful in attracting and absorbing extensive FDI as a
result of policies developed over the past quarter of a century. There is no doubt that FDI
15

Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Australia’s Bilateral Relationships’ Year Book Australia 2008, (7 February
2008) Australian Bureau of Statistics
<http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/bb8db737e2af84b8ca2571780015701e/57AF1259CBCDBEE
8CA2573D20010A7D2?opendocument>.
16
National Archives of Australia, ‘Fact Sheet 247 – Australia’s Diplomatic Relations with China’ National
Archives of Australia <http://www.naa.gov.au/about-us/publications/fact-sheets/fs247.aspx>. Australia’s first
diplomatic mission in China opened in 1941 and closed after the Communist victory over the Nationalist
Kuomintang and the subsequent establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Cold War
fears of Communism characterised Australia’s relations with China over the next two decades, with Australia
refusing to recognise either the Communist government of the PRC in Peking (Beijing) or the Nationalists in
the Republic of China (Taiwan). In 1966, under Prime Minister Harold Holt, a diplomatic mission was
established in Taipei. In 1973 the Whitlam government established diplomatic relations with the PRC. The
Taipei embassy closed and an embassy was opened in Peking.
17
Australian Embassy in China, ‘Trade and Investment’ Australian Embassy in China
<http://www.china.embassy.gov.au/bjng/relations2.html>.
18
United Nations Conference on Trade and Investment, ‘Transnational Corporations, Extractive Industries
and Development’, (World Investment Report 2007, No WIR07, United Nations Conference on Trade and
Investment, 16 October 2007) 32.

321

Ch 8: Research Survey

has brought benefits to China. Although Australia is not one of the largest investors in
China, Australian investment in China is significant and growing.
The China Daily newspaper reported that the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC
stated, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
2004 annual report on investment flows:
Within the region, there was considerable unevenness of FDI flows to different sub-regions
and countries, as well as industries. Overall, inflows were concentrated in North-East Asia
($72 billion in 2003) and in services. Setting aside the special case of Luxembourg (owing
to trans-shipping), China became the world’s largest FDI recipient in 2003, overtaking the
United States, traditionally the largest recipient … China overtook the United States as a
top global destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2003 while the Asia-Pacific
19
region attracted more investment than any other developing region

China’s continuous economic growth provides massive opportunities globally to
business participants. Meanwhile, the legal and business environments in China have
attracted the close attention of those enterprises that have already been operating in China
as well as that of potential foreign investors. It is no surprise that Australian enterprises are
seeking to join this enormous economic market. On 24 October 2003 Australia and China
signed the Australia-China Trade and Economic Framework. According to the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia:
The Trade and Economic Framework set the direction for the future development of the
strong and rapidly expanding trade and economic relationship between Australia and China.
The practical measures and co-operative activities contained in this Framework will make it
easier to do business with China and provides for closer government, business-business and
20
people-people linkage.

In June 2010, the former Australian Honourable Minister for Trade Simon Crean said:

19

The China Daily, ‘China Overtakes US as Top Investment Destination’ The China Daily, 23 Sep 2004
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-09/23/content_377209.htm>.
20
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Trade and Economic Framework between Australia and the
People’s Republic of China’ (5 October 2004) Australian Government
<http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/framework/intro_economic_framework.html>.
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The speed with which the Australia-China economic relationship has progressed is
astonishing. China is our largest two-way trading partner, and last year became our largest
export partner. Two-way trade is now valued at AUD85 billion, or nearly 17 per cent of
Australia’s total trade. The upwards trajectory shows no sign of slowing and this year, twoway trade may well exceed AUD100 billion. Australian investment in China also continues
on an upward trajectory, with about AUD7 billion in Australian investments in China in
2008, up from just AUD1.35 billion in 2003.21

The continued growth in trade between Australia and China has led to a consequent
increase in the number of Australian enterprises participating in, and investing in, China.
The experiences of some of those investors have been the focus of a survey and follow-up
interviews conducted as part of this thesis.

8.3

A Research Survey in Australia

In an attempt to gain a better understanding of the challenges arising from China’s
institutional environment, interviews were conducted with seven individuals closely
involved with foreign firms operating businesses in China. The interviews ranged from 30
minutes to an hour discussion based upon a set of ten questions. Detailed notes of the
interviews were taken and a complete report of each interview was dictated. Interviews
were generally based on an earlier questionnaire completed by 132 participants and focused
on some particular aspects of the legal environment for a foreign investor conducting
business in China. As the handling of legal matters and related disagreements in China can
be sensitive, interviews were conducted face to face on condition of anonymity. The
interviews were all conducted at the interviewees’ offices in Sydney, Australia. One of the
interviewees was the founder of a China-based legal consulting firm that also deals

21

Simon Crean, ‘Australia and China: Expanding Our Horizons’ (Speech delivered at the Australia-China
Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum, Canberra, 21 June 2010).
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regularly with legal problems of foreign firms in China. The other six interviewees were
senior managers of large foreign enterprises with extensive operations in China.

The interviews elicited useful information and led to substantive observations that
provided some insight into aspects of foreign investment in a rapidly changing China. It
would be an over-simplification to suggest that the survey and interview procedure would
enable a grasp of all problems that foreign investors are facing in their operations in China.
However, it can safely be regarded as a window upon the reality of foreign investment and
some of the special aspects of current legal practice in China today with regard to foreign
investment. The survey was confined to a small sample of business operators thus the value
of its findings will be somewhat limited.

The responses to the questionnaire indicated a number of common experiences of
Australian foreign investors regarding the Chinese legal environment and administrative
system. Ninety-four per cent of participants were doing business in or with China between
1983 and 2004 in the wholesale, manufacturing, IT or financial or legal services, or
education and health services sectors. Among them, 55 per cent considered partner
selection as a priority strategy to enter China’s market. During the beginning of the
economic reform period in 1990s, the Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture format was
chosen by the majority of foreign investors. According to statistics from the Ministry of
Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2002, equity joint ventures
accounted for 42.91 per cent in cumulative FDI.22 One of the reasons that partner selection
for foreign investment seemed so popular was that a Chinese partner with good connections
22

Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, ‘Statistics of Cumulative FDI by Form as of 2002’ (10 July 2003)
Ministry of Commerce of PRC <http//www.fid.gov.cn/Foreign investment/Statistics of cumulative FDI by
form as of 2002.htm>.
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with the host government was perceived to be very helpful and important for the western
party to have successful business in China. Hal Sirkin the Senior Vice President of the
Boston Consulting Group Chicago office and head of the firm’s global operations practice,
suggested, ‘One of the major problems is to just knowing whom to partner with in China.’23
Luo Yadong’s study also revealed that timing of investment, industry and local partner
selection are critical to the overall performance of a venture. Local partner selection is one
of the strategies essential to a joint venture’s efficiency and risk reduction. 24 A survey into
UK-Chinese joint ventures reported that while choice of Chinese partners appears to be
highly constrained, on the whole UK parent companies analysed the joint venture decision
thoroughly and generally concluded that they had joined forces with the right partner. 25
When selecting a Chinese partner the most important characteristic is seen as the partner’s
ability to negotiate with the host government.26

With respect to the legal environment in China, more than 72 per cent of
respondents to the survey questionnaire rated ‘negotiation’ as the most efficient dispute
resolution method and 94 per cent agreed that to avoid disputes rather than taking legal
action is a Chinese problem-solving approach. Also, 94 per cent agreed that the Chinese
prefer to suppress or settle matters in private through negotiation and compromise rather
than to engage in litigation with the relevant government authority. It is traditional in China

23

Jamie Hammond and Chris Mark, ‘China Report: Studies in Operations and Strategy China and The New
Rules for Global Business’ (24 January 2005) Boston Consulting Group
<http//www.bcg.com/publications/files/BCG-KWspecialreport:pdf>.
24
Yadong Luo, Foreign Parent Investment Strategies and International Joint Venture Performance: Chinese
Evidence (Temple University, 1996) 252.
25
Keith W Glaister and Yu Wang, ‘UK Joint Ventures in China: Motivation and Partner Selection’ (1993) 11
Marketing Intelligence and Planning, Bradford 9, 13–5.
26
Ibid.
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to reach agreement and resolve disputes through a process of friendly consultation.27 The
1985 Foreign Economic Contract Law’s chapter on dispute resolution begins with a
statement to the effect that when contractual disputes arise, the parties should do everything
possible to resolve them through consultation or third party mediation.

28

Perhaps

surprisingly, in the past, parties would have often preferred to abandon their rights rather
than go to court.29

Additionally, regarding the administrative system in China, more than 69 per cent of
those surveyed with the questionnaire considered good communication with the Chinese
government important or very important for their business operation. More than 91 per cent
believed that utilising Chinese partners or networks was the most efficient way to deal with
administrative matters in China and 94 per cent believed tolerance and compromise are
necessary to deal with Chinese officials. More than 55 per cent had informal relationships
with administrative institutions. All respondents agreed that the development of networks is
a necessary requirement for doing business in China. The Chinese culture is distinguishable
from western culture in many ways and this includes the ways that business is conducted.
For example, the Chinese prefer to deal with people they know and trust. On the surface
this does not seem to be much different from doing business in the western world but, in
reality, the heavy reliance on relationship means that western companies have to make
themselves known to the Chinese before any business can take place. Furthermore, this
relationship is not simply between companies but also between individuals at a personal
27

K C D M Wilde, ‘Introduction’ in K C D M Wilde (ed), China’s International Transactions Trade and
Investment (LBC Information Services, 2000) 1, 11.
28
<<中华人民共和国涉外经济合同法>> [Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People’s Republic of
China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 1 July 1985, art 37. Contract Law of the
PRC adopted March 1999 and superceded Foreign Economic Contract Law.
29
Kuihua Wang, Chinese Commercial Law (Oxford University Press, 2000) 38.
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level. The relationship is not simply a precursor to, for example, sales being finalised, but is
an ongoing process. The company has to maintain the relationship if it wants to do more
business with the Chinese.

The survey questionnaire responses gave a glimpse of the nature of problems in the
foreign investment environment in China. Respondents noted that, in the quarter of a
century since the commencement of the ‘Open Door Policy’ in 1979, the Chinese
government has made great efforts to reduce barriers to foreign investment and to improve
the investment environment through legal reform and reintroduction of a series of
preferential policies.30 Hundreds of new laws and regulations governing foreign investment
have been passed and been given effect in order to improve the foreign investment
environment. Chinese legislative and administrative bodies have shown remarkable
diligence and energy in formulating and adopting rules on a wide variety of subjects, many
being technically complex. 31 As well, China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 promised
further foreign investment liberalisation. 32 General commitments made by China have
included non-discriminatory treatment of foreign and domestic enterprises, adherence to
WTO rules on intellectual property rights, and elimination of various requirements on
foreign investment.33 However, the written laws do not appear to be functioning in ways
30

Donald C Clarke, ‘The Chinese Legal System since 1995: Steady Development and Striking Continuities’
in Donald C Clarke (ed), China’s Legal System: New Developments, New Challenges (Cambridge University
Press, 2007) 1, 1.
31
Donald C Clarke, ‘Legislating for a Market Economy in China’ in Donald C Clarke (ed), China’s Legal
System: New Developments, New Challenges (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 13, 31. By the end of 2002,
there have been more than 400 legislative amendments, 1000 administrative regulations enacted or amended
and more than 10,000 local regulations promulgated.
32
Kim Anderson, ‘China’s WTO Accession: Foreign Investment, Government, Procurement, Grain SelfSufficiency, and Labour Standards’ (May 2011) Centre for International Economic Studies University of
Adelaide < http://www.adelaide.edu.au/cies/papers/sp9810.pdf>.
33
World Trade Organisation, ‘WTO Overview the TRIPS Agreement’, Arts 3, 4 and 5 include the
fundamental rules on national and most-favoured-nation treatment of foreign nationals, (8 September 2008)
World Trade Organisation <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm#generalprovisions>.
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that could have been reasonably anticipated. Some socio/legal phenomena, such as the
administrative discretionary power and networks, have resulted in the formal laws being
ignored or manipulated. 34 In response to the interview question ‘What are the major
difficulties for a successful business in terms of cultural factors?’ an interviewee, who was
conducting a cooperative business with an influential Chinese state owned enterprise, said:

One of the big difficulties is finding the right person, the right decision-maker with the right
amount of power who can implement things so you can do business. There is no doubt that
relationship is very important depending on what type of business you’re dealing with. The
business I deal with is a state owned enterprise, so obviously business, and government
35
connections, and relationship and friendships come with that.

This observation is in line with the views expressed by the other interviewees,
reinforcing the idea that connections with people who have power may be crucial for
business operations and that awareness of this aspect is important for foreign investors. The
role of the government or the state owned enterprises associated with governmental power
in the economy was always protected, and important economic decision-makers at all levels
— from the members of the State Council down to the managers of factories — comprised
a powerful supplementary network for transmitting and implementing the economic goals
and policies of the government.36

Connections can be valuable in any country, but in most western countries the
primary focus of a business is its product or service because buyers and sellers deal at arm’s
length. In China, the quality of the product is important, but Guanxi is even more

34

Murray Scot Tanner and Eric Green, ‘Principles and Secret Agents: Central versus Local Control over
Policing and Obstacles to ‘Rule of Law’ in China’ (2007) 191 China Quarterly 644, 670.
35
Interview with Interviewee ‘13’ (Sydney, 15 December 2004).
36
Ying Lin, ‘Foreign Investment and Cultural Context: Law, Administration and Social Relations in China’,
(2007) Australian Law Post-graduate Networks Paper Series <http://www.alpn.edu.au/files/alpn-paper-series2007/ALPNper cent202007per cent20G.Ying.Lin.pdf>.
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important. 37 It can take a long time to develop Guanxi independently, but it can be
accomplished vicariously. The most effective vehicle is the joint venture with a local
participant that has Guanxi at levels appropriate to the transaction.

Experiences of institutional interference also appear unavoidable for foreign
investors. One of the interviewees, relating his business experience in China said;

We did experience a lot of interference from Customs. We were importing goods into China
and there was constant interference from Customs. Mostly it was in relation to the nongiving of ‘kick-backs’. Whether you are importing or exporting products you do have to
have some relationship with Customs. I feel that Customs officials still have a lot of local,
domestic authority and power in terms of clearing your goods quickly and agreeing on the
value of the cleared goods, calculation of VAT – those types of issues.38

Whilst facing a dramatic economic transition, the Chinese government is
confronting a dilemma. The need to enact a set of concrete, objective laws and regulations
that would assist long term economic development by increasing certainty conflicts with
the reality that such rules, in the short term, would limit the flexibility of the government to
implement changes to policy to adapt to the economy. 39 The government has clearly
decided to retain flexibility in the administration of law to deal with different situations and
varieties of human behaviour so regulators continue to be given enough discretionary
power to adapt rules and regulations to local circumstances. For example, the ZunYi
Municipal Government promulgated a local administrative decision regarding enhancing
credit grants for small business for promotion of local economic development.40 It is clear
that a local government is entitled to enact local administrative rules in order to promote
37

Bee Chen Goh, ‘Trade and Investment Negotiation with the Chinese’ in K CD M Wilde (ed), China’s
International Transactions Trade and Investment (LBC Information Services, 2000) 34, 39.
38
Interview with Interviewee ‘13’ (Sydney, 15 December 2004).
39
Kui Hua Wang, Chinese Commercial above n 29, 43.
40
ZunYi Government of the PRC, ‘Enhancing Credit Granting for Small Business for Promotion of Local
Economic Development’ (8 September 2008) ZunYi Government of the PRC
<http://yjj.zunyi.gov.cn/cms/cms/website/zhengfu/jsp/page.jsp?channelId=173&infoId=2008210158>.

329

Ch 8: Research Survey

local economic interests. That discretionary power, and more particularly its use, misuse or
abuse, is one of the matters at the heart of many of the difficulties reported by respondents.
Whilst the interviews, and to some extent the questionnaire responses, can be regarded as
anecdotal to some extent, they do serve as pointers to some of the essential features of the
social, cultural and legal aspects that are pertinent to the central questions of this research.

8.4

Relating the Survey Responses to Local Chinese Conditions

This study demonstrates how law is affected by, and in turn affects, social relationships in
China. Because of the Chinese emphasis on relationships, trust is regarded as more
important than any written document supposedly evidencing commercial arrangements. For
example, if the Chinese party and foreign/western party have agreed on a new joint venture,
the Chinese party will want the terms to be as broadly framed as possible but the foreign
party wants to be specific about all details. This situation is very common during a
negotiation between Chinese and westerners. Successful business dealings with the Chinese
require more than competent negotiating skills. An understanding of the essential aspects of
Chinese culture is vital.41

There are long-established customs and practices that are most closely associated
with, but not limited to, cultural elements in a society.i These include informal constraints
embodied in traditions, accepted conventions, and subconsciously accepted rules and
customs. 42 Such institutions develop over time through social interactions, reflecting

41

Bee Chen Goh, ‘Trade and Investment Negotiation’ above n 37, 34.
David Ahlstrom et al, ‘Managing the Institutional Environment: Challenges for Foreign Firms in Post WTO
China’ (2003) 68 SAM Advanced Management Journal 41, 42.
42
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actions that are appropriate and conceivable.43 In a commercial context in China, such rules
exercise their influence quietly upon maintaining relationships and mutual obligations in
Chinese society.

Such rules are well-established, and can be traced to China’s long history and rich
culture, but formal laws and case precedents were not part of the institutional structure for
social governance.44 In addition, certain normative and cultural elements and conventions
manifest themselves in the way of doing business in China, as evidenced by the heavy
reliance on relationships rather than the formal rule of law. 45

8.5

Central Issues Affecting Foreign Investment Operation

One of the aims of this research survey was to analyse business conditions in China
concerning social and legal aspects from foreign investors’ business experience. It may not
reflect the entire picture of the business environment; however it can provide an
opportunity to gain some valuable insight. As the Australian Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Trade Reference Committee suggested:

Clearly, Australian companies need to be able to read accurately the messages and signals
being conveyed to them in their dealings with Chinese businesses. They also need to know
46
how to respond appropriately and to their advantage.

Openness to foreign investment is an important, but not sufficient, condition for sustained
GDP growth for China. It is important that good macro-economic policies are

43

Peter L Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on Sociology of
Knowledge (Penguin, 1967) 82.
44
Debin Ma, ‘Law and Economic Growth: The Case of Traditional China – A Review with Some Preliminary
Hypotheses’ (Working Paper Series No 2009–2, Centre for Economic Institutions, September 2007) 4.
45
Ibid 44.
46
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Reference Committee, Opportunities and Challenges above n 5, 232.
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complemented with a host of other institutional policies that together comprise the total
investment climate. China’s solid macro-economic performance over the past decade is
unquestionably sound. China has gradually improved its investment environment over the
last three decades.47 However, some continuing impediments in the investment climate in
China have been identified by western countries that have various levels of economic
engagement with China. In this respect, the Australian Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
References Committee observed:
In 2005 … in some cases there were grounds for Australian businesses to consider China a
‘risky place to do business’. Evidence pointed to a legal and regulatory environment that is
complex, time-consuming, expensive, uncertain and at times discriminatory. China is a
country that, despite reform, still has inadequate legal protections, poor corporate
governance, intellectual property rights violations, government interference–particularly at
48
the local level–and corruption.

Two analysts of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pointed to explicit
restrictions written into laws and regulations as well as other restrictions that are an
important part of the overall investment climate in the minds of investors.49 Corruption and
bureaucratic red tape which raise business costs are part of some implicit disincentives for
investment in China.50

47

David Dollar et al, ‘Improving City Competitiveness through the Investment Climate: Ranking 23 Chinese
Cities’ (Working paper No 30247, The World Bank, December 2003) 6.
48
Ibid.
49
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8.5.1 Bureaucracy
Chinese officials and scholars have debated the merits of tight control over China’s
economic, social and political stability against the advantages of free markets. The phrase
Yi kai jiu luan, yi zhua jiu jin (‘as soon as you open it up, you get chaos, but if you grasp it
tightly, it dies’) expresses this balancing act in vivid terms, and it suggests that government
— not the markets or the individual — is the most powerful force in the Chinese economy.
Every

firm

in

China,

whether

foreign

or

domestic,

public

or

private,

must manage its relationship with government as carefully as it would a relationship with
a key investor or customer.
The architecture of Chinese government is like a matrix, with geography on one
dimension and the functional areas of government on the other. On the geographic axis,
there is the central government in Beijing, which controls the next level, which consists of
the provinces and China’s four largest cities. Below the provinces are cities and counties,
with townships and villages at the fourth and lowest level. On the other axis, powerful
government ministries control key sectors of the economy and locate offices at each of the
geographic levels. At each node in the matrix, there is tension between geographic and
functional interests, which can dramatically slow the decision-making process.
Foreigners often believe that China’s government is monolithic, with consistent
policies and practices across all bureaucratic levels and geographic areas and that the
Communist Party is the organised expression of the will of society. 51 This perception
largely springs from the fact that the central government generally does do a good job of
speaking with one voice on key policy matters. For example, the Central Committee of the
51

See Susan L Shirk, ‘The Chinese Political System and the Political Strategy of Economic Reform’ in
Kenneth G Lieberthal and David M Lampton, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao
China (University of California Press, 1992).
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Communist Party is served by a Secretariat and other departments. At provincial,
municipal, and county levels there are similar leadership bodies (CCP committees) and
staff offices. Every agency of the national, provincial, and county governments has within it
a Party committee. Policy matters emanate from the central government and accordingly
will be passed on to provincial, municipal and county level governments as guidelines for
implementation.52 Bureaucratic debates over policy are usually concealed from the public.53
There is a tremendous variance in how the goals and policies of the centre are
interpreted and implemented at the other levels of government. One important reason is
simply the size of the country, where single provinces have populations that exceed those
of some of the largest countries of Europe. For example, according to a report from
National Statistics of China in 2011, the population of Guangdong Province in November
2010 was 104,303,132 ranking the highest provincial population in China. 54 Germany’s
population in 2011 is 82,302,000.55 Regional diversity in China has increased over the past
decades of economic reform, particularly with regard to personal incomes. According to
statistics from the United Nations, China’s per-capita GDP in 2009 was USD3769 56

52
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2011), 46–7 <http://www.seiofbluemountain.com/upload/product/201001/1263543482bn0qghaa.pdf>.
54
<<2010 年第六次全国人口普查主要数据公报(第 2 号)>> [Bulletin of Major Statistics of the Sixth
National Census 2010] (People’s Republic of China) National Bureau of Statistics, Order No 2, 29 April
2011.
55
Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat,
‘Population Division Prospects – The 2010 Revision’ (5 August 2011) Population Division of the Department
of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, 1
<http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/p2k0data.asp>.
56
United Nations Statistics Division, ‘Social Indicator’ (June 2011) United Nations Statistics Division
<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/socind/inc-eco.htm>.

334

Ch 8: Research Survey

compared to USD277 in 1979.57 Policies from the central government are often seen to be
vague and open to interpretation. This would imply that central policy-makers want local
leaders to be able to adapt them to local conditions.
Local autonomy in China can often result in increased negotiating power for foreign
firms. When local governments have the discretion to award financial incentives to foreign
investors, these investors can negotiate simultaneously with multiple local governments,
bargaining with each to achieve the most satisfactory outcome. Similarly, when a foreign
company is established in multiple jurisdictions, the potential of downsizing or the promise
of expansion can provide the foreign investor with negotiating power over local
governments. The effect may be further magnified when a number of foreign companies
co-locate in the same jurisdiction and coordinate their pressure on local government. A
research study, conducted by Zhejiang University School of Economic and Development
and Reform Committee of Zhejiang Province, indicated that the competition to attract
foreign investment projects between local governments in the Yangzi Delta region has
damaged national interests. 58 For example, the Kunshang Technology Economic Zone
provided incentives to export-orientated foreign investment with a 10 per cent income tax
rate59 which is lower than the national income tax rate of 15 per cent for foreign investment
according to the Foreign Investment Enterprise and Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law
1991.

57
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However, when local concessions to foreign firms extend beyond guidelines set by higher
levels of government, foreign investment firms may lose their power to appeal when
disputes and/or clear malfeasance occurs. Similarly, when foreign firms start their
negotiations at the central level, as is often the case with large projects, it is in their interest
to locate operations in areas with close relations with the central government. When, as an
example, Motorola negotiated its landmark deal to open a major manufacturing centre in
China, it traded on the unprecedented size of its capital commitment to gain complete
ownership control of its operations, a concession that could only be approved by the central
government.60 When the production facility was located in the northern industrial city of
Tianjin, it meant that the project would be geographically close to Beijing, and that its daily
interactions would be with the administration of the Tianjin Municipality, which reported
directly to the central government.61

The often fluid relations between central and local governments are only one reason
why Chinese bureaucracy is much less monolithic than it seems. Although the central
ministries in Beijing seem to have clearly defined boundaries of authority, these are the
result of years of aggressive negotiation and in-fighting among ministries.62 When there is a
new and volatile development in Chinese society, such as the rapid rise of the internet, rival
ministries will compete intensely for the right to monitor, regulate, and tax the new

60
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activity.63 New regulations and policies are often vague and poorly defined because they
are the outcome of a compromise between rival bureaucratic factions. These rivalries can
continue for years, and often the intervention of one of China’s top leaders is required to
settle disputed matters. In fact, at all levels of government, decisions that may seem routine
are often pushed up through the bureaucracy until they reach an appropriate senior official.
For example, the central government issues guidelines to regulate how local governments
should exercise administrative power in order to prevent these organisations from abusing
such powers.64

Every few years, debates about political reform have been published that include the
suggestion that China is on the verge of political disintegration into a feudal collection of
municipalities, provinces, and geographic regions.65 There are certainly powerful separatist
forces at work in China, largely attributable to China’s vast size and population,
geographical barriers to communication and transportation, linguistic and cultural
differences, growing income inequality, local protectionism, and vastly different attitudes
toward the outside world.66 These forces are concrete and easily understood by foreigners,
while the forces that maintain China as a single political entity are not as obvious. These
include the increased economic interdependence among China’s regions, including rapidly
63
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increasing exchanges of capital and labour, legal changes that have increased the centre’s
share of tax revenues, and a personnel system that rotates the top political appointments in
local governments.67 These forces, however difficult for the outsider to appreciate, are at
least equal in power to the forces that threaten to pull China apart. China has been aware
that social conflict arising from uneven economic development between and within regions
has threatened the stability of society. Discussions and studies on these matters in
government departments and academic institutions have been active and open. 68 The
central government can still apply overwhelming pressure on specific locations for specific
purposes for a limited time, although it often does have to select its battles carefully.69

Responses to the survey for this research indicate that for most foreigners operating
businesses in China, bureaucracy comes in the form of daily interactions with the many
local agencies that control, regulate, tax, inspect and monitor the foreign enterprise.
Interviews with the survey participants suggested that good connections with local
government can play an important role in relation to successful business operation in China.
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From a survey of executives of electronics enterprises in Hong Kong with business
operation in the Pearl River Delta China, the results confirmed the importance of personal
relationships for doing business in the Pearl River Delta and suggest that companies rely on
personal relationships for business not only for cultural reasons but also to cope with
deficient legal and political institutions.70 While it is possible to have smooth cooperation
with local government, particularly if the foreign enterprise has the support of local leaders,
it is common for senior managers in both foreign and domestic firms to spend a great deal
of time sorting out problems with the Chinese bureaucracy. 71

Sudden changes in the regulatory environment are not random events, and the
complaint that the Chinese bureaucracy behaves irrationally is not only inaccurate but also
unhelpful regarding a possible resolution of the problem. A new, unannounced tax on a
foreign enterprise, for example, can be the result of many factors. The local tax agency may
be experiencing a decline in tax revenue from other sources, possibly because the local
economy is heavily dependent on loss making, state owned enterprises. There may be a
renewed sense that foreign firms are already privileged through a variety of laws and
regulations that give them various financial incentives to invest in China, and that a new tax
will ‘level the playing field’ with domestic firms. Regrettably, the new tax may also be an
attempt on the part of a local official to extract a bribe from the foreign firm. According to
Jia, Yan and Yan:
Research on foreign headquartered companies investing in the Suzhou Economic Zone,
Jiangsu province was an example. Suzhou Economic Zone has lost its financial revenue
from annual growth rate of 68 per cent (1994 – 2004) to 24 per cent in 2005. The reason for
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this decline was that major companies such as Nokia, Nike and Adidas moved out to the
Beijing and Shanghai areas as these areas had better taxation regimes than other regions.72

In the interview section of the survey for this research, in response to the question
— ‘Has your business in China experienced institutional interference, for example in the
form of the exercise of discretion by an authority?’ — one of the interviewees related their
business experience in China in the following manner, admitting that there were still
problems in this area:

We’ve had problems where various levels of government have interfered. We’ve won
projects then they’ve tried to overturn them at a high level of government – effectively it
was corruption. They had their favourite entities that they wanted to put in there for
whatever reason. We’ve challenged that on a couple of occasions – sometimes we win,
sometimes we lose – but that’s part of the learning process. They’ve caught on that they still
need to think those things through sometimes.

This respondent expressed a number of concerns regarding their company’s
experience in China. The questions of return on investment, lack of legal sophistication,
and lack of foreign investor control were indicated:

In our business there is a desire by Chinese firms to tap into the experience of foreign firms
and that’s good and there is also a strong desire by foreign firms to be strongly involved in
Chinese projects. What is concerning and what has happened to us is that we have put a lot
of intellectual property and effort into moving a project forward with very little return
including where we’ve given ideas and we’ve trained people and have introduced them to
projects here in Australia and the like. All of this in the early parts of a project — only to
find in the later parts of the project we are, sort of ‘pushed out’. That’s a risk management
procedure so you need to watch how much you give for what you get back – so you need to
be aware of that issue.73
While responding to a question related to ‘institutional interference’ this interviewee had,
perhaps unwittingly, made reference to an issue (possibly specific to his own industry) arising from
a cultural difference as they perceived it, stating:
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There is still a cultural thing in China where I think, even in the major cities and even in
sophisticated companies that they don’t quite grasp the value of expertise and the value of
ideas et cetera, they think that the value of that is so little compared to the value of say a
building or a structure. They tend to minimise the value of expertise. In my area of
business, the Chinese are second to none in the world. They are very, very experienced and
very good at dealing with detail and implementation but not very good at ideas –
particularly at bringing in new technology and the expertise that may be on similar projects
overseas – which are very valuable to China but they tend to under-value that and therefore,
from a business perspective we need to be very careful about how much we give for how
74
much we get back. So that’s a major cultural issue I think.

Another interviewee investor expressed their experience somewhat differently by
reference to the difficulties and delays in the examination and approval process, observing:
Well, it’s taken 5 years to get approval, to get a licence to practise in Shanghai. I don’t think
the reason is interference. I think that when we applied, the legal processes in China were
not yet … were still in the embryonic stage. Now you can not expect the government to
suddenly become mature and to change a system that has been in practise for … so
therefore, I wouldn’t call it interference but they need a long time to grasp the western
system.75

Evaluating the capabilities of a Chinese firm involves much more than simply
assigning it an ownership category. Some state-owned firms are very profit driven, and
collectives can have many of the shortcomings of state-owned enterprises. Privatised firms
vary dramatically in their performance and profitability. According to Chow and Yau’s
research, foreigners tend to identify most strongly with market-oriented firms, since they
can readily understand the sources of their success.76 The local firm’s knowledge of the
culture and the market and sharing of financial risks are also reasons why joint ventures are
set up.77

In many industries, a profit-oriented approach is not enough. Good connections with
government may be essential in order to secure bank loans, favourable interpretations of
74
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regulations, access to supplies and materials, and other benefits. State-owned enterprises by
their nature are hard-wired into the Chinese bureaucracy, but other types of firms must use
their Guanxi, or informal connections, to have any influence. 78

8.5.2 A System of Interpersonal Connections
Guanxi, literally meaning ‘relationships’, stands for any type of relationship. In the Chinese
business world, however, it is also understood as the network of relationships among
various parties that cooperate with and support each other. 79 This essentially implies a
mentality amongst business persons of exchanging favours, which are expected to be
reciprocated regularly and voluntarily. The Chinese, like business people elsewhere, have
their unique way of conducting business.80 Many China experts refer to a business culture
in China that is based on strong family networks or cultural ties secured in Guanxi
(interpersonal) connections that are underpinned by strong Confucian ethics. 81 Therefore, it
is an important concept to understand if one is to function effectively in Chinese society.

Regardless of business experiences in one’s home country, in China it is Guanxi
that makes all the difference in ensuring that business will be successful. By the use of
Guanxi, the organisation minimises the risks, frustrations, and disappointments when doing
business in China. Often it is acquiring Guanxi with the relevant authorities that will
determine the competitive standing of an organisation in the long run in China. Moreover,
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the inevitable risks and barriers a foreign business will encounter in China will be
minimised when it has a Guanxi network working for it. That is why the correct Guanxi is
so vital to any successful business strategy in China.

Survey interview respondents suggested that although developing and nurturing
Guanxi in China is very demanding in terms of time and resources, the time and money
necessary to establish a strong network was well worth the investment. It is normal practice
for domestic businesses in China to establish wide networks with their suppliers, retailers,
banks, and local government officials.

In response to the question in the interview survey — ‘Establishing networks is
considered a very important aspect of doing business in China. Can you give examples of
networks you have developed and why they are important? How does this compare with
doing business in other western countries?’ — one interviewee said:

Networking has become the buzz-word if you have business in China because everybody
will talk about networks. But networks are ... starting social contacts is what networks are
all about because the Chinese way of doing business is establishing social contact, by
establishing a network. In the west a network doesn’t seem to be so important. The Chinese
culture is to get to know the person before doing something. In the west it’s not so much to
get to know the person but the firm is known or the firm is an associate member or the firm
is referred to. It will depend on your reputation, your referral, whereas in China and other
82
Asian countries they would like to put a face to a name.

Chinese culture can be distinguished from Western culture in many ways, including
how business is conducted. Evidence has shown that the foreign company needs to fully
maintain the relationship if it wants to do more business with the Chinese. 83
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Since Guanxi also functions as an information exchange network, companies with wide
Guanxi or relationship networks often have much higher performance than companies with
little or no relationship with Chinese colleagues. According to a new survey of more than
4,000 entrepreneurs, business managers and aspiring entrepreneurs in China, 93 per cent of
business owners say Guanxi, the networks and relationships (primarily with the state) are
important to their own business success.84
As a result, in practice, commercial activities have heavily relied upon social
networking. Difficulties inevitably occur for business people or organisations without
Guanxi. According to Pitta’s investigation, in 1993 AST sold 140,000 machines in China
(31 per cent of the personal computers purchased in the country). China’s entire personal
computer market last year came to USD638 million, less than half the USD1.4 billion in
revenue that AST alone reported in the 1993 fiscal year. The success of AST personal
computer sales in China occurred because AST was in a good position to set up business in
Hong Kong, where AST co-founders Albert Wong and Thomas Yuen had knowledge of the
importance of personal relations in making these sales.85 Attention to the development of
social networks may require very significant input of time and resources for business
operators. For a western business organisation this is often a completely new and
challenging process because it somehow moves the business centre of concentration upon
marketing of products towards paying more attention to apparent socialising as the core of
developing Guanxi.
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business opportunities, government policies, scarce necessities and availability of
professionals, but also be of great value to them in terms of building up corporate
reputation, enlarging market share and even motivating employees.87
In relation to a common problem experienced by new foreign investors in China,
that of identifying then communicating with, the appropriate local contacts, one of the
survey interviewees explained:
My experience is that many foreigners have gone to China and stayed in the wrong hotels,
bought food for the wrong people and had many meetings with the wrong people. They
have gone over very unsure of what’s going on. I think a very key thing is to find the right
people to deal with who will make decisions quickly and to also find the person who has
the power to make those decisions rather than wasting time with too many other people who
have promises of connections when in fact it’s not the case. One of the big difficulties is
finding the right person, the right decision-maker with the right amount of power who can
implement things so you can do business. There is no doubt that relationships are very
important depending on what type of business you’re dealing with.88

This interviewee also raised an important underlying difference in respect of ‘ease
of operation’ for the foreign investor when dealing with a State owned enterprise as
compared to operating in the private sector, saying:
The business I deal with is a state owned enterprise, so obviously business, government
connections and relationships and friendships come with that you know. If you were
dealing with the private sector – yes, things can happen much more quickly because you
don’t have the bureaucracy attached as with government business but the risk is quite
higher. There are a lot of entrepreneurs now in the private sector who can make promises to
do things very quickly but the risks are significantly higher too. So I guess you’ve got to
identify your key sector – whether you’re going to deal with state-owned or government
89
business or you’re going to deal with the private sector.

In a business context, Guanxi can take place between a firm manager and a
government official whose decisions can have an impact on the firm. Business associates
may also rely on Guanxi, using their personal relationships to ensure that mutual
87
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obligations are met. The strongest forms of Guanxi develop between classmates, blood
relations, and people from the same city or province when they are living in other parts of
China. Foreigners can and do resort to gifts and other favours to create a sense of obligation
on the part of the receiving party, but even under the best of circumstances they can never
compete with these stronger forms of Guanxi.
However, one of the biggest mistakes that foreigners can make in China is to
assume that the cultivation of Guanxi alone will lead to success. Personal relationships in
business matter everywhere but no one suggests that they can entirely replace good
business sense.
The Chinese can be very critical of someone who is seen to use Guanxi extensively
for personal gain. According to Fan’s study, Guanxi may bring benefits to individuals as
well as the organisations they represent but these benefits are obtained at the expenses of
other individuals or firms and thus detrimental to the society. 90 The Chinese can also have
mixed feelings toward the simple, ingenuous person at the other end of the spectrum who
has no Guanxi skills at all. To westerners, relationships help the individual however, to the
Chinese, they also define the individual. In China, if you are related to a senior official you
will be treated with more respect.91 While admiring the pureness of their morals, they will
also lament their inability to get anything done in the real world. The vast majority of
Chinese fall between these extremes. They may possess competent Guanxi skills but will
use them selectively and only when official procedures have failed. At the same time, they
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may have a circle of friends within which favours are done out of genuine affection and
where any expectation of reciprocity or material gain would be considered to be rude. 92
Several factors suggest reasons for the enduring importance of Guanxi in China.93
One is the continuity of Chinese tradition, including heavy government intervention in the
economy, a powerful bureaucracy and the freedom of local officials to interpret policies
and regulations emanating from the central government. 94 Also, there is a sense that the
complexity and speed of economic transition have outpaced the ability of written rules and
official institutions to support it.95 The seeming persistence of Guanxi in Chinese society, in
spite of conscious and conscientious efforts to eradicate it by Communists and capitalists
alike, offers interesting insights into the complex interactions of culture, institutions and
social practice in a modern society.96

As China has become wealthier and more urbanised, the concept of Guanxi is
increasingly seen as a vestige of traditional society and of the worst aspects of socialism.
Critics see it as fuelling the country’s rampant corruption, and as an obstacle to China
becoming a modern society based on the rule of law. 97 To suggest that Guanxi is still
important can even be insulting to some managers and officials in China’s largest cities.
Guanxi is a laborious, time-consuming activity, and its practice contradicts the fast-paced,
cosmopolitan image cultivated by China’s coastal cities. Moreover, many educated Chinese
92
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feel that a stronger, rule-based legal system — which would take away the freedom of
officials to interpret regulations in ways that can benefit them personally — as essential for
China’s continued development.98

8.5.3 Claimed Corruption of Government Officers/Employees
Many foreigners assume that the tradition of Guanxi in China goes a long way toward
explaining China’s serious problem with corruption. 99 It is certainly true that the Guanxirelated exchange of gifts and favors100 would be considered bribery in most countries (and
increasingly in many parts of China)101, but China’s corruption problem is mainly the result
of weak law enforcement, vague regulations that allow government officials to interpret
them on a case by case basis, and its very prevalence, which gives bribe-takers a sense of
safety in numbers. Dai suggested that for complete success in eradicating corruption, China
would have to adopt the democratic model of checks and balances. 102

The conventional definition of corruption is the use of an official office for private
gains, a definition that does not include private sector crimes such as embezzlement and
fraud. 103 The Criminal Law Amendment 2011 specifies that any public servant who takes
advantage of their position to encroach, steal, swindle or use other illegal means to take
98
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possession of public property shall be guilty of the crime of embezzlement. 104 Any person,
who is appointed or authorised by state organs, state-owned companies, enterprises,
institutions and other organisations to manage and administer state property, who commits
any of the above acts shall be guilty of a crime of embezzlement.105 The Chinese context is
much more complicated because managers in state-owned enterprises, who report to
government ministries rather than private investors, have opportunities for embezzling state
funds that are not available to their counterparts in more market-oriented firms.106

Unlike the members of many authoritarian governments, China’s leaders openly
acknowledge that it is one of China’s most significant economic and political problems. 107
This attitude is in response to polls and surveys indicating that corruption is the source of
tremendous resentment toward the Communist Party of China. 108 This is because, as China
is a one-party state, much of the corrupt activity in China is undertaken by Party officials,
which means that attempts to battle corruption require the Party to police itself, an
inherently difficult task anywhere.109 Corruption has worsened since the economic reforms
began in the late 1970s. During the Tiananmen student protests of 1989, corruption was one
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of the major complaints of the protesters.110 Pre-reform corruption did exist, but because
China was poorer and much more tightly controlled, bribes came in non-monetary forms,
such as better housing and permission to travel abroad.111 The corruption problem is now so
severe that it has led some to argue that the only solution is political reform leading to a
democracy and that this should be the direction of future anti-corruption efforts.112
Corruption is difficult to measure directly. Those who pay and those who receive
bribes are both committing illegal acts. It is axiomatic that secrecy is part of the
arrangement and that most of the time both sides are satisfied with the transaction. Surveys
on corruption113 have measured perceptions among diplomats, academics and executives
but the results from such surveys can be misleading. Increased arrests and convictions, 114
for example, can mean an increased commitment to fighting corruption, but it can also
create the perception that the problem is getting worse. In any event, the Chinese widely
believe that arrests for corruption are politically motivated and often interpret a major arrest
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as a sign that the target of the investigation, while certainly guilty of corruption, has
possibly lost out to other more powerful political enemies.115

Research has indicated that China’s corruption epidemic partially results from the
transitional nature of China’s economy. 116 Pockets of very extensive entrepreneurial vitality
exist in an overall environment that is still subject to heavy government control, creating
perfect conditions for corrupt activity. A manager in a private firm, for example, is faced
with a long list of regulations, taxes, licensing fees and fines, sometimes reaching the point
where financial obligations to the state exceed the firm’s total revenues. A close
relationship with a local government official may be an obvious solution. The forms of
corruption can be as simple as a one-time bribe payment or as complex as a partnership in
the business. While these arrangements are illegal, it is often argued that they are necessary
in order to develop the private sector. 117 Moreover, as long as the official’s gains are
modest, the chances of detection and punishment are often minimal. This is because,
according to the Criminal Law Amendment 2011 and the People’s Procuratorate
Provisions Concerning Filing Standard of Cases Accepted for Investigation, a public
servant’s acceptance of a monetary amount of RMB5,000 or more shall be regarded as
constituting the crime of bribery.118
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American foreign investors are subject to the terms of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
1977 (USA) (FCPA) (substantially revised in 1988),119 which effectively criminalises the
paying and taking of bribes by Americans and US firms. According to Campos, since the
FCPA punishes American investors when they or their partners in the joint ventures bribe
local officials, some American investors in China may prefer wholly foreign-owned
enterprises over joint ventures because of the FCPA.120 Australia signed the United Nations
Convention against Corruption 2003 (UNCAC) on 9 December 2003 then ratified it on 7
December 2005 and has implemented the mandatory requirements and some nonmandatory requirements.121 Westerners accuse Asian firms of paying bribes more readily
than other foreigners, but the Asians reply that the Chinese demand bribes from them more
often.122
As corruption has become a more public issue in China, with frequent news reports
of major arrests, it has become more subtle and difficult to detect. A direct payment from a
foreign firm to a local official in order to avoid a new tax, for example, may attract too
much attention. Instead, hiring a retired official from the same tax office, who then serves
as a liaison between the two parties in exchange for a ‘consulting fee’, serves the same
119

Within the United States federal legislation, a facilitating payment or ‘grease payment’, as defined by the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 and clarified in its 1988 amendments, is a payment to a
foreign official, political party or party official for ‘routine governmental action’, such as processing papers,
issuing permits, and other actions of an official, in order to expedite performance of duties of nondiscretionary nature, that is, actions that they are already bound to perform. The payment is not intended to
influence the outcome of the official’s action, only its timing.
120
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121
Australian Government Attorney-General Department, ‘Australia’s International Anti-Corruption
Obligations’ Australian Government Attorney-General Department
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purpose, but it is not clear if such an appointment breaches any law. The media often
reveals the corrupt activities of officials using their influence for payment of bribes.123

Guanxi can take on many forms. It does not have to be based on money.
Trustworthiness of both the company and individual is an important component. Following
through on promises is a good indication of this. Frequent contact fosters friendship as well.
Chinese feel obliged to do business with their friends first. There are risks with this system
as well. When something goes wrong, the relationships are challenged, and friendships can
quickly dissolve.

In response to the following questions —‘If we accept that there are still difficulties
of achieving foreign investment success in emerging economies such as in China, what do
you consider are the major difficulties for a successful business in terms of cultural factors?
What factors other than cultural factors are important in your experience?’ —one
interviewee commented specifically on legislative overlap and complexity:

I think there is a lot of concern about in terms of a public (listed) company like ours about
risk management and the status of legislation in whatever area of business you are in. In the
last five years certainly, the rate of development of legislation by the central government
has been very rapid and that’s good. A lot of the legislation is, in my mind, good
legislation. It is well-meaning. It is still very complicated because you have that level of
legislation and the multiple level of legislation at provincial level and city level as well.
What I think is the biggest challenge at the moment is the implementation of that legislation
down at the city level, and the cross-over and the duplication that exists in some areas. So
from that point of view one needs to be extremely careful when looking at that from a risk
management viewpoint. Having said that, again I think that things have changed quite
124
dramatically.
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On the issue of official corruption, this interviewee indicated that, while the situation was,
in their view, improving, it remains as a serious risk factor for foreign investors:
Ten years ago it was – it was risky. It’s not as risky now but one needs to be extremely
careful. So that’s one area, another area I think that causes concern for public companies,
particularly Australian companies, American companies and British companies, is
corruption. That still exists in my experience of various levels of government. Again, not so
much now. I think in the bigger cities things have moved on a bit and things are more
sophisticated but down at the grass roots level in the secondary cities and in the rural areas
it’s still quite endemic. And that is a major concern from a ‘foreign corrupt practices’
viewpoint if you are an Australian company or an American company. But all that means
for a company like ours is that you need to have quite strict risk-management procedures in
125
place.

This concern was echoed by other interviewees, but for this interviewee a third concern
remained:

The third thing is the ability to transfer your profits, to transfer your profits out of the
country. Again, that is rapidly changing. Our company has moved from being a branch
office to being a WOFE – a wholly owned foreign enterprise for that very reason. Having
said that, the processes of doing that are still quite complicated and time consuming. It’s not
very efficient but I’m sure it will get more efficient with time and with China’s acceptance
126
into the WTO. It’s all part of the ongoing process of business improvement I guess.

It is clear from the foregoing that corrupt practices in China remain a matter for
concern both for domestic residents and for foreign investors. Of course, such practices are
not confined to China. They exist worldwide within western countries that possess the most
sophisticated and advanced systems of law, regulation and policing.

127

In such

circumstances there is always a ‘payer’ and a ‘payee’. However, it seems that the existence
of other matters that cause concern for foreign investors in China might lead to some undue
emphasis on the issue of corrupt officials or regulators.
125
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8.5.4 The Formal Law – Informal Law Dichotomy
It is important to acknowledge that informal law and legal practices can play an equally
important role in legal activity as do formal laws. It has been said that in China, the creation
of formal law is much easier than its application, since informal legal traditions continue to
dominate modern, formal ones. 128 In primitive societies, religion, law, and morals were
indistinguishably mixed. The separation of morality and of religion from law belongs very
distinctly to the later stages of the process of the development of a rule of law. The western
legal tradition is characterised by, among other things, the clear separation of these three
ideas. But although religion, law and morals are separated in western law, they are
nevertheless still very dependent on each other.129 Since the 1980s, China has introduced
thousands of pieces of legislation to make the business environment for foreign companies
more attractive. However, in some instances the practice was inconsistent with the new
laws because of the legacy of the old way of doing things in China often prevailing over
legislative reform.
In the interviews, among the questions asked was: ‘If we accept that there are still
difficulties of achieving foreign investment success in emerging economies such as in
China, what do you consider are the major difficulties for a successful business in terms of
cultural factors? What factors other than cultural factors are important in your experience?’
One interviewee responded:
The first one, in my experience, is where the Chinese do not place a lot of emphasis on
contracts whereas in the west the contract is the most decisive piece of paper. I feel that in
China it’s getting better now. A handshake was the closing of a deal whereas in western
culture the written form is vital. If this difference is not overcome in the near future it will
128

H Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2004) 302; Robert
Hughes, Culture of Complaint (Oxford University Press, 1993) 110.
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create a lot of difficulties because the handshake, although in Chinese culture is legal, it is
inappropriate for western culture as it doesn’t have any basis in law at all. So that is one of
130
the most important barriers that have to be overcome.

Other cultural differences (and some of their effects) were obvious to this
interviewee:
In the east the ways of negotiating involve banquets and social gatherings whereas in the
west you go to your legal firm office, discuss contracts then you sign on the bottom line –
that is it. And there is no need to socialise with very expensive eating. But in the east – in
China in particular that is the way. Maybe that is another aspect that we should look at. I
think in doing business, if you don’t understand cultural matters it is going to be very
difficult. I think that with the Chinese, before the contract there are a lot of friendly
relations but in the west, before the contract you don’t need to have any relationship. In
China there is a lot of nurturing before you come to the point of agreement whereas in the
west there doesn’t need to be too much nurturing.131

These comments reinforce the importance (for foreign investors) of the different
status of contracts between a foreign investor and a Chinese business partner as an issue for
concern and early preparation. When added to the difficulties that might be experienced by
a foreign investor in dealing with a sometimes unpredictable regulatory framework it is not
surprising to find confusion and frustration amongst some foreign investors. When asked
‘What regulatory and institutional challenges did you experience in China as a foreign
investor? How do they compare to doing business in Australia?’ the same interviewee
responded:
Well I think in Australia, when you approach the authority, the authority will consider your
application and state it’s response in the reply because in Australia we consider that all
authorities are working for us. In China it’s a different story altogether. Although in China
it is opening up to the west, the person in authority expects you to submit to that authority –
this is still very strong. Therefore it is natural that that predatory and authoritarian styles are
being used. Also we can go up and talk to Bob Carr (former Premier of NSW, Australia) –
132
in China you can’t do that. This is an important difference in a democratic country.

130
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The matter of dispute resolution in foreign investor operations in China (and the methods
available or appropriate) was raised by numerous interviewees. One interviewee, when
asked ‘In the questionnaire, you agreed that avoidance of disputes rather than taking legal
action is a Chinese problem-solving approach. Can you explain and cite examples in your
experience of dealing with conflict with a Chinese partner if any?’ said:
Dispute resolution you are talking about? We’ve always advised our clients that in any
circumstances we can resolve disputes much, much better than going to court. We have
important clients from the Australian ministry in China who we have advised to use
alternative dispute resolution methods rather than going to court and somehow they have
accepted our advice and in the end all parties are happy because they chose not to confront
the dispute and take it to court. The reason is that in alternative dispute resolution all parties
at the end of the day are better off. Number one for lower legal fees, number two, it may be
in the future both parties would like to work together again. If a dispute is taken to court –
no matter what – one party will be very angry.133

In response to the question ‘What regulatory and institutional challenges did you
experience in China as a foreign investor?’ How do they compare to doing business in
Australia?’ the same interviewee replied:
You’ve got to be careful of criticising the Chinese system because we have our own system
here and we are used to them, but the Chinese ones are different. The biggest issue in our
area I think is a regulation framework around our services in the same way as with legal
services and the ability of a foreign firm to operate in China. It’s a very similar situation in
engineering and environmental services. We can provide advice, as a wholly owned foreign
enterprise, to foreign and local firms operating in China from an engineering or
environmental viewpoint. We can project manage but we can’t actually submit drawings for
approval – for development approval for instance to build a new factory or build a building
or whatever. Those processes require a local, Chinese design institute – a registered design
institute – to make those submissions and to be able to sign them.134

The lack of freedom to operate in associated aspects of the same industry was
clearly a concern for this interviewee but he had identified a strategy to attempt to
overcome the problem:
So the answer to that from our point of view is that we would normally work in joint
venture with one of those design institutes. That in general terms can be quite successful
133
134
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and can be difficult at other times. It’s about relationships and the design institute – how
sophisticated they have become. 20 years ago it was quite difficult, but now it’s much,
much better. But it does create problems for us because we can’t do things in our own right.
As a foreign company we have to go through the design institutes so in some ways that’s a
restrictive trade practice.

The restrictions and controls upon some of this foreign investor’s business activities
in China were clearly a source of irritation but were not serious enough to cause a cessation
of operations or, one might assume, the profit of the enterprise. The interviewee continued:
Having said that, the same thing applies in Singapore and the same thing applies in
Australia but to a lesser degree. But these are the challenges that you have to face but there
has been discussion that some of these requirements will be eased in China as a result of
WTO and particularly if the free trade agreement between China and Australia goes ahead.
So this is an example of one of the things we face in our particular industry. In many other
industries and in business generally, there are similar things and you just need to face them
and be aware of them I guess.

This interviewee concluded with some general guidance to those planning to
become foreign investors in China:
One of the big problems of a company going into China for the first time is to navigate your
way through all of those particular issues and understand them. But you can get good
advice on those sorts of things from your legal firm in China. So it’s a matter of asking the
right questions and being aware of what you’re getting into and trying to find a way through
that. For us there is no point in going in to do things that the locals can do and do cheaply.
We need to add value and we can do that in areas such as project management, contract
135
management and dealing with other foreign companies for example.

Whilst the agendas of the various players in the foreign investment processes in the
PRC have some commonality, there are some clearly competing interests. The desire of the
PRC government to protect China from the ‘market’ taking over control (as can be said to
have occurred in the west in many instances) is balanced against its desire to maximise
foreign investment activity. The government is also aware of the need to avoid domestic

135
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criticism of its granting of preferential treatment to foreign investors as against local
business operators.136

8.6

China’s Accession to the WTO and its Effects on Substantive Laws
and their Administration

China became a member of the WTO on 11 December 2001. As a member, China gave a
commitment that it would comply strictly with WTO requirements.137 The commitments
China was required to implement are summarised in the Protocol, which represents the
terms and conditions of the various bilateral negotiation agreements between China and the
WTO members.
The concessions required from China fell into four categories. First was market access to
goods and related mainly to the commitment of foreign trade liberalisation and tariff barrier
reduction under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). China agreed to
reduce tariffs on industrial goods to an average rate of 8.9% and to sustain this average
against future increases. The second related to market access in services and required the
lifting of bans on market access as required under GATT. A number of service sectors that
were previously closed or severely restricted to foreign investment were required to be
liberalised including finance, telecommunications, and insurance. The third related to the
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement and China’s
acceptance of and adherence to internationally accepted norms to protect and enforce the
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) of foreign companies and individuals in China. The
fourth related to China’s transparency-related commitments: China specifically agreed to
translate into one of the WTO languages and make publicly available all WTO-related laws,
to apply such laws in a uniform and neutral manner, and to allow judicial review of
administrative decisions relating to such implementation.138
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These external pressures on China to reform and to implement measures necessary under
the WTO commitments have been the catalyst for the creation of a modern legal framework
to support its new market-oriented, rule-based trading system.139 Following its decision to
apply for membership to the WTO, China had already commenced the systematic overhaul
of its existing laws, administrative regulations, and departmental rules to comply with
WTO rules and its WTO accession commitments. From the end of 1999 to end of 2008, the
Central Government enacted, adopted, revised, or repealed more than 887 laws,
administrative regulations, and department rules covering trade in goods, services and
transparency and uniformity in application of trade measures.140

China is providing significantly improved market access on a secure basis,
including access in the agricultural, industrial and services sectors, with in-built provisions
for growth in access. These include remarkable progress for the agricultural sector in
improving household food security and reducing the incidence of malnutrition141 and the
fact that foreign investors are now able to own up to 40 per cent of shares in commercial
banks in China.142

Tariffs are bound (that is, guaranteed) in the WTO, non-tariff measures

that cannot be justified in the WTO are being progressively eliminated, restrictions on the
right of enterprises within China to engage in trade are being phased out, and China’s
standards system is being brought more into line with international norms. For instance,
one of the first steps taken by the Chinese government after accession to the WTO was the
139
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reissue of the Guideline Catalogue of Foreign Investment Industries 2007143 and the related
Provisions on Guiding the Direction of Foreign Investment 2002.144 The Catalogue sets out
lists of industries in which foreign investment is encouraged, restricted or prohibited.
Investment in an industry which is not included in the list is considered to be permitted.
The Catalogue was updated in 2007. China is reforming other trade regulations and
administrative practices in a way that will support further growth in trade. The Foreign
Trade Law 2004145 was originally issued in 1994 and was reissued on 6 April 2004 with
significant changes in order to comply with China’s WTO commitments such as adopting
the national equality of treatment principle.

Also, China agreed to improve the

transparency of its licensing system within the administrative system. The Law of the
People’s Republic of China on Administrative Licences 2003 146 has set out procedures for
licensing.147

China is in the process of implementing these commitments. Implementation is the
subject of a formal annual review process in the WTO in which Australia participates. 148 In
addition, the Australian government is monitoring China’s implementation and has been
taking up specific issues with the Chinese government. Australia participates actively in
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joint efforts within the Cairns Group 149 and with other like-minded WTO members to
ensure that new WTO members, including China, will participate meaningfully in the
multilateral reform process for trade in agriculture, including giving commitments to limit
the subsidisation of the agricultural sector. Accession negotiations are non-reciprocal and
offer a unique opportunity for Australia to address existing trading problems, secure new
market access, and achieve commitments which provide a substantial degree of
transparency and security in future trading conditions. Australia engages actively in
accession negotiations to ensure that the commercial interests of Australian businesses are
accommodated adequately.150

The potential of the Chinese market has been given a significant boost by
membership of the WTO, resulting in even greater trading opportunities for Australia and
adding further impetus to already fast-growing bilateral trade. China’s WTO commitments
have provided new opportunities in a wide range of sectors including wool, sugar, wheat,
barley, meat, seafood, horticulture, dairy, oilseeds, wine, processed food, hides and skins,
chemicals,

pharmaceuticals,

metals,

information

technology,

automotive,

telecommunications services, and in the financial and professional services sectors.

WTO membership is also resulting in a more open, secure and predictable business
environment in China as China is committed to reduce trade barriers and limit future
149
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increases, improve significantly its administration of trade regulations and increase the
transparency in the way such measures are applied. Australia has consistently given strong
support to China’s membership as an important step in China’s integration with the world
and regional trading systems.

The survey, with questionnaires and interviews conducted with a group of
Australian business people with operations in China as discussed in this chapter, gave first
hand information that provided a better understanding of China’s business and legal
environment in the post-WTO accession period. The business experiences in China from
the participants have confirmed that China has unresolved issues in relation to its
administrative and legal systems that were discussed in Chapter 6.

8.7

Conclusions

This part of the study shows that there has been a very large growth of trade between China
and Australia in the past two to three decades. This has corresponded with an increase of
the incidence of Australian investors entering into business partnerships in China. A survey
of a group of Australian business operators in China was conducted as part of the research.
The survey elicited a number of causes of concern for some of the investors involved in the
survey including:
i)

confusion in respect of the implementation and interpretation of both national laws
and local regulations,

ii)

difficulties in finding the appropriate decision-maker, and slow decision-making
processes,

iii)

dealing with government interference and delays,

iv)

lack of knowledge of how to deal with the discretionary power of decision-makers,
particularly at local levels,
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v)

knowing how to choose, and choosing, the right local Chinese partner,

vi)

methods of building relationships of trust with Chinese partners,

vii)

understanding differing perceptions of the meaning of written contracts and
operating within the uncertain boundaries arising from such differences,

viii)

avoidance of corrupt practices,

ix)

dealing with disputes, and

x)

appreciating the importance of, and working with, the system of networking or
Guanxi in Chinese business activity.
Competing interests in terms of local, provincial and national authorities at the

different administrative levels and as between different individual decision-makers, coupled
with sometimes conflicting interpretation of laws has been, and continues to be, a
frustrating experience for some foreign investors.
Corruption is a very real problem in China and foreign investors are very often
exposed to it. The government has acknowledged the magnitude of the issue and appears
to be making substantial efforts to address it by way of investigation, punishment and wide
exposure as discussed above. China’s law-makers have been under continuing pressure to
enhance the foreign investment experience in recognition of the immense value such
investment brings to its economy. The resultant changes to policies, laws and regulations
are beginning to bring China’s foreign investment legal environment more into line with
international expectations. In part, China’s admission to the WTO in 2001 and the extra
scrutiny151 flowing from such membership has assisted that process.
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The following chapter continues the examination of some actual experiences of investors in
China in the context of both the legal and social environments. Also, by way of contrast
with the experience of less substantial investors, it examines the case studies of two large
scale western investors and their relationships with government in the PRC.
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Chapter 9
Some Insights into Social and Legal Concerns for Foreign
Investors
9.1

Introduction

Earlier chapters of this thesis have demonstrated that foreign investors in China have often
experienced difficulties in coming to terms with an often unpredictable legal environment
and quite unique administrative systems. The nature of human relationships with business
partners in China is also an area that may be difficult to understand and predict. The
different social, political and economic systems are likely to form part of the explanation
for confusion and frustration on the part of some foreign investors along with the fact that
China is undergoing dramatic transitions both economically and socially.

It is not surprising for foreign investors to have concerns when attempting to deal
with a system that has such a unique history and background. Although some foreign firms
have succeeded in China, many have failed and left, having concluded that Deng Xiao
Ping’s ‘Open Door’ policy of 1978 was not truly intended to create a free market society, at
least in the foreseeable future.1

However, the relatively sudden openness of the Chinese market may not be the only
explanation for some failed foreign investment cases. Expanding upon the earlier
1

Ying Yu Wong et al, ‘Neo-Confucianism: The Bane of Foreign Firms in China’ (1998) 21 Management
Research News 13, 13.
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discussion in this thesis, it is considered to be important to further examine Chinese social
and legal aspects that, it is suggested here, are embedded in the success or failure of foreign
investment proposals.

Section 9.2 expands upon some Chinese social characteristics, including Chinese
business culture and ‘Guanxi’ or personal connections. Section 9.3 discusses relationships
with Chinese governments. Two specific foreign direct investment (FDI) cases, those of
German Volkswagen Group and American Motor Corporation, are examined in some detail
in this section in order to provide some insight to the difficulties that foreign investors
sometimes encounter. Section 9.4 discusses the underlying characteristics of law in China
including its role, some inherent conflicts that exist between the various law-making bodies
and the difficulties arising from inconsistencies between the laws made by them. Section
9.5 summarises and concludes the chapter.

9.2

Social Aspects

In this thesis, it has been demonstrated that FDI operations in Chinese society inevitably
involve dealing with both business counterparts and governmental officials — often at a
number of levels. Relationships and networks are built between and among people. Hence,
the effective deployment of human resources is crucial to the success of building such
relationships. Chinese business culture and relationships with government are here explored
to demonstrate the importance of personal connections for FDI and long-term success in
China. An important starting point is an understanding of how Chinese conduct their
business operations and how they relate to each other when in business relationships.
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9.2.1 Chinese Business Culture
Chinese business practice is vastly different from the more formal and therefore probably
more predictable western methods that are often considered to be more professional. 2 It
might be argued that nowadays China’s business practice — having been opened up to the
international community including China’s joining the WTO — is conducted in a more
western style; however, Chinese business culture is still very different as a result of the
country’s unique history and background. Throughout history, Chinese business-people
from different regions have exhibited distinct characteristics. 3 Business culture in China has
become an important factor for foreign investors to be aware of when they are dealing with
their Chinese partners or government administrative personnel. It seems a very natural
progression that in China a business relationship inevitably becomes a social relationship,
with each strengthening the other.

Throughout Southeast Asia, where many markets are underdeveloped and law is
often unpredictable, informal networks have become the preferred vehicle for many
complex transactions.4 The financing for a USD100 million property deal can be arranged
in a matter of days within the ‘bamboo network’. 5 Under such circumstances, personal trust
replaces formal — as well as more expensive and time consuming — ‘due diligence’
processes. As a result, the cost of doing business is lowered substantially. Without these

2

Katherine Nie Su, ‘Development and Validation of a Cross-Cultural Appraisal Instrument for Assessing
Chinese Business Strategy Orientation: Based Upon Western Theoretical Underpinning’ (2008) 16 Research
and Practice in Human Resource Management 131, 131.
3
Ming-Jer Chen, ‘Common Culture, Different Styles’ (2004) 31 China Business Review 53, 57.
4
Ming-Jer Chen, Inside Chinese Business: A Guide for Managers Worldwide (Harvard Business School
Press, 2001) 45.
5
Murray L Weidenbaum and Samuel Hughes, The Bamboo Network: How Expatriate Chinese Entrepreneurs
are Creating a New Economic Superpower in Asia (Martin Kessler Books, 1996) 1.
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informal arrangements, many business transactions would be impossible or prohibitively
expensive. Seen in this light, the extensive trade among overseas Chinese is a direct
response to the high transaction costs inherent in many economies in Southeast Asia such
as the Philippines, Indonesia and particularly in China which lacks sophisticated political
and economic institutions.6

These trans-national trading networks are very much in accord with Chinese
tradition.7 They allow for the flexible and efficient transmission of information, goods, and
capital in what are often informal agreements and transactions. 8 Confidence and trust
replace contracts as the major guarantees that commitments will be met satisfactorily.9 In a
region where capital markets are rudimentary, financial disclosure is limited, and contract
law is weak, interpersonal networks are critical to moving economic resources across
political boundaries.10

Doing business in a foreign country can be both risky and rewarding. This is
particularly the case in China, where everything seems to be on a huge scale, including the
challenges and opportunities that face western businesses. The difficulties are numerous,
starting with substantial differences in language, customs, and the pace of everyday life.
When actually doing business in China, there are several risks foreign business people need
to understand. The first is the importance of going in with eyes open. Foreigners simply
cannot enter a venture in China with only a cursory understanding of its terms and
6

Michael W Bell, Hoe Ee Khor and Kalpana Kochhar, China at the Threshold of a Market Economy
Occasional Paper No. 107 International Monetary Fund, June 1993).
7
Ming-Jer Chen, Inside Chinese Business above n 4, 157.
8
Seung Ho Park and Yadong Luo, ‘Guanxi and Organizational Dynamics: Organizational Networking in
Chinese Firms’ (2001) 22 Strategic Management Journal 455, 477.
9
Peter J Buckley et al, ‘Cultural Awareness in Knowledge Transfer to China: The Role of Guanxi and
Mianzi’ (2006) 41 Journal of World Business 275, 288.
10
Murray Weidenbaum and Samuel Hughes, The Bamboo Network above n 5, 52–53.
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conditions. 11 As Edelman and Suchman asserted, awareness of the importance of
organisational environments and non-contractual relations in business is essential.12 There
are four other specific risk issues related to China: maintaining local partnerships, the
existence of fraud, and corruption; and natural hazards.13 These obstacles are compounded
by sharp divergences from western legal systems, which may often prevent the orderly
progress of business contracts and transactions.

In the case of China, informal local variations are often far more serious than formal
legal hurdles because they cannot be predicted. The combination of these obstacles creates
a barrier to a foreign business that wants to participate in China’s rapidly growing
economy. In the world of business, customs and culture play a large part, so much so that
the prospective foreign investors cannot expect to meet with any success in China without
any understanding of how the Chinese undertake business and how that business
intermingles with Chinese culture. 14 Relationships between foreign investors and their
Chinese colleagues or partners are crucial for successful outcomes in business ventures in
China. For the purposes of this research it is seen as important to explore in some depth the
nature of these relationships in business practice in China.

11

Ricky Szeto et al, ‘Business Networking in the Chinese Context’ (2006) 29 Management Research News
425, 438; Yee Kwan Tang, ‘The Influence of Networking on the Internationalisation of SMEs: Evidence from
Internationalised Chinese Firms’ (2011) 29 International Small Business Journal 374, 398.
12
Lauren B Edelman and Mark C Suchman, ‘The Legal Environment of Organisations’ (1997) 23 Annual
Review of Sociology 479, 479.
13
W Atkinson, ‘Doing Business in and with China: The Risks are Great, but so are the Rewards’ (2004) 51
Risk Management 24, 28.
14
Patricia Blazey, ‘Culture and Its Relationship to Undertaking Business in China’ in Patricia Blazey and
Kay-Wah Chan (eds), The Chinese Commercial Legal System (Lawbook, 2008) 57, 57.
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9.2.2 ‘Guanxi’ – Relationships
Networking is important for any business in any country. However, it has more important
implications in China. ‘Guanxi’ (personal connection) has been identified as a necessary
pre-condition to do business successfully in China.15 In the view of Chen and Chen:
We view Guanxi as an indigenous Chinese construct and define it as an informal,
particularistic personal connection between two individuals who are bound by an implicit
psychological contract to follow the social norms such as maintaining a long term
relationship, mutual commitment, loyalty, and obligation.16

‘Guanxi’ can be defined in different ways. Literally it means a special relationship
or connection.17 Since ‘Guanxi’ and relationship could function as an information network,
companies with wide ‘Guanxi’ and relationship networks often have much higher levels of
performance than companies with little or no relationship with the Chinese. The hypothesis
has been tested using data from 102 ventures within China in a study in which the results
confirm that the nature of the personal relationships and ‘Guanxi’ have a measurably
positive impact on the performance of these ventures.18

People in China still prefer to trust or rely upon their personal relationships when
they are dealing with business. This indicates a lack of confidence or trust in the legal and
regulatory system. However, there is a different attitude in western countries, where people
can do business with strangers with some quite high level confidence that the legal system
can protect their interests when disputes arise. In the Chinese context it can be suggested
that ‘Guanxi’ assumes some of the functions of a legal system, ‘mutual favours’ were not

15

Xiao Peng Chen and Chao C Chen, ‘On the Intricacies of the Chinese Guanxi: A Process Model of Guanxi
Development’ (2004) 21 Asia Pacific Journal of Management 305, 324.
16
Ibid.
17
Patricia Blazey, ‘Culture and Its Relationship’ above n 14, 58.
18
Tim Ambler et al, ‘The Effect of Channel Relationships and Guanxi on the Performance of Inter-province
Export Ventures in the People’s Republic of China’ (1999) 16 International Journal of Research in Marketing
75, 87.
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traditionally viewed as corruption, and ‘Guanxi’ operating as a code of conduct partially
substituting for the rule of law. Chung and Hamilton who explored the nature of Chinese
business practices by looking at their social foundations suggest:

Although relational rules play a role in Chinese economic practices similar to that of a legal
framework in western economic practices, the results are quite different. Whereas western
legal norms de-personalise market activity, Chinese relational rules personalise
19
transactions, making them part of the interpersonal social matrix of daily life.

‘Guanxi’ is different from the western concept of networking. It is long-term and
concentrated and involves ties of loyalty whereas western networking is more akin to
having a wide range of acquaintances. In the west a business relationship has a group
implication, whereas in ‘Guanxi’ the ties are always personal. Personal loyalty is more
important than loyalty to the organisation. Lin and Ho’s study reveals that national culture
and Guanxi have significant impacts on organisational behaviour. 20 Confucius was very
concerned with relationships and social propriety,21 stating that a strict social hierarchical
order should apply in order to maintain social harmony. 22 The Confucian term ‘li’ actually
refers to ritual. Rituals are manifested not only in terms of appropriate behaviour and roles,
but also for ceremonies and other social processes.23 Confucian teaching and its historical
importance will be discussed in Chapter 8. To this extent, ‘Guanxi’ has to be regarded as a
part of culture that should be taken into account in every aspect of business as it embraces
all the roles in Chinese life.
19

Wai-Keung Chung and Gary G Hamilton, ‘Social Logic as Business Logic: Guanxi, Trustworthiness, and
the Embeddedness of Chinese Business Practices’ in Richard P Appelbaum et al (eds), Rules and Networks
the Legal Culture of Global Business Transactions (Hart Publishing, 2001) 325, 325.
20
Lianghung Lin and Yuling Ho, ‘Guanxi and OCB: The Chinese Cases’ (2010) 96 Journal of Business
Ethics 285, 285.
21
任继愈 [Ren Jiyu], <<中国哲学史>> [History of Chinese Philosophy] (人民出版社 [People’s Publishing
House], 1997] 79–80.
22
Ibid 80.
23
Charles A Rarick, ‘The Historical Roots of Chinese Cultural Values and Managerial Practices’ (2009) 8
Journal of International Business Research 59, 62.
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9.3

Relationships with Chinese Governments – Two Case Scenarios

The automotive industry is a notable example that has demonstrated the importance of
relationships with relevant governments for foreign investors in China. As with economic
growth, developing an automotive capacity is clearly significant for China’s aim of having
world class technology and quality performance in developing its automotive industry. As a
result, China’s central government enacted automotive policy by promoting joint ventures
between Chinese and foreign suppliers.24 It was therefore important that foreign investors’
operations in this sector acquired targeted and sustained policy support from the Chinese
government. The Chinese government has maintained tight control over the automotive
industry, including joint ventures with foreign companies. According to the Seventh Fiveyear Plan 1986 China planned to develop automotive parts manufacturing industries in
order to eventually have all automotive parts made in China. 25 The Government had
announced its intention to promote consolidation of the automotive industry around the
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (which is part of a joint venture with General
Motors), Dong Feng Motors Corporation (which is part of a joint venture with Citroën), and
First Automotive Corporation (which is involved in a joint venture with Volkswagen). In
1995, two companies, Shanghai Volkswagen and Tianjin Auto, accounted for 72 per cent

24

<< 中 共 中 央 关 于 制 定 国 民 经 济 和 社 会 发 展 第 七 个 五 年 计 划 的 建 议 >> [Suggestion of Central
Committee Concerning Making the Seventh Five-Year Plan of National Economy and Social Development]
(People’s Republic of China) National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 23 September 1985, arts
16, 44.
25
<<中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第七个五年计划 1986-1990>> [The Seventh Five-Year Plan of
National Economy and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China 1986-1990] (People’s
Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 12 April 1986, Chs 6[3], 12.
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of the market for passenger cars in China.26 In 2003 sales of Volkswagen Group in China
reached 700,000 units compared to a figure of less than 100,000 units in 1992. 27 The
practice of these joint ventures between Chinese government and foreign investors has
demonstrated the significance of a good relationship with government. It also provides
insights to some failed Chinese-western cooperation. To an extent, such ventures reflect the
reality of the notable influence of the Chinese government on business activities generally.

9.3.1 German Volkswagen Group
In 1994, Volkswagen decided to make an investment of RMB2.3 billion (USD 277.8
million) in China, to have the capacity to manufacture 300,000 cars annually and to be the
largest car manufacturer in China.28 It established two joint venture operations, one with
First Auto Works (FAW) (producing the ‘Jetta’ and the previous-generation Audi 100 from
kits), and the other with Shanghai Volkswagen (SVW) (producing the 1980s model
‘Santana’).29 The two plants built 130,000 cars in 1993, accounting for more than 50 per
cent of China’s total automobile output.30 Volkswagen’s involvement in China had begun
in 1978 when the Chinese Minister of Machinery and Construction visited Wolfsburg in
Germany. The Shanghai Volkswagen contract was signed in 1984 after five years’
negotiation. Dr Posth, chairman of Volkswagen Asia-Pacific, revealed in an interview:

The World Fact Book 1997, ‘Country-by-Country Review of Asian Auto Parts Industries’ (1998) U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency
<http://www.aftermarket.org/International/Foreign_Market_Reports/APAC99/8per cent20COUNTRY.pdf>.
27
Bernd Leissner, ‘Volkswagen and the Chinese Automotive Market’ (2004) Volkswagen Automotive Group
<http://www.volkswagenag.com/vwag/vwcorp/info_center>.
28
Shanghai Volkswagen, <<上海大众历史>> [History of Shanghai Volkswagen] Shanghai Volkswagen
<http://www.csvw.com/csvw/csvw/gsjs/shdzls/index.shtml>.
29
‘Face to Face: with Martin Posth of Volkswagen Asia-Pacific (4th Quarter 1994), International Motor
Business 6, 16. Martin Posth was the chairman of Volkswagen Asia-Pacific in 1993.
30
Ibid.
26
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Several years of discussion and negotiation followed until, by the end of 1981, the Chinese
government and Volkswagen agreed to work together. Contracts were signed in 1984 and
trial assembly operations began shortly after. The first major production plant was opened
31
in 1991. It takes a long time to set up business in China.

The new company was capitalised at USD40 million (approximately RMB330
million). Several details of the contract revealed Volkswagen’s careful foresight. Firstly,
the new joint venture was owned 50 per cent by Volkswagen, 25 per cent by Shanghai
Automotive Industrial Corporation (SAIC), 15 per cent by the Bank of China, and 10 per
cent by the China National Automotive Industrial Corporation (CNAIC).

32

While

Volkswagen was the largest shareholder, the diversity of partners spanned geographic
boundaries for the venture’s operations. The Bank of China could provide or guarantee
necessary loans; SAIC would have an interest in solving local problems; and CNAIC could
be a link to the central planners. Secondly, the contract allowed Volkswagen to convert its
RMB profits for hard currency until 89,000 cars were produced. 33 Volkswagen thus would
avoid the kind of foreign exchange problems experienced by other foreign investors.
Finally, the contract specified that while Volkswagen would try to increase the local
content, the responsibilities of developing qualified local suppliers rested squarely on the
side of the Chinese.34

Coming under criticism from CNAIC in respect of this ‘local content’ and ‘local
suppliers’ issue, Volkswagen’s precise contract provided some respite for the Germans, as

31

Ibid.
René Haak, ‘Market and Technology Leadership in the Chinese Car Industry – Japanese and German
Strategies in a Dynamic Environment’ in René Haak and Dennis S Tachiki (eds), Regional Strategies in a
Global Economy: Multinational Corporations in East Asia (Monographien Aus Dem Dentshen Institut Für
Japanstudien, 2004) 183, 196; Mike W Peng, ‘Controlling the Foreign Agent: How Governments Deal With
Multinationals in a Transition Economy’ (2000) 40 Management International Review 5, 5.
33
Yadong Luo, Strategy, Structure, and Performance of MNCs in China (Greenwood Publishing, 2001) 148.
34
Ibid; Shanghai Volkswagen, <<上海大众概况>> [Shanghai Volkswagen Profile] Shanghai Volkswagen
<http://www.csvw.com/csvw/csvw/gsjs/gsjs/index.shtml>.
32
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it indicated that the Chinese were responsible for developing local suppliers that would
meet Volkswagen’s standards.35 However, the Germans neither complained to the press,
nor sought to directly confront the central government. Instead, they chose quiet persuasion
and reasoned arguments, and allowed the Chinese to find a solution to the problem. 36 In the
end, the criticism from CNAIC abated because of Volkswagen’s efforts and also because of
the Shanghai local government’s — and particularly the mayor’s — lobbying.

37

Volkswagen was fortunate that, with a sympathetic mayor, the Shanghai local government
often sided with its position. The reason that the local government in Shanghai showed a
strong interest in the joint venture was the enterprise’s growing economic importance. Its
production crossed the 100,000 unit mark by 1993. 38 In the mid-1990s, Shanghai
Volkswagen was the largest Chinese-foreign joint venture in China and was listed as a
‘pillar firm’ in Shanghai’s development plan. 39 At the venture’s full capacity of 300,000
vehicles in 1997, it contributed up to 17 per cent of municipal output, and had captured 52
per cent of the automotive sedan market in China.40

Peng’s study compared joint ventures in Beijing to those away from central
government. On the Volkswagen approach Peng suggests:

As a result, a basic level of trust had been established before the venture was formed. Later
on, in the drive toward higher localisation levels, again the Germans refrained from fingerpointing when facing criticism from the central government. Instead, they quietly worked

35

David M Upton and Dianne Long, ‘Shanghai Volkswagen’ (23 April 1996) Harvard Business Review 1, 17.
Mike W Peng, ‘Controlling the Foreign Agent: How Governments Deal with Multinationals in a Transition
Economy’ (2000) 40 Management International Review 141, 165
37
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38
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39
Mike W Peng, ‘Controlling the Foreign Agent’ above n 36, 165.
40
Wayne Xing, ‘Shifting Gears’ (1997) China Business Review 8, 18.
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with the local government, thus reaching the mutually shared goals of increasing local
content.41

Volkswagen’s approach towards the Chinese government when they were dealing
with the operational problems was moderate and practical. It chose to take advantage of its
relationship with government rather than creating direct conflict. Volkswagen might have
chosen to exercise its majority control right in the joint venture and force its decision on to
the operation; however, such an approach may not be an efficient way to deal with any
disagreement between Chinese and German parties in such a situation. Volkswagen has a
very well developed understanding of the importance of its reliance upon the Chinese
government for its substantial operation in China. Volkswagen’s managers in China had
grasped the concept of the importance of maintaining a good relationship with its Chinese
partners and other significant Chinese participants. This understanding has contributed to
its success in China.

9.3.2 American Motor Corporation (AMC)
The ‘Beijing Jeep’ was the largest and most visible manufacturing joint venture established
by the American Motor Corporation (AMC) and the Chinese in the early 1980s. 42 The
negotiations between AMC and CNAIC on behalf of the central authorities took four years
from 1979. An agreement was signed in 1983 to establish a joint venture, named the
‘Beijing Jeep Corporation’, by AMC and the Beijing Automobile Works, a state-owned
enterprise.43 Of a total of USD51 million (approximately RMB422 million) initial capital,

41

Mike W Peng, ‘Controlling the Foreign Agent’ above n 36, 148.
Eric Harwit, China’s Automobile Industry (Armonk, 1995) 12.
43
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AMC held 31 per cent, contributing USD8 million (approximately RMB66 million) in cash
and technology judged to be worth another USD8 million.44 The 69 per cent share of the
Beijing Automobile Works comprised a contribution which included buildings, equipment,
and USD6.6 million (approximately RMB54.6 million).45 Intense differences of objectives
between the two sides were clear from the beginning. The Chinese hoped that the
Americans would help design a completely new model. A policy to support joint ventures
and use these as a means of technology transfer was implemented.46 Moreover, they wanted
to export most of the venture’s output. 47 The Americans, on the other hand, were primarily
interested in selling completely knocked down (CKD) kits of their existing Jeep Cherokee
model for local assembly. 48 In the end, the Americans signed the joint venture contract
pledging to help develop a new model that the Chinese insisted upon, but the contract
contained little detail on the timing and financing of the process. 49 After the initial period,
both sides quickly found that the new vehicle was not easy to design. 50 Facing potentially
hundreds of millions of dollars in further investment to create a new model, the Americans
balked. They insisted that the Chinese import the Jeep Cherokee CKDs for domestic
assembly, and that implicitly allowed AMC to make a profit on kit sales.51 The Chinese
side reluctantly gave up the plan for the new model, on the condition that kit parts would
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gradually adopt Chinese-manufactured components, a process called ‘localisation’. 52 The
Americans objected and notified Chinese bureaucracies at all levels, including,
progressively, the Beijing Municipal Government, CNAIC, the State Planning
Commission, and eventually the State Council. 53 But no solution was forthcoming.
Frustrated, the Americans publicised the crisis by complaining to western media such as the
Wall Street Journal and Business Week, which published reports on the crisis in April
1986.54 They also wrote directly to the Chinese Premier, with a concrete threat of shutting
down the joint venture. 55 Only through the intervention from the then Premier, Zhao
Ziyang, was the venture saved.

In this case the Americans resorted to highly unconventional tactics (in the Chinese
view) in making their case, including publicising the crisis in the media, bringing the matter
directly to the higher authorities, and threatening to shut down the joint venture. Facing the
crisis, various bureaucracies seemed to break down, unable to reach a solution until the
Premier took a ‘top down’ approach to solve it. 56 The role of the local government in
Beijing was, at best, ambiguous. Unlike local governments in Shanghai, the local
government in Beijing initially seemed to be indifferent to the looming crisis, even when
the venture halted production. This situation differed from the Volkswagen case in that two
levels of bureaucracy were involved. In Beijing the joint venture was tightly overseen by
the central government through CNAIC. In Shanghai, although CNAIC maintained
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nominal control, it was the local government that was in charge. The Shanghai officials’
strategy of ‘settling for less’ seemed to be more rational, realistic, and flexible than their
counterparts’ approach in Beijing. 57

Many western investors seeking participation in China’s growth have been
disappointed. They have spent a great deal of time and money in the region over a period of
years and have little to show for it. However, Volkswagen is a significant exception. This
success story is worth noting in view of the many complaints in recent years about the
difficulties of operating and managing joint ventures in China. Its success has no doubt
relied on significant factors such as its early entry, resourcing, effective marketing,
management skills, and commercial strategies. However, the major factor of Volkswagen’s
success was its relationship with the Chinese government. Connecting and networking with
the Chinese government is still a vital skill to master when considering large scale foreign
investment. As Child points out:

Early entry and investment in building up a good relationship with local government are
significant factors for joint venture success in China. Volkswagen … entered the Chinese
market early which enabled them to build up considerable political credibility with the
government authorities – an important factor in countries such as China where government
still plays a major role.58

The preceding two cases seem to suggest that building coalitions with local
government agencies seems to be a good strategy that may pay off in the long run.
Although central authorities in China usually have the power to veto investment projects,
having a local partner that can clearly gain from a project and is therefore committed to the
undertakings, appears to be enormously helpful. Shanghai Volkswagen benefited from such
The World Fact Book 1997, ‘Country-by-Country’ above n 26.
John Child, ‘Challenges of Establishing Successful Joint Venture in China’ (3 April 2003) Spotlight on
John Child <http:// www.fernando.emeraldinsight.com>.
57
58
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a close relationship with the local government in the venture’s struggles to get established.
In contrast, Beijing Jeep, at least initially, suffered from a lack of local support, and had to
resort to highly unconventional and risky tactics, such as publicising the problem to media
and threatening the government, to solve its problem . 59 Stefan Marowski’s review of a
volume by Harwit and Sharpe, that contained case studies of four automotive joint ventures
in China, notes:

… the four cases (Beijing Jeep, Shanghai Volkswagen, Guangzhou Peugeot and Panda
Motor)60 studies are preceded by describing the political players and institutions that were
most instrumental in shaping the development of car manufacturing facilities in China and
61
in determining the nature and extent of foreign direct investment in this sector.

Clearly, during the reform era China has been very successful in attracting FDI for
its economic development despite a developing legal system. Woo Young Wang revealed
in his research that the solution to the puzzle lies in the informal institutions underlying FDI
development in China.62 He found that networks of personal connections (Guanxi), which
are pervasive in Chinese society, have played a major role in facilitating FDI flows to
China.63 While foreign companies have been able to establish a presence in China, their
moderate level of satisfaction with performance of their projects may be attributable to
their inability to build very strong and appropriate ‘Guanxi’ with the relevant authorities.
The social aspect of interpersonal relationships in China is subtle and deeply entrenched,
and on the surface it may not appear to be as important as it is. Some might argue that this
kind of personal relationship is very similar with western ‘relationship marketing’ that also
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intends to gain trust in order to promote business.64 However, the underlying differences
are based upon the influence of China’s long history and philosophy including Confucian
thought, an aspect that will be discussed in a later chapter. It is reasonable to conclude that
a well established awareness of the importance of close relationships is central to the
success of the foreign investor in China.

9.4

Underlying Legal Characteristics

China’s economic development has been accompanied by legal and economic reforms of
great cultural significance. Foreign investors engaging business activities in China not only
need to maintain an ongoing awareness and understanding of its business culture but also of
its developing legal system, particularly in regard to the current legal framework within
which commerce is conducted. It is important to examine the role of law and conflicts of
laws in light of underlying traditional socio-legal relationships in order to acquire a
reasoned understanding of the practical implementation of law and its practice.

9.4.1 The Multi-level Nature of Law in China
At the outset, it is important to know the meaning of ‘law’ in China. Generally speaking,
the concept of law has been inherited from the former Soviet Union. Wang and Zhang
suggest that:
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Law is the sum-up [sic] of action rules embodying the ruling class’s will and customs and
rule of public life confirmed by the state authority and is defined by legislation.65

From this socialist point of view, the concept of law is focused upon the nature and
function of law, that is, law as an instrument of the ruling class. 66 According to almost all
the textbooks of jurisprudence in China’s law schools, it is the ruling instrument of the
bourgeoisie in a capitalist society and of the working class in a socialist society. 67 The
Communist leaders view law primarily as a political instrument of the Party for maintaining
the socialist order and one-party rule in China’s politics.68

Acknowledging this concept of law, that is law as an instrument of control, will
assist non-Chinese to understand the Chinese government’s attitude to law and its
application.69 However, it can be reasonably argued that laws everywhere are all tools or
instruments needed for the maintenance of the stability of any country.

In a broad sense, the body of law in China includes laws, regulations, rules, some
decisions, and even interpretations by the Supreme Court or the Supreme Procuratorate,
which can be divided into several groups according to their jurisdiction and enforcement.
On the top of the pyramid that constitutes the legal system is the Constitution, the supreme

65

See Yongfei Wang and Guicheng Zhang, Summary and Commentary of Chinese Jurisprudence (China
University of Political Science and Law Publishing House, 1992).
66
卢云 [Lu Yun], <<法学基础理论>> [Legal Theory],(中国政法大学出版社 [University of Politics and
Law of China Press], 1994) 35–41; 沈宗灵 [Shen Zongling], <<法学基础理论>> [Legal Theory] (北京大学
出版社[Beijing University Press], 1994) 27–31.
67
沈宗灵 [Shen Zongling], <<法理学研究>> [Legal Theory Study] (上海人民出版社 [Shanghai People’s
Press], 1990) 34; 丁邦开, 邢鸿飞 [Ding Bangkai and Xing Hongfei], <<中国现行法制探析>> [Analysis of
China’s Current Legal System] (南京大学出版社 [Nanjing University Press], 1990) 19; 卢云 [Lu Yun] <<法
理学>> [Legal Theory] (四川人民出版社 [Sichuan People’s Press], 1993) 27–31.
68
Xin Ren, Tradition of the Law and Law of the Tradition: Law, State, and Social Control in China
(Greenwood Press, 1997) 48–9.
69
In March 1999, the NPC of the PRC adopted and amendment to the Constitution 1982, incorporating in
Article 5 yi fa zhi guo (governing the country in accordance with law) and jianshe shehui zhuyi fazhi guojia
(building a socialist rule of law state).
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law in China. The Constitution now in force was enacted in 1982 after the other 3
preliminary Constitutions, those of 1954, 1975 and 1978. It was amended respectively four
times, principally to reflect the policy and economic developments in China. 70

The second level of law is the set of ‘basic statutes’ enacted by the National
People’s Congress (NPC). This is not the same basic law as in the Basic Law of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, although the latter was also enacted by the NPC. According
to the Constitution 1982, basic laws include the basic statutes concerning criminal offences,
civil wrongs, the state organs and other matters.71

The third level is ‘statutes’, which specifically refer to the statutes enacted by the
Standing Committee of the NPC. As the NPC has a conference only once a year and
members of the NPC are voters from the functional electorates not professional politicians,
its standing committee makes most of the statute law. Also, there is no stipulation
concerning the separation of legislative power between the NPC and the Standing
Committee. Most of the substantive laws have been made by the latter.

But then, there is the most controversial law-making method — administrative
legislation. The Constitution 1982 states that the State Council exercises the following
functions and powers:

i.

to adopt administrative measures, and

ii.

enact administrative rules, regulations decisions and orders in accordance with the
Constitution and the statutes.

70

Kay-Wah Chan, ‘The Constitution and the Governmental System of China’ in Patricia Blazey and KayWah Chan (eds), The Chinese Legal System (Lawbook, 2008) 71, 71.
71
<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China)
National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, 14 March 2004, art 62.
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State Council makes laws as according to:
i.

delegated laws which are granted by the NPC; and

ii.

administrative regulations made by the State Council; and

iii.

administrative rules made by ministries and commissions of the State Council.72

Again, because there is no special limit to the power of delegation of the Congress, and
because most laws adopted are drafted by branches of the State Council, the administration
seems to become the most powerful legislature in China.

The base of the law pyramid is local enactment which includes:

i.

local regulations, statutes and the administrative rules and regulations adopted by
the people’s congresses of provinces and municipalities directly under the central
government, and their committees;73

ii.

autonomous regulations and specific regulations of people’s congresses of national
autonomous areas, which include autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and
autonomous counties;

iii.

74

special delegation of the NPC to Municipalities of Economic Special Regions,
larger cities, counties, and capital cities in provinces, notwithstanding the Basic
laws and other enactments in the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong
and Macao.

Apart from the above-mentioned organs, the Supreme Court and Supreme
Prosecutor also have powers to interpret laws in accordance with the Decision of the NPC’s

72

Ibid art 89.
Ibid art 100.
74
Ibid art 116.
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Standing Committee Concerning Judicial Interpretation 1981.

75

The Administrative

Procedure Law of the PRC 198976 stipulates:

In handling administrative cases, the people’s courts shall take the law, administrative rules
and regulations and local regulations as the criteria. Local regulations shall be applicable to
administrative cases within the corresponding administrative areas. In handling
administrative cases of a national autonomous area, the people’s courts shall also take the
regulations on autonomy and separate regulations of the national autonomous area as the
77
criteria.

Even though China has this multi-subject law-making system, the Constitution 1982
has no provisions which constrain the different law-making powers. As a result, conflicts of
laws occur from time to time among all these law-making bodies.

9.4.2 Various Conflicts of Laws in China
The Constitution 1982 expressly prescribes that: ‘No laws or administrative and local
regulations should contravene the Constitution.’78 However, different institutions in China
have been substantially granted the right to make law, and, as there is no constitutional
review, with the ongoing development of the economy, conflicts of law can easily occur.
Conflicts of law have raised problems of application and compliance, which in turn
influence the decisions of the Courts. A brief examination of the basic types of conflict of
law that occur in China follows in an attempt to discover the institutional reasons for such

75

<<关于加强法律解释工作的决议>> [Decision of the NPC’s Standing Committee Concerning Judicial
Interpretation] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, June 1981, art
2.
76
<<中华人民共和国行政诉讼法>> [Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 4 April 1989.
77
Ibid art 52.
78
<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China)
National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, art 5, s 2.
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conflict. Conflicts of law can be divided into three basic types according to the law-making
body’s status in the whole law-making system. Each basic type has its own subdivisions.

9.4.2.1 NPC versus NPC Standing Committee

Conflicts of law between the laws of the NPC and those of its Standing Committee derive
from two causes. The first is the vague demarcation between the Council and the Standing
Committee. The second reason is that the NPC is not a place for professional politicians as
it is composed of delegates who are selected from designated functional electoral districts
who meet only once a year.79 As Peerenboom observes:

The law-making and rule-making processes still lack transparency, and opportunities for
public participation are limited, notwithstanding some improvements since 1978. The
quality of much legislation remains low, in part due to the lack of practical experience and
competence of drafters. Laws and regulations are subject to frequent change. Even more
worrisome, there is a shockingly high incidence of inconsistency between lower and
superior legislation.80

Although the NPC is the supreme authority in China, it has no obligation to explain
its own enactments; thus there is no legal process to review any conflict that may occur
with legislation enacted by its Standing Committee. For example, on the one hand the
Constitution 1982 stipulates that the NPC may revise the Constitution,81 enact and revise

79

Ibid art 59; <<全国人民代表大会和地方各级人民代表大会选举法>> [Electoral Law of the People’s
Republic of China on National People’s Congress and Local Various Level People’s Congress] (People’s
Republic of China) 27 October 2004, [2]–[4].
80
Randall Peerenboom, ‘Competing Conceptions of Rule of Law in China’ in Randall Peerenboom (ed),
Asian Discourses of Rule of Law: Theories and Implementation of Rule of Law in Twelve Asian Countries,
France and the U S (Routledge, 2004) 113, 116.
81
<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China)
National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, art 62, s 1.
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the Criminal Law, Civil Law, laws of state institutes and other basic laws,82 and revise or
annul improper decisions made by the Standing Committee.83

On the other hand, Article 67 states that the Standing Committee may:

a.

construct the Constitution;

b.

enact and revise laws except what should be enacted by the NPC;

c.

during the session of the NPC, supplement and revise laws enacted by the NPC
while not contravening the basic principles thereof;

d.

construct laws; and

e.

annul administrative regulations, decisions and orders made by the State Council
84
which contravene the Constitution and laws.

As a result, even if the Standing Committee enacts laws within the scope of
responsibility contrary to NPC legislation, no institution can correct the error, for it is the
Standing Committee which will interpret both the Constitution and the laws. In fact, no law
has ever been annulled by the Standing Committee.85

9.4.2.2

The Legislature versus the Executive

The same problem occurs between the legislative authority and the executive organ of the
government. Firstly, with the development of modern society, the complexity and
technicality of most enactments make it impossible, as elsewhere in the world, for the
legislative members to draft law without help from experts from the administration. In
1985, the Third session of the Sixth meeting of the NPC’s Standing Committee passed a
82

Ibid s 3.
Ibid s 11.
84
Ibid art 67.
85
<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China)
National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, art 5.
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resolution that empowered the State Council to make regulations and acts in respect of the
‘Open Door’ policy and economic reform.

86

Secondly, no provision in either the

Constitution or the Organic Law of the State Council 198287 provides ministries with the
power to enact regulations; however, most of the regulations now in force have been
enacted by them. Also, there are conflicts between different departments of the State
Council. With the expansion of administrative regulation more regulations are made, not by
the State Council, but its functional commissions and ministries. These are called subregulations. According to a statistic published in 1994, in the period from 1979 to the first
half of 1994 the NPC and its Standing Committee adopted 270 laws and decisions, while
the State Council enacted about 1500 administrative regulations. 88 The State Council
published the first White Paper on the Rule of Law in China in 2008. Legal reform in China
has made impressive progress. There are 229 currently effective laws adopted by the NPC
and its standing committee and the State Council enacted 600 currently effective
administrative regulations, there are 7000 provisions enacted by various levels of People’s
Congress and their standing committees.89

Also, local laws on foreign investment form a significant part of the legal
framework for foreign investment in China. Local governments have considerable authority
in approving foreign investment proposals and extensive powers in making local laws,

86

<<全国人民代表大会常务委员会工作报告>> [Work Report of National People’s Congress Standing
Committee] (People’s Republic of China) The Third Session of the Sixth Meeting of the National People’s
Congress Standing Committee, 3 April 1985.
87
<<中华人民共和国国务院组织法>> [Organic Law of the State Council of the People’s Republic of
China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, Order No 14, 10 December 1982.
88
‘White Paper on Political Democracy Published: Building of Political Democracy in China’ (19 October
2005) China Organisation News <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Oct/145718.htm>.
89
<<中国的法治建设>>白皮书 [Rule of Law in China] (国务院新闻办公室 [Information Office of the
State Council], 北京 [Beijing], February 2008) para 29.
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regulations and policies on foreign investment. 90 Local laws, regulations and policies
should not conflict with national laws and regulation. 91 However, when it comes to the
interests of a local economy, the situation can be different. Some local policies on attracting
foreign investment may not be consistent with the national laws. For example, during the
mid 1990s there were some cities in Guangdong province in southern China which were the
most rapidly developing areas in China at that time. They had policies of attracting foreign
investment by promoting the package sale of village land for foreign-invested
manufacturers. The Administration Bureau of National Land intervened and issued a
notification concerning abuse of agricultural land in order to exercise control over the
illegal transfer of collective land.92 In fact, these policies were inconsistent with the Land
Law which regulates all village land as collective property which, as collective property is
not permitted to be transferred into commercial land use. 93 This was a confusing situation
for foreign investors many of whom had invested in projects that included the purchase of
village land on which they had built factories.
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John Shijian Mo, ‘Foreign Investment Law’ in Guiguo Wang and John S Mo (eds), Chinese Law (Kluwer
Law International 1999) 255, 283.
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[Notification Concerning Carefully Implementing the State Council’s Related Documents of Strict Prohibition
of Abuse and Illegal Occupation of Agricultural Land and Developing Real Estate] (People’s Republic of
China) Administration Bureau of National Land, 25 December 1992, art 4.
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9.4.2.3

The Legislature versus the Judiciary

In the 1981 NPC Standing Committee Decision Concerning Reinforcement of Judicial
Interpretation 198194 (adopted at its 19th session, 5th Meeting), the Supreme People’s Court
and Supreme Prosecutor were empowered to interpret laws and decrees concerning the
application of concrete cases.95 The meaning of the ‘application of concrete cases’ is not,
however made clear in the Decision Concerning Reinforcement of Judicial Interpretation
1981. Judicial interpretation does not resemble its counterparts in the west. The Judiciary
does make laws in the name of judicial interpretation. Conflicts of law not only exist
between the legislature and the judiciary, but also in the judiciary itself, that is, between the
Supreme Court and the Supreme Prosecutor.96 The Decision Concerning Reinforcement of
Judicial Interpretation 1981 made it clear that such conflicts would be resolved by
reporting to the NPC Standing Committee.97

The problem of central-local conflicts of law is a reflection of the more general
central-local relationship in China. Conflicts of law between the two levels results from the
State Council’s assignment of its rights to both the administrative authority and to the local

94

<<全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于加强法律解释工作的决议>> [Decision of the NPC’s Standing
Committee Concerning Reinforcement of Judicial Interpretation] (People’s Republic of China) National
People’s Congress Standing Committee, 10 June 1981.
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Ibid art 2.
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of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Order
No 4, 10 May 2006, art 2. The Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate shall
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level administrative bodies.98 The extensive legislative power granted to the State Council
has thus made the Council, de facto, the most powerful law-making institution in China.
This would appear to explain the huge number of administrative regulations issued by it.99
The problem is exacerbated by the lack of legislation concerning central-local separation
and balance.

The central-local relationship in legislation shifts with the development of the
market economy. The more power that the central government releases, the more
discretionary power local governments enjoy in all aspects of governance. In 1994, separate
systems of taxation were being applied despite this being more appropriate for a federation
than for a unitary state. Compared to other unitary countries, local levels have more lawmaking power in China in accordance with the Constitution. 100 The local levels did not
enjoy such law-making powers in the past because the central government controlled and
constrained the economic resources.101 After the adoption of the ‘Open Door’ policy, the
central government gradually surrendered some of its power of decision-making, while
local levels of administration took advantage of this to advance their own interests by
implementing local laws and regulations.102 According to a mid 1990s investigation by the
Product Bureau of the State Council Reform Commission, two thirds of the local officials
agreed with the assertion that: ‘For the sake of local interests, even if policy constraints
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exist, we will make it work for us’.103 This is a clear indication of the rising eagerness of
the local institutions to strive for the interests of their local areas.

It is very natural for different local levels to have conflicts of law as a result of the
different arrangements made by the central government for different regions in China. This
is exacerbated in the southern provinces which are assigned more discretion in both
economic and social terms and have looser ties to the central authority. 104

9.4.3 Further Analysis of Inconsistency between Laws
Brief references have been made to the problems arising from the question of inconsistent
laws adopted by the different law-making bodies in China. The issue is worthy of more
detailed consideration. Every legal system must have rules for reconciling conflict between
inconsistent laws. Observers in China have argued about this mixed legislative system since
the early 1990s.105 The solution in the common law system, which is applicable in such
states as the UK or New Zealand, is the ‘doctrine of implied repeal’.106 Where there are two
inconsistent (or conflicting) statutes, often the latter can be deemed to have implicitly
repealed the earlier to the extent of the inconsistency, although this is not always the case.
The doctrine of implied repeal applies in China to resolve conflicts between laws enacted
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by the same legislative body, for example, conflicts between two statutes of the NPC or two
statutes of a provincial legislature.107

The second rule adopted implicitly or expressly is the doctrine of ‘central
paramountcy’, which is also very common in federal systems. Where there are inconsistent
(or conflicting) central and local laws, it is the central law which prevails. A similar
doctrine applies in Australia, in the US and in Canada. 108 In China the doctrine of
‘paramountcy’ also applies when it comes to a conflict between the NPC and other abovementioned law-making bodies. Another variation of this rule is the doctrine of ‘higher level
paramountcy’, which applies where conflicting laws are enacted by different levels of the
same law-making body; (for example, conflicts of administrative regulation made by the
provincial government and a municipality in that province or conflicts of some rules made
by a Ministry and a lower level branch).109 However, it is notable that no such constraint is
set for: (a) a conflict between different departments of the same level (such as those
between Judicial Interpretation and Executive Regulation); (b) regulations between
different departments of the State Council; or (c) where conflicts of law exist in different,
but still local, levels.110
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There is also another effective resolution method for the conflicts of law, namely
negotiation or, more formally, reconciliation. In China, conflict of statutes between
different provincial legislatures is unlikely to occur because the legislative authority of each
province is confined within its own territory. However, conflict of regulations between
different branches of the administration is bound to occur from time to time because such
regulations are applicable in the same territory. In these cases, the conflicting regulations
will be referred to the State Council for decision and rulings. 111 For example, the
Administrative Procedure Law of the PRC 1989 proclaims:

If a people’s court considers regulations formulated and announced by a local people’s
government to be inconsistent with regulations formulated and announced by a ministry or
commission under the State Council, or if it considers regulations formulated and
announced by ministries or commissions under the State Council to be inconsistent with
each other, the Supreme People’s Court shall refer the matter to the State Council for
112
interpretation or ruling.

This is an apt illustration of the conciliation rule in the ‘living law’ in China.
Despite all of these resolution mechanisms, conflicts of law in China are still a major
problem that continues to bewilder the Chinese legal community. One reason for this is that
conflicts of law continues to be an obstacle for the court when they apply laws in a specific
case. The 2003 ‘Luoyang Seed Case’ 113 was an example. This was a seed reproduction
contract dispute case with the claim of economic loss by the plaintiff on the ground of
failure of performance of contract by the defendant. The issue arising out of this case was
which law should be applied for the purpose of calculation of the economic loss by the

111

Ibid arts 86[2], [3].
<<中华人民共和国行政诉讼法>> [Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China]
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plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed its loss based upon the Seed Law of the People’s Republic of
China 2004114 in which it argued that the economic loss should be estimated on the market
price when the decision was made. However, the defendant argued that the Regulations
Concerning Administration of Agricultural Products of Henan Province 1984 115 should
apply in which it stated that the price of the seed should follow the government directed
price. The difference between the two bases of calculation was RMB680,000
(approximately USD82,000).116 The first instance court — Luoyang Intermediate People’s
Court — delivered its judgment that the provision in relation to the seed price in the
Regulation Concerning Administration of Agricultural Seed Products of Henan Province
1984 shall be invalid as a result of it being in contradiction to the national law of Seed Law
of the People’s Republic of China. 117 The second reason was that these principles are
neither expressly stipulated in the Constitution nor written in other national
legislation. Therefore, it will be at the discretion of those in the most powerful position to
decide when they should or should not be applied. Finally, there are neither legal
proceedings to coordinate such mechanisms nor a statutory process to deal with such
matters concerning conflicts of law. Consequently, there is a pressing need to establish
some mechanism to address this situation.
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The primary need is to set up an efficient law-making system. Governmental power is
vested in one national authority; and local authorities are subordinate to the national
authority. The powers of a city, borough or county are granted to it by the national
legislature, and may be taken away, altered or controlled at any time by the national
legislature. 118 No matter what kind of institution it is, there will always be laws to
demarcate responsibilities between the two levels.

The Communist Party of China preferred a typical unitary country. However, local
levels were vested with powers to make law simply as a result of the practical reality that
direct control at the central level brought about too many technical obstacles. As a result,
although the state structure in China is characterised as consisting of centralised power,
there are indications that it is also characterised by some federal features, such as
autonomous regions, special regions and the four municipalities.

What appears to be necessary in China today is more work on confining different
legislatures or law-making bodies to their own territories. The Government will be faced
with a continuation of problems as more and more discretionary power is demanded by the
lower or local levels. So it would be wise to take measures to deal with such serious
aspects.
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China) Supreme People’s Court, Order No 19, 19 December 1999, art 4.
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China today needs not only constitutional rules to regulate statutes, but due process to carry
out these rules. According to Yasuhen and Yaxin, rights and duties stipulated in the
substantial law are an illusion of rights and duties unless they are manifested in concrete
decisions.119

In the Chinese system, both parties in a conflict of law have the right to take part in
an action and to resolve disputes in public. In consideration of the public nature of
procedural law, there is no good reason why the Constitution should not apply to
procedural laws. Given the extreme rapidity of change over the last twenty to thirty years
the time is probably right for a constitutional review to ensure the protection of rights,
obligations and powers vested by the Constitution and to deal with the local/central
problems referred to above.

Inter-regional conflicts of law should also be dealt with. This was not a problem in
the past because the reach of provincial statues was confined to their own territories and
there seemed to be no need to set rules for conflicts. For example, the Regulations
Concerning Land Use Right Transfer of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 1994 120 can only
apply within the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone area. It is not applicable nation-wide or
to other cities. 121 But Hong Kong and Macao have since reverted to the PRC and there
exists a real dilemma in trying to integrate the legal powers of the competing jurisdictions.
The legislative system is a multiple system that has been described by some private
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Taniguchi Yasuhen and Wang Yaxin, Procedural Justice and Lawsuit (China University of Political
Science and Law Publishing House, 1996).
120
<<深圳经济特区土地使用权出让条例>> [Regulations Concerning Land Use Right Transfer of the
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone ] (People’s Republic of China) Shenzhen People’s Congress Standing
Committee, 18 June 1994.
121
Ibid art 4.
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international law scholars in China, as ‘one country, two systems, four legal families’.122
Also, considering the surging demand for discretionary power from the local
authorities, there is a possibility, based upon the various economic conditions in different
regions, that the local levels will be granted law-making powers more or less similar to
those of the special administrative regions.123

Over-empowerment and abuse of powers at local levels have been major problems
in Chinese history. In the past, conflicts arising from these causes used to be settled by
wars, but in contemporary society law is supposed to be able to contemplate and lead to the
resolution of such conflicts. If law is not utilised in time, it is conceivable that both
economic and political battles will occur in and amongst the newly developing regions of
China.

9.5

Conclusions

In terms of social factors as discussed here, there is little doubt that the comparison between
the ‘depersonalised’ relational rules in western business practice and the quite different
ways in which Chinese business relationships maintain and enrich personal relationships
supports the validity of the proposition that the western foreign investor in China can
benefit by, to some extent, casting aside their normal concepts of how business should be
done. The different attitudes of communicating with Chinese authorities as between the
German Volkswagen Group and the American Motor Corporation as discussed in this
chapter, shows that the importance of good relationships with Chinese parties for foreign
122

An often repeated expression of former President Deng Xiao Peng.
<<中国的法治建设>>白皮书 [Rule of Law in China] (国务院新闻办公室 [Information Office of the
State Council], 北京 [Beijing], February 2008), para 24.
123
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investors and the complicated administrative influences on the business environment in
China. This indicated that the good balance of German Volkswagen Group in the course of
handling the business partnership and dealings with the administration has contributed to its
success in China’s motor vehicle market. According to Lenganberg:

Relationships with government officials are highly significant for modern day business.
This is not surprising considering that China’s unique context of institutional force still
124

contains many elements of state-designed arrangements and functions.

The importance of relationships at almost every level of activity in China cannot be
overstated. It also extends to the working relationships between individuals, small business
operators, corporations and authoritative decision-makers at every level and, it must be
said, has appeared to work very effectively, despite the fact that it can also be manifested in
ways that border upon being, or actually are, corrupt. The case studies discussed here show
that some ‘hard-line’ business practices that may well be acceptable in some western
countries have the capacity to invite failure when adopted in China. The conciliatory style
of negotiation in dispute situations certainly appears to be a more appropriate and effective
approach for foreign investors in the PRC.

The characteristics of the legal structures of China have been examined in some
detail here, and it has become clear that the structure invites confusion and conflict on the
one hand and opportunities for ‘flexible’ interpretation and possibly manipulation or
exploitation on the other. The PRC government can certainly utilise these elements of the
law to its advantage in properly attempting to retain some level of control of economic
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Eike A Langenberg, Guanxi and Business Strategy: Theory and Implications for Multinational Companies
in China (Physica-Verlag Heidelberg, 2007) 141.
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activity of the country. China is physically vast and the imposition of total central control of
all laws over the whole country would seem an impossible feat. It is undoubtedly politically
wise to devolve a measure of power to the regional and municipal centres but there may be
a cost to such devolution.

The traditional levels of legal semi-autonomy that exist between different regions of
the country also contribute to the incidence of inconsistency between laws, conflicts of law
and varied interpretations of laws — all of which have the capacity to assist, frustrate or
confuse the foreign investor.

Traditionally, those governing China have always had to cope with the difficulties
presented by huge distances and diverse groupings within its borders as well as (from time
to time) the unpopularity of the idea of imposition of rules from the capital. In modern
China it is the case with much foreign investment activity that a great deal of decisionmaking and regulation occurs at provincial and regional locations as well as within the
SEZs.
This aspect has earlier been shown to present opportunities for foreigners in terms
of competition between different Chinese localities and authorities for the operation of a
business, building infrastructure, employment opportunities, local income tax and so on. 125
In general terms it can be fairly said that the continuing existence of certain cultural
habits, preferences and attitudes has the capacity to impact adversely upon foreign investors
in China. However, if those investors have gained some understanding of those local
characteristics and, in addition, make some effort to modify pre-conceived notions about,
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See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Investment Perspectives
2003 (OECD, 2003) 52–5.
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for example, contract formation and dispute handling, then adverse outcomes can very
likely be limited.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions
10.1 Introduction
As has been discussed in the previous two chapters, Chinese legal tradition developed from
both Confucianism and Legalism.1 The interlacing of the two dominant streams of thought
has been shown to pervade not only the legal codes promulgated during imperial times, but
to underlay the administration of justice and the legal institutions that have been developed
up to the present.2

This chapter concludes the research by suggesting that an understanding of the role
of the history of Chinese legal tradition gives an explanation for the coherence (and
sometimes a perceived lack of coherence) of the law and government in the current legal
system in China. This thesis has explored the relationship between modern foreign
investment in China and the laws of that country and, more specifically, the application of
Chinese laws to foreign investment. It has shown that an understanding of the nature of,
background to, and influences upon Chinese law is knowledge that can be invaluable for
the successful exercise of investment in or with China today.

A recurring observation in this research has been the significance of an
understanding of Chinese history and its influence on Chinese legal system. The influence
1

Xin Ren, Tradition of the Law and Law of the Tradition: Law, State, and Social Control in China
(Greenwood Press, 1997) 19.
2
Patricia Blazey and Gisele Kapterian, ‘Traditional Chinese Law’ in Patricia Blazey and Kay-Wah Chan
(eds), The Chinese Commercial Legal System (Lawbook, 2008) 19, 36.
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has been so long-standing and all-pervasive in Chinese society that it continues to have
profound effects upon Chinese legal practice today, even though China has been through
quite radical stages of political change and development. Its implications have been
examined in several aspects in relation to foreign investment and the legal framework.

Section 10.1 of this chapter introduces the proposition that within the character of
the Chinese people there is an ingrained and pervasive belief system that has resulted from
centuries of acceptance of some basic concepts of human behaviour in addition to and
complementary to laws from time to time. One aspect of significant importance for foreign
investors is that related to the need to establish strong relationships — often at a personal
level — with Chinese partners. It is also necessary for the foreign investor to accept the
importance of establishing links between significant players in the particular sphere of
activity concerned and to understand that the regulatory framework requires patience and
an acknowledgement of the need, in many instances, for assistance by the Chinese partner
in navigating the local requirements. Section 10.2 summarises the subjects broadly under
discussion in each of the preceding 9 chapters of this research and includes some specific
conclusions drawn from the study. Section 10.3 presents some more general conclusions
from the research

10.2 Summary of Earlier Chapters
The introductory chapter discussed the background of the Chinese economic system at the
time when China’s political leaders decided to attempt the transformation of the country’s
economy from a ‘command’ economy on the verge of collapse to a market economy on a
global scale.
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The need for the development of a legal regime to facilitate and support the enormous
development of China’s trading relationship with the rest of Asia and the western world
was immediately evident and this study documents much of the development of such a
legal system over the past three decades.

As part of the general development of it laws, China developed, and continues to
develop a specific set of laws to deal with ever-increasing levels of foreign investment in
the PRC. During this process the role of law and the relationship between law and
government began to be revealed and, as a result, that relationship has continued to be the
subject of external scrutiny. The scrutiny, often incorporating some doubts as to the
motives of the government of the PRC, centered upon the seemingly contradictory position
of a communist government system engaging in a capitalist, market driven economic
policy.

China’s rapid economic reform has not only developed the country’s economic
system and led to its position as one of the most rapidly growing and strongest economies
in the world it has also facilitated and, it is suggested, demanded the development of its
legal system to be one more aligned with the legal systems of western market economy
states.

This research has mapped the development of Contract law in China and in so doing
has provided an example of the nature of the country’s modern legal reform process. It
shows that legal reform is based upon, and relies upon, the changes inherent in economic
transformation. Specific laws were necessary to service the needs of China’s progress and
changes to economic policies.
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Also, matters relating specifically to foreign investment operations have been examined.
China has been a popular foreign investment destination since the opening of its massive
market and its manufacturing skills to the world. Whilst there have been many successful
international business operations in China, there have also been some substantial failed
enterprises. The lack of a consistent and transparent legal system along with complicated
systems of administration have certainly been major contributing factors as, of course, have
been the often misplaced expectations of some of those seeking access to the Chinese
market or its manufacturing advantages.

The survey that was conducted as part of this research identified some common
concerns amongst Australian individuals and enterprises operating their business in or with
China. Legal and social aspects regarding China’s business, administrative and legal
environment were examined. The survey and interviews indentified a number of existing
difficulties in terms of relationships with Chinese government at a various levels, Chinese
partners and the Chinese judicial system. The conclusion drawn from these investigations is
that whilst actual laws and regulations in China may be difficult to comprehend on
occasions and often do not demonstrate a clear direction for the foreign investor, it is often
the nature of individual relationships where communication breakdowns occur and this can,
and often does, lead to unsatisfactory and possibly costly outcomes.

The outcomes of the survey and interview component of this study confirms the
thesis that the success of business relationships between foreign investors and Chinese
partners are not simply dependent upon reaching agreement and committing the terms of
such agreement to a written contract between the parties.
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Even though initial written contracts nearly always exist between the foreign investor and
his or her Chinese partner, they are often regarded by the Chinese participants as general
blueprints for the ongoing relationship rather than iron-clad arrangements for all aspects of
a business partnership in the way that such contracts would normally be designed in the
west.

Additionally, social and legal aspects of the current environment in China have been
explored from the perspective of China’s historical and cultural background. In an
examination of Chinese legal tradition, the influences of Confucian and Legalist
philosophies in Chinese political and legal evolution have been explored. It is concluded
here that these philosophical positions have had profound influence on Chinese legal
tradition and are still functioning in current society in subtle ways. It is suggested that, in
the search to understand the complexities of western business relationships with Chinese
partners, an understanding of Chinese history and culture and their influence on the legal
system is an important pre-requisite knowledge.

There is little doubt that connections with people who have power may be crucial
for business operations and that awareness of this aspect is important for foreign investors.
The role of the government or the state owned enterprises associated with governmental
power in the economy was always protected. Important economic decision-makers at all
levels (from the members of the State Council down to the managers of factories), comprise
a powerful supplementary network for transmitting and implementing the economic goals
and policies of the government. Connections can be valuable in any country but in most
western countries the primary focus of a business is its product or service because buyers
and sellers deal at arm’s length. In China, the quality of the product is important, but
407
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Guanxi3 is even more so. It can take a long time to develop Guanxi independently, but it
can be accomplished vicariously. The most effective vehicle is the joint venture with a
(local) participant who has Guanxi at levels appropriate to the transaction.

This research has been limited by a number of factors in indicating that some future
investigations may be appropriate. Firstly, the survey for this research took place in 2005
and the passage of time, particularly with the pace and dynamics of development in China
since then, may have resulted in a range of different experiences for foreign investors in
China in the last six years. Secondly, important factual information about immediate past
events and decisions in China are often difficult to obtain causing difficulties in
maintaining objectivity about current issues. It is often the case that, only after many
months or even some years after policy or administrative decisions have been made, does it
become possible to rationally analyse their nature and their practical effects. In the
intervening period it may be that an observer’s or analyst’s own prejudices and interests are
more likely to influence their views or conclusions. Thirdly, the Chinese philosophical and
social systems were, and are, very complex and composed of so many interacting strands
that are difficult to fully unravel.4

10.3 Concluding Comments
Today, law in China serves as a means both to consolidate the achievements of economic
reform and to promote further development of economic reform by way of standardising

3

‘Guanxi’ in this context essentially means connections or networking.
Werner F Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal System of Asia and Africa (Platinium
Publishing, 2000) 447.
4
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and institutionalising changes in the economic system. 5 Deng Xiaoping said in the
Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC
that law must be used to establish stability and order for economic development .6

In China, Party policy decides the direction of economic reform and development.
China’s prominent scholar Chen suggested, ‘Law is the fixing and codification of policy. It
is necessary to stabilise, in legal form, Party policies that in practice have repeatedly proven
their effectiveness and whose implementation should be continued.’ 7 Therefore, law is a
better tool than policy, capable of securing and institutionalising policies in a more
universal manner and of providing stability and order (supported by the threat or use of the
state’s coercive forces) for economic development and defining rights and duties in relation
to the state as represented by various administrative authorities.8

To date the ‘stability’ referred to may not have been achieved in practical terms for many
foreign investors whilst some very substantial, long term joint venture operations —

5

Rongheng Liu (ed), Economic Structural Reform and the Construction of an Economic Legal System (Press
of Current Affairs, 1985) 3–4 cited in Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law,
Its Nature and Development (Kluwer Law International, 1999) 1.
6
Jianfu Chen, From Administrative Authorisation to Private Law: A Comparative Perspective of the
Developing Civil Law in the People’s Republic of China (Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1994) 274; Deng
Xiaoping, ‘Implement the Policy of Readjustment, Ensure Stability and Unity’, in Deng Xiaoping, Selected
Works of Deng Xiaoping (Foreign Languages Press, 1984) 335–55. See also ‘Communique of the Third
Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC’ in Selected Readings of Important
Documents since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Congress of the CPC (People’s Press, 1987) 10–
11.
7
Jianfu Chen, ‘China: Constitutional Changes and Legal Developments’ in Alice E-S Tay and Conita S C
Leung (eds), Greater China: Law, Society and Trade (The Law Book, 1995) 139, 142; See Chen, Jianfu, ‘The
Transformation of Chinese Law from Formal to Substantial’ (2007) 37 Hong Kong Law Journal 689, 718–9.
8
Law Development of Beijing University (ed), Basic Theories of Legal Science (Beijing University Press,
1984) 212–21; Daying Wu and Zhongling Shen, A Basic Theory of Chinese Socialist Legal Science
(Publishing House of Law, 1987) 165–77.

409

Ch 10: Conclusions

notably some major motor vehicle manufacturers — seemed to have achieved such
stability. By 1997 they had captured 52 per cent of the sedan market in China. 9

The ‘Open Door’ policy recognises that China needs not only foreign technology
and foreign capital, but also foreign management expertise, marketing experience and
marketing networks. Competition among provincial and local authorities to attract foreign
investment by offering preferential treatment and concessions (other than those granted or
approved by the central government) has increased the possibility of conflict between
central and local authorities but this has probably benefitted foreign investors rather than
hurt them. The Chinese Constitution does not expressly give any exclusive powers to the
central government. It does allow local government at the provincial level to make local
regulations and rules, provided that these regulations and rules do not contravene the
Constitution, the law and administrative rules and regulations issued by the central
government.10 Therefore, it remains unclear whether locally granted preferential treatments
and concessions are legally valid, in particular when central government policies change.
This clearly constitutes an important issue in the medium to long term for a potential
foreign investor.

As in other areas of economic activities, various forms of foreign investment
developed and were often permitted by ad hoc policies ahead of reformulation and
enactments of relevant legislation. However, as foreign investment increased in China, so
did the volume of Chinese laws and regulations both at the central and local levels. These
laws and regulations have resulted in a special legal regime for foreign investment
9

Wayne Xing, ‘Shifting Gears’ (1997) China Business Review 8, 18.
<<中华人民共和国宪法>> [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China)
National People’s Congress, 4 December 1982, art 100.
10
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enterprises. A unique feature of these laws and regulations is that they deal with specific
types and specific aspects of foreign investment, there being no unified code for foreign
investment. 11 The trend appears to be towards uniformity while still allowing certain
special concessions for foreign investment that brings foreign technologies and capital.

Some of the vagaries of the day to day dealings in setting up and operating a new
business China will continue to cause frustration. Among the vital ingredients for an entry
strategy for foreign investment and for sustained operations in China for the foreign
investor are patience and a willingness to cope with the Chinese ways of conducting
business.

An assumption by a foreign investor that the mere existence of a law guarantees that
all parties concerned will comply with such a law, may be risky. Western business
operators generally expect the laws to be complied with within the normal range of
flexibility that might be available. Laws may often, in practical terms, be seen by Chinese
partners and, importantly, by administrators — as general guidelines. Understanding the
variable nature of the administration of some laws relating to foreign investors and the
building of strong administrative and personal, relationships are valuable strategies and
may well result in desirable outcomes.

In the trend to ever increasing economic globalisation, no country will be able to
dissociate itself from the world economic system. Economic globalisation has promoted
economic growth and increased the output of the world; it has also resulted in increasing
interdependence between all countries in terms of economic activity and trade. China

11

Jianfu Chen, ‘China: Constitutional Changes’ above n 7, 163–4.
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became a member of the WTO on 11 December 2001. As a member, China gave a
commitment that it would strictly comply with WTO requirements. As discussed earlier in
chapter six, China is providing significantly improved market access on a secure basis, in
the agricultural, industrial and services sectors with in-built provision for growth in that
access.

The Chinese legal system is a work in progress. China’s legal reform effort also
depends to a significant extent on the dynamics of its legal culture. Legal culture may be
defined by references to sociology and political science, customs, values, and opinions, and
ways of thought and behaviour.12

The perspective of this thesis has been to focus on legal culture as a basis for
understanding the relationship between imported and local norms. It is suggested here that
the analysis of China’s legal culture provides appreciation of the tension between the
globalised systems of liberal legal norms — from which many of China’s legal reform
efforts are drawn — and of deeply embedded systems of local norms and values.

In China, the effects of globalised regulatory norms are confronted by powerful
forces of Chinese local culture. The resilience of local norms, despite new institutional
arrangements, is a salient factor of political culture of modernising societies, 13 and is no
less evident in the area of Chinese legal culture. Local norms in China derive from
traditional values contextualised by diversity in local socio-economic and political
12

See Henry W Ehrmann, Comparative Legal Cultures (Prentice-Hall, 1976); Lawrence M Friedman, The
Legal System: A Social Science Perspective (Russell Sage Foundation, 1975); Mary Ann Glendon,
Comparative Legal Traditions (West Publishing, 2007); Csaba Varga (ed), Comparative Legal Cultures
(Dartmouth, 1992).
13
Mary McAuley, ‘Political Culture and Communist Politics: One Step Forward Two Steps Back’ in Archie
Brown (ed), Political Culture and Communist Studies (Macmillan, 1984) 35.
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conditions, which include factors such as status, gender, age, education, and employment. 14
Although indigenous legal norms may emerge and become stable and influential through a
process of formalisation of customary values,15 when local traditional norms are ineffective
to manage the totality of changing social and economic conditions, new norms may emerge
as an alternative.16 Acceptance of imported norms may then become possible to the extent
that these respond to local conditions more effectively than traditional norms. According to
Cotterrell:

Culture, therefore, appears fundamental – a kind of lens through which all aspects of law
must be perceived, or a gateway of understanding through which every comparatist must
17
pass so as to have any genuine access to the meaning of foreign law.

The Chinese economic reform process has created opportunities for increased
reliance on law in management of the economy and society. Increased complexity in socioeconomic and political relations may require norms of formality and objectivity to replace
informal and subjective relational norms associated with tradition. 18

The Chinese legal system, particularly as it relates to foreign investment, is still in
development but there are aspects of Chinese law that appear to be difficult to reconcile
with western laws. The most significant factors appear to be the variable administration of

14

See Wenfang Tang and William L Parish, Chinese Urban Life under Reform (Cambridge University Press,
2000); Elizabeth Perry and Mark Seiden (eds), Chinese Society: Change Conflict and Resistance (Routledge,
2000).
15
Paul Bohannon, The Differing Realms of Law, (American Anthropologist, 1965) 33; Harold J Berman, Law
and Revolution: The Formation of the western Legal Tradition (Harvard University Press, 1983) 79; Stanley
Diamond, ‘The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom’ in Donald Black and Maureen Mileski (ed), The
Social Organization of Law (Seminar Press, 1973) 65.
16
Clifford Geertz, Ideology as a Cultural System, (Free Press, 1964) 105–157.
17
See Roger Cotterrell, Living Law: Studies in Legal and Social Theory (Aldershot, 2008); R Zimmerman and
M Reimann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 283.
18
See S N Eisenstadt and Luis Roniger, Patrons, Clients and Friends: Interpersonal Relations and Structure
of Trust in Society (Cambridge University Press, 1984); Robert K Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure
(Free Press, 1965).
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laws across geo-political boundaries and the legal and political difficulties that exist
between central government and provincial and local governments and regulators.

Foreign investors in China encounter a somewhat unpredictable investment
environment and are witnesses to an unprecedented commitment to the modernisation of
laws and the Chinese legal system. As referred to earlier in chapter five, observers have
expressed concerns about problems in the investment environment, such as lack of
predictability and unclear dispute processing. These are continuing and possibly inevitable
hurdles arising from China’s economic evolution.
For foreign investors China’s huge market presents an opportunity for their business
to expand enormously. However, China’s legal system is difficult to become accustomed to
because it is not only operating within a complicated Communist social system but is also
impacted by a long history of traditions.

It is this researcher’s view that a better understanding of China’s current legal
reform can be achieved by the analysis of the effects of traditional embedded customs that
are still operating within the legal system in subtle but persuasive ways. Careful
consideration of the social conditions within which the legal system is operating is, this
researcher suggests, worthy of significant attention in order to move towards efficient and
successful outcomes in legal reform in China today. It is suggested here that some
understanding of such factors is an important prerequisite for foreign investors in equipping
them to operate in China.

Foreign direct investment in China, with 32 years history since the promulgation in
1979 of the Joint Venture Law, has had its elements of drama and reports of dissatisfaction.
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The problems of the effects of social and cultural factors on the PRC legal system
(described above) have been serious obstacles and, although their severity has been
reduced, it remains more difficult for foreign investors to do business in China than in
many other locations. 19 The key to attracting foreign direct investment remains China’s
wage costs, but the attractiveness of investing in China has been increased by reducing the
drawbacks referred to earlier, in particular removing most of the bureaucratic obstacles
which suggested that smaller investments may not be worth the effort involved. However,
according to Kirby and Kaiser’s research concerning small and medium sized firms from
Germany and the UK:
Joint ventures, though successful, are not without their problems. Their experiences are
similar to those of large multi-national enterprises. As the key to success is often predicated
upon the successful selection of the joint venture partner, assistance is required to help
SMEs in the process of identification and selection of appropriate partners.20

The most debatable consequences for China are the ‘Open Door’ policy’s links to
social and political change. New ideas of how to do business, exposure to images of
capitalist societies, being encouraged to think on the job and having material possessions
have all contributed to an increased desire for the rule of law and political pluralism. Direct
foreign investment in China has been a success, increasing Chinese economic welfare and
realising profits for the foreign investors. According to Zhang’s study:

The role of FDI in the Chinese economy has become increasingly important. In 2004, FDI
inflows constituted seven per cent of gross fixed capital formation; 21 per cent of China’s
tax revenue came from the foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs); 28 per cent of industrial

19

Richard Pomfret, Investing in China: Ten Years of the ‘Open Door’ Policy (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991)
127.
20
David A Kirby and Stefan Kaiser, ‘SME Foreign Direct Investment: An Examination of the Joint Venture
Experiences of German and UK Small and Medium Sized Firms in China’ (2005) 1 International
Entrepreneurship and Management Journal 83, 83.
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output was produced by FIEs; and more than half of China's exports (57 per cent) were
created by FIEs.21

It is important, however, neither to exaggerate nor to belittle this success. Not all
FDI succeeds and not all of China is attractive to foreign investors.

Before investing in China, investors are advised to carefully study the program
of policies relating to the sector in which they intend to invest. China has developed a
very elaborate legal system to provide protection for foreign investment. At the same
time, the system is often subject to policy parameters, which are established at the
central government level. Therefore, when looking to invest in China, investors are
advised to study carefully the policy directions currently in force and to seek the advice
and support of government officials and concerned ministries.

Although the need to create an appropriate legal framework for foreign investors
is notable, they take time to be absorbed in a centrally governed economy, as officials
need to overcome their suspicion of foreign capitalists and to understand foreign
business practices.

Additionally, it is important for potential foreign investors to have an
understanding of the effect of social and cultural factors on the legal system in China.
Understanding the local culture and traditions has been well addressed in the
international business literature for international corporations operating their global
operations — especially in developing countries. Integrating western and Chinese
cultural elements and traditions into a company’s business policies and operational
procedures and ensuring those policies and procedures are protected by local legal
21

Kevin H Zhang, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in China’ (2006) 13 Canadian Foreign Policy 35, 35.
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systems — has emerged as another key success factor for an international venture in
China. As Chen affirms:

There are many issues that are important and relevant in regard to doing business in and
with China. Indeed, an understanding of Chinese political and legal systems and
sensitivity to Chinese social and cultural issues are indispensable. Although the
convergence of the two legal systems, domestic and foreign related, is yet to be
achieved and completed, there is no doubt, at least once a foreign business is
22
established, that many aspects of domestic law will be applicable to foreign business.

The NPC passed the China Enterprise Income Tax Law in 2007 in order to provide
a ‘level-playing field’ for both domestic-invested enterprise and foreign-invested
enterprises to comply with the WTO’s national treatment rules. 23 There are, of course, two
sides to the coin, and numerous pitfalls are often experienced on the path to prosperity in
China. The sometimes miraculous numbers that appear in any description of the economic
progress of China in recent years cannot disguise the problems associated with the
country’s developmental transition period. 24 China has made very significant progress in a
wide range of aspects of its legal reforms since 1995. 25 Even though the Chinese legal
system is still tightly politically controlled, significant changes in the legal system might
prove to be signs of truly significant changes in the political system as well. 26 This research
has examined how law in China is created in the context of cultural and historical
22
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24
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25
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Ch 10: Conclusions

dimensions. Chinese law was indigenously developed from the secular philosophies of
social morality, namely Legalism and Confucianism. The patriarchal relationship and
behavioural norms within the extended family or clan were not only reflected in the power
structure of officialdom but also formed the basic foundation and standards for social
conformity. Foreign investors’ operations in China must meet the challenge of differences
of legal culture and tradition because these will continue to provide significant influence in
the future shaping of the legal system of the PRC. It is to be hoped this research will
provide assistance to academics, international practitioners and people conducting business
in, or with, China, in their efforts to understand China’s foreign investment policies and
laws and, perhaps more importantly, their attempts to understand the people with whom
they are, or will be, working in their China venture.
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Communist Party of China, 14 November 1993
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of China) Central Committee and State Council, 5 October 1993
<<中国共产党十三届五中全会关于同意邓小平同志辞去中共中央军事委员会主席
职务的决定>> [Decision Concerning Deng Xiaoping’s Resignation of Chairmanship of
the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China at the Fifth Plenary
Session Meeting of the Thirteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China]
(9 November 1989)
<<关于加强法律解释工作的决议>> [Decision of the NPC’s Standing Committee
Concerning Judicial Interpretation] (People’s Republic of China) Standing Committee
of National People’s Congress, 10 June 1981
<<全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于加强法律解释工作的决议>> [Decision of the
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1981
<<全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于授权深圳市人民代表大会及其常务委员会和
深圳市人民政府分别制定法规和规章在深圳经济特区实施的决定>> [Decision of
the Standing Committee of the NPC on Authorising the People’s Congress of the
Shenzhen City and its Standing Committee and the People’s Government of Shenzhen
City to Formulate Regulations and Rules Respectively for Implementation in the
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s
Congress Standing Committee, 1 July 1992

<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业所得税法施行细则>> [Detailed Rules for the
Implementation of Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China on ChineseForeign Equity Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) State Council, 10
December 1980
<< 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 中 外 合 作 经 营 企 业 法 实 施 细 则 >> [Detailed Rules for the
Implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign
Cooperative Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No 6, 7
August 1995
<<中华人民共和国外资企业法实施细则>> [Detailed Rules for the Implementation of
the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise]
(People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No 301, 12 April 2001
<<中华人民共和国经济合同法>> [Economic Contract Law of the People’s Republic
of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 13 December 1981
<<全国人民代表大会和地方各级人民代表大会选举法>> [Electoral Law of the
People’s Republic of China on National People’s Congress and Local Various Level
People’s Congress] (People’s Republic of China) 27 October 2004
<< 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 企 业 破 产 法 >> [Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing
Committee, Order No 54, 27 August 2006
<<最高人民法院关于适用<中华人民共和国涉外经济合同法>若干问题的解答>>
[Explanation of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Questions Relating to the
Application of the Foreign Economic Contract Law] (People’s Republic of China)
Supreme People’s Court, Order No 27, 19 October 1987
Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Commonwealth)
<<中华人民共和国涉外经济合同法 >> [Foreign Economic Contract Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress,
1 July 1985
<<中华人民共和国外商投资企业和外国企业 所得 税法 >> [Foreign Investment
Enterprise and Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law] (People’s Republic of China)
National People’s Congress, Order No 45, 1 July 1991
<<中华人民共和国对外贸易法>> [Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of
China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee,
Order No 15, 6 April 2004
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Commonwealth)
Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW)

<<中华人民共和国民法通则>> [General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 1 January
1987 (adopted by the 4th Session of the 6th National People’s Congress on 12 April 1986
and came into force on 1 January 1987)
<<外商投资产业指导目录>> [Guideline Catalogue of Foreign Investment Industries]
(People’s Republic of China) Ministry of Commerce National Development and
Reform Commission, Order No 57, 1 December 2007
<< 权 限 内 外 商 投 资 企 业 设 立 审 批 >> [Guideline Concerning Approval of
Establishment of Foreign Investment Enterprises within the Authority] (People’s
Republic of China) Beijing Economic-Technological Development Area, 10 March
2010. section 3[3] <http://www.bda.gov.cn/cms/tzzn/12097.htm>
<<中国共产党党员领导干部廉洁从政若干准则试行实施办法>> [Implementation
Rules Concerning Leaders and Cadre Members of the Communist Party Carry Out
Government Position with Probity] (People’s Republic of China) Central Committee for
Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China, 3 September 1997
<<企业国有产权转让管理暂行办法>> [Interim Measures Concerning Administration
of Transferring State-Owned Assets] (People’s Republic of China) State-Owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission and Ministry of Finance, Order No 3, 31
December 2003
<<城镇国有土地使用权出让和转让暂行条例>> [Interim Ordinance Concerning
Transfer of Urban State-Owned Land Use Right] (People’s Republic of China) State
Council, Order No 55, 19 May 1990
<<关于设立外商投资股份有限公司若干问题的暂行规定 >> [Interim Provisions
Concerning a Number of Issues of Establishing Foreign-Invested Company Limited by
Shares] (People’s Republic of China) Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation, Order No 1, 1 October 1995
<<利用外资改组国有企业暂行规定>> [Interim Provisions Concerning Restructuring
State-Owned Enterprises Using Foreign Capital] (People’s Republic of China) National
Economic and Trade Commission, Ministry of Finance, State Administration for
Industry and Commerce and State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Order No 42, 1
January 2003
<<指导外商投资方向暂行规定>> [Interim Provisions on Guiding Foreign Direct
Investment] (People’s Republic of China) State Planning Commission, the Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and the State Economic and Trade
Commission, 20 June 1995
<<国家工商行政管理局关于中外合资经营企业注册资本与投资总额比例的暂行规
定 >> [Interim Provisions of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce
Concerning the Proportion of Registered Capital and Total Amount of Investment of
Chinese-foreign Equity Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) State
Administration for Industry and Commerce, Order No 38, 17 February 1987

<<招标拍卖挂牌出让国有建设用地使用权规定>> [Interim Regulations Concerning
the Assignment and Transfer of Rights to Use the State-Owned Construction Land Use
Right through Bid Invitation, Auction and Quotation] (People’s Republic of China)
Ministry of National Resources, Order No 39, 21 September 2007
<< 最 高 人 民法 院关 于适 用 < 中华 人民 共 和国 合 同法 > 若干 问 题的 解 释 (一 )>>
[Interpretations Concerning Several Issues of Application of Contract Law of the
People’s Republic of China (1)] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme People’s Court,
Order No 19, 19 December 1999
关 于 执 行 <<中华人民共和国中外合作经营企业法实施细则>>若干条款的说明
[Interpretations of the Implementation of Certain Articles of the Detailed Rules for the
Implementation of the Law of the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures]
(People’s Republic of China) Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, 22
October 1996
<<最高人民法院关于执行 <中国人民共和国刑事诉讼法 >若干问题的解释 >>
[Interpretations of the People’s Supreme Court Concerning Enforcement of Criminal
Procedure Law] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme People’s Court, Order No 23,
29 June 1998
<< 最 高 人 民法 院关 于适 用 < 中华 人民 共 和国 合 同法 > 若干 问 题的 解 释 (一 )>>
[Interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Regarding the
Application of the Contract Law (1)] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme People’s
Court, Order No 19, 19 December 1999
<< 最 高 人 民法 院关 于适 用 < 中华 人民 共 和国 合 同法 > 若干 问 题的 解 释 (二 )>>
[Interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Regarding the
Application of the Contract Law (2)] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme People’s
Court, Order No 5, 9 February 2009
<<中华人民共和国劳动合同法>> [Labour Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order
No 65, 29 June 2007
<<中国人民共和国城市房地产管理法>> [Law on Administration of the Urban Real
Estate of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National
People’s Congress Standing Committee, 5 July 1994
<< 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 行 政 许 可 法 >> [Law of the People’s Republic of China on
Administrative Licences] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress
Standing Committee, 27 August 2003
<<中华人民共和国反垄断法>> [Law of the People’s Republic of China on AntiMonopoly] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing
Committee, Order No 68, 30 August 2007

<<中华人民共和国中外合作经营企业法>> [Law of the People’s Republic of China
on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) National
People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 40, 31 October 2000
<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法>> [Law of the People’s Republic of China
on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) National
People’s Congress, 1 July 1979
<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法>> [Law of the People’s Republic of China
on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) National
People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 48, 15 March 2001
<<中华人民共和国外资企业法>> [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Wholly
Foreign Owned Enterprise] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress
Standing Committee, Order No 41, 31 October 2000
<<中华人民共和国立法法>> [Legislation Law of the PRC] (People’s Republic of
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 31, 15 March 2000
<<江苏省著名商标认 定和保护办法 >> [Measures Concerning Identification and
Protection of Famous Trademark of Jiangsu Province] (People’s Republic of China)
Jiangsu Province Government, Order No 157, 10 August 1999
<<中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业登记管理办法>> [Measures of the People’s
Republic of China for the Administration of the Registration of Chinese-Foreign Equity
Joint Ventures] (People’s Republic of China) State Administration of Industry and
Commerce, 8 August 2006
<<关于审理行政案件适用法律规范问题的座谈会纪要>> [Memorandum Concerning
Application of Laws to Administrative Cases] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme
People’s Court, Order No 96, 18 May 2004
<<关于加快海南岛开发建设问题讨论纪要>> [Memorandum Concerning Discussion
about Issues of Accelerating the Development of Hainan Island] (People’s Republic of
China) State Council and Central Committee of Communist Party of China, Order No
11, 1 April 1983
<<沿海部分城市座谈会纪要>> [Memorandum of Conference within Several Coastal
Cities] (People’s Republic of China) Central Committee of the Communist Party and
State Council, 4 May 1984
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Commonwealth)
<<中 华人民共和 国国 家赔偿法 >> [National Compensation Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, Order No
29, 29 April 2010
<<国家土地管理局关于认真贯彻国务院严格制止乱占滥用耕地和发展房地产业有
关文件的通知>> [Notification Concerning Carefully Implementing the State Coincil’s

Related Documents of Strictly Prohibitation of Abuse and Illegally Ocuppation of
Agricultural Land and Developing Real Estate] (People’s Republic of China)
Administration Bureau of National Land, 25 December 1992
<<关于深化金融改革，整顿金融秩序，防范金融风险的通知 >> [Notification
Concerning Deepening Financial Reform, Rectifying Financial Order, Preventing
Financial Risks] (People’s Republic of China) State Council and Central Committee of
Communist Party of China, Order No 19, 6 December 1997
<<关于加强外商投资房地产业审批备案管理的通知>> [Notification Concerning
Strengthening Administration of Project Approval for Foreign Investment in Real Estate
Industry] (People’s Republic of China) Ministry of Commerce, 22 December 2010
<<关于暂停将上市公司国家股和法人股转让给外商的请示性通知>> [Notification
Concerning Suspension of Transferring State-Owned Share and Legal Person Share to
Foreign Enterprise] (People’s Republic of China) State Securities Commission, Order
No 48, 23 September 1995
<< 关 于 清 理 整 顿 行 政 执 法 队 伍 实 行 综 合 行 政 执 法 试 点 工 作 意 见 的 通 知 >>
[Notification of Working Opinions Concerning Rectification of Administrative
Implementation Team] (People’s Republic of China) General Office of the State
Council, Order No 056, 11 October 2002
Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW)
<<国 务院关于 鼓励支 持和引导个 体私营等 非公有制经 济发展的 若干意见 >>
[Opinions Concerning Encouraging, Supportting and Guiding Development of Private
Non State-Owned Economy] (People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No 3,
19 February 2005
<<关于进一步扩大对外开放提高利用外资水平的若干意见>> [Opinions Concerning
Further Expansion of Opening to Foreign Countries and Improvement of Utilisation of
Foreign Investment] (People’s Republic of China) State Council and Central Committee
of Communist Party of China, Order No 6, 14 April 1998
<< 国 务 院 关 于 进 一 步 做 好 利 用 外 资 工 作 的若 干 意 见 >> [Opinions Concerning
Matters of Further Utilisation of Foreign Investment] (People’s Republic of China)
State Council, Order No 9, 14 April 2010
<<关于上市公司涉及外商投资有关问题的若干意见>> [Opinions Concerning Some
Issues of Listed Company Related to Foreign Investment] (People’s Republic of China)
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and China Security Supervision
Committee, 8 November 2001
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[Opinions Concernig Strengthening Supervision and Guidance on Lawyers Dealing
with Influential, Sensitive and Classic Cases (Trial)] (People’s Republic of China) 三门
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<<中华人民共和国广东省经济特区条例>> [Ordinance of the People’s Republic of
China on Guangdong Special Economic Zones] (People’s Republic of China) National
People’s Congress Standing Committee, 26 August 1980
<<中华人民共和国技术进出口管理条例>> [Ordinance of the People’s Republic of
China on Technology Import and Export] (People’s Republic of China) State Council, 1
January 2002
<<中华人民共和国人民法院组织法>> [Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the
People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress
Standing Committee, 1 January 2007
<< 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 人 民 检 察 院 组 织 法 >> [Organic Law of the People’s
Procuratorates of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China)
National People’s Congress, 2 September 1983
<< 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 国务 院 组 织 法 >> [Organic Law of the State Council of the
People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress,
Order No 14, 10 December 1982
<< 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 合 伙 企 业 法 >> [Partnership Enterprise Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing
Committee, Order No 55, 27 August 2006
<< 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 专 利 法 >> [Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 25
August 2000
<< 人 民 检 察 院 直 接 受 理 立 案 侦 察 案 件 立 案 标 准 的 规 定 试 行 >> [People’s
Procuratorate Provisions Concerning Filing Standard of Cases Accepted for
Investigation] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Order No
2, 6 August 1999
<< 行 政 法 规 制 定 程 序 条 例 >> [Precedural Ordinance Concerning Making
Administrative Regulations] (People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No 321,
16 November 2001
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Commonwealth)
<<关于设立中外合资对外贸易公司试点暂行办法>> [Provisional Measures on the
Trial Establishment of Sino-Foreign Joint Venture Foreign Trade Companies] (People’s
Republic of China) Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, 30
September 1996
<< 最 高 人 民 法 院 关 于 案 例 指 导 工 作 的 规 定 >> [Provisions Concerning Cases
Guidance of the Supreme People’s Court] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme
People’s Court, Order No 51, 26 November 2010

<<国务院关于鼓励外商投资的规定>> [Provisions Concerning Encouragement for
Foreign Investment] (People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No 95, 11
October 1986
<<关于投资举办投资性公司的规定>> [Provisions Concerning Establishing ForeignInvested Investment Company] (People’s Republic of China) Ministry of Commerce, 23
November 2004
<< 关 于 外 国 投 资 者 并 购 境 内 企 业 的 规 定 >> [Provisions Concerning Foreign
Investors’ Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises] (People’s Republic of
China) Ministry of Commerce, Order No 6, 8 September 2006
<<外商投资企业投资者股权变更的若干规定>> [Provisions Concerning Foreign
Invested Enterprise’s Share Transfer] (People’s Republic of China) Ministry of Foreign
Economic and Trade Cooperation and State Administration for Industry and Commerce,
Order No 267, 28 May 1997
<<驰名商标认定和保护规定>> [Provisions Concerning Identification and Protection
of Well Known Trademark] (People’s Republic of China) State Administration for
Industry and Commerce, Order No 5, 17 April 2003
<< 最 高 人 民 法 院 裁 判 文 书 公 布 管 理 规 定 >> [Provisions Concerning Public and
Management of Judicial Documents] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme People’s
Court, 15 June 2000
<< 最 高 人 民法 院关 于适 用 < 中华 人民 共 和国 公 司法 > 若干 问 题的 规 定 (一 )>>
[Provisions Concerning Several Issues of Application of Company Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) Supreme People’s Court, Order No 3,
27 March 2006
<<最高 人民法院关 于 司法解释工作的 规定 >> [Provisions Concerning Work of
Judicial Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court vol 3] (People’s Republic of
China) Supreme People’s Court, Order No 12, 23 March 2007
<<指导外商投资方向规定>> [Provisions on Guiding Direction of Foreign Investment]
(People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No 346, 1 April 2002
<<外商投资企业劳动管理规定>> [Provisions on the Labor Administration of the
Enterprises of Foreign Investment] (People’s Republic of China) Ministry of Labor and
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Order No 246, 11 August 1994
<<国务院关于鼓励外 商投资的规定 >> [Provisions of the State Council for the
Encouragement of Foreign Investment] (People’s Republic of China) State Council,
Order No 95, 11 October 1986
Public Service Act 1999 (Commonwealth)
<< 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 国 民 经 济 和 社 会 发 展 第 十 一 个 五 年 年 规 划 纲 要 >>
[Recommendation of National Economic and Social Development of the 11th Five Year

Plan of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s
Congress, 14 March 2006
<<河南省农作物管理条例>> [Regulations Concerning Administration of Agricultural
Seed Products of Henan Province] (People’s Republic of China) Henan Provincial
People’s Congress Standing Committee, 27 April 1984
<<深圳经济特区土地使用权出让条例>> [Regulations Concerning Land Use Right
Transfer of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone] (People’s Republic of China) Shenzhen
People’s Congress Standing Committee, 18 June 1994
<< 行 政 法 规 制 定 程 序 条 例 >> [Regulations Concerning Procedure of Making
Administrative Provision] (People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No 321,
16 November 2001
<< 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 中 外 合 资 经 营 企 业 法 实 施 条 例 >> [Regulations for the
Implementation of the Law of the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures]
(People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No 311, 22 July 2001
<<中华人民共和国外汇管理条例>> [Regulations of Foreign Exchange Control of the
People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) State Council, Order No 532,
1 August 2008
<<中华人民共和国政府信息公开条例>> [Regulations of the People’s Republic of
China on Public Government Information] (People’s Republic of China) State Council,
Order No 492, 17 January 2007
<< 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 行 政 复 议 法 实 施 条 例 >> [Regulations on Administrative
Reconsideration of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) State
Council, Order No 499, 29 May 2007
<<关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议>> [Resolution Concerning A Number of
Historical Issues within the Party since Establishment of the PRC], 一九八一年六月二
十七日中国共产党第十一届中央委员会第六次全体会议 [Sixth Plenary Session of
Eleventh Central Committee of Communist Party of China] (27 June 1981)
<<中共中央关于社会主义精神文明建设指导方针的决议>> [Resolution Concerning
Direction Guideline for Construction of Socialist Spiritual Civilasation] (People’s
Republic of China) The Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Twelfth Central Committee of
Communist Party, 28 September 1986
<<全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于加强法律解释工作的决议>> [Resolution of
the NPC Standing Committee on Strengthening of Legal Interpretive Work] (People’s
Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 10 June 1981
<<中华人民共和国种子法>> [Seed Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s
Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No 26, 28
August 2004

<<关于司法公开的六项规定>> [Six Provisions Concerning Judicial Transparency]
and <<关于人民法院接受新闻媒体舆论监督的若干规定>> [Provisions Concerning
People’s Court Accepting Supervision from News Media] (People’s Republic of China)
Supreme People’s Court, 8 December 2009
<<中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第七个五年计划的建议>> [Suggestion
of Central Committee Concerning Making the Seventh Five-Year Plan of National
Economy and Social Development] (People’s Republic of China) National Congress of
the Communist Party of China, 23 September 1985
<< 关 于 进 一 步 贯 彻 落 实 中 央 落 实 政 策 小 组 扩 大 会 议 纪 要 的 补 充 意 见 >>
[Supplementary Opinions Concerning Enlarged Meeting Memorandum of Further
Implementing Policies from Central Committee] (People’s Republic of China) General
Office of Central Committee and State Council, 22 February 1986
<< 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 技 术 合 同 法 >> [Technology Contract Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, Order No
53, 1 December 1987
The Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW)
<<中华人民共和国商标法>> [Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 27
October 2001
<<全国人民代表大会常务委员会工作报告>> [Work Report of National People’s
Congress Standing Committee] (People’s Republic of China) The Third Session of the
Sixth Meeting of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 3 April 1985

Treaties
<<关于解决各国和其他国家的国民之间的投资争端的公约>> [Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States]
Washington, opened for signature 18 March 1965 (entered into force on 14 October
1966) ‘World Bank, List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the
Convention’, 4 November 2007
<<承认及执行外国仲裁裁决公约>> [1958 - United Nations Convention on
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – the New York Convention]
The Convention is open to accession by any Member State of the United Nations, any
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